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BEFORE THE OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA
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IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL OF, )
V. ONYEABOR, ) OTA NO. 18063297
APPELLANT.

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TRANSCRIPT OF VIRTUAL PROCEEDINGS
State of California
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Tuesday, July 20, 2021

Reported by:
ERNALYN M. ALONZO
HEARING REPORTER

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BEFORE THE OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS
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    IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL OF, )
V. ONYEABOR, ) OTA NO. 18063297
APPELLANT.
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Transcript of Virtual Proceedings,
taken in the state of California, commencing
at 1:40 p.m. and concluding at 3:59 p.m. on
Tuesday, July 20, 2021, reported by
Ernalyn M. Alonzo, Hearing Reporter, in and
for the State of California.

APPEARANCES:

Panel Lead:

Panel Members:

For the Appellant:

For the Respondent:
ALJ ALBERTO ROSAS

ALJ NGUYEN DANG
ALJ ANDREW WONG
DAVID PIDAL

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF TAX AND
FEE ADMINISTRATION

NALAN SAMARAWICKREMA
JASON PARKER
CHRISTOPHER BROOKS

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(Appellant's Exhibits $1-17$ were received at the prehearing conference. )
(Appellant's Exhibit 18 was received on page 71.)
(Department's Exhibits A-J were received at the prehearing conference. )

## OPENING STATEMENT

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California; Tuesday, July 20, 2021
1:40 p.m.

JUDGE ROSAS: Good afternoon. We're on the record in the matter of the Appeal of Onyeabor, OTA Case Number 18063297. Today is July 20th, 2021, and the time is approximately 1:40 p.m. This hearing was duly noticed for Sacramento, California, but due to ongoing concerns regarding Covid and with the agreement of all the parties, we're holding this hearing remotely using video conferencing.

The panel of Administrative Law Judges includes Nguyen Dang, Andrew Wong and me, Alberto Rosas. Although I may be the lead Administrative Law Judge for purposes of conducting this hearing, please know that the three of us on this panel we are all equal participants and equal decision makers.

Our stenographer today is Ms. Alonzo who is reporting this hearing verbatim. To ensure we have an accurate record, we ask that everyone speaks one at a time and does not speak over each other. Also, please speak slowly and clearly. If needed Ms. Alonzo will stop the hearing process and ask for clarification. After the hearing the stenographer will produce the official hearing transcript, which will be available on the Office of Tax

Appeals' website.
Now, I'm going to ask participants to please state their appearance, state their name for the record, starting with Appellant's representative.

MR. PIDAL: Yeah. David Pidal.
JUDGE ROSAS: This is Judge Rosas. Thank you, Mr. Pidal.

And now for Respondent's representatives.
MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: This is Nalan
Samarawickrema, Hearing Representative.
MR. PARKER: This is Jason Parker, Chief of Headquarters, Operations Bureau.

MR. BROOKS: This is Christopher Brooks, Tax Counsel for CDTFA.

JUDGE ROSAS: This is Judge Rosas. Thank you, gentlemen.

I do want to point something out about virtual hearings in general and the visual optics of how I may come across onscreen. Today's virtual hearing -- during today's virtual hearing, it may sometimes seem that I'm not looking at you or that $I$ am distracted, but that is not the case. I have two monitors in front of me. I'm also using an instant messenger app where I am able to communicate with my co-panelists, or earlier, I was able to communicate with tech support, and where I'm able to
communicate with management and staff members who work behind the scenes to make these virtual hearings possible. Regardless of how I may come across onscreen, I assure you I am listening to you, and I am taking good notes.

Now, before we continue, $I$ just want to ask whether there's anything that my co-panelists wish to add at this time.

Judge Dang?
JUDGE DANG: This is Judge Dang speaking. Thank you, Judge Rosas. I have nothing further to add.

JUDGE ROSAS: This is Judge Rosas. Thank you, Judge Dang.

Judge Wong, anything to add before we continue? JUDGE WONG: This is Judge Wong. I also have nothing to add. Thank you.

JUDGE ROSAS: This is Judge Rosas. Thank you. We held a prehearing conference on June 29th of this year. As a result of that conference, Appellant's Exhibits 1 through 17 were admitted into evidence without objection. Also, Respondent's Exhibits Alpha through Juliet were admitted into evidence without objection. The conference resulted in the issuance of prehearing conference minutes and orders, and those minutes and orders included six orders. Those orders and the minutes and orders are self-explanatory. But just in
case, I will ask the parties whether they have any questions.

Mr. Pidal?

MR. PIDAL: Yes. David Pidal. No question.
JUDGE ROSAS: This is Judge Rosas. And for Mr. Samarawickrema.

MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: This is Samarawickrema. No questions. Thank you.

JUDGE ROSAS: This is Judge Rosas. Thank you, gentlemen.

Before I proceed, I do want to address the recent development regarding what has been marked for identification as Exhibit 18. This was an exhibit that Mr. Pidal sent to everyone earlier today via e-mail.

Mr. Pidal, what was Exhibit 18?

MR. PIDAL: Yes. Thank you. This is David Pidal. Exhibit 18 is, basically, were purchases that were marked up by CDTFA. I found that some of those vehicles were resold to Manheim, an auction house. So, therefore, it would be deleted from the purchases that are marked up and should be allowed as an exempt sale for resale.

JUDGE ROSAS: This is Judge Rosas. Thank you, Mr. Pidal.

Respondent, do you have any objections or concerns regarding the admissibility of Exhibit 18 at this
stage?
MR. BROOKS: This is Christopher Brooks. Yes, Your Honor. The -- excuse me. Yes, Mr. Rosas. The exhibit is obviously late. We haven't had the time to adequately go through it, and so we would object to it.

JUDGE ROSAS: This is Judge Rosas. Thank you, Mr. Brooks.

I do realize that we did indicate and inquire during the prehearing conference whether there were any additional exhibits. And, generally, per OTA's regulations, any new exhibits should be submitted 15 days prior to the oral hearing, or sooner if requested by the Administrative Law Judge. There was no indication regarding this exhibit, but I'm not going to rule on that at this time. I'm going to reserve my ruling on that.

In discussing other matters with my co-panelists,
it may very well be that we might be asking the parties for post-hearing briefs. We don't know. We'll discuss that before we conclude this hearing. In the event that we do request pre-hearing briefs, at that time we'll also probably ask Respondent to respond regarding Exhibit 18. For the time being it's not being admitted as mentioned, but I do reserve the right to admit it at a later time.

Any questions or concerns regarding Exhibit 18 before we move on? Was it clear what I mentioned
regarding the fact that I'm reserving making a ruling on the admissibility of that exhibit?

MR. BROOKS: No, Your Honor. This is Christopher Brooks again. I just want to make it clear. The Department believes that these documents -- these sales have already been removed. But, again, we haven't had a chance to go through the exhibit carefully, and that's why we make our objection.

JUDGE ROSAS: This is Judge Rosas. No, I understand, Mr. Brooks. Thank you for that objection.

Moving forward I do want to give the parties an opportunity to discuss the issues before us. As stated in the prehearing conference minutes and orders, the parties disagreed as to the specific issues that this panel is asked to decide. As I mentioned, it's fine to disagree. The parties may agree to disagree. In fact, that's why we're here because there has been a disagreement between the parties.

But as indicated during the prehearing conference, I did want to give each party a brief opportunity to provide an opening statement, specifically, focusing on the issues that you believe this panel must decide. And by brief, I mean one to two minutes. And I'll get started with Mr. Pidal first.

Mr. Pidal, whenever you're ready please provide a
brief statement of the issues.

## OPENING STATEMENT

MR. PIDAL: Yeah. Excuse me. This is David Pidal the representative. Basically, my understanding is that the Appellant was issued a wholesale license with the occupational license, which is part of DMV, therefore, was not able to prepare a report of sales book or report of sales as a normal used car lot or a used car dealer.

Initially, the CDTFA, they got the purchases from the auction houses, various auction houses in the area, and they marked up the purchases by 50 percent. And later on during the appeals -- later on during the audit, they arbitrarily marked it down -- used a markup of 25 percent, which they said was the industry average or below the industry average. I don't know where that industry average comes from. I have worked with the Board of Equalization for 34 years. I've been representing taxpayers for 12 years. So I have 45 years of experience with the Board of Equalization. I've never heard such a markup in the used car dealership.

CDTFA did make some adjustments for resales and for vehicles that were assessed tax on the cost because they were either gifted, as they put it, or used as demonstration display. My main contention is that the

25 percent markup that's being used is overstated. And based on information contained in the audit-working papers, I've established a 7.24 percent markup, which is a lot more reasonable than what the -- than the 25 percent. And it's supported by research I did on the internet. It's supported by the Audit Manual itself. And it's supported by the statements that the Appellant had made during the appeals conference that they only sell for $\$ 100$ to $\$ 300$ a vehicle.

And, unfortunately, the Appellant is -- is under the strong belief that they sold the vehicles for resale or sales in interstate or foreign commerce. However, unfortunately, the documentation to support those exempt sales were not available. Therefore, CDTFA used the markup of 25 percent. So I want to establish that the 7.24 is much more reasonable.

And Exhibit 18, I know we won't discuss at this time, but there are other adjustments that should be made to the purchases.

JUDGE ROSAS: This is Judge Rosas. Thank you, Mr. Pidal.

Now to Respondent, Mr. Samarawickrema, whenever you're ready a brief statement of the issues. / / / / / /

MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: Thank you. This is Nalan Samarawickrema.

The three audit issues presented to your panel today are whether Appellant has shown that adjustments are warranted to the unreported audited taxable sale of \$314,063; whether Appellant has shown that adjustments are shown to the unreported withdrawal of inventory subject to use tax of $\$ 9,800$; and whether Appellant has shown that adjustments are warranted to the unreported use of the vehicles prior to be resold of $\$ 2,263$.

Thank you.
JUDGE ROSAS: This is Judge Rosas. Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. Pidal, I do want to just ask for
clarification. It seems that the issue that you're framing has to do with the alleged unreported taxable sales. You described it as 3 points -- I'm sorry -- 7.24 percent markup rather than 25 percent. What about the other two issues that Mr. Samarawickrema just described; the use tax regarding three vehicles withdrawing from inventory, and also the unreported use of vehicles from resale inventory. Are you not disagreeing with those? Is your focus just on the markup for the unreported taxable sales?

MR. PIDAL: Yeah. This is David Pidal. As I said, I've worked with Board of Equalization for 34 years. So, yes, I understand the adjustment, and although the Appellant doesn't agree with it, I know what -- I know what it is. I know what the regulation says. I know what the law is. I know how the audit procedure is. So I cannot disagree with that -- with those items, the 160 th and the 140 th, or the cost of vehicles.

JUDGE ROSAS: So just to be clear, Mr. Pidal. We're going to -- Appellant is going to concede what has been described as Issues 2 and 3, and we're just going to move forward focusing on the bulk of the appeal, which is the unreported taxable sales and the markup that applies to those; is that correct?

MR. PIDAL: That's correct.
JUDGE ROSAS: Okay. And I believe I saw something in the chatter function. One of my co-panelists wanted to clarify something.

JUDGE DANG: This is Judge Dang speaking. Judge Rosas, I did have the same question that you had just asked the Appellant, so thank you.

JUDGE ROSAS: Thank you, Judge Dang.
At this point, we're going to just move forward
with the oral argument. And I realize that the Appellant is not here nor is the other witness. So we're just going
to avoid any issues regarding witness testimony, and we're going to skip right to the argument portion. I want to thank both parties for already clarifying the issues before us. That is very helpful to the panel.

We'll turn it over to Mr. Pidal as Appellant's representative to provide his presentation. As we discussed, a vague estimate was 20 minutes. But if you need any additional time, Mr. Pidal, please just let us know if you need additional time.

Also, in terms of Exhibit 18, even though I have not ruled on the admissibility of it, feel free if you want to address it or make any arguments. At this point, Exhibit 18 is just for identification purposes, but I don't know whether the panel will decide after we meet and confer whether that exhibit needs to be admitted. We'll cross that bridge when we get to it. We'll deal with the admissibility of Exhibit 18 in due course. At this point I'm reserving any order on that admissibility, but that does not mean that either party has to avoid addressing Exhibit 18. If either party wants to talk about it to the extent that you can, please feel free to do so.

With that said, Mr. Pidal, I will turn it over to
you. You have approximately 20 minutes for your
presentation. And as I mentioned, you and the panel, we all have the PDF, the electronic exhibit binder. In the

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event that you want to refer to any exhibits, please do so, and we will be able to follow along. I'll turn it over to you, Mr. Pidal. Thank you, sir.

## PRESENTATION

MR. PIDAL: All right. Thank you. This is David Pidal. Thank you.

I submitted exhibits, I believe, 12 through 17 to support the markup of 7.24 percent. And I'm not sure if I need to explain what the markup is, but -- but, basically, CDTFA took the cost of the vehicles from the auction houses, made adjustments for vehicles gifted or sales for resale that were verified. And as I said, initially, they were -- the CDTFA marked them up at 50 percent.

It was then determined by, I believe, the Riverside office that did the audit, that the Appellant did not have a used car lot. Exhibit 12 that I submitted is a picture of the office space that the Appellant had. It was about a 200-square foot office. There was no lot. There was no inventory of vehicles.

And on that premise, I believe CDTFA said, well instead of using 50 percent, we'll use 25 percent. And, basically -- I'm reading in the analysis -- basically as 1 quote, it says, "Staff used a conservative retail markup percentage of 25 percent." Again, I don't know where

CDTFA got the conservative markup of 25 percent. I don't know where they got 50 percent.

Again, I worked for the Board for 34 years. I've represented clients for the last 12 years. Nowhere have I come across that type of markup in the used car lot. But using the information contained in the audit working papers, I was able to trace some cost of vehicles and trace the respective selling prices. And that's in my exhibit -- that's my Exhibit 13, which basically schedules vehicles that are in the audit working papers. As I note in the exhibit, lines 1 through 17 are from the audit working paper $1 R-12 \mathrm{E}-1$. And lines 17 and 18 are from the working paper $2 \mathrm{R}-12 \mathrm{~F}$.

Now, if you look at the Exhibit 13, there's about -- at least 17 vehicles. And you can see that the markup ranges are all over the place. So to try to get some kind of representative markup I -- I subtract -- I took out the two highest and the two lowest markups of vehicles, you know, for -- to eliminate, you know, the significant aberrations in that test. After adjusting for that, the markup that is scheduled on Exhibit 13 is 7.24 .

Again, that 7.24 is in line with what the Appellant had tried to sell. They would go to the auction. They would sell the vehicles. And it's stated in the decision and recommendation that he would sell for
$\$ 100$ to $\$ 300$, which would even be a lower markup than the 7.24 percent. I also did some research on the internet, and I searched what is the markup on a used vehicle on a -- or a used car dealer.

My research indicated that they say that the average markup in a used car dealer is between 10 and 15 percent, which is Exhibit 14, Autohitch website. Of course, they say the average cost of a vehicle is between 10 and $\$ 20,000$. My client or the Appellant doesn't have that type of vehicle. Their vehicles are anywhere from, you know, \$7 -- actually, range from $\$ 200$ up to, you know, $\$ 5,000$. So that type of vehicle they're not going to generate a 25 percent markup or let alone a 15 percent markup. So again, my research on the internet indicates that the 25 percent markup that CDTFA used is over. It's way too high, even though they say it's a conservative markup.

The other thing is that the -- the Audit Manual. My client is -- was issued a license, a wholesale license, not a retail, license under the occupational license part of DMV. Audit Manual Section -- sections -- Audit Manual Section 0604.10 talks about used car wholesalers. And in the Audit Manual it states that they have a small margin of profit, 25 to $\$ 50$ per vehicle. And that's what my -that's what the Appellant is, a wholesale license.

So they have a -- the CDTFA's Audit Manual alone understands that there's a low markup when you're dealing with wholesale. Keep in mind that these vehicles are not sold at retail. They were sold either interstate or foreign commence for sales for resale. And they are not being allowed because the documentation was not there to support such exemptions. So if they're not supported as an exemption, they should be marked up to a fair markup. Again, the Audit Manual itself talks about used car wholesale; Exhibit 17, which quotes Audit Manual Section 60 -- I mean, 0604.1 .

Furthermore, the Appellant was never issued any report of sale books until February of 2011. The Appellant has no idea who requested it. DMV -- I'm sorry. Yeah. DMV or the Consumer Use Tax Division of CDTFA got the information saying that somehow on $2 / 28 / 11$, Exhibit 16 -- on 2/28/2011, our ROS sales -- report of sales were requested. They could not find a hard copy of who requested that. So I -- the Appellant denies or has no knowledge of requesting that.

As a matter of fact, in 2011, February of 2011, the landlord of the office that I showed you -- they did not pay the rent. So they got kicked out of the office. And with that, unfortunately, they lost their records. That's about the time when somebody requested these report
of sale books. I don't know if someone saw the records and said, hey, let's request some records. I don't know. DMV could not provide a hard copy of the application.

So again, in summary, I believe a fair markup to be used to apply to the purchases would be 7.24 percent. And Exhibit 18 is additional adjustments to those purchases that are marked up. Whether it's at 7.24 or at 25 percent, those vehicles were not adjusted. CDTFA did make adjustments, and those were not adjusted.

So that is what we're seeking here is that the markup is applied to adjusted purchases is 7.24 percent, and the purchases should be adjusted for the amounts listed on Exhibit 18. I didn't -- I didn't do the math and the extensions of the measure of tax on that, but those are the adjustments that we're seeking.

JUDGE ROSAS: This is Judge Rosas. Thank you, Mr. Pidal. It seems that concludes your presentation. Is that correct, sir?

MR. PIDAL: It's David. Yes, that's correct, Judge Rosas.

JUDGE ROSAS: Thank you, Mr. Pidal.
Before we turn it over to CDTFA to give their presentation, I'm going to see if any of my co-panelists have any clarifying questions for Mr. Pidal based on his presentation.

Judge Dang.
JUDGE DANG: This is Judge Dang speaking. Mr. Pidal, I did have a few questions for you, if you wouldn't mind indulging me, please. It's my understanding, and please correct me if I am wrong in any way, but that license wholesale dealers are required to file a wholesale report of sale with the DMV whenever they dispose of the vehicles in the manner that you're asserting here, that they were either resold back to the auction house or sold to other retail dealers. Do you happen to know if Appellant had ever filed any of these wholesale ROS reports?

MR. PIDAL: Yeah. This is David -- David Pidal. There were only 24 issues per DMV per the request from CDTFA from the Consumer Use Tax Division. There were only 24 ROS's requested for wholesale. You are correct in that the whole -- the -- I'm not sure what the form is, but currently it's called a Reg 396. I don't know what it was back in 2011 and 2009 and that, but they're supposed to, yes, complete the information.

Again, I don't know what was on there back then, but if you look -- when I looked at the website of DMV, yeah, they're supposed to complete it, and it comes in triplicate. They are supposed to retain one copy, a blue copy. Unfortunately, as I stated earlier whether or not
the Appellant completed those ROS's -- and I'm thinking based on the amounts that are involved with the auction houses, if they only had 24, I don't see how they're going to complete the 24. I mean, they only have 24 . So did they complete them? I'm going to say I don't know.

JUDGE DANG: This is Judge Dang. Thank you, Mr. Pidal. If I could get some clarification from CDTFA before I proceed with my questions for you.

Was Respondent able to obtain -- was it the actual ROS that Respondent obtained, or was it registration information? Is there some difference here that I may be missing?

MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: This is Nalan Samarawickrema. We requested the DMV information for the 99 cars. You know, for the audit period there were 99 cars, and the Department received 37. And we make adjustment based on that 37 DMV information.

JUDGE DANG: This is Judge Dang, if I can just interrupt you for a moment. The information that you received from DMV, was that registration related information, or was that information that would be contained within a report of sale?

MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: This is Nalan
Samarawickrema. This is according to the sale -- the -when the dealer makes a sale, they have to file the
paperwork, the report of sales. So that -- that information is the one -- the information that we receive from the DMV.

JUDGE DANG: Okay. This is Judge Dang. I just want to be very clear. So when Respondent -- when Department says that there's no information available for 50-some-odd transactions from DMV, are you saying that's because either the vehicle was not subject to registration in California, or are you saying that no report of sale had been filed?

MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: That no report of sale has been filed.

JUDGE DANG: Okay. Thank you.
MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: Yeah.
JUDGE DANG: Mr. Pidal, do you want to comment as to Department's response? Or does that comport with your understanding as well?

MR. PIDAL: Yeah. This is David. Yes, I mean, they started with 99 vehicles. So the other vehicles that were found in DMV records would indicate that they're not registered in California, which kind of says that either they were sold -- I mean, shipped outside of the state or outside of the country. Again, unfortunately, the Appellant does not have the documentation to support sale in interstate commerce or sale in foreign commerce.

But to me, I would say that indicates that that vehicle was never registered in California. Because if you -- if the vehicle is in California, DMV is going to have it in their records. Again, $I$ don't -- I don't remember what -- how they did things back in 2009, 2010, 2011. I know they're a little better today, and I say a little better because there's still a lot of information that is not available. So I don't know if I answered your question.

So -- so I would say that because of those vehicles not being traced to DMV records, to me that's a good indication that they never were registered in California as opposed to an ROS not being made out for a wholesale or whatever. Because, again, my client -- I'm sorry. The Appellant believed, again, these were sales for resale or sales of interstate commerce or sales in foreign commerce.

I believe, as I explained to the Appellant, I said -- you know, if they take delivery in California, and whether they ship it to Nigeria, Mexico, or Arizona, once they take delivery in California, it's subject to tax in California. But -- so if you don't have the documentation, can't support the exemption. And that's why CDTFA said, "Okay, let's mark it up."

And what I'm saying is mark it up at 7.24 percent.

JUDGE DANG: This is Judge Dang speaking. Thank, you, Mr. Pidal. My concern is that I don't really understand what it means when Respondent comes back and says, "We asked DMV for information, but they are only able to provide information on 37 transactions," or however many it was. If it is as you state that it's just, you know, this is based on registration information, then we really don't know the disposition of the vehicles. Because they could have been something that we're not -these could have been vehicles that were not required to be registered within the state, and that's why there was no information available at the DMV.

But on the other hand, if your client had filed wholesale report of sales as it was required to do so under its license, there should -- I'm thinking there should be a record at DMV or somewhere of that report that was filed. Do you happen to know why the Appellants weren't able to obtain that information, or why there's no information such as affidavits or other transaction-related information with these other dealers or auction house that they are asserting they sold these vehicles to ultimately?

MR. PIDAL: I'm sorry. This is David. Were you asking me, Judge?
JUDGE DANG: Yes, I'm asking you.
MR. PIDAL: Oh, okay. I'm sorry.
JUDGE DANG: There's just --
MR. PIDAL: Yeah. I mean --
JUDGE DANG: -- a huge dearth of evidence here.
And --
MR. PIDAL: Yeah.
JUDGE DANG: -- my understanding also is that if
they did make these sales to dealers, the dealers would
need the wholesale ROS form in order to obtain, for
example, temporary plates, or to be able to even resell
the vehicle to begin with. So shouldn't there be a record
somewhere of that transaction?

MR. PIDAL: I would agree. A lot of times they're sold back to the auction. For example, Exhibit 18, you'll see that they were purchased from an auction house and then within a week or two weeks or maybe a month or so, they're sold right back to Manheim, another auction or -- or the same auction house. So did they prepare -- they, meaning the Appellant -- prepare an ROS for each transaction? Apparently not because I would say that if an ROS was prepared, then it should be in DMV records.

But as I mentioned, I only have a notation here that they were only issued 24 ROS's for wholesale, and
they purchased 99. They don't have enough wholesale ROS's for the vehicles involved. So, apparently, auction houses are able to buy or sell vehicles to other retailers or other wholesalers and somehow not getting into DMV's data. I don't -- I don't know DMV's system, unfortunately.

JUDGE DANG: This is Judge Dang, if I could just ask a quick clarifying question to that point. Wouldn't there need to be some transfer of title, a recorded transfer of title for an action house to sell a vehicle? And if that did not occur and it's not in the DMV records, how is it that these auction houses would be able to resell the vehicle?

MR. PIDAL: I'm not sure how -- this is David. I'm sorry. I'm not sure how auction houses work. They sell a lot of vehicles. They buy a lot of vehicles. So what documentation is required by DMV from auction houses? I don't -- I don't know.

JUDGE DANG: This is Judge Dang. Thank you. And
I just wanted to follow up with my previous question regarding the auction houses and the dealers that

Appellant allegedly sold to. Is there some reason why you're unable to go back to these entities to obtain any type of records or evidence?

MR. PIDAL: This is David. Well, this is where the information came from. Whether CDTFA got it, or the

Appellant got it, but in Exhibit 18 it shows that the source of the purchases are in Exhibit 10. I mislabeled Exhibit 18. It's actually Exhibit 3, and it's not -Exhibit 18 says Exhibit 3 and 10 . It's just Exhibit 3. Exhibit 10 is the purchases. But Exhibit 15 is a schedule, that I'm assuming that CDTFA prepared, of the purchases of the vehicles based on the information that was received from the auction houses.

So a lot of this information was, in fact, received from the auction houses, either to support they bought from the Appellant, or they sold to the Appellant. And they're labeled sell or purchase.

JUDGE DANG: This is Judge Dang. Thank you. I do believe there's a large number of transactions for which no sale information -- I mean, the ultimate disposition of this vehicle, information pertaining to that, appears to be missing. Do you have any explanation for why Appellant was not able to produce this information? Were the dealers out of business? The records are no longer available?

MR. PIDAL: There was only one car dealer that was involved, according to my interview with the Appellant, and that was -- it was called Clem's Auto. It was referenced in the decision and recommendation as Clem's Motors. And the Appellant stated that they dealt
with a gentleman named Michael, and there was no -- CDTFA couldn't find anything under Clem's Motors or Clem's Autos. So the answer is the vehicles went somewhere. So, you know, like I said, if they sold it in interstate or foreign commerce, which they thought they did. But they may not have put it in the stream of commerce and, therefore, the exemption would not apply.

JUDGE DANG: This is Judge Dang. Thank you, Mr. Pidal for your responses. I have no further questions.

JUDGE ROSAS: This is Judge Rosas. Thank you, Judge Dang.

Judge Wong, do you have any clarifying questions for Mr. Pidal?

JUDGE WONG: This is Judge Wong. Yes, I did have
a couple of clarifying questions for Mr. Pidal. So for these 60 ROS's for which -- that weren't registered with DMV, what did your client claim they did with them?

MR. PIDAL: Well, this is David. Their whole contention is that they were -- they're not -- they don't hold ROS retails. They're not a dealer, a used car dealer. They're not licensed with an occupational license as a used car dealer. Therefore, they cannot register the vehicle to a consumer. Okay. So their contention is that the vehicle was sold for interstate and/or foreign
commerce or a sale for resale. However, again, no documentation. Therefore, CDTFA said, "You owe tax on retail."

JUDGE WONG: So they contend they sold these cars to other states or overseas?

MR. PIDAL: Well, they sold them to other -- they sold them to either a used car dealer in California or could be out of state. Or they sold them to someone to ship to Nigeria. Okay. But, again, under the regulation if they, the Appellant, does not deliver to a freight forwarder or the common carrier or put it in stream of foreign commerce, the exemption for foreign commerce is not available. They're getting -- the CDTFA takes the position that that transfer of title and possession was in California, therefore, subject to California sales tax.

JUDGE WONG: This is Judge Wong. So your clients are not claiming that they themselves exported the car.

MR. PIDAL: Well, they don't -- they -- they were
not clear on that, unfortunately. But as I explained to them, if they don't have the documents, whether or not they did -- if they did it, they should have the documents. If they didn't do it and then the buyer shipped them, their exemption is lost, basically.

JUDGE WONG: This is Judge Wong. Thank you. I just had one last question. I think you touched on it
before, but I want to clarify. I think the measure of unreported taxable sales is about $\$ 314,000$, but you're claiming that the markup should not be 25 percent. It should be 7.24 percent plus some other adjustments that are recorded in proposed Exhibit 18. What should the measure of unreported taxable sales be after your proposed adjustments?

MR. PIDAL: I didn't schedule that but -- so I don't have -- I did it, but I don't have it readily available. If you want me to do it, I can take the time to do it. But it's basically -- if you want to take Exhibit 18 into consideration -- I mean, the total purchases on schedule 18 is $\$ 26,975$. If you mark that up by 25 percent -- and excuse for this chatter here. I'm just going to use my calculator here.

The measure on that is $\$ 33,719$. That's the measure for those vehicles that are being marked up by 25 percent. If you mark it up by 7.25 percent that I'm suggesting we use, it would be -- the measure would be less. But the main thing is these purchases on Exhibit 18 were resold to an auction house, Manheim, and not be marked up, whether it's 25 percent or 7.25 percent. So that's --

JUDGE ROSAS: This is --
MR. PIDAL: I'm sorry. So the measure of tax
that we're talking about right now is at 25 percent, this $\$ 33,719$.

JUDGE WONG: This is Judge Wong. Thank you. I just wanted to see what portion of that $\$ 314,000$ measure your client conceded and just try to figure out exactly what the measure is at issue. But thank you.

MR. PIDAL: You're welcome. This is David. You're welcome.

JUDGE ROSAS: This is Judge Rosas. Judge Wong, does that conclude your question?

JUDGE WONG: This is Judge Wong. Yes, I have no further questions at this time. Thank you.

JUDGE ROSAS: This is Judge Rosas. Thank you, Judge Wong.

Mr. Pidal, $I$ just wanted to clarify something, and I want to make sure $I$ am able to fully wrap my brain around your position. I understand what you're saying about Exhibit 18 that those -- that that sum of approximately $\$ 27,000$ should not have been included in the unreported taxable sales measure because you're saying that those cars were sold back -- resold back to the auction; is that correct?

MR. PIDAL: This is David. What -- what Exhibit 18 is the cost of the vehicles that were marked up 25 percent. So the actual measure -- if you mark up that
-- $\$ 26,975$ is the cost. But if you mark that up at 25 percent, the selling price of the measure of tax is \$33,719. So what I'm saying with Exhibit 18 is that whatever markup is applied to the purchases, purchases should be decreased by $\$ 26,700$-- I'm sorry -- $\$ 26,975$. So hopefully that --

JUDGE ROSAS: Understood. Thank you for that clarification. And taking a step back in terms of your broader argument, if I'm understanding you correctly, not counting the cars that are identified in Exhibit 18 by VIN number, not counting those, but it seems that you're saying that all the other cars that were part of the unreported taxable sales measure, you're saying that, technically, those cars are exempt from taxation; that they were sold out-of-state commerce or resold to dealers.

But you're agreeing that your clients do not have the documentation. So they know that because they cannot prove that these vehicles are subject to resales, but -sorry -- subject to sales tax. But your point is that, okay, because we don't have documentation and we know that these transactions are going to be subject to sales tax, we agree with that. But we disagree with the 25 percent measure. Is that a fair summary of your client's position, Mr. Pidal?

MR. PIDAL: This is David. But it's not the 25
percent measure. It's the 25 percent markup.
JUDGE ROSAS: Right.
MR. PIDAL: Okay. But yeah. That's -- you put it -- you summarized it well. Thank you.

JUDGE ROSAS: Okay. And thank you for correcting me on that terminology, Mr. Pidal.

MR. PIDAL: That's all right.
JUDGE ROSAS: I know it's really important in this industry. Thank you so much. I do have a few other clarifying questions for you, Mr. Pidal. I do want to talk briefly about Exhibit 14, page 1, which you provided. Now, at Exhibit 14, page 1, it indicates car dealers will mark up a used car around 10 to 15 percent for the average used car. And that the average used car refers to cars priced between $\$ 10,000$ or $\$ 20,000$.

But Appellant was not a used car dealer.
Appellant was a used car wholesaler. And based on the documentary evidence, it seems that Appellant's cars were priced on average below $\$ 4,000$. So even though the facts listed in Exhibit 14 are different than the facts in this appeal, can you make the connection in terms of why you believe that 10 to 15 percent markup is more reasonable than the 25 percent that CDTFA applied?

MR. PIDAL: Well, CDTFA -- this is David. Hello. This is David. Yeah. What -- what I'm trying to convey
is that I do not know where 25 percent markup came from. Okay. Because keep in mind, they started off with 50 percent. And then through conversation, through negotiation they realized that the Appellant does not have a used car dealer -- I'm sorry -- used car dealer lot. So they said we'll mark it down to 25 percent because they don't have a lot.

So all I'm trying to show is that the 25 percent is not reasonable. How they got -- how CDTFA got 25 percent, I have no idea. In our -- in our quote that I quoted, I said, "Staff used a conservative retail markup percentage of 25 percent." A conservative markup. I mean, I really don't know where that came from and perhaps CDTFA can explain that. But the correlation that I'm trying to make is that 25 percent cannot be substantiated any more so than 50 percent.

So taxes are going to be due, but let's be fair and let's use whatever information we have that is applicable to the Appellant. That information is coming right from the Appellant's records. And the mark ups just bare -- I mean, the price of it any car -- I'm sorry -- of any used car, you can go to a car lot and they'll -- they may be asking for $\$ 7,000$. That doesn't mean you're going to buy for $\$ 7,000$. You may say, hey, I'll offer you $\$ 5,000$.

So the price is going to change. So you can make $\$ 100$. You can make $\$ 1,000$. You can make $\$ 2,000$. It just fluctuates. But where is 25 percent coming from? I have no idea. I referenced the Audit Manual section that talks about wholesalers where there's -- it's a fast turnaround. It's a $\$ 25$ to $\$ 50$ transaction. And if you use that, the markup would be real low. It would be below 25 percent -7. 25 percent.

JUDGE ROSAS: This is Judge Rosas. Thank you, Mr. Pidal, for that clarification.

At this point I'm ready to turn it over to Respondent for their presentation, but I'd just like to hear from co-panelists.

Gentlemen, any questions for Mr. Pidal or are we ready to move on?

JUDGE DANG: This is Judge Dang. I have no further questions. Thank you.

JUDGE WONG: This is Judge Wong. Same. Thank you.

JUDGE ROSAS: This is Judge Rosas. In that case we're going to turn it over to Respondent for their presentation. Gentlemen or Mr. Samarawickrema, I don't know who is going to provide the argument, but you may begin whenever you're ready. Thank you.

MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: Thank you. This is Nalan Samarawickrema.

Appellant operated a business selling used motor vehicles from February 1st, 2007, through December 31st, 2011, in San Bernardino, California, doing business as Fendi's Cars. The Department audited Appellant's business for the period of January 1st, 2009, through December 31st, 2011. During the audit period, Appellant reported a little over $\$ 48,000$ as total sales and claimed the same amount as nontaxable sales for resale. And that will be on your Exhibit A, pages 21 and 23.

Appellant did not report any taxable sales for the audit period. During the audit, Appellant failed to provide complete sales records. Appellant did not provide complete Department of Motor Vehicle wholesale report of sales. Appellant did not provide complete copies of sales contracts, resale certificates, shipping documents, bank statements, sales journals, or sales summaries to support its reported total and nontaxable sales for the audit period.

In addition, Appellant failed to provide complete purchase information or purchase journals for the audit period. Appellant was also unable to explain how it
reported its sales on its sales and use tax returns. Appellant was also unable to explain what sources it relied upon to file its sales and use tax returns.

The Department rejected Appellant's reported sales due to lack of reliable records and negative book markups. It was also determined that Appellant's records and such that sales could not be verified by a direct audit approach. Therefore, the Department estimated sales using cost plus markup method for this Appellant. The Department completed two verification methods to verify the reasonableness of Appellant's reported total and nontaxable sales.

First, according to Appellant, she can only purchase 24 cars per year. And that will be on your Exhibit H, page 7, line 12. Based on this information, the Department computed the average selling price of a car of around $\$ 1,000$ using reported sales. And that will be on your Exhibit A, page 32. However, based on audited taxable sales, the average retail selling price of a car is around $\$ 5,000$. An average cost of a car is around $\$ 3,400$. And that will be on your Exhibit A, page 30, 33 and 37.

Second, because Appellant did not provide complete purchase records the Department audited Appellant auction house purchase information. And that will be on
your Exhibit C, pages 39 to 44, and Exhibit E. The Department compared reported total sale of $\$ 48,000$ to purchase of $\$ 337,375$ reflected on Appellant's auction house purchase information for the audit period and calculated a negative markup of 85 percent. And that will be on your Exhibit A, page 33.

The total purchases of $\$ 337,375$ is also more than seven times larger than the reported total sale of $\$ 48,000$ for the audit period. In other words, this means that according to Appellant's reported sales, Appellant was losing money every time it made a sale. However, based on the analyses of available exempt sales and purchase information, the overall exempt sale markup was 23.76 percent. And that will be on your Exhibit A, page 34.

The Department rejected Appellants's reported total sales due to lack of reliable report, no reported selling prices, and negative reported markups. Therefore, the Department conducted further investigation by analyzing Appellant's auction house purchase information. The Department was able to obtain Appellant's auction house purchase information, which includes vehicle auction report of sales data. The Department analyzed auction house purchase information and determined Appellant purchased 99 vehicles that had a total purchase price of
$\$ 337,375$. And that will be on your Exhibit A, pages 41 through 47.

The Department attempted to track the vehicle information received from the auto auction houses to DMV information to determine whether any other vehicles were sold to other motor vehicle dealers. Out of the 99 vehicles, the Department found DMV and sales information for 37 of the vehicles. The Department determined these transactions were not retail sales and removed them from the auto auction house purchase information to compute the purchases available for retail sales. And that will be on your Exhibit A, pages 35 through 37.

Specifically, the detailed DMV registration information indicated 10 other vehicles were sold to other used car dealers. Two of the vehicles were registered to Appellant's family members. Another was registered to Appellant's business name. And another was taken by a lienholder. And that will be on your Exhibit A, pages 39, 40, and 46. With respect to the remaining 23 vehicles in which the Department located DMV and sales information, the Department noted that the information was limited to the auction house transactions.

Nonetheless, the Department was able to determine that these 23 transactions represented nontaxable sales because Appellant eventually resold the vehicles back to
the auction house. And that will be on your Exhibit A, page 38.

After removing the 37 vehicle transactions, the Department determined that Appellant did not have sufficient supporting documentation to establish that the remaining 62 vehicles, which had an aggregate total purchase price of $\$ 251,250$, was sold as exempt sales for the audit period. Therefore, the subsequent sale of these vehicles was considered taxable retail sale. No documentary evidence was provided to show the retail sale prices for used vehicles sold. Therefore, the Department was unable to conduct a shelf test for this Appellant.

All the used car dealers have an average industry markup of 50 percent. The Department decided to use a 25 percent markup to estimate audited taxable sales for the audit period to give a benefit for the Appellant. Audited taxable sales were compared with reported taxable sales to compute unreported taxable sales based on auto auction house information of $\$ 314,063$ for the audit period. And that will be on your Exhibit A, page 30.

We are not going to make our arguments on audit issues numbered 2 and 3, unless your panel wants to hear. Subsequently, on July 13, 2021, the Department received Appellant's federal income tax returns from the Franchise Tax Board. The Department reviewed Appellant's federal
income tax return for years 2009, 2010, and 2011.
Department noted that Appellant did not report any purchases on her federal income tax return for these three years. The Department also noted Appellant only reported a sale of $\$ 4,800$ for year 2009; sale of $\$ 9,300$ for year 2010; and zero sales for year 2011 on her federal income tax returns.

However, based on auditor taxable sales of $\$ 314,063$ and the number of vehicles of 62, the average retail selling price of a car is around $\$ 5,000$. And that will be on your Exhibit A, pages 30 and 37. Thus, it appears that Appellant reported only one car for year 2009 and two cars for year 2010. For federal income tax returns, Appellant reported a net loss of $\$ 54,361$ for year 2009 and net loss of $\$ 2,983$ for year 2010. Appellant did not report any sales and purchases in her 2011 federal income tax returns. Appellant understated her purchases by $\$ 137,025$ for year 2009 and $\$ 158,800$ for year 2010. And that will be on your Exhibit A, page 33.

If Appellant included these purchases and recomputed net losses for these years, then the reported net loss of $\$ 54,361$ for year 2009 will increase to net loss of $\$ 142,456$, and the reported net loss of $\$ 2,983$ for year 2010 will increase to net loss of $\$ 161,783$. Therefore, the audit calculation of unreported taxable
items based on available auto auction house and DMV information were reasonable. And Appellant's federal income tax return information further support the Department's deficiency measure.

Appellant provided Exhibit 18 and requested additional adjustments for purchases available for retail sales. The Department allowed this adjustment, and these vehicles were not part of the 62 vehicles that the Department marked up. And that will be on your Exhibit A, pages 35 through 37, 38, 39 and Exhibit B, pages 17 and 20. Appellant stated some vehicles were sold to out-of-state customers, and those vehicles were shipped to an out-of-state location. Appellant did not have proper documentation to support delivery to an out-of-state location, such as bill of ladings or custom documents.

Even though no information is available regarding
California DMV registration after Appellant's purchases from the auction house, it cannot be assumed that vehicles were sold as exempt in foreign or interstate commerce. If the customer or their representative take possession of the vehicles in California, even if temporary, the sale does not qualify as an exempt in foreign or interstate commerce. Appellant did not provide shipping documents supporting that the Appellant delivered the vehicles by a common carrier, custom broker, or shipper to an
out-of-state location.
Appellant claim that the 25 percent markup that was used to estimate audited taxable sales is arbitrary. To support this, Appellant provided some selected exempt sales and purchase information to claim a markup of 7.24 percent. And that will be on your Exhibit 13, page 1. The Department used the same complete exempt sales and purchase information and computed an overall exempt sale markup of 23.76 percent. And this will be on your Exhibit A, page 24.

This overall exempt sale markup is a little less than the retail markup that the Department used in this audit. Therefore, the Department concluded that the retail markup of 25 percent was not arbitrary, and this retail markup of 25 percent is in line with Appellant's overall exempt sale markup of 23.76 percent. Based on the exempt sales markup, the Department finds it was fair and reasonable to use 25 percent markup to estimate audited taxable sales for the audit period.

Appellant also claimed that she did not make any retail sale of vehicles. Appellant explained that she only has a wholesale license from the DMV, which prevent her from making retail sales of vehicles. However, according to DMV information, Appellant's relatives were able to register the vehicle under their own name as gift
from Appellant without the payment of tax. And that will be on your Exhibit A, page 61.

This fact indicates that it is possible for a vehicle to be registered with the DMV even if purchased using a wholesale license. Appellant has not provided any supporting documentation to establish that the vehicles were sold to another dealer or transported or shipped to an out-of-state location.

Appellant has not provided any documentation to show that any of the unreported taxable sales determined in the audit did not occur. Appellant has not identified any errors in the Department's computations or provided any reasonable documentary evidence to establish a more accurate determination. Therefore, the Department request the appeal be denied.

This concludes my presentation, and I'm available to answer any questions the panel may have.

Thank you.
JUDGE ROSAS: This is Judge Rosas. Thank you, Mr. Samarawickrema. I.

I'm going to turn it over to my colleague to see if they have any clarifying questions. Judge Dang?

JUDGE DANG: Thank you. This is Judge Dang speaking. I did have a few questions for Respondent. One of my concerns in this matter is that -- I believe these
facts are undisputed -- that Appellant was only licensed as a wholesale dealer and, also, that Appellant did not possess a retail sales lot. The evidence in the record -and, again, please correct me if $I$ am wrong. The evidence in the record, what CDTFA was able to obtain from DMV, shows that the Appellant either withdrew these vehicles for personal use or were transferred to their relatives or that the vehicles were sold for resale to either a dealer or auction house.

Does CDTFA have any -- is there anything in the exhibits that CDTFA can point to indicating that the Appellants made any retail sales of vehicles? Or is it just your position that it was possible for them to do so, and they should carry the burden of proving that they did not?

MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: The Department requested DMV information for all those 99 cars, but the Department only received 37 -- the information for 37 cars. So based on the 37 cars of -- 23 cars were sold -- purchased and sold in the auction house, and it was listed separately in one of our schedules. And, also, there were 10 cars that were sold to another dealer. It's also listed, as I explained during my presentation.

And there are 3 cars that it transferred between relatives, and one was transferred to the Appellant's
business name. And for the other remaining 62 of the vehicles, we don't have. And, you know, even if we have them, it's only limited to the auction transaction; meaning, we didn't see transfers after they purchased from the auction house.

JUDGE DANG: Thank you. This is Judge Dang. Is it not sufficient that the Appellant has demonstrated that they are a licensed wholesale dealer and that the record contains no evidence -- I'm assuming based on your response, the evidence contains no record of any retail sales being made?

MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: This is Nalan Samarawickrema. That's a true statement, yeah. There's no record to show retail sales.

MR. PARKER: Mr. Dang, this is Jason Parker. I'd like to add on to that as well. The wholesale license allows the dealer to buy vehicles to resell them, and they can only resell them in wholesale transactions. They're not allowed to sell it at retail. However, they are able to purchase them for resale. And in this case, they may have resold them in a retail transaction but not a retail transaction that can be registered with DMV in California.

If these vehicles are taken to other states or other countries, I'm not familiar with the registration requirements of other states and other countries. But if
someone purchased a vehicle from outside of California, whether from a dealer or from a private party, and brought it into California, they would register that through our Department of Motor Vehicles.

JUDGE DANG: Thank you. This is Judge Dang. I do understand the point that you've made, Mr. Parker. I guess my question pertains more to as to the burden of proof. CDTFA, as I'm sure you're well aware, is required to -- carries the initial burden in some cases of showing that the -- that their determination is reasonable and rational. It's a very minimal burden. But in this case, I'm having a difficult time understanding why CDTFA believes that the Appellant made retail sales when, in fact, they were licensed as a wholesale dealer, did not have the retail lot, and none of the transactions came back as being sold in a retail transaction to a consumer. MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: This is Nalan Samarawickrema. During the field -- during the audit notes, the Appellant claimed most of the cars went out of the state to a Nigerian customer. So as I explained in my presentation, if a customer buys from the Appellant and ships it to an out-of-state location by the customer, then it comes under the definition of exempt for interstate commerce. And -- but if the taxpayer -- if the Appellant can show that they hired a shipping company or a custom
broker and shipped directly to an out-of-state location, yeah, then it's exempt.

And we -- the Department also gave the opportunity for Appellant to contact the shipping company or broker, custom broker, and get that information. And they were unable to -- to obtain that information, and the Department believes they sold it to another customer in California or a representative of a customer, and that particular customer shipped it to an out-of-state location. Meaning, the Appellant is responsible for the sales tax because they made the sale in California and gave the possession of the car to a California customer or their representative.

JUDGE DANG: This is Judge Dang. I do agree with that assessment in that situation, but I'm a bit confused as to the facts.

I believe, Mr. Pidal, maybe you can clarify. This question is for you. Are you -- is it your position that Appellant sold vehicles out of state in a retail transaction or is it that they sold them out of state to other wholesalers -- or I'm sorry -- other retailers?

MR. PIDAL: This is David Pidal. It could be both. Unfortunately, there are no records. That's why we're in this mess. The Appellant is in this mess because there's no records. There's no indication what particular
vehicle was sold to what used car dealer. The only documentation -- the best documentation, unfortunately, that the Appellant had was the information that was obtained by CDTFA from the auction houses. And I believe the Appellant was able to get some information too from the auction houses. So who were they sold to?

Unfortunately, I can't answer that.
But as I've stated previously and then you are well aware, there's no record of that vehicle being registered in California as retail sale or even a wholesale for that matter. So we know that the vehicle was purchased by the Appellant because it was purchased from an auction house. We know that some adjustments were made based on DMV information that was obtained by CDTFA. And the balance then, again, they're -- CDTFA is marking it up at 25 percent. And they said the average -- Mr. -I'm sorry. I can't see your last name.

Anyway, CDTFA -- the Respondent said that the average markup for a car dealer is 50 percent. I don't know where that comes from. I don't know where 25 percent comes from. And, you know, I don't know where those -- so to answer your question, you said, "Is it a sale for interstate commerce to a customer or to another retailer?"

I don't know the answer. I'm sorry.
JUDGE DANG: This is Judge Dang. Thank you.

I'm going to go ahead and move on to my next question for Respondent. During your presentation you had mentioned a 23.7 percent markup that you had computed from -- I think you said exempt sales. I couldn't follow. I missed that part. If you could just please clarify again how you came up with the support for the 25 percent markup.

MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: This is Nalan
Samarawickrema. The Appellant provided Exhibit 13 to claim that markup for 7 points -- a little over percent. And the Department used the same information because when Appellant computed 7 percent, they removed extraordinary items from that list. So what we did, we -- the Department used the 15 cars in that Schedule 13. There are 15 cars. The Department took all the 15 with high markups and low markups, including negative markups. So we combined. We took the whole -- all the information as is. And based on that, the overall exempt markup was 23 percent.

So the reason we said it's exempt because those were -- we got the selling prices from the auction house information. Because when they bought it -- the Appellant bought it and sold it to auction. So that's the only selling prices the Department had. And that -- if we had the retail selling prices, we would have computed the
shelf test. But in this case, we only exempt sales and the purchase information. That's why we compute a little over 23 percent. And we believe --

JUDGE DANG: This is --
MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: I'm sorry. We believe that the exempt sale markup is 23 percent. You know, 25 percent is very reasonable. And, also, in preparing for this hearing, if $I$-- if you take all the sales, including resales and -- the overall markup is 15 percent. And if you compare -- the way I got that number by comparing the total purchase to $\$ 314,000$ taxable sales and $\$ 48,000$-- $\$ 42,375$ of sales listed under my exhibit -- our Exhibit A, page 38 and Exhibit A, page 39, our resale amount was $\$ 32,450$; Exhibit $A$, page 39. So the overall markup based on everything, based on that 99 cars, the overall markup for this Appellant is 15, including resale, exempt sales.

JUDGE DANG: This is Judge Dang. Thank you for that detailed explanation. If I'm hearing you correctly then, it sounds as if the Department has some evidentiary basis for the 23 -some percent markup. But as far as 25 percent, is there anything in the record that you can point to that supports that figure?

MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: Yeah. If the exempt sale is
23 percent and -- because always -- most of the time
exempt sale, you know, the resale markup or exempt sale markup is lower than the retail markup. And according to Judge Rosas, you know, Exhibit 14, page 1 of the -- the articles say 10 to 15 percent markup for the cars between $\$ 10,000$ and $\$ 20,000$. But for this particular Appellant, average cost of a car is $\$ 3,400$. So it is our position that the 25 percent markup is very reasonable and fair and also, is in line with the overall exempt markup of 23 percent.

JUDGE DANG: Thank you. This is Judge Dang. I just have one final question for you. I don't want to assume anything because $I$ really don't know much about these types of transactions. But I'd like to ask you just to clarify. Why -- again, why would a retail transaction have a higher markup than a wholesale transaction?

MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: When the -- when the -- when they -- they always go, you know, like if it goes with the volume. Like if it's a resale, it always goes with the volume, and also so many cars they buy. When the Appellant find low prices, they buy it, and they turn over the vehicle within a few days by going to the auction. So the object is to have a -- to make a profit, you know, as soon as they see an opportunity.

But when you -- when you do a retail sale, you know, the turnover rate is lower than the retail
turnover -- I mean, exempt sales turnover. So based on experience and based on the audit that we completed, most of the time retail markup is higher than the exempt sales markup.

JUDGE DANG: This is Judge Dang. Thank you so much for your explanations. I have no further questions.

JUDGE ROSAS: This is Judge Rosas. Thank you, Judge Dang.

Judge Wong, do you have any questions for Respondent?

Judge Wong, if I'm not mistaken, I believe you are on mute.

JUDGE WONG: Apologies. How about that? Can you hear me now?

JUDGE ROSAS: Sounds great. Yes, sir.
JUDGE WONG: Okay. Sorry. I did have one
question for CDTFA. When did CDTFA check with DMV for information on the 99 cars? Like, at what point in time did that request take place?

MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: This is Nalan
Samarawickrema. It's during the -- when the Department was -- got some information from the Appellant, and it's during the revised audit.

JUDGE WONG: During the revised audit?

MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: Yeah. I can give you the
exact date if you want.
JUDGE ROSAS: Sure.
MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: May I have a moment, please. JUDGE WONG: Sure.

MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: It's our Exhibit A, pages 15 through 19, during June 2012.

JUDGE WONG: This is Judge Wong. Okay. So that's in the point of time where CDTFA checked with DMV about information for these 99 cars. And that's the freshest -- if I use that term -- information CDTFA has? After that we just don't know what happened to these other 62 cars, or at least CDTFA has not checked.

MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: This is Nalan
Samarawickrema. That's true.
JUDGE WONG: Okay. Thank you. I have no further questions.

JUDGE ROSAS: This is Judge Rosas. Thank you, Judge Wong.

Mr. Samarawickrema, I just wanted to clarify. You were talking about the overall markup of the 99 cars. Did you say that the overall markup was 15 percent, one-five, or 50, five-zero?

MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: I'm sorry. This is Nalan Samarawickrema. 15 percent, one-five. The way I -- the way we computed the total purchases were $\$ 337,375$ and
compared that to the audited taxable sales of $\$ 314,000$, plus resale allowed, $\$ 32,450$ listed in page 39 of Exhibit $A$, and page 38 of the same Exhibit, $\$ 42,375$.

JUDGE ROSAS: And I just want to make sure I'm following along. Does that Exhibit A, pages 38 and 39, show that overall 50 percent markup?

MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: I'm sorry. No, it doesn't show the overall markup. It shows the amount that we used to compute that 15 percent.

JUDGE ROSAS: Understood. Thank you. Another point of clarification. I want to focus on the markup. Mr. Samarawickrema, you were referring to Exhibit A, page 34. And you mentioned that, essentially, you were looking at the same vehicles that Appellant listed in Appellant's Exhibit 13, with the exception that, if I'm not mistaken, Mr. Pidal mentioned that in Exhibit 13 it lists 18 vehicles, and it includes the vehicles' purchase price as well as the sales price at auction.

And as to these 18 vehicles, Mr. Pidal deleted the two highest and the two lowest markups in order to arrive at the 7.24 percent markup, which is the basis of Mr. Pidal's argument. But back to you,

Mr. Samarawickrema, are you saying that you -- that Exhibit A, page 34, uses all of these vehicles with the only difference being that you're not removing the highest
or the lowest, the way Mr. Pidal did?
MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: This Nalan Samarawickrema. Yes, that's correct.

JUDGE ROSAS: Okay. Can you briefly talk, Mr. Samarawickrema, in terms of Mr. Pidal's argument that removing the two highest and two lowest markups to arrive at a 7.24 percent? Is it more reasonable than not deleting those vehicles?

MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: This is Nalan
Samarawickrema. There was another schedule in the audit working papers. If I use -- there's another schedule in the audit working papers that listed all exempt sales. So if you combine the Schedule 13 with that schedule -- in a moment I can give you the exact page number. The overall markup by incorporating those other vehicles, the overall markup is 20.37. In that test we have -- that is using 21 cars. And I can -- I'll give you the schedule of that; Bates Number 152 and 154. That is Exhibit C, page 32.

So if the Department included the information in page C -- excuse me -- Exhibit C, page 32, and Exhibit C, page 52, the overall exempt sales markup was 20.27 percent. But if the Department used only 152 , then the exempt markup is a little over 23 percent.

JUDGE ROSAS: This is Judge Rosas. Thank you, Mr. Samarawickrema. That concludes my questions for you
at this time. I believe one of my colleagues had a follow-up question.

JUDGE DANG: This is Judge Dang. I do apologize.
I did have one additional follow-up question. You had stated that the retail markup -- you have given a great explanation of why the retail markup should be higher than the exempt sale or the sale for resale markup -- wholesale markup, how we would like to refer to it. And the reason was based on turnover. And I'm assuming the fact that associated cost -- selling a vehicle in such a manner is lower than in a traditional retail channel where you might have to maintain, you know, a retail location. You have salespeople. You have test drives and the like.

In this situation it seems that Appellant -- even if we were to assume that Appellant made retail sales, wouldn't those also be fairly quick low markup-type sales just because they don't have the facilities. They don't have the traditional sales -- retail sales channel. It would be, I'm assuming, based on what Appellants have asserted. They simply take a customer to the auction market and say, "Is this the car you like?" And they would somehow work out the deal later.

So I'm just wondering if that fact maybe changes the analyses in any way as to whether or not, you know, there should be a higher markup than the 23 percent --
some odd percent calculated by Respondent?
MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: This is Nalan
Samarawickrema. It depends. When we start the field work, according to Appellant, they buy and sell 24 cars per year. So, you know, during the audit period, 99 cars. So we believe the information is close to 75 versus 99. And the -- when we -- when the Department checked page 100 -- Exhibit C, page 30, and Exhibit C, page 54, the selling -- the date sold and the date purchases were very close.

Like some days it's like -- yeah, it's like, for example, Bates Number 152, Exhibit C, page 30. If you take line 1 of the Appellant purchase on May 5 th and sold on May 21st, and the Item Number 12 in the same schedule, you know, bought on April 24th and sold in 2018. And the reason they have, like, a two-month gap because the Appellant used some vehicles. 18 vehicles were used, and we didn't make our presentation on that audit Item Number 3.

But, you know, so the date quickly -- either they didn't use it, they sold within few days or few weeks, and we -- the Department did not have enough information to make a conclusion that, you know, whether they sold by using the office parking lot. The Appellant had the office in a building. So they have some parking. And
according to exhibit -- Appellant's Exhibit 12, page 1, they have a large parking lot.

So we -- the Department did not have enough information to conclude, you know, how they bought and sold. And we -- the Department did not know their selling practice and the business model they used during the audit period. And it says particularly the Exhibit 12, page 1, it's a big parking lot. And they only bought 99 cars during the three years.

JUDGE DANG: Thank you. This Judge Dang. Maybe I can rephrase my question to make it easier for you to answer. I think what the Department is saying is that as a general principle for vehicle dealers who sell both retail and wholesale, the retail markup will be higher than wholesale markup. But in a situation where you have a person who is licensed only as a wholesale dealer and they don't have a retail lot, and they go beyond the scope of their license, there's really no way to say what the markup could be on a retail sale in that situation; whether it's higher or lower than the wholesale markup.

MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: Based on the experience, the Department had most of the time the retail markup is higher than the resale markup of the -- is because of the volume and because of the duration that they hold the vehicle. And, you know, like the -- of the -- this is all
the information we had. And based on the wholesale markup, the Department believe that the retail markup is more than -- more than the exempt sales markup, you know. If the retail -- if the Appellant is selling the vehicle to another dealer, and the other dealer they know the prices, they know the comparables. They don't pay if the other dealer can't make a profit. So that's why typically the used car dealer markup is 50 percent or little over 50. And the taxpayer information -- if the taxpayer's own records for the information vehicle from the auction house shows 20 -plus markup on exempt sales, so we use 25 percent at that time.

JUDGE DANG: This is Judge Dang. I promise last follow up here. You mentioned holding time turnover. For a dealer who doesn't have a retail lot, where are they supposed to store this inventory? Wouldn't they also necessarily be required to have a high turnover rate as well -- or I'm sorry -- a faster turnover rate?

MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: This like the -- this is the business model the Department don't know. So that's why it doesn't mean that the dealer goes -- I mean the Appellant goes and buys 10 cars. They buy, like, a few cars or one car per week. They only bought 99 cars. So it's like per week. You know, they buy, like, a car per week. So we didn't -- you know, that's 99 cars during

150 weeks for a year, 52 times, 356 weeks, but they only bought 99 cars.

So we -- we, you know, like 99 cars, you know, we can also check if you go to Exhibit 41, page -- I mean, Exhibit A, page 41 through 47. It lists all the 99 cars. And it, you know, it also has the purchase date under Column 4. It says sales date, you know, this is the purchase date. For the auction it's a sale. So that's why they listed the sale dates. So, you know, if you check the line 1, the purchase of one car on January 2nd, 2009, the second car was -- there are two cars purchased on January 23rd, 2009.

Then after that, they only purchased one car on February 3rd, 2009, and another one on August 6. So they're not buying a lot. They buy, like, two cars per day. Over a period of 156 weeks, they only bought 99 cars. And it specifically says -- it specifically shows the date of the purchase when you review Exhibit A, page 41 through 47. And I don't see -- I'm just -- I don't see they bought five cars on a particular day. On the -- on the first transaction only one car. That's Item 2 and 3 on the same day, January $23 r d$.

And on line 14 and 15 on the same schedule, May 15th they bought two cars. And after that they bought only one car -- sorry -- two cars on May 29th. And then
after that, they bought one car June 19 on page 42, Item 18. So like page 42 on September 10, 2009, they bought two cars. So they don't -- they don't need to have a large lot because their buying practices is not bulk. They buy one car or two or three cars per week.

JUDGE DANG: This is Judge Dang speaking. Thank you so much for answering all my questions. I don't have any further questions at this time.

JUDGE ROSAS: This is Judge Rosas. Thank you, Judge Dang. I know that we started late today because of technical issues, but $I$ believe we've been going at it for about two hours. Next, we're going to have Mr. Pidal's rebuttal argument, and then we're going to be wrapping this up shortly thereafter. But before we move on to the rebuttal argument, does anyone need a short break?

Okay. I see Mr. Pidal's hand. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Pidal.

We're going to take a short recess. Ms. Alonzo, please go off the record. (There is a pause in the proceedings.) JUDGE ROSAS: Good afternoon. Welcome back. We're back on the record.

Mr. Pidal, at this moment we're going to give you an opportunity to respond to anything that you heard. You heard CDTFA's argument, and you also heard their responses
to various questions. So at this time you have a brief opportunity, up to five minutes if you wish, to respond to anything that you heard from CDTFA.

## CLOSING STATEMENT

MR. PIDAL: Yeah. This is David Pidal.

With all due respect, I still have not got a good answer as to where CDTFA got the 50 percent or 25 percent. It seems like CDTFA used my Exhibit 13, which I acknowledged that I eliminated two -- four of the aberrations, the two lowest and the two highest. Again, this is not a normal used car dealer. And I believe CDTFA said they computed the overall markup at 15 percent, one-five. And if I understood correctly, that was after factoring in the audited taxable sales, which was computed at, like, a 25 percent markup.

So, I mean, that's like a circular reference to me. So, again, aside from what -- where these vehicles went because it has not been established that any of these vehicles were registered as a retail sale. I honestly cannot answer whether they were sold to a consumer or sold in interstate commerce because there's no documentation. And that's why we're here because, again, there's no documentation to support any exemption sale for resale or sales in interstate commerce or sales in foreign commerce.

So I'm trying to come up with a fair resolution as to using a reasonable markup applicable to the Appellant, not to what the industry average is because this is not an average car dealer. And so you saw the lot. The lot is not used to inventory cars. The lot is used to -- for patrons to park their vehicles when they're occupying the office space. So that office -- that parking lot has nothing to do with holding inventory. The vehicles are purchased.

I might be speaking too fast, so I apologize.
The vehicles are purchased with a specific customer in mind, usually, as Mr. Godwin Onyeabor, the Appellant's husband, he would go to the auction. If I wanted a vehicle, he would charge $\$ 100$ or so, but there's no proof of that. But that's what he would do. And that alone tells you that he's not buying vehicles to put in inventory. He's buying vehicles for a specific customer. It may not be 100 percent of the time, but $I$ would say, you know, I'm going to guess, 90 percent of the time he has a customer in mind when he's bidding on a vehicle at an auction house.

The markup, again, is not 25 percent. It's not 50 percent as CDTFA started. And the only closest explanation or justification $I$ got for the 25 percent is using my Exhibit 13 information to support a 23 percent
markup, which as CDTFA explained, well, retail sales have a higher markup. And that may be true, but we're not talking about normal. This is not a normal operation. That's what we're trying to establish.

Aside from the tax returns that CDTFA mentioned, we're -- we're not disputing that. We're -- all Appellant -- all we are as Appellant wants is a fair and reasonable answer to any under -- any understatement of tax, only because they do not have the proper documentation. We've already conceded that. They don't have their resale certificates. They don't have the shipping documents. They don't have proof that the car was put in a foreign -- stream of foreign commerce. That's not a question.

The question is what should the Appellant be held response -- held liable for, at a 25 percent markup or something more reasonable. And that's why I submitted Exhibit 13. I knew well beforehand when I submitted it that it was 23 percent. I didn't submit that to support the 25 percent.

So that's -- that's my rebuttal.
JUDGE ROSAS: This is Judge Rosas. Thank you, Mr. Pidal.

Do either of my co-panelists have any questions? Judge Dang?

JUDGE DANG: This is Judge Dang. No questions. Thank you.

JUDGE ROSAS: Judge Wong?
JUDGE WONG: This is Judge Wong. I did have just one follow-up question for Mr. Pidal.

Do you have any authority for disregarding the highest two markups -- the two transactions with the highest markup and the two transactions with the lowest or the highest negative markup? Like, why disregard two transactions at either end? Why not one or three?

MR. PIDAL: I'm sorry. Yeah. This is David Pidal. That's a very good question. As I stated earlier, I have 34 years of experience with the Board of Equalization as an auditor, as a reviewer, as a supervisor, as a manager. And I have 12 years of experience representing taxpayers. Whenever a shelf test is done -- and that's what this is, Exhibit 12 -- a shelf test is done. We want to get something that's representative. When a shelf test is prepared, you want to take out something that's not representative.

You question why not one, why not two, why not five. I didn't know what the markup was. I just said two. I saw the two highest one, and I'm looking at it right now. The two highest -- the highest one is \$224, and the next one is \$102. So I said if I take out the two
high ones, I should take out the two low ones. So I took out the two low ones. So it's a minus 42 and a minus 91.

Is there authority for that? No. It's judgmental based on my experience working for the Board of Equalization and representing clients after, the last 12 years. There's no legal authority.

JUDGE WONG: This is Judge Wong. Thank you. Just one last question. If you're relying on your extensive experience with the Board for this audit method, couldn't the Department also rely on their experience for the 50 percent markup, the 25 percent markup?

MR. PIDAL: I have 34 years of experience. Again, $I$ don't mean to keep saying that, but I've never used a 50 percent markup in my working years with the Board of Equalization or representing people. I've never seen a 25 percent markup. As I explained earlier, when you buy -- and this is not a normal used car lot. But even if you went to a car lot, they'll have a -- they may have a sales price on it, you know, $\$ 5,000$. It doesn't mean you're going to pay $\$ 5,000$, you know.

So whatever you can buy that for, you're obviously not going to pay more than $\$ 5,000$. And the same holds true for a new vehicle. You see the suggested retail price. Normally you're not going to pay that. But that's based on my experience. And CDTFA -- I worked for

BOE, which was prior to CDTFA. So I'm using my experience. I have -- I haven't seen anything written in the Audit Manuals and any memorandums that I saw when I worked for the Board of Equalization that says the markup for a used car lot is 50 percent or 25 percent.

JUDGE WONG: This is Judge Wong. Thank you so much, Mr. Pidal. No further questions.

JUDGE ROSAS: This is Judge Rosas. Mr. Pidal, I don't have any questions.

I did want to discuss briefly with both parties Exhibit 18. I mentioned I was going to reserve ruling on that. Before $I$ forget, $I$ do want to get back to Exhibit 18. So Exhibit 18 is a document that Mr. Pidal prepared. And based on what's on the document and based on what Mr. Pidal mentioned during today's argument, it's a compilation of data from Exhibit 15 and Exhibit 3; is that correct, Mr. Pidal?

MR. PIDAL: Yeah. This is David Pidal. Yes, I have referenced Exhibit 3 and 10, but 10 is actually the purchases. So it should just be Exhibit 3. JUDGE ROSAS: Right. I do believe you corrected that during your presentation.

MR. PIDAL: Okay. Okay.
JUDGE ROSAS: It is just Exhibits 15 and 3. MR. PIDAL: Yes, that is correct.

JUDGE ROSAS: And the point is Exhibit 18 is not a factual document. It seems to the panel that it is more of a -- it's more argument, and it's an organized way of presenting Mr. Pidal's argument and allowing the panel to visually follow along and understand his position. It's not a factual document and will not form the basis of any factual finding. With those caveats, we're going to admit Exhibit 18 into evidence.
(Appellant's Exhibits 18 was received
in evidence by the Administrative Law Judge.)
But I do want to allow Respondent an opportunity if they want to provide any argument in terms of how much weight they believe this panel can give Exhibit 18, if any.

MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: This is Nalan

Samarawickrema. If you compare Exhibit 18 with Exhibit A, page 38, it's listed as "Motor Vehicle Resold Back to The Auto Auction House." All this $\$ 26,975$ worth of cars were adjusted in page 38. So Chris will add more.

Thank you.
JUDGE ROSAS: Thank you, Mr. Samarawickrema. And we'll take that into consideration in terms of the weight, if any, to be given. As I mentioned, Exhibit 18 in and of
itself will not form the basis of any factual finding. It's just an organizational tool, and we're considering it
as argument.
With that said we are going to wrap this up, but I do want to hear last -- I do want to give each side a final opportunity to be heard. I'll start with CDTFA, and then I'll give Mr. Pidal the last word.

Does CDTFA have anything else that they would like to add?

MR. SAMARAWICKREMA: This is Nalan
Samarawickrema. We have nothing to add.
JUDGE ROSAS: This is Judge Rosas. Thank you, Mr. Samarawickrema.

Mr. Pidal, you represent the Appellant. Appellant filed the appeal. Appellant has the burden of proof, so I want to give you the last word. Now, I don't need you to repeat yourself, sir. But my question is, other than what you've already told us here today, and other than the exhibits that have already been admitted into evidence, is there anything else that you believe this panel needs to know in order for us to make a well-informed decision?

MR. PIDAL: I do not have -- this is David. I do not have any additional information that I have not already voiced my opinion or facts.

JUDGE ROSAS: This is Judge Rosas. Thank you very, much Mr. Pidal.

In that case this concludes the hearing in the Appeal of Onyeabor. Evidence has been received. The record is now closed, and the matter is submitted as of today, July 20th, 2021. A written decision will be issued no later than 100 days from today.

Thank you to all the representatives, to my co-panelists, to our stenographer, and to all of the OTA team members who work behind the scenes. This hearing is now adjourned, and that concludes today's calendar. Thank you.

And we may go off the record.
(Proceedings adjourned at 3:59 p.m.)

I, Ernalyn M. Alonzo, Hearing Reporter in and for the State of California, do hereby certify:

That the foregoing transcript of proceedings was taken before me at the time and place set forth, that the testimony and proceedings were reported stenographically by me and later transcribed by computer-aided transcription under my direction and supervision, that the foregoing is a true record of the testimony and proceedings taken at that time.

I further certify that $I$ am in no way interested in the outcome of said action.

I have hereunto subscribed my name this 6th day of August, 2021.

