BEFORE THE OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL OF,)
ROBERT W. HENSE AND PAMELA M. HENSE,) OTA NO. 18073409
APPELLANT.))

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Los Angeles, California

Tuesday, July 23, 2019

Reported by: ERNALYN M. ALONZO HEARING REPORTER

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2	STATE OF CALIFORNIA
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14	Transcript of Proceedings, taken at
15	355 South Grand Avenue, South Tower, 23rd Floor,
16	Los Angeles, California, 91401,
17	commencing at 10:00 a.m. and concluding
18	at 10:39 a.m. on Tuesday, July 23, 2019,
19	reported by Ernalyn M. Alonzo, Hearing Reporter,
20	in and for the State of California.
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1	APPEARANCES:	
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3	Panel Lead:	Hon. SARA HOSEY
4	Panel Members:	Hon. RICHARD TAY
5	raner members.	Hon. DANIEL CHO
6	For the Appellant:	ROBERT HENSE
7	ror the Apperrant.	JEFFREY S. JACOBS
8	Eastha Dagaandanti	
9	For the Respondent:	FRANCHISE TAX BOARD
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1	Los Angeles, California; Tuesday, July 23, 2019
2	10:00 a.m.
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4	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HOSEY: We're going on
5	at on the record.
6	This is the appeal of Robert W. and
7	Pamela M. Hense, Case Number 18073409. Today is July
8	23rd, 2019, approximately 10:00 o'clock. We are in
9	Los Angeles, California. I'm lead Administrative Law
10	Judge Sarah Hosey, and with me today are Judges Daniel Cho
11	and Richard Tay.
12	Parties, can I have you state your names for the
13	record.
14	MR. JACOBS: Jeffrey Jacobs, attorney for
15	appellants.
16	MR. KOWLACYZK: David Kowalcyzk for respondent.
17	MS. MOSNIER: Marguerite Mosnier for respondent.
18	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HOSEY: Thank you.
19	Today's issue is whether appellants have
20	established a basis to abate the demand penalty.
21	Mr. Jacobs, is that accurate?
22	MR. JACOBS: Yes.
23	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HOSEY: Mr. Kowalcyzk?
24	MR. KOWLACYZK: Yes.
25	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HOSEY: Thank you. So

1	we premarked Exhibits 1 through 12 for appellants and A
2	through AA for respondent, FTB, at the prehearing
3	conference held on July 9th, 2019.
4	Mr. Jacobs, do you have any objections to
5	admitting A through AA?
6	MR. JACOBS: No.
7	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HOSEY: Thank you.
8	(Department's Exhibits A-AA were received
9	in evidence by the Administrative Law Judge.)
10	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HOSEY: Mr. Kowalcyzk any
11	objections to admitting Exhibits 1 through 12?
12	MR. KOWLACYZK: No.
13	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HOSEY: Thank you.
14	(Appellant's Exhibits 1-12 were received
15	in evidence by the Administrative Law Judge.)
16	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HOSEY: Mr. Jacobs, do
17	you have any new exhibits today?
18	MR. JACOBS: No.
19	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HOSEY: Thank you.
20	Mr. Kowalcyzk?
21	MR. KOWLACYZK: No.
22	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HOSEY: Great. Exhibits
23	1 through 12 and A through AA are admitted as evidence
24	into the record.
25	Mr. Jacobs, are you ready for your presentation?

MR. JACOBS: I am.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HOSEY: Please begin.

2.0

OPENING STATEMENT

MR. JACOBS: So let's see what really happened here. Appellant filed a return which showed a refund of \$7,958 in 2014 and ended up costing him \$20,045 because of penalty and interest. So the issue is there reasonable cause.

Appellant was employed in the State of California 2014, while his family resided in Illinois, and he had \$88,139 withheld from state income taxes, and he was entitled to an estimated refund of \$7,958. As dated October 2nd, 2018, and indicated in respondent's opening brief page 4, appellants previously filed timely, tax returns for 2012 and 2013 as nonresidents.

However, a tax in our Respondent's Exhibits V, W, Y, and Z -- I'm not sure if Y and Z was actually -- actual exhibit was on there or not -- all referred to duplicates for the year 2013 as not filed, even though the preset was.

So my question is why are there incorrect requests for tax returns for the year 2013 in respondent's brief for 2014? Anyone who would refer to these exhibits may think the rest of the briefs and demands are subject

to question. By not filing and by not responding timely and properly to notices and demand letters, appellant's CPA and CPA tax attorney caused appellants to incur an assessed delinquency penalty and a demand penalty totaling \$20,045 based upon total tax liability without any reduction for California withholding.

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The form 540NR 2014 was received

September 1st, 2016, Respondent's Exhibit H, the final notice before levy and lien, dated 9/12/2016, Exhibit G, indicates a penalty code of AD. AD means failure to file by the due date, and demand failure to file for a total amount of \$22,835. So the failure to file by due date penalty of approximately \$2,800 was abated.

When a penalty code A was removed from the notice of state income tax dated 9/26/16, Respondent's Exhibit N, it did not state any reason for the abatement of the delinquency penalty file. My question is why wasn't the demand failure to file penalty, penalty D, also abated at that time, September 26, 2016.

The failure to file the return by the due date and the demand failure to file penalties were caused by the same inaction their CPA and CPA tax attorney. The penalties were intertwined with similar facts and similar tax law. Although, Mr. Hense was a nonresident when he was working 2012, '13, and '14 in California, he went back

each weekend -- each weekend for three years,
approximately 150 times, to be with his wife and children,
especially with his son Eric.

Eric has a medical condition which includes malformations in the interior and posterior portions of the brain. Plus, neurologists are undecided if his corpus -- these are all tricky words -- callosum is present or his immunity is failing. It's difficult to identify. His condition is present similar to cerebral palsy.

Although appellants have never been given a simple diagnosis or description, such as within months of his birth were told he may never walk or talk. However, over a period of 9 to 10 years, he attends school. And he's had physical therapy, neuro muscular and speech therapy. Eric walks, talks, plays, and attends school with neuro normal children, albeit with the aid of a full-time aide at all times.

His wife, who did not go to California to be with him nor his kids -- he stayed in California -- had the responsibility to take the children -- Eric, for physical therapy and medical doctors. That's Exhibit 5.

Appellants continue to use their current accounting firm, Marvin M. Siegel CPA PC, located in the State of Illinois to prepare and file forms 540NR for 2012

and '13, which I previously stated were filed timely, and then subsequently 2014 in California. Marvin Siegel CPA PC is an Illinois accounting firm and has a long-term relationship with appellants. The accounting firm has two partners, Steven Siegel CPA and Marvin Siegel, CPA, tax attorney with a master's degree in taxation.

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Appellants felt comfortable relying on their long-term representation with them, and who were familiar with appellants' financial and family issues, and specialized in taxation to prepare and file timely their 2012 and 2013 in California. Although the CPA firm was located in Illinois, the CPA Firm Mobility Act allows CPA firms to provide services across state lines without having to register in each in which they offer these services.

As previously stated, appellants were clients for many years with the firm and trusted their expertise in preparing their returns. Appellants exercised ordinary business care and prudence in choosing their tax preparers who they have confidence in and who they have used for many years to file the 2014NR. This was neither frivolous, negligent, or an illegal act.

However, appellants' CPA and tax attorney were not familiar with the requirement to file -- timely file a return in order to avoid late filing and demand penalties

that were being assessed on the total tax even though a refund was due in the State of California. Even a tax professional in the State of California never had this issue could have overlooked this provision.

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This was a substantive issue. This was not a mathematical error. It was instead an erroneous interpretation of the law by appellants' tax professionals, which appellant reasonably relied in determining whether or not they needed to file timely. Also, appellants' CPA and tax attorney were not aware of the requirements to respond and the consequence to additional penalties and demand letters.

There are several cases which indicate when reasonable cause comes into place. This one is a little tricky of a name for me to pronounce. In Rohrbaugh versus United States -- decided in United States versus Boyle, in the statement thereon, both relied on taxpayer's CPA or CPA tax attorney on a substantive issue and had also -- he had also relied on other medical serious illness as reasonable cause for hardship defense.

In the additional case which I submitted,

Repetto, indicated that if taxpayer relies on improper

advice of an accountant or tax attorney as a matter of tax

law failing to file if there were two conditions met. The

person relied on a tax professional with competency on the

subject; and two, whether the professional advice was based on taxpayer's full disclosure of relevant facts and documents.

Also in Rohrbaugh, it indicated it is not the purpose of the law to penalize innocent errors made in spite exercising reasonable cause. Although appellants' CPA and CPA tax attorney had competency in the subject tax law, taxation, and income taxes, they were not required to be familiar with all the California code provisions. They require the requirement to file timely tax returns in California in order to avoid late filing penalties and demand penalties, even though a refund was due.

The code provision in Illinois was different than in California. Appellants' CPA and CP were also not aware of the requirements to respond timely to the additional penalty notice and demand letters. CPA tax attorney submitted declaration of facts under perjury of law, Exhibit one-one or 11, I guess. It's Exhibit 11.

Based upon the above court cases, appellants have reasonable cause and/or undue hardship defense.

Appellants did not intentionally or negligently not file.

They reasonably relied on their CPA and CPA tax attorney by substantive issue of whether or not to timely file.

Based upon the reasonable cause or serious illness hardship, based upon son's, Eric, medical conditions, the

1 demand to file penalty should be abated and interest be 2 recomputed. 3 Thank you. 4 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HOSEY: All right. Thank you, Mr. Jacobs. 5 Do we have any questions from the co-panel? 6 7 Judge Cho? ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE CHO: I have no 8 9 questions at this time. 10 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HOSEY: Judge Tay? 11 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE TAY: Mr. Jacobs, you 12 mentioned a hardship defense as grounds for reasonable 13 cause for the demand penalty. I note that the demand notice question was issued January 2016. And there was a 14 15 deadline to respond, February 2016. Do you have any facts 16 that support the hardship defense for that time period? Well, it's the same all the way 17 MR. JACOBS: 18 through. I mean he was moving -- going back and forth 19 during those periods of time, and it was still a hardship. 2.0 It was indicated also in the declarations that the CPA and 21 tax attorney did get the documents, notices, and did not 22 respond. 23 So they have been relying on them for many years. 24 Prior to even 2012 they were clients. And these are 25 clients who had, you know, sufficient knowledge what they

should do and not do.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE TAY: Thank you.

MR. JACOBS: You're welcome.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE TAY: In regards to the reliance on the CPA tax attorney, do you have any evidence of specific advice that your clients received with regard to the response, any kind of response to --

MR. JACOBS: So I did -- I did send an e-mail in that talked about it. But, basically, what happened was that Mr. Hence was in California working and all that stuff. And the accountants and tax attorney said, "Look, we believe there is not going to be any penalties, and, therefore, we don't have to file timely, which was wrong. This was wrong, you know. They made a mistake. They weren't right.

Therefore, they didn't proceed in gathering all the information they could have gotten because they did file timely in 2012 and 2013. So sometimes -- well, first of all, they didn't keep good records either because there was no documentation on that when I asked them for it.

They said, "No, we never discussed it with them."

So sometimes no documentation is the best documentation. They didn't converse with him. They didn't keep him abreast. They were wrong in the analysis of filing the tax return. It was a mess.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE TAY: Okay. And just to clarify when you say they didn't need to file, did that include not needing to respond in any other way to the notice?

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MR. JACOBS: Well, first of all, the notices would come, and they would also come to the attorney and CPA. They didn't respond to them. So they did not realize how important it was. And taxpayers, appellants, they relied -- I mean, they weren't involved in this. They gave them all the information to file 2012 and '13, even though they indicate that those records that I was mentioning said they weren't filed. 2013 wasn't filed timely.

Those documents are very difficult to read, even if somebody were to read them. They would have to know what the A means. You have to do what the D means. You have to do this. You have to do that. I'm not making excuses. I'm just saying that based upon the stress of being away and having to deal with the situation at home, the appellants did not look at the notices. The CPA attorneys did or did not look at the notices. They didn't respond appropriately. So that's all.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE TAY: Thank you. Just last point ever clarification when you said they didn't discuss it, do you mean that -- that your clients did not

discuss the notices at all with the CPA? 1 2 Well, the CPA got the notices. MR. JACOBS: They should have responded properly. 3 CPA got the notices. It's the same issue. First of all, this issue wouldn't 4 have occurred if it would have been filed timely. 5 6 Everything starts at the top. They didn't file timely. 7 They got penalized. They got a delinquency of penalty. 8 That was abated. Why was that abated? There's no record 9 of why it was abated. And then after that, they filed a tax return and 10 11 they started -- and they continued to get demand notices, 12 and those weren't responded to. Like I said, why wasn't 13 the demand abated at the same time. It's all the same issue. If they would have filed timely, he would have 14 15 gotten his refund. He would have no penalties. 16 of non-filing he's getting demand notices which weren't 17 responded to properly. And then taxpayers, appellants, 18 kept believing in their accountants. 19 It's all one thing. It started at the top, went 2.0 down. It's all the same issue. 21 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE TAY: Thank you. 22 MR. JACOBS: You're welcome. 23 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HOSEY: Okay. Thank 24 you. 25 Mr. Kowalcyzk, I'm probably jumping ahead here a

little, but since Mr. Jacobs brought up the abatement of the delinquent penalty, which we discussed at the prehearing conference, can you explain the reasoning for the abatement, FTB's abatement of the delinquent penalty?

MR. KOWLACYZK: Yes.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HOSEY: Okay.

MR. KOWLACYZK: So because the taxpayers did not file a 2014 tax return on time, respondent imposed a delinquent filing penalty. However, once we receive their tax return, the tax return showed that they were owed a refund because they had sufficient tax payments.

So the way the demand -- the delinquent filing penalty works is that in the calculation of it, if there are sufficient tax payments, those are taken into account when determining how much of the delinquent filing penalty will be imposed. In this case because they had sufficient tax payments to satisfy their tax liability, the delinquent filing penalty would have effectively been calculated at zero. And that's why the delinquent filing penalty was made.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HOSEY: Okay. Thank you. If you would like to begin your presentation as well, please -- sorry. I probably messed you up a little bit, but please proceed.

MR. KOWLACYZK: Thank you.

OPENING STATEMENT

2.0

MR. KOWLACYZK: Good morning. The issue before us today is whether appellants have met their burden of proof to establish reasonable cause to abate the demand penalty for tax year 2014. To establish reasonable cause, appellants must show their failure to reply to the demand for tax return occurred despite exercise of ordinary care and business prudence.

Appellants argue they established reasonable cause to abate the demand penalty because they relied on the advice stating they did not have to file a timely tax return when they were due a refund. However, this argument fails because ordinary care and business prudence require appellants to timely reply to the demand and explain why they were not required to file a tax return.

Appellants had a non-delible duty to respond to the demand notice. In addition, appellants' argument that they didn't have to reply to the demand because they had sufficient tax payments to satisfy their tax liability also does not constitute reasonable cause. Appellants also argue they established reasonable cause because appellant, husband, spent the majority of his time traveling to and from Illinois to California for work.

However, workplace pressures do not constitute reasonable cause, and appellant, husband, quit his job

1 approximately one year before respondent issued the demand 2 Finally, appellants argue they for tax return. established reasonable cause to abate the demand penalty 3 4 because they have a child with physical disabilities. However, this argument also failed because appellants have 5 6 not explained how having a child with physical 7 disabilities continuously prevented them from responding 8 to the demand notice. 9 As stated in the appeal of Haliburka (phonetic), medical conditions do not constitute reasonable cause 10 11 unless the taxpayers were continuously prevented from 12 responding to the demand notice. The only explanation 13 appellants provided for why they did not respond to the demand notice, was because the demand notice was either 14 15 misplaced or thrown out, which are both not reasonable 16 cause. Accordingly, appellants have not met their burden 17 18 of proof to establish reasonable cause, and for the 19 Franchise Tax Board, action must be sustained. 2.0 Thank you. 21 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HOSEY: Thank you. Do I 22 have any questions from the panel? 23 Judge Cho? 24 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE CHO: Yeah. Just a 25 couple of quick clarifying questions. In earlier

1 presentation by Mr. Jacobs, he was saying how the 2 appellants have timely filed their 2013 tax returns, but it looks like FTB's position is that those tax returns 3 4 were not timely filed. Can I just get your response to that? 5 6 MR. KOWLACYZK: Yes. So respondent issued a 7 request for tax return on April 22nd, 2015, for the 2013 8 year, and that's Respondent's Exhibit V. And also in 9 Respondent's Exhibit W, we issued a Notice of Proposed 10 Assessment when they did not file a tax return in response 11 for the request for tax return. 12 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE CHO: Okay. Thank you. 13 Mr. Jacobs, do you have a response to that? 14 MR. JACOBS: Yes. It was filed timely. 15 filed timely. 16 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE CHO: Do you have any 17 evidence to support your statement? 18 MR. JACOBS: Yeah. In the respondent's opening 19 brief, page 4, it says, "Appellants previously filed 2.0 timely California returns for 2012 and '13 as 21 nonresidents." It's in the middle. 22 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE CHO: One second. I'm 23 sorry. 24 MR. KOWLACYZK: Can I clarify the statement? Ιt 25 says in -- appellants representative stated that.

1	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE CHO: I see.
2	MR. KOWLACYZK: Yes.
3	MR. JACOBS: I'm not sure what that says. It's
4	clear to me that it says
5	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE CHO: So it looks like
6	FTB is just repeating your arguments in their brief.
7	MR. JACOBS: I don't think so.
8	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE CHO: So other than this
9	document, do you have anything else
10	MR. JACOBS: No.
11	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE CHO: to kind of
12	support that?
13	MR. JACOBS: No. And I I have they would
14	have to have the records to show if there was a penalty
15	assessed or not.
16	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE CHO: Okay. Thank you.
17	And then another quick question for Mr. Kowalcyzk
18	is the calculation of the penalties. So from what I
19	understand FTB's position is that the delinquent filing
20	penalties measured off of the tax owed. And the demand
21	penalty, what is that measured off of?
22	MR. KOWLACYZK: So the demand penalty is
23	calculated based on the amount of tax that's required to
24	be shown on the tax return without taking into account
25	timely payment.

1	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE CHO: Okay. So is that
2	the difference between Section 19131 and 19133?
3	MR. KOWLACYZK: Correct.
4	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE CHO: Okay. Did you
5	understand that, Mr. Jacobs?
6	MR. JACOBS: Yes. But my argument is, as I said
7	before, there would be no demand penalty if it was filed
8	timely. So the whole issue is a reliance on the attorney
9	and the CPA. It's one issue. One issue continuing
10	through the whole mess, that if you would have filed
11	timely based upon the attorneys and tax reps, you know,
12	the right way to do it, there would be no penalty. And
13	there would be no notices.
14	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE CHO: Okay. Thank you.
15	That's all questions I had.
16	MR. JACOBS: So, basically, I'm saying is, there
17	was a reasonable cause not to file. And there was
18	reasonable cause to abate the demand penalties also
19	because it's all one issue.
20	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HOSEY: Okay. Thank
21	you.
22	Judge Tay?
23	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE TAY: Mr. Kowalczyk, to
24	the question of reasonable reliance on the tax
25	professional, I note that in your brief you cite U.S.

versus Boyle. I also note that's -- that addresses the late filing penalty. Are there -- do you have any other cases that would apply the same standards to finding a reasonable cause to the demand penalty?

MR. KOWLACYZK: Not in particular. But in this case, Boyle does not apply because the taxpayer, as appellants' representative has stated, the taxpayers did not receive advice regarding how to respond to the demand. And the only time they did receive advice, was about 9 months before respondent issued the demand notice. And that was in regards to how -- if they needed to file a return from the original due date.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE TAY: You mean nonspecific written advice on the -- whether or not there's a requirement to respond to the demand or -- what do you mean by advice?

MR. KOWLACYZK: They did not receive tax advice on whether they needed to respond to the demand notice.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE TAY: The Boyle is -kind of holding in Boyle is really more about the fact
that there was a deadline, and the deadline is not really
tax advice at all.

MR. KOWLACYZK: Yes. That -- that is true. And Boyle also stands for the proposition that taxpayers do not have -- or have a non-delible duty to timely file

their tax return. And in Boyle, the taxpayers relied on their CPA to file a tax return. And in that case, that does not constitute reasonable cause. But if they did receive advice as to a matter of tax, then it could be considered reasonable cause.

2.0

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE TAY: If we were to find that there was advice about whether or not to -- there was a filing -- a response requirement overall, would that be substantive tax advice?

MR. KOWLACYZK: No. That would not be tax advice because it does not get to the issue of whether there needed to be a legal interpretation or a legal opinion.

It's just merely following a deadline.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE TAY: So you're saying that if the taxpayer received advice from their attorney saying you don't have to file because you're -- you paid enough and you're an Illinois resident, that's not substantive tax advice? Is that what you are saying?

MR. KOWLACYZK: Yes. That would not be substantive tax advice because that's merely a calculation of the amount of tax due, and it's not a matter of California tax law. If the attorney would say that because of a certain provision in the tax code, such as whether they were a non -- whether it would be -- they could be considered a resident or nonresident.

Then that might be considered substantive tax advice, but in this case that would be merely a calculation of the tax due. And it doesn't really require a legal opinion to determine whether they would need to file.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE TAY: I see you're making the distinction between a mathematical calculation -- excuse me -- as to whether tax is due versus whether or not they have a requirement to respond to the notice. That's the distinction that you're making?

MR. KOWLACYZK: Yes.

2.0

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE TAY: Okay. No further questions on that.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HOSEY: Okay. I'm going to bring up something a little different. As we were preparing for this hearing, we started talking about Subsection (b)of 19133, specifically (b)(2). (B)(1) requires for the application of demand penalty whether the taxpayer fails to respond to the current demand for tax, which we have -- we're discussing now.

But (b)(2) also requires FTB to propose an assessment of tax after the taxpayer fails to timely respond to a demand at any time during the taxable year period preceding the taxable year, which is 2014. And we were kind of discussing that language and what it means.

And I know we haven't -- we didn't bring this up in the prehearing conference, or it really wasn't ferreted out in the briefing. So if you would like to respond, you're more than welcome to. But I'm thinking what I'll do is have a post-hearing briefing on that specific other issue. And I will issue an order kind of explaining what I would like to -- or what we as a panel would like to hear about that subsection.

2.0

Mr. Kowalcyzk, if you would like to make a statement, you're more than welcome to. But I do believe I'm going to give each party a chance to brief it after the hearing today.

MR. KOWLACYZK: I will make a quick statement about that issue, if that's all right?

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HOSEY: Okay. Yeah. Please.

MR. KOWLACYZK: So literally reading of regulation 19133 Subdivision (b)(2), provides that the demand penalties are properly imposed when the notice of proposed assessment is issued during 4-year taxable period prior to the taxable year in the demand penalty.

However, Subdivision (d) of example 2 shows the demand penalty is properly imposed when the notice of proposed assessment is issued for one of the previous calendar years. The United States Supreme Court and the

California Courts of Appeal have explained that when interpreting a regulation, every word and phrase in the regulation must have meaning and the regulation as a whole must be read as a whole so that all parts are given effect.

2.0

If there's an ambiguity on the regulation, then the court is to the agency's interpretation of its own regulation. In this case, regulation 19133, is clearly ambiguous on when the demand penalty is properly imposed because Subdivision (d) is inconsistent with subdivision (b)(2).

Respondent contends in regulation 191334 should be interpreted similarly to Subdivision (d), and that the demand penalty is properly imposed when the notice of proposed assessment is issued for one of the previous four calendar years.

This -- this interpretation is consistent with the history of the regulation. Initially the California legislature confer discretionary authority on respondent to assess the demand penalty whenever a taxpayer failed to file a return upon notice and demand. And respondent assess the demand penalty on any non-filer.

In response to public concern, the three-member board adopted policy to only impose the demand penalty on only repeat non-filers who had not filed a tax return in

response to the demand notice on one of the previous four calendar years. Respondent subsequently formally adopted this policy in regulation 19133, and the examples in Subdivision (d) show when the demand penalty will be imposed. Therefore, the panel should defer to respondent's interpretation of when -- the regulation on when the demand penalty should be imposed.

Thank you.

2.0

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HOSEY: Okay.

Mr. Jacobs, I know that lists a lot. So what I'm going to do is I'm going to have FTB do their post-hearing brief first. I'll give you 30 days, since it seems like you have a good grasp on how you want to interpret that subsection.

And then Mr. Jacobs, you'll have 30 days to respond.

Then we will close the record at that point and then confer and issue a decision after that. So we're not ready to submit the case today. The record will remain open for the parties to address this 19133 Subsection (b)(2) requirement. I will issue an order laying out what should be discussed in the deadlines.

But just a heads up, 30 days from today is

August 23d. So I foresee that being Mr. Kowalcyk's

deadline, and then 30 days after that is September 27th,

1 Mr. Jacobs. So I'll issue an order laying out these 2 deadlines, and we will go from there. I appreciate you 3 guys and your time today on this. I know there's a lot to 4 unpack, but the hearing is now adjourned. Wait. Can I have a rebuttal? 5 MR. JACOBS: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HOSEY: Oh, I'm so 6 7 sorry, Mr. Jacobs. Yes, you do have an opportunity for rebuttal. 8 9 Right. And it's a good one. MR. JACOBS: 10 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HOSEY: Okay. 11 hear it. 12 MR. JACOBS: So I'm going to respond to what he said. 13 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HOSEY: Please. 14 15 MR. JACOBS: There was a lot of information he 16 gave us, and it seems to me that it's substantive issues, 17 what he's talking about. And of course, one of my things is a reliable -- reasonable cause based on substantive 18 19 That is definitely a substantive issue. issue. 2.0 think I'm going to be in good hands with my response. 21 The second thing is, yes, both appellants and 22 respondents are relying on the same cases and the same 23 facts for reasonable cause. One thing, however, that is 24 very, very important is in this terrific case, Rohrbaugh.

I don't know if I'm pronouncing it right or not.

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specifically stated, "It is not the purpose of the law to 1 2 penalize innocent errors made despite the exercise of reasonable care." 3 Taxpayers, appellants, used reasonable cause. 4 They relied on their representatives who are knowledgeable 5 6 on taxation to file a tax return. That's a substantive 7 It is not a mathematical issue. issue. Whether or not 8 you have to file timely is in issue in the code, and it 9 says you have to file by a certain date. If they made a 10 decision not to file by a certain date, it's an issue of 11 law, substantive issue. 12 Thank you. 13 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HOSEY: Yes, thank you. 14 Okay. As I stated before, we're not submitting 15 the case today. We're going to leave the record open. will issue the order laying out what we'd like to see 16 17 discussed about the 19133(b)(2) issue. And will layout 18 the deadline for each party again just so it's clear. 19 Again, thank you for your time today. 2.0 MR. JACOBS: Thank you. 21 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HOSEY: And now the 22 hearing is adjourned. 23 (Proceedings adjourned at 10:39 a.m.) 24

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1 HEARING REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 2 I, Ernalyn M. Alonzo, Hearing Reporter in and for 3 the State of California, do hereby certify: 4 5 That the foregoing transcript of proceedings was 6 taken before me at the time and place set forth, that the 7 testimony and proceedings were reported stenographically by me and later transcribed by computer-aided 8 9 transcription under my direction and supervision, that the foregoing is a true record of the testimony and 10 proceedings taken at that time. 11 12 I further certify that I am in no way interested in the outcome of said action. 13 14 I have hereunto subscribed my name this 13th day 15 of August, 2019. 16 17 18 19 ERNALYN M. ALONZO 2.0 HEARING REPORTER 21 22 23 2.4 25