1	HEARING
2	OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS
3	STATE OF CALIFORNIA
4	
5	In the Matter of the Franchise and
6	Income Tax Appeals Hearing of:
7	WILLIAM A. LLANOS, OTA Case No. 18010692
8	Appellant.
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. 6	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
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.8	TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 2019
. 9	9:17 A.M.
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21	OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS 400 R STREET
22	SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA
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25	Reported by AMY E. PERRY, CSR No. 11880

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1	EXHIBITS	
2		
3	APPELLANT'S EXHIBITS	PAGE
4	Exhibits 1-10 admitted into evidence	7
5	Exhibits 11-15,17 admitted without qualification	9
6	Exhibit 16 excluded	9
7	Exhibit 18 admitted for argument	9
8		
9	RESPONDENT'S EXHIBITS	
10	Exhibits A-U, X admitted into evidence	13
11		
12		
13	(Exhibits premarked, described and retained by Administrative	
14	Law Judge.)	
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
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1 TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 2019 - 9:17 A.M. 2 3 ALJ MARGOLIS: We're on the record in the 4 appeal of William Llanos, OTA Case No. 18010692. 5 date is March 26, 2019, and this hearing is being held 6 in Sacramento, California before Judges Jeffrey 7 Margolis, Andrew Kwee, and Neil Robinson. 8 Will the parties and their representatives 9 please identify themselves for the record, starting 10 with the taxpayer and his representative. 11 THE APPELLANT: William Llanos. 12 ALJ MARGOLIS: Yes. 13 MR. POLK: David William representing the 14 taxpayer. 15 ALJ MARGOLIS: Mr. William, you appeared 16 before the Office of Tax Appeals in February, and you 17 identified yourself as David Polk. I just want to 18 make sure we have your proper name and address in the 19 record here today. What is your --MR. POLK: It's David William Polk. 20 21 ALJ MARGOLIS: It's David William Polk, and 22 how would you like me to refer to you today, as 2.3 Mr. Polk or Mr. William? 24 MR. POLK: Either one is fine.

ALJ MARGOLIS: Okay. And also, I want to

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1 make sure we have your correct address because the 2 address on your power of attorney in this case is 3 different than the address than the power of attorney 4 in the Janelle Polk [sic] case. 5 MR. POLK: All right. I'm sorry, what do you 6 have? 7 ALJ MARGOLIS: Well, in this case it says 8 care of West Burbank Boulevard, No. 262, Burbank, 9 California. In the Janelle Polk [sic] case, it's on 10 916 West Burbank Boulevard, Suite C. 11 MR. POLK: It's the same address, it's just 12 written incorrectly. It is 916 -- the 262 -- it's 916 13 C West Burbank Boulevard, No. 262. 14 ALJ MARGOLIS: So there's no Suite C? Is it Suite C as well? 15 It's 916 16 MR. POLK: Yes, the C goes on it. 17 С. 18 ALJ MARGOLIS: 916 C West Burbank Boulevard? 19 MR. POLK: Correct. Yeah. Sorry. I guess 20 that was just written incorrectly. 21 ALJ MARGOLIS: 916, and then is there a 22 number 262 as well? 2.3 MR. POLK: Yes. ALJ MARGOLIS: Number 262. Okay. We'll make 24 25 that change in our records for this case.

1 And Mr. Llanos, I just want to make sure you 2 want to proceed here today with Mr. Polk as your 3 representative; correct? 4 THE APPELLANT: Yes. 5 ALJ MARGOLIS: Okay. Would the FTB please 6 identify themselves for the record. 7 MR. AMARA: Sure. Andrew Amara for the 8 Franchise Tax Board, and then I'm here with Nancy 9 Parker as well. 10 ALJ MARGOLIS: Okay. Thank you. The issues 11 in this appeal, as agreed to in pre-hearing 12 conference, are, as I understand, the following: 13 Whether FTB's proposed tax assessment for 2012 is 14 proper and correct; second, whether Appellant is 15 liable for the late filing and demand penalties 16 proposed by the FTB; and third, whether a frivolous 17 appeal penalty should be imposed, and if so, in what 18 amount. 19 Do the parties agree that that correctly 20 states the issues to be decided today? 21 MR. POLK: Yes. 22 MR. AMARA: Correct, Judge. 2.3 ALJ MARGOLIS: Thank you. And then at the 24 pre-hearing conference, both parties indicated they

did not intend to call any witnesses; is that still

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1 correct? 2 MR. POLK: Correct. 3 MR. AMARA: Correct. 4 ALJ MARGOLIS: Okay. Let's go over the 5 exhibits that the parties asked to be admitted into 6 evidence today. Let's start with Petitioner's 7 exhibits. 8 Petitioner's Exhibits 1 through 10, I believe 9 there was no objection by Respondent to any of those; is that correct? 10 11 MR. AMARA: Correct, Judge. ALJ MARGOLIS: Okay. Those exhibits will be 12 13 admitted. 14 (Appellant's Exhibits 1-10 15 admitted into evidence.) ALJ MARGOLIS: Then there are some new 16 17 exhibits, Exhibits 11 through 18. 18 What's the FTB's position on these exhibits? MR. AMARA: We don't have any issue with 19 20 those, Judge. 21 ALJ MARGOLIS: I do have a problem with two 22 of these exhibits in that they kind of circumvent our 2.3 rules, the declaration of Mr. Llanos. Mr. Llanos is here, he could testify here. We don't allow 24 25 declarations, as you may recall, we kept out the

declaration at your request of Mr. McDonald. So I think that for fair play, if someone's not going to be here to testify, I mean, he is available to testify if you want, but I'm not going to allow his declaration into evidence.

MR. POLK: Can we admit it as argument?

ALJ MARGOLIS: Yes, we can admit it as argument.

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MR. POLK: Okay. That's fine.

ALJ MARGOLIS: And also, you submitted additional briefing in terms of Exhibit 16. That circumvents our rules on filing additional briefs. You didn't ask for permission to file additional briefs.

As you recall, at our pre-hearing conference, when Mr. Amara asked for permission to provide additional authorities for us, I told him that I didn't want them submitted in the form of an additional brief, I just wanted him to mention them in his argument if he thought they were significant. And I ask that you do the same with respect to the authorities that you raised in Exhibit 16.

MR. POLK: With all due respect, Judge, the FTB has been allowed to submit legal arguments as argument, they have a memo with --

1 ALJ MARGOLIS: You are allowed to submit 2 them, but you need to submit them in accordance with 3 the pre-hearing rules about submitting briefs. 4 MR. POLK: Okay. 5 ALJ MARGOLIS: So I'm going to exclude those. 6 Other than that, Exhibits 11 through 15, and 18 will 7 be admitted without qualification. Exhibit 16 will be 8 excluded, and Exhibit 17 will be admitted as an 9 argument. 10 (Appellant's Exhibits 11-15, 18 11 admitted without qualification.) 12 (Appellant's Exhibit 17 admitted 13 as argument.) 14 MR. POLK: Sorry, Judge. Just for the 15 record, I want to object to your keeping out 16 Exhibit 16 because it goes to the -- just for the 17 record, just want to object it goes to the 18 reasonableness of the appellant's position in his 19 determinations. 20 ALJ MARGOLIS: Okay. Your objection is duly 21 noted for the record. 22 MR. POLK: Okay. 2.3 ALJ MARGOLIS: Let's move on to the FTB's 24 exhibits. At our pre-hearing conference, I indicated

that I would admit Exhibits A through B, as well as

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1 Exhibit -- no -- A through U, as well as Exhibit X. 2 And I know that Mr. Polk, you made several objections. 3 I will note them for the record for you. 4 With respect to Exhibit F, Appellant's 5 Protest -- oh, no, I'm sorry. 6 Exhibit F, I agreed to sustain your objection 7 to the protest. That will be excluded. MR. AMARA: Can we just go on the record to 8 9 indicate our position on that Exhibit F? I can wait 10 until you get through everything. 11 ALJ MARGOLIS: No, you may go on the record. 12 Please be brief. 13 MR. AMARA: I will. So we would contest the 14 lack of admissibility of that Exhibit F. That's 15 Appellant's protest. There's a statutory protest 16 process that FTB is required to follow, Revenue 17 Taxation Code Section 19041 and 19045. That goes to 18 not only full due process here, but it shows the 19 entire appeal process was followed by FTB. 20 So our position is that protest 21 correspondence should come in because, again, it's 22 relevant to show that the entire appeals process 2.3 according to taxpayers as well. 24 And then also, it's relevant to the frivolous 25 appeal matter that is under consideration here as

well. I just wanted to go on the record on that.

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ALJ MARGOLIS: Thank you. Our ruling stands on that, but you're certainly permitted to make your objection for the record.

For with respect to Exhibit H. H, I believe, Mr. Polk, you objected to on the grounds of relevance, and I'm overruling that objection.

With respect to I, the employer's declaration verifying wages, I am excluding the declaration, but I am admitting the W-2 as a business record. You're objecting to that on the grounds of relevance, I believe.

MR. POLK: Yeah. I'm objecting to the W-2 form, that's a new objection. But we already have a federal wage transcript in exhibits with the same information. So it's redundant and I don't see that it proves anything beyond. And also, we have an admission that the money was received. So I'm not sure what the W-2 is supposed to prove.

ALJ MARGOLIS: Okay. Your objection is overruled.

Next, with respect to the EDD wage record,

Exhibits J and K and 2012 wage and income transcript.

At the pre-hearing conference you raised no objection,
but since that time you sought a statement of

1 objections to those exhibits.

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MR. POLK: I withdraw the objection to Exhibit K with no objection to that.

ALJ MARGOLIS: Okay. That will be admitted.

MR. POLK: However, D -- I'm sorry, J, the EDD wage record contains the same information as the federal wage and income transcript and the W-2, so it's redundant, and just don't know what that's supposed to prove.

ALJ MARGOLIS: Okay. I'm going to admit it as a business record and we will overrule your objection.

Let's move on to Exhibit L, the law summary. At the pre-hearing conference I had said that we will exclude it. We will allow it only as evidence that it was mailed to the taxpayer, mailed and received by the taxpayer. And that's my ruling on that.

With respect to Exhibits M through Q, those are demands for prior year's tax returns. You objected on the grounds of relevance. I'm overruling that objection. I think they are relevant.

Exhibit T, the Form 1040 for the tax year 2015, you objected to the grounds of relevance.

1 Pre-hearing conference, I indicated I would overrule 2 that objection, and I am overruling that objection. 3 Exhibit U and X, you had no objection to, and 4 those will be admitted. 5 And you have objections to Exhibits V and W 6 on the grounds of relevance. And I agreed to sustain 7 your objections to Exhibit V and W. 8 Mr. Amara, do you want to be heard in any of 9 those other exhibits? 10 MR. AMARA: Just with respect to Exhibit I, 11 the declaration, our position is that the declaration 12 authenticates and provides credibility for the 13 attached W-2. So it's relevant in that respect, and 14 it can come in even for that limited purpose. Other 15 than that, no, nothing else. 16 ALJ MARGOLIS: I just want to make clear that 17 I'm allowing the W-2 to come in as a business record 18 already shown, that's why I'm excluding the 19 declaration. Okay. The exhibits that I've said will 20 be admitted will be entered into the record. 21 (Respondent's Exhibits A-U, X 22 admitted into evidence.) 23 MR. POLK: For the record, I just want to 24 object to all of your overruling's. 25 ALJ MARGOLIS: Okay. That's fine. Your

objections are noted. Now, each side will have 15 minutes to make its arguments.

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Mr. Polk, you may go first.

MR. POLK: Thank you. I want to raise a point that's not in the briefs, but it's an important point. The NPA is invalid. It should never have been issued. Revenue Taxation Code 19087 authorizes an NPA when the taxpayer fails to file a return.

In this case, FTB's Exhibit B shows that the Appellant timely responded for demand for a return. On page 3 and 4 of that exhibit, you can see he provided a tax return. The heading on page 3, middle of the page clearly says return of tax. And that document means a four-part test for a valid tax return established [unintelligible] number one, it purports to be a return --

ALJ MARGOLIS: Mr. Polk, our court reporter has asked me to ask you to slow down.

MR. POLK: We had this problem last time. Sorry. Apologies already. Your fingers are going to get sore.

Okay. Number one, it purports to be a return; number two, it has sufficient data to calculate the tax liability. If it is [unintelligible] just let me know. It is an honest

and reasonable attempt to comply with law and is signed under penalty of perjury.

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The FTB ignored this return and sent a second demand notice, that's Exhibit C, claiming that the appellant did not file a return. And the appellant replied to say he had filed a return and told FTB if there's something wrong with what he had filed, to let him know and he will fix it.

The FTB ignored this response and issued an NPA. So the appellant did not fail to file a return. The FTB filed to acknowledge his return and failed to acknowledge Appellant's response to the second demand notice offering to cure any defect in his tax return.

ALJ MARGOLIS: Mr. Polk, excuse me, did he respond to the first demand?

MR. POLK: Yes, with the tax return. That is Exhibit -- Exhibit D. Oh, no, I'm sorry, Exhibit B. That's FTB's Exhibit B is the timely response that contained the tax return. So the required conditions of RTC 19087 were not met.

All right. Moving on, and this is going to expand a bit what's on the briefs. But the preponderance of the evidence shows the NPA is wrong. The FTB relies on Appellant's admission that Appellant received money from Space Systems/Loral, I'll call

them SSL, and that he received the money from City Group.

2.3

Now, contrary to common misconception, that is not sufficient factual basis to conclude that the money is included by law in gross income, and therefore, taxable. The FTB cannot just assume the money its received is included by law in the gross income.

As the U.S. Tax Court stated in Lidy [sic] v. Commissioner, it is well-settled that the mere receipt and possession of money does not by itself constitute taxable income.

The distinction between earnings that are taxable income and those that are not is recognized in the Code of Federal Regulations 1.61-2, where it lists several types of earnings and states that these things are income to the recipients unless excluded by law.

The regulation does not say unless excluded by a provision of subtitle A or of the code, it says excluded by law. That could be an exclusion under any law. How could earnings be excluded by law from income? Many federal cases refer to the need to connect a taxpayer to a taxable income-producing activity in order to conclude there is unreported gross income.

For example, Third Circuit in Anastasato v.

Commissioner stated, Given the obvious difficulties in proving on a nonreceipt of income, we believe the commissioner should have to provide evidence linking the taxpayer to the tax-generating activities in cases involving unreported income, whether legal or illegal.

2.3

ALJ MARGOLIS: Can you spell that case for the court reporter?

MR. POLK: Yes. A-N-A-S-T-A-S-A-T-O,
Anastasato v. Commissioner. Also, we're going to have
fun with this one, Ninth Circuit in Weimerskirch v.

Commissioner. Do I need to spell that?
W-E-I-M-E-R-S-K-I-R-C-H, Weimerskirch v. Commissioner.

Ninth Circuit in that case said there must be some evidentiary foundation linking the taxpayer to the alleged income-producing activity.

So the appellant determined that perhaps the evidence linking the taxpayer to the federally-taxable activity, and to further clarify that point, the House Congressional Record of March 27, 1943 states, The income tax is therefore not tax on income as such is an excised tax with respect to certain activities and privileges which is measured by referring to the income which they produce. The income is not the subject of the tax. It is the basis for determining

the amount of the tax.

2.3

So the appellant determined that the subject of the federal tax is a federally-taxable activity or privilege, it is not a tax on money per say and it is not a tax on everything that came in.

The Supreme Court in Eisner v. Macomber, I've referenced this case in the briefs, recognized there were earnings that would not qualify as taxable income within the meaning of the 16th Amendment stating it becomes essential to distinguish between what is and what is not income as the terms that are used in that 16th Amendment, and to apply the distinction as cases arise according to truth and substance without regard to form.

This distinction between what is taxable and what is not is recognized at 26 CFR 1.61-1, defining the term gross income. And it states it means all income from whatever source derived unless excluded by law. The regulation does not say unless excluded by a provision of subtitle A or a provision of the code. It says excluded by law.

That could be an exclusion under any law.

And Exhibit 16 has been tossed, so I will just have to refer to this -- to these legal authorities. But Title 26 regulations, current regulations used various

1 terms to describe income.

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It is excluded by law from gross income, terms such as income holding exempt from tax under the provisions of any other law. And income not taxable by the Federal Government under the constitution, that's in current regulations.

Exhibits -- well, also Treasury Decision 3146 refers at Article 71 to exclusions from gross income of income that is, quote, by fundamental law free from tax.

And I quote further from Article 71, quote, such tax-free income should not be included in the return income and need not be mentioned in the return unless information regarding it is specifically called for.

The exclusion of such income should not be confused with the reduction of taxable income by the application of allowable deductions, end quote.

How's my speed? Okay.

ALJ MARGOLIS: Mr. Polk, which law are you saying specifically excluded it?

MR. POLK: Treasury Decision 3146. That's what I'm citing, and I want to expand on that point.

ALJ MARGOLIS: 3146, that's the basis --

MR. POLK: Treasury Decision 3146 is what I'm

quoting from. The appellant determined that the money he received is not included by law in gross income. Despite admitting he received the money, he never expressed any certainty that the money is included by law in gross income, and he ultimately determined that if he cannot be certain that it is included by law in gross income from his reading of the law, then [unintelligible] it is excluded by law from gross income.

2.3

This is due to the well-settled rule of construction established by the Supreme Court in Gould v. Gould, G-O-U-L-D, where they set such statutes are not taxing statutes and not to be extended by implication on the clear import of the language used. If the words are doubtful, the doubt must be resolved against the government and in favor of the taxpayer.

Also, in Spreckels Sugar Refining Company v. McClain, Supreme Court says the well-settled rule. The citizen is exempt from taxation unless the same is imposed by clear and unequivocal language, and that where the construction of tax law is doubtful, the doubt is to be resolved in favor of those upon whom the tax is sought to be laid.

The appellant relied on these rules of construction for taxing statutes to determine that he

is exempt from taxation on that money, and that he is entitled by law to exclude that money from the gross income on his return.

Per Treasury Decision 3146, a tax return does not require a taxpayer to mention any money that is excluded by law from gross income. And very significantly in this case, the IRS has agreed with these determinations and has removed the previously-assessed federal tax.

The IRS took more than a year after the appellant filed his return before they did that. It might be very hard to accept that they did that, but they did it. There is no basis, in fact, or law for the FTB's claim that this was a mistake by the IRS. This is was not a mistake. The IRS simply followed the evidence and the law.

The federal account transcript at Exhibit X on page 2, you can see that on June 5, 2017, the IRS removed \$30,850 of tax based on audit reconsideration after the appellant filed a return April 15, 2016. So the IRS took more than a year to decide to agree with Appellant's determinations. And it has been nearly two years since then, and they have not changed those determinations.

Now, the federal AGI reported on Appellant's

state return in Exhibit 5, which FTB claims is invalid, is exactly the same amount of federal AGI shown in his federal records in Exhibit X. So I don't know what else he's supposed to put on his state return for the federal AGI when the IRS agrees with him.

2.3

It is obvious from federal cases such as Portillo v. Commissioner, and in SBE and OTA cases, the taxpayer's determination of his gross income on a valid filed tax return is presumed correct. Cases show that the FTB has been given wide latitude to rely on EDD reporting and W-2 forms, but only when no valid tax return has been filed.

The FTB claims the federal AGI on Appellant's tax returns and the federal records is wrong because the FTB claims the money Appellant received is included by law in gross income as a jurisdictional claim that the FTB is making, contrary to file tax returns, and contrary to federal determination, such a claim requires evidence, sufficient jurisdictional facts. The FTB has not produced evidence of sufficient jurisdictional facts.

If the FTB is correct this money is included by law in gross income, then probative evidence of that should be available from the third parties who

issued this information returns the FTB relies on.
But FTB did not ever contact City Group to verify
inflow on the 1099 or issued by City, and FTB did
contact Space Systems/Loral. But FTB has failed to
produce probative evidence as to the issue of whether
the money is included by law in gross income.

2.3

Yet, FTB has produced nothing to [unintelligible] doubts as to the accuracy of the legal determination represented on the W-2 form. The appellant is thus entitled to a presumption against the FTB.

Per the Appeal of Don A. Cookston,

83-SBE-048, the failure of a party to introduce
evidence that is within its control gives rise to a
presumption that such evidence is unfavorable to its
case. If such evidence existed, then they could have,
should have, and would have produced it.

If FTB is correct, they had ample opportunity to obtain that evidence, but they did not. They just assumed the tax return is inaccurate, they even claimed without basis that the return is invalid, and they assumed that the federal determinations are erroneous.

FTB has made the same error that IRS made in Portillo $v.\ Commissioner.$ The FTB has arbitrarily

attributed voracity to un-verify third-party reporting and assumed the taxpayer's return is false just as the IRS did in *Portillo*. The federal court recognized that information filed by the third parties are not conclusive evidence as [unintelligible] --

2.3

As the district court stated in *Daines v*.

Alcatel, that's D-A-I-N-E-S, Alcatel, A-L-C-A-T-E-L,

the court said an informational return is filed by a

third party which reports income that that third party

believes it to be. The Internal Revenue Code makes it

clear that an information return is not the final word

on what a taxpayer's taxable income is.

As provided in 26 USC 6201(d), in any court proceeding if a taxpayer asserts a reasonable dispute with respect to any item reported on an income ratio return by a third party, the IRS shall have the burden of producing reasonable and probative information concerning such deficiency in addition to the information return.

The appellant's dispute of the W-2 and 1099 R recording is reasonable. These forms represent legal determinations that the money that was paid was included by law in gross income. The appellant determined that those legal determinations are arbitrary and incorrect.

The United States District Court in David

Nelson v. United States of America ruled that the

taxpayer in that case had failed to assert a

reasonable dispute, quote, because the taxpayer did

not dispute that the remuneration he received was

wages and, therefore, taxable.

The court was clearly recognizing that a dispute of a claim that remuneration received is included by law in gross income and, therefore, taxable --

ALJ MARGOLIS: Mr. Polk, you only have two minutes left. But slow down.

MR. POLK: Oh, all right. All right. The Portillo court says, quoting, Carson v. United States, the need for tax collection does not serve to excuse the government from providing some factual foundation for its assessment. The tax collector's presumption of correctness has a Herculean muscularity of Goliath-like reach, but we strike an Achille's heel when we find no muscles, no tendons, no ligaments of fact.

The FTB has produced no ligaments of fact to support its claim. Furthermore, they assume the federal determinations are erroneous. Now, the FTB is not bound by law to follow federal determinations, but

federal determinations are presumed correct when the FTB bases its determinations on them, per the appeal of Willard B and Esther J Schoellerman -- boy, lots of fun names today -- S-C-H-O-E-L-L-E-R-M-A-N, that's SBE September 17, 1973.

2.3

Now, if the previous federal determination were still standing, the FTB assessment based on that would be presumed correct, and the appellant would have the burden to show that it's wrong. So effectively, federal determinations are presumed correct.

So now that the federal determinations changed, why wouldn't those fed determinations be presumed correct now, because the FTB doesn't like what it says? The Federal determinations are entitled to at least a rebuttable presumption of correctness. The FTB is not bound by them but they cannot arbitrarily disregard them.

They are arbitrarily disregarding them. They have to have basis in fact or law to support their claim that the federal determinations are erroneous and they cannot prove that by just simply alleging that they are erroneous.

ALJ MARGOLIS: Thank you. Your 15 minutes are up.

MR. POLK: All right.

ALJ MARGOLIS: Mr. Amara.

MR. AMARA: Sure, Judge. Before I go into my summary of the case, I just want to direct your office to a recent U.S. Tax Court case called *Hendrickson vs. Commissioner*. The site is T.C. Memo. 2019-10. That's a February 2019 case that's directly on point with this, with the issues in this case. And I'll just briefly take you to a couple key portions there.

First of all, the litigants in that case received wage at 1099 income. The approach, so to speak, they took is, again, directly on point with what's occurring here. They submitted -- this is page 480 opinion.

They submitted amended Form W-2s zeroing out the wages reported by their employer, and they submitted corrected 1099 forms as well.

The court, in addressing -- and then they filed essentially zero returns in that case. The court, when addressing what occurred there, indicated its use of zero returns, zeroing out wages and compensations, reporting zero liability has been repeatedly characterized as frivolous. That's page 5 of the opinion.

And then further on, the court squarely

addressed those arguments and said the litigant's tax-protestor arguments have burdened the judicial system and the IRS for nearly three decades. Their use of substitute Forms W-2 and, quote/end quotes, corrected Forms 1099-MISC, as discussed in cracking the code where this approach is laid out, and used by the taxpayers in a different case, have been repeatedly rejected by the court.

2.3

They go on to say this frivolous argument is not new to the court and we will not waste judicial resources addressing it further.

And then one other thing that's relevant to this case, the litigants in that case submitted zero returns or returns showing minimal income but not containing the correct wage in 1099 income. The court indicated the IRS is incorrect. The IRS in that case incorrectly processed those returns. They indicated the processing of an invalid return does not make it valid. The court -- in response to that issue.

So I just wanted to highlight that case because it's directly on point with this case. It's a recent -- it's a recent opinion.

Now, getting to this case, as you're aware, this is a 2012 case involving unreported income and penalties. The reason we're here is because Appellant

refuses to accept this 2012 wage and 1099 income is taxable and creates a filing obligation.

2.3

This classic frivolous argument is insufficient to overturn FTB's action in this case. With respect to the burden of proof here as set out in FTB's briefing, the FTB's assessment is presumed to be inaccurate and found to demonstrate errors unless we were to prevail.

There are penalties in this case as well.

Appellant has to establish reasonable cause for failure to timely file a return and/or respond to the demand notices in this case -- the demand notice.

Now, getting to the key facts in this case, it is the dispute that is relatively basic. There's no real dispute Appellant received income for his services with his employer in 2012, and he received 1099 income as well.

The crux of the case is in Appellant's entire case rests on his semantic argument that the income he received was somehow misclassified, and that it's nontaxable or reportable on that basis.

This is an often repeated frivolous argument or variations on that argument. It's been repeatedly rejected by courts, both the U.S. Tax Court and District Courts, the Board of Equalization and your

agency in the Appeal of Holm rejected such an argument.

2.3

It's incontrovertible that Appellant's wage in 1099 income is reportable and taxable, and it forms sufficient basis for FTB's assessment. Appellant has not demonstrated error in assessment so it should be sustained in full.

With respect to the penalties in the case,
Appellant has not advanced any reasonable cause
argument against either penalty and those should be
sustained as well. I don't have anything further.

ALJ MARGOLIS: Okay. Mr. Polk, you have five minutes to reply.

MR. POLK: Yeah. The Hendrickson v.

Commissioner case, I want to address that. This case is off point. It's [unintelligible]. In this case, the litigant Hendrickson had been convicted of filing fraudulent tax return. So it was res judicata and established that the returns were invalid. And that makes a huge difference.

In this case, the IRS had accepted the appellant's determination. And that makes a big difference when it is settled, whether it's settled or not, that the return is fraudulent or false as the FTB claims.

I want to point out the third party's reporting the FTB relies on has not been substantiated in any way. The appellant actually offered positive evidence for you to indicate the W-2 form SSL is not reliable. He's asked SSL multiple times to verify their legal determinations that they represented on the original W-2, and they have refused to respond in good faith.

2.3

See the email exchange in Exhibit 10.

SSL legal department flatly refused to discuss the matter and refused to provide him any information.

See also Exhibit 13 where the appellant warns SSL that their failure to produce facts and evidence to verify their claims would be assumed to be their admission that the information they reported on the original W-2 is not accurate, and that their representation of gross income paid in the course of business is arbitrary and without basis or fact or law. And they were warned that this would be presented as evidence at this hearing as a failure to respond.

Again, SSL refused to respond in good faith making spurious claims that the information is confidential. The appellant is entitled to take that failure to produce evidence as an admission that their determinations are arbitrary and incorrect. SSL had

the duty --

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ALJ MARGOLIS: Slow down again, please.

MR. POLK: I'm sorry. All right.

The SSL had a duty to address an inquiry in good faith. The U.S. Court of Appeals in Fifth

Circuit in Clemens [sic] v. Revlon found Revlon

negligent for failing to correct an erroneous W-2.

They found it was an actionable negligence.

The bottom line, FTB has relied on unverified and unreliable third-party reporting in order to assume the appellant's return is false and assume the IRS determinations are incorrect. The appellant has thus demonstrated error in the proposed assessment.

As for the frivolous appeal penalty, there is nothing frivolous about saying I don't believe this money is included by law in gross income as it was reported by this third party. That's a legal determination in terms on questions of fact.

It's perfectly reasonable to dispute third-party reporting. The IRS and FTB both make forms expressly for that purpose. There's a 3525 form made by FTB and a 4852 form made by the IRS. And those forms do not require the taxpayer to get the third party to agree with the corrections. There is no law preventing a taxpayer from issuing his own

corrected form so long as it reflects what people leave is the correct information. The issue is whether the information is correct.

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The FTB just assumes again that the third party, whatever the third party says is correct and whatever is the taxpayer says is false. Well, that's very self-serving of them.

The appellant had already filed his federal return as an appeal began and was waiting for the IRS to adjust his federal tax, which they did. There's nothing frivolous about his position in this appeal. It is supported by 26 CFR 1.61-1 and many other legal authorities. His appeal of the NPA is perfectly reasonable and is supported by federal determinations that are in his favor.

If the state tax had already been assessed at the time the IRS removed his federal tax in 2017, the appellant would actually be required for FTB Publication 1008, he would be required to contact the FTB for adjustment to a state tax.

So there's certainly nothing improper about his reliance for this appeal on his federal AGI, on his federal return and the IRS determination that agree with him. Therefore, there's no reasonable basis for calling this appeal frivolous.

ALJ MARGOLIS: Okay. Do my panelists have any questions of the parties?

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ALJ KWEE: I just have one question for the Franchise Tax Board. I'd like just some clarification on the demand penalty.

Does the Franchise Tax Board's position that the taxpayer did not respond at all to the demand, or that the taxpayer did timely respond to the demand, but provided invalid returns so the response was not accepted?

MR. AMARA: Our position is that the response was insufficient in that it didn't -- yeah, it didn't constitute a return, and it didn't address the income that was underlying the demand for the tax return. So FTB responded to the initial response by saying, please file a valid return. That's Exhibit C in the record.

Appellant, again, failed to file a valid return in response. And so the demand penalty was imposed.

ALJ KWEE: Okay. Thank you.

MR. POLK: If I may interject. It is your role as the board to decide whether the return was valid or invalid. The FTB obviously decided it wasn't. I think the case law does not support their

1 position. 2 ALJ KWEE: Thank you. 3 ALJ MARGOLIS: Okay. Is there anything 4 further from the parties? 5 MR. AMARA: Just one thing with respect to 6 the frivolous appeal penalty. I just want to direct 7 your attention to Exhibit U, page 8 of Exhibit U, 8 which was there was a prior frivolous appeal penalty 9 imposed against Appellant. And that was a 2010 case, 10 I believe, page 8 of that --11 ALJ MARGOLIS: We're aware of that \$750 12 penalty, I believe. 13 MR. AMARA: Sure. And I just want to 14 highlight that in bold letters, in bold print at the 15 end of that summary decision, it indicates Appellant 16 should be aware we will not hesitate to impose a 17 higher penalty of statutory maximum \$5,000 per appeal 18 if he pursues further frivolous appeals. 19 ALJ MARGOLIS: Okay. Mr. Polk. 20 MR. POLK: Yeah. No question the previous 21 appeal was frivolous argument that this should not 22 prejudice him for making a valid appeal as he has done 2.3 in this case, and then supported by federal 24 determinations.

ALJ MARGOLIS: Thank you. With that, this

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hearing is adjourned. We will take a five-minute recess while we set up the next hearing. Thank you. Ms. Rubalcava, what is the next hearing? MS. RUBALCAVA: The next case on the agenda is the appeal of Jeffrey G. Sandoval, Case ID No. 18043037. Appellant has indicated that he is waiving appearance. Therefore, the matter is removed from the agenda, and the appeal will be decided based on the written record. (Whereupon the proceedings were adjourned at 9:55 a.m.)

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I, Amy E. Perry, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter in and for the State of California, duly
appointed and commissioned to administer oaths, do
hereby certify:

That I am a disinterested person herein; that the foregoing hearing was reported in shorthand by me, Amy E. Perry, a duly qualified Certified Shorthand Reporter of the State of California, and thereafter transcribed into typewritten form by means of computer-aided transcription.

I further certify that I am not of counsel or attorney for any of the parties to said hearing or in any way interested in the outcome of said hearing.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 8th day of April, 2019.

AMY E. PERRY Certified Shorthand Reporter License No. 11880

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