BEFORE THE OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS STATE OF CALIFORNIA LINDA CHENG, HEARING JUDGE

In the Matter of the Appeal of:)		
SALVACION Y. TORRE,)	OTA No.	18010827
Appellant.)		
)		

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Los Angeles, California

Tuesday, March 19, 2019

Reported by:

Lisa V. Berryhill CSR No. 7926

Job No.:

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1	BEFORE THE OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS
2	STATE OF CALIFORNIA
3	LINDA CHENG, HEARING JUDGE
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6	In the Matter of the Appeal of:)
7	SALVACION Y. TORRE,) OTA No. 18010827
8	Appellant.)
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L6	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, taken at
L7	PBC - Wells Fargo Center, 355 South Grand Avenue,
18	Suite 2450, Los Angeles, California,
L9	commencing at 2:28 p.m. on Tuesday,
20	March 19, 2019, heard before LINDA CHENG,
21	Hearing Judge, reported by Lisa V. Berryhill,
22	CSR No. 7926, a Certified Shorthand Reporter
23	in and for the State of California.
24	
25	

1	APPEARANCES:	
2	PANEL LEAD:	LINDA CHENG
3		
4	PANEL MEMBERS:	SARA HOSEY DOUGLAS BRAMHALL
5		
6	For the APPELLANT:	LILI SITJAR
7	For the RESPONDENT:	STATE OF CALIFORNIA FRANCHISE TAX BOARD
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1	Los Angeles, California; Tuesday, March 19, 2019
2	2:28 p.m.
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4	
5	JUDGE CHENG: We're opening the record in the
6	appeal of Salvacion Y. Torre, before the Office of Tax
7	Appeals. Case number is OTA No. 18010827. This hearing
8	is being convened in L.A. on March 19, 2019, at 2:30 p.m.
9	Today's case is being heard and decided equally by a panel
10	of three judges. My name is Linda Cheng and I will be
11	acting as the lead judge for the purpose of conducting
12	this hearing. Also on the panel with me today are Doug
13	Bramhall and Sara Hosey.
14	Will the parties please introduce yourselves.
15	MS. SITJAR: I am Lili Sitjar and I'm the
16	representative of Salvacion Torre.
17	MR. PAIRIS: I'm Eli Pairis. I was a tax
18	preparer on this.
19	JUDGE CHENG: Mr. Pairis, are you here as a
20	witness or as the representative of Appellant?
21	MR. PAIRIS: Witness.
22	MS. SITJAR: No. We discussed things because
23	he was the tax preparer, answering the audit before,
24	that's why his name is on the name that I was
25	representing. That's why I brought him here, to say that

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1
     this one came from him when he responded to the audit
 2
    before I came in. It was Eli Pairis responding to the
3
     Franchise Tax Board regarding Salvacion Torres.
 4
               JUDGE CHENG: So just as the representative?
5
               MS. SITJAR: As representative, yes.
                             In that capacity, not to testify?
6
               JUDGE CHENG:
7
               MS. SITJAR: Not to testify.
               JUDGE CHENG: Very well.
8
                               This is our first understanding
9
               MR. GEMMINGEN:
10
     that the taxpayer was going to bring a witness and that
11
    was not disclosed during the pre-hearing conference.
12
               JUDGE CHENG: He's not here as a witness.
13
               MR. GEMMINGEN: He said he was a witness.
14
               JUDGE CHENG: He's not going to testify today.
15
               MS. SITJAR: It's not his knowledge that --
    because his name is here on the paperwork, from the
16
    Franchise Tax Board, to acknowledge that he's the one --
17
18
    he received this one because I just saw the paper.
19
               JUDGE ANGEJA: I understand but he's not going
20
     to testify to anything today; right?
21
               MS. SITJAR:
                           Not to testify. It's not needed.
22
               JUDGE CHENG:
                             Okay.
23
               Respondent?
24
              MR. GEMMINGEN: David Gemmingen for Franchise
25
    Tax Board.
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1 MR. TAY: Richard Tay, for Franchise Tax Board.

JUDGE CHENG: Okay. So the issues on appeal are the following -- No. 1, whether taxpayer has established that she is entitled to deduct a loss pertaining to the short sale of real property for the 2014 tax year; No. 2, whether taxpayer properly recorded cancellation of debt income for the 2014 tax year and No. 3, whether taxpayer correctly calculated her basis on the real property at issue.

And as I stated in my order, issues No. 2 and 3 should only be discussed to the extent that taxpayer is entitled to deduct a loss. Okay.

Prior to the hearing the parties have stated that they're submitting as evidenced the exhibits attached to the briefs. All of these documents were combined into an exhibit file which has been sent to the parties. FTB's exhibits are marked as A through K and taxpayers exhibits are marked as 1 through 6.

Now, today taxpayer brought several documents which will -- with the exclusion of one item -- will be admitted into evidence as Exhibit 7, subject to relevancy objections by the FTB. So that will be the evidence on record.

So Ms. Sitjar, you are representing the Appellant and you bear the burden of proof here; so you

will begin and as we've discussed, you will have up to 30 minutes to make your presentation.

OPENING STATEMENT

MS. SITJAR: Yes, Your Honor. I'm just -- I'm not a lawyer but I'm just, you know, trying to answer the questions based on how I understand, how we put the numbers on when we do our own taxes as well. We base on the numbers that was given to us and submit this to us by the lender.

When we receive numbers like cancellation debt, we base on the ruling of whatever IRS was given to us on how to calculate the information that we have to enter and I was just curious to -- I know they know more because they've been experienced but I'm just being a taxpayer as well and if I -- if I'm doing my taxes, I put myself on Salvacion Torre's position.

When she has property that was short sale and she was told by her realtor at the time to do -- to help her out, to facilitate also, to help out, to short sale in order for her not to -- to avoid -- in order for her to avoid any more tax consequences. That was her information that was -- I was told by her. And the number that was -- the question was how we were able to calculate -- how she was able to calculate the schedule D or the losses.

The given number by the acquisition, by the 1099-A that was given to us, was totally different from the Franchise Tax Board response to the protest that we had based on the number and the evidence they were saying that the bank reported the principal (inaudible) --

THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry. I didn't understand that. Could you please repeat it?

MS. SITJAR: According to this (inaudible) that was awarded already to the Franchise Tax Board. That's why the response on June 30 of 2017 --

THE COURT REPORTER: Please say that again.

MS. SITJAR: According to this evidence that I just admitted, that was awarded already to the Franchise Tax Board. That's why -- this is the response on June 30, on 2017, that according to them, the public records indicate about the sale, that the taxpayer abandoned the property on June 6, 2014, as evidence on 1099 acquisition about the unsecured property issued by the Seneca Mortgage report to the principal outstanding balance of 548,728 and a fair market value of 432,000.

But the 1099-A that was given to her was totally different from the number that was given by the Franchise Tax Board. And we based only on the number that was presented to us, which is the balance of 190,246 and the fair market value of 199,000. We didn't know that we have

to go to the Riverside county to confirm what was given when we do our tax. So that's why I brought this one too, to answer -- to be able to get an answer why we have to do the extent of really have to go to the county to ask for the real numbers.

And based on the calculation too, I get also the credit from the credit report that I just admitted right now that the Seneca had reported that it was open on May 2007 to get the original cost of the amount. It was open on May of 2007.

MR. GEMMINGEN: Excuse me. I'd like to make an objection right now because the loan that was foreclosed on was not Seneca. It was a Flagstaff loan. So we object to the relevance of this particular discussion.

MS. SITJAR: But the 2014 -- she didn't receive anything from the -- what was the --

MR. GEMMINGEN: Flagstaff is the loan that created the calculation debt income, not Seneca --

MS. SITJAR: It was transferred from Seneca to Flagstaff or Flagstaff to Seneca. I don't know. But she didn't receive anything from Flagstaff. She got the information from Seneca. The 2014 taxes was information from the numbers, from the figures that was given based on the paperwork that was given to her. Not by Flagstaff.

The question, where did she get the number of

532,800 -- it's from the balance that was reported by Seneca Mortgage as well. And if you can see on the credit report, it's only Salvacion Torre's paying for the monthly from May 2007 up to July of 2014. And the reason why I sent the email -- I know it's not accepted -- just to prove that realtor is the one discussing with the tenants at the time, living at the time there was a closing or short sale of the property.

They were evicted by the realtor and she's not around to -- to present today or to do testimony, but if needed, we will try to locate her to testify that she's the one who was talking to -- helping out Salvacion Torre because she's a 77-year-old woman. So somebody is helping her out as well as I'm the other one helping her out too. So she's helping Salvacion Torre to evict people living on the property at the time that it was under foreclosure. She can testify if she was needed to come and we were just discussing where the number come from.

And we base it on the computation on those numbers from the Seneca given to her on the tax year 2014.

JUDGE CHENG: I'm going to stop you for a second here. So what is this printout tending to show, that she paid the mortgage?

MS. SITJAR: No. She's the one -- because they were saying she's only like one third of paying the

mortgage and the owner of the property is only one third because there are three on the title of the property, because of the son and the wife of the son was there; so they're trying to say that one third of the loan was owned by the son but actually it's only Torre 100 percent who's paying the mortgage and she's the one on the borrower.

JUDGE CHENG: Where does it show that she was the only person on here? Where does it show that she was the --

MS. SITJAR: It's because she was the only one given also this abandonment of the 1099-A and this one, the amount of the loan is 538,000 originally, which is the high balance. So it's -- and the Seneca Mortgage, the high balance was just the original amount of the loan, which is 532,800. This is part of the. . .

JUDGE BRAMHALL: Just a question on your 1099-A, where you're saying the balance of 190 -- that's principal only. Are you including the accrued interest that's also outstanding on this loan?

MS. SITJAR: Balance of principal,
outstanding -- usually when we do our taxes, we only -when we have a property that's in foreclosure or short
sale, we base it on how much the calculation based from
the lender, how much the principal was owed. Because the
principal -- she was paying since 2007, paying monthly

mortgage amortization. So what was left on the 548 balance actually was -- she owed only 190,000 for the property. That was -- originally, if she pays off up to now for 30 years, the balance goes up to 900,000, if they didn't forgive him, forgive or. . .

And that's all how we base that calculation and the depreciation also. That's why I gave the copy for the depreciation on the property. I think that's all I can. . .

JUDGE ANGEJA: Did you want to address the other issues, because I think you were talking about the calculation of her basis. Did you want to address the other two issues?

MS. SITJAR: If she is -- she can -- if she's -- she is entitled to deduct the loss pertaining to the short sale of real property for 2014. Is that the question?

JUDGE CHENG: The loss.

MS. SITJAR: Yeah. She has established based on the owner 1099 that I was given entirely on her only. So she has to report also -- she is the only one to report that she has the loss based on this 1099-A.

JUDGE CHENG: Okay.

MS. SITJAR: And on the -- and on the financial report, that she's the one paying for the mortgage 100 percent. She owes the -- and she's the one taking care on

1 | the property. So she has -- it's appreciated.

JUDGE CHENG: Okay. And what about the cancellation of debt income? Did you want to address that?

MS. SITJAR: Yeah. The one that I submitted, the calculation, for the calculated for cancellation of debt? I gave the worksheet also.

JUDGE CHENG: The worksheet?

MS. SITJAR: Yes. That was report that -worksheet is the one supporting the schedule D for the
losses on the -- how did she come up on the losses and
also, if it's based on the cancelled debt (inaudible),
this is the one that's included also on the 2014. If it
is not properly reported, can I ask -- can we ask to
submit a form and she can make a -- make an amendment to
show how to -- that she will -- that she reported it but
it's not properly -- probably not properly been reported
to their system, you know, if they want. But the numbers
that was given is based on the canceled debt worksheet
which has been added supposedly on the 2014 tax report.

JUDGE CHENG: Are you saying that this is a new worksheet that you filled out or was it to calculate what was filed --

MS. SITJAR: To calculate what was filed, this supposedly be attached. And I just can't find it on the

exhibit that was given. I didn't see that but -- because this has to be kept, her own -- you know, because when I asked how did she come up with the numbers from the Seneca and it was -- in order to come up from the schedule D, this was to be inputted on the software -- new report and calculate your 1040 tax report. So this calculation was given. If it is not seen by the Franchise Tax Board, then I can formally submit it.

JUDGE CHENG: Do you have a copy of the 1040?

MS. SITJAR: The 1040 that was -- it's the same

1040, same one that was given to me that was submitted to
the IRS, to the Franchise Tax Board, except that it wasn't
showing a cancellation that the board -- I don't have it
right now but I can submit it if given time.

JUDGE CHENG: Okay. Well, you know what? Let's let the FTB make its presentation first and then we'll continue with the questions.

OPENING STATEMENT

MR. TAY: Thank you, Judge. This appeal centers on the short sale of Appellant's second home in 2014.

Appellant received her ownership interest in the home, one third, in 2007 and two thirds in 2013, as a gift from her son. Appellant claimed a business loss deduction; although she was not entitled to the tax benefits of such

a deduction.

Respondent's assessment for the 2014 taxable year denied Appellant's deduction for the alleged business loss she took on her original tax return. In 2014 Appellant sold her second home, which she owned as a personal asset, in a short sale. In her 2014 tax return, Appellant misreported the result of that sale and erroneously took a business loss deduction. Appellant erred that she was not entitled to take a deduction, failed to report income that would have offset her purported loss and reported an inflated basis, which in turn inflated her alleged loss.

Now, there are three independent reasons why Respondent's assessment is proper. First, Appellant's sale of her second home in Corona, California was a sale of a personal asset and so any loss she incurred would have been a personal loss, which is not deductible.

Second, Appellant's recognized \$212,000 of cancellation of debt income as a result of the short sale, which Appellant admitted at the pre-hearing conference. However, Appellant alleged during the pre-hearing conference she included her cancellation of debt income on her 2014 income tax return, which she did not; however, the inclusion of Appellant's cancellation of debt income offsets any loss she may have incurred on the sale of her

home.

And finally, Appellant miscalculated her basis by adding the balance of a refinance loan to her basis and so inflated her purported loss on the sale of her second home.

These are three independent reasons which I will discuss more fully that are well supported by facts and law to find in favor of Respondent. If the Office of Tax Appeals agrees with Respondent on any one, Appellant is not entitled to the deduction she originally claimed.

First, Appellant's sale of her second home in Corona, California was the sale of a personal asset and so not deductible under IRC Sections 1231 and 165. The requirements for deductibility under the law are clear. The Corona home must have been properly used in Appellant's trade or business for a loss incurred in a transaction engaged in for profit.

The law is well established that the deduction is not allowable under IRC section 165(a) for a loss suffered on the sale of a personal residence. Here Appellant does not meet either requirement. Appellant herself was in the medical profession and did not use her Corona home in her line of work. Appellant's son used the Corona home as his primary residence and ultimately gifted the property to Appellant. The evidence points to the

fact that the house was not used in any other trade or business but was always used as a personal residence.

Moreover, the Corona home was never used as a rental and certainly was not used as a rental up to the date it was sold, as is required by treasury regulation section 1.165-9. The treasury regulation states that a personal residence properly converted to income producing property as a rental must be used as a rental up to the time of the sale of the property.

However, Appellant never reported rental income on her 2014 income tax return or for any other year she owned the property. Appellant provided a purported rental agreement from 2014; however, the rental agreement is of dubious origin because it is incomplete and unreliable. The document provided was only one of three pages, was not executed and was purportedly executed after she received a notice of default, which was recorded in April 2013. Purported rental agreement began just one month before the forced sale of the property, which means that Appellant alleges that she rented the property knowing she would lose the home in just one month.

Additionally, the purported monthly rental amount was \$500, which is approximately 1/6 of the fair market rental value. The partial, unexecuted and frankly questionable rental agreement is not good evidence to show

that Appellant used the Corona home for anything other than a personal asset and at best, the rental agreement was a last-minute attempt to characterize her second home as business property and really is without substance.

Additionally, Appellant's use of the home does not show that Appellant converted into income producing property for the five-factor test that the tax court set forth. The home was used as a personal residence, was never converted out of personal use, as shown earlier, and did not receive offers to retro-sell unless one accepts that she began renting it after notice of default was received and just one month before the foreclosure sale. As such, Appellant has not shown that the Corona home was a business or an income producing asset and so she is not entitled to take any deduction on the disposition of her second home because it was a personal asset.

The second reason Respondent's assessment is correct is that Appellant recognized but did not report approximately \$212,000 of cancellation of debt income as a result of the sale of the Corona home. In 2014 the lender, Flagstaff Bank, forgave \$212,000 at or around the time Appellant sold the Corona home in a short sale. The trustee deed upon sale contains the outstanding loan amount of approximately \$611,000 and a sales price of \$399,000.

Appellant's representative admitted during the pre-hearing conference that Appellant recognized cancellation of debt income in 2014 and should have reported such income on her 2014 income tax return.

Indeed, Appellant received the 1099-A, and so it is clear from the evidence and Appellant's own admission that Appellant recognized and should have reported cancellation of debt income on her 2014 income tax return.

Although Appellant has submitted the canceled debt worksheet today, her self-serving, self-generated document does not support her position. As "Roberts vs. Commissioner" in the tax court case said, "Such a document should not be relied on for the truth of what is represented on that self-serving document."

Additionally, the documents that she provided were for a loan issued by Seneca Mortgage servicing and not the loan that generated the cancellation of debt income, which is a loan issued by Flagstaff Bank.

Despite her recognition of and duty to report her cancellation of debt income, a review of the Appellant's 2014 return shows that she failed to report such income. Appellant's federal income tax return -- which is I believe Exhibit G, that's attached to respondents opening brief -- shows only \$821 reported as other income on line 21 of the first page.

Additionally, Appellant's IRS form 4797 does not report any cancellation of debt income, which shows that Appellant omitted the cancellation of debt income she recognized in 2014. The facts in law showed that Appellant should have reported such income. Appellant's unreported cancellation of debt income exceeds any purported loss she incurred on the sale of her Corona home and consequently, Respondent's assessment should be upheld.

Finally, Respondent's assessment should be upheld because Appellant inflated her basis in her Corona home. It is uncontroverted that the Appellant received the Corona home as a family gift. The basis rules found in IRC section 1015 state that the recipient's basis is the donor's basis or the fair market value at the time of the gift, whichever is less.

Here, Appellant received ownership interest in the property as gifts in 2007 and 2013. In 2007 Appellant received a one third ownership interest. The property was valued at \$555,000. So Appellant's basis and her one third interest was \$185,000. In 2013 Appellant received a two thirds ownership interest. The property was valued at \$363,930. So her basis in two thirds of the property was \$242,620.

Thus Appellant's total basis minus the 5 percent

she purportedly gifted in her ownership interest in the property was \$407,930, which is less than Appellant's reported basis of \$548,729, upon calculating her basis by using the amount of her refinancing of the Corona home; however, including the refinance amount in her basis is contrary to law. Thus Appellant's calculation is wrong because Appellant should have used the basis rules for gifts, as Respondent did, to correctly calculate her basis.

For loss purposes, Helen's correct basis amount minus the amount she received from the short sale result in a deficit of approximately \$9,000. So even if the OTA does not agree with Respondent's position in the first two reasons to uphold its complete denial of Appellant's loss deduction, Appellant's loss is limited to approximately \$9,000 and not the \$130,000 she originally reported.

In conclusion, Appellant's claimed loss on her 2014 income tax return suffers from three defects. First, Appellant is not entitled to deduct a loss from the sale of a personal asset, her second home. Second, Appellant did not report cancellation of debt income, which exceeded and offset any loss she recognized on the sale of her Corona home. And third, Appellant inflated her basis far in excess of her or actual basis.

Each of these reasons is a well supported,

1 independent and separate grounds upon which Respondent's 2 assessment can be upheld. In response to Appellant's presentation, 3 4 Respondent sympathizes with whatever confusion that may 5 have led to Appellant's mistakes in the original filing of her return but the facts in law show that Respondent's 6 7 assessment should be upheld. Thank you. JUDGE CHENG: 8 Thank you. 9 Questions, panel? 10 MS. SITJAR: Can I ask a question? 11 JUDGE CHENG: One second. Do we have questions 12 right now? 13 JUDGE BRAMHALL: I think I do. 14 Your cancellation debt worksheet -- you're 15 showing that you're reporting zero cancellation of debt 16 income on the basis of an insolvency of \$589,000? MS. SITJAR: It came from the calculation from 17 18 the cost of property, including it prevents from 538,000. 19 JUDGE BRAMHALL: Maybe you didn't understand my 20 question. Let me try again. Okay. 21 MS. SITJAR: Sorry. JUDGE BRAMHALL: What this worksheet shows is 22 23 that the taxpayer reported zero of the cancellation debt. 24 MS. SITJAR: Yes, sir. 25 JUDGE BRAMHALL: And the basis for doing so was

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1
    even though there was recognized cancellation of debt of
 2
    this income, there's an exception for insolvency. And
3
    you're claiming insolvency on this form of $589,000.
4
               MS. SITJAR:
                           Yes.
5
               JUDGE BRAMHALL: What evidence do you have that
    the taxpayer was insolvent?
6
7
               MS. SITJAR: At the time -- there's no 500,000
    on her account showing that she sold the property that she
8
    received any -- any proceeds from the sale or from the --
9
10
    according to them, like a short sale of the property.
11
    has no -- she has no -- she has a lot of debts when it
12
    comes to one of the. . .
13
               JUDGE BRAMHALL: What evidence have you
     submitted to show me that?
14
15
               MS. SITJAR: Only the calculation right now that
     I've sent, I have --
16
17
               JUDGE BRAMHALL:
                               Thank you.
18
               MS. SITJAR: -- based on this one.
19
               JUDGE BRAMHALL: That's good. Thank you.
20
               MS. SITJAR: I sent to them all the bank
21
     statement during the time of the audit in 2017.
22
               I have a question too. Sorry.
23
               JUDGE BRAMHALL: That answered my question.
               JUDGE CHENG: You'll have some time on rebuttal.
24
25
               No questions?
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MS. HOSEY: No. Thank you.

JUDGE CHENG: Okay. We're ready to go to closing statements and you may begin.

MS. SITJAR: Thank you. Based on what they said on the exhibit or their statement that she is a doctor, a medical practitioner -- I don't think that being a medical practitioner stops you from doing a business of having a rental property. And a gift -- it's not a gift. It's an inter -- what do you call that? It's intra-family transfer, refers to the transfer of ownership with a family member.

Actually, it's not a gift from the son to the mom. It's the title itself and the deed is only to get refinancing. They're trying to find out who can do a better rate at the time but the ownership still prevails that it was her because -- hers. That's all I can say. I mean she didn't sell it. She just have to -- it's being foreclosed; so the only option that was given to her is to short sell it, not to make proceeds out of it.

And regarding to the renting it like 500, it's only to protect -- she agreed on it because nobody wants to stay with it at the time that they were being harassed by the family -- from the other people who's doing the foreclose and stuff but somebody is staying there for 500 (inaudible) in order for her property not to be vandalized

and stuff because she had experienced that her property has been vandalized when one of the tenants left and they took all the -- it's in the police report. She had it.

But I didn't know that it will matter here but that's the reason why she allows the \$500 -- to protect the property.

And the numbers were calculated and stuff. It's just based on the -- this is the only paperwork that she received. She didn't receive Flagstaff or cancellation of debt or any debt in the tax year -- we're talking about tax year 2014 -- she only received 1099-A -- and that's anything from Flagstaff -- it's only from Seneca, saying that whatever she owes, the balance is 190, not the \$548,000.

She didn't know that every time you have to calculate your tax, you have to find out the real basis and you have to go through the county of what number to go against. They tried to call Seneca but there's no contact number that they can call regarding this -- and she said that too on the letter, that she tried to contact the Seneca Mortgage regarding this 1099-A. And she didn't receive anything from Flagstaff back at the time; so that's why we just have this number on this paper -- on 2014. That's all I can say.

JUDGE CHENG: Any closing statement, FTB?

MR. TAY: Just a couple things, Judge Cheng.

just want to clarify that although the Appellant focus is on the 1099-A, we believe the trustee deed of sale is the best evidence, the more reliable document that contains figures that were -- actually came into being as a consequence of the short sale.

The second thing is that the Corona home was not used as a rental. Appellant did not provide any evidence of tenants living in that home and never reported any income -- rental income for any amount that she allegedly received as rent, for any year that she owned the home.

MR. GEMMINGEN: One item. You excluded the email from evidence -- opposing side did comment on it -- and I'd just like to note there's no reference to the Lemon Grass property itself, nothing tying this to the Lemon Grass property.

JUDGE CHENG: Appellant, you have the opportunity for rebuttal, if any.

MS. SITJAR: For that she can -- if you need -- I don't know if you have more time for that email. She's a realtor of that property on the Lemon Grass. So that's why she gave it to me, to prove, to say that she's saying the truth, that it was Vicky who was trying to supervise and asking those tenants to leave the property because of the short sale at the time. That's why I just brought up that email. As I told you, I'm not a lawyer. Next time

I'll be better. JUDGE CHENG: Again, just for the record, the email is not coming in because it's not signed. We don't know, you know, the source of it; so it's not coming in as evidence and in fact, we are out of time. Because we've been -- we've had a lot of time -- you've had opportunities to submit documentation to support your case and so we will be closing the record as of today and this -- this case submitted and the panel will convene and discuss and we will strive to issue a decision within 100 days. Thank you for coming and for your presentation. And this hearing is adjourned. I thank you. (Proceedings concluded at 3:08 p.m.)

1	STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
2) ss. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)
3	
4	I, Lisa V. Berryhill, C.S.R. No. 7926, in and for the
5	State of California, do hereby certify:
6	That the foregoing 28-page Hearing was taken down by
7	me in shorthand at the time and place therein named, and
8	thereafter reduced to typewriting under my direction, and
9	the same is a true, correct and complete transcript of
10	said proceedings;
11	I further certify that I am not interested in
12	the event of the action.
13	Witness my hand this day of
	, 2018.
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14 15	
15 16	Isa Berghall
15 16 17	LISA V. BERRYHILL, CSR NO. 7926
15 16 17 18	LISA V. BERRYHILL, CSR NO. 7926
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