BEFORE THE OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL OF,)			
)			
F.A.R. INVESTMENTS, INC.,)	OTA	NO.	19125618
ARCIERO & SONS, INC.,)	OTA	NO.	19125619
)			
APPELLANT.)			
)			
)			

TRANSCRIPT OF VIRTUAL PROCEEDINGS

State of California

Wednesday, July 28, 2021

Reported by: ERNALYN M. ALONZO HEARING REPORTER

1	BEFORE THE OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS
2	STATE OF CALIFORNIA
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4	
5	IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL OF,)
7	F.A.R. INVESTMENTS, INC.,) OTA NO. 19125618 ARCIERO & SONS, INC.,) OTA NO. 19125619
8	APPELLANT.)
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14	Transcript of Virtual Proceedings,
15	taken in the State of California, commencing
16	at 1:18 p.m. and concluding at 4:24 p.m. on
17	Wednesday, July 28, 2021, reported by
18	Ernalyn M. Alonzo, Hearing Reporter, in and
19	for the State of California.
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24	
25	

1	APPEARANCES:	
3	Panel Lead:	ALJ JOSHUA LAMBERT
4	Panel Members:	ALJ CHERYL AKIN ALJ MIKE LE
6	For the Appellant:	EDWARD I. KAPLAN BARRY L. GUTERMAN
7		RUDOLPH F. SILVA F. ARCIERO, JR.
8	For the Respondent:	STATE OF CALIFORNIA
10		FRANCHISE TAX BOARD CAROLYN S. KUDUK
11		MARGUERITE MOSNIER
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1	<u>I N D E X</u>			
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3	<u>EXHIBITS</u>			
4				
5	(Appellant's Exhibits 1-21 were received at page 7.)			
6	(Department's Exhibits A-O were received at page 7.)			
7	(Joint Stipulation of Facts Exhibit J-1 was received at			
8	page 7.)			
9	DDFCENITATION			
10	PRESENTATION			
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1	California; Wednesday, July 28, 2021
2	1:00 p.m.
3	
4	JUDGE LAMBERT: We are now on the record in the
5	Office of Tax Appeals' oral hearing for the consolidated
6	appeals of F.A.R. Investments, Inc., and Arciero & Sons,
7	Inc., Case Numbers 19125618 and 19125619. The date is
8	July 28th, 2021, and the time is 1:18 p.m.
9	My name is Josh Lambert, and I am the
10	Administrative Law Judge for the purposes of conducting
11	this hearing. My Co-Panelists today are Judge Akin and
12	Judge Lee.
13	FTB, could you please introduce yourselves for
14	the record. Do we have Ms. Mosnier or Ms. Kuduk?
15	MS. MOSNIER: Oh, sure. Marguerite Mosnier for
16	Franchise Tax Board.
17	MS. KUDUK: Carolyn Kuduk for Franchise Tax
18	Board.
19	JUDGE LAMBERT: Thanks.
20	And, Appellants, could you please introduce
21	yourselves for the record.
22	MR. KAPLAN: Edward Kaplan for Appellants on the
23	end.
24	MR. GUTERMAN: Barry Guterman for Appellants on
25	the in the middle.

JUDGE LAMBERT: Thank you.

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The issues today are whether Appellants have shown error in FTB's determination denying Appellants' claimed deferral of gain from a like-kind exchange under IRC Section 1031; and whether gain from the sale of the sale of the property should be attributed to Arciero Wine Group, LLC, pursuant to an assignment of income theory.

Appellants, do you agree that these are the issues?

MR. GUTERMAN: Mr. Guterman speaking. Yes, we do.

JUDGE LAMBERT: And, FTB, do you agree?

MS. MOSNIER: Marguerite Mosnier speaking. Yes,
we do.

JUDGE LAMBERT: Okay. And I'll just address

Appellants to Mr. Guterman, and I'll talk to Ms. Mosnier

for now, unless otherwise directed.

The exhibits that FTB is providing are A through O, and Appellants will be entering Exhibits 1 through 21. And also, there's a joint stipulation of facts, Exhibit J-1 and Exhibit Number 20 is the replacement for Exhibit 20 that was submitted recently.

Mr. Guterman, are there any objections?

MR. GUTERMAN: Mr. Guterman speaking. There are no objections.

1	JUDGE LAMBERT: And, Ms. Mosnier, are there any
2	objections?
3	MS. MOSNIER: This is Marguerite Mosnier. No
4	objections.
5	JUDGE LAMBERT: Okay. Thanks.
6	That evidence is now in the record.
7	(Appellant's Exhibits 1-21 were received
8	in evidence by the Administrative Law Judge.)
9	(Department's Exhibits A-O were received in
10	evidence by the Administrative Law Judge.)
11	(Joint Stipulation of Facts
12	Exhibit J-1 was received in evidence
13	by the Administrative Law Judge.)
14	So at this time we'll begin Appellants'
15	presentation. You'll have an hour and 20 minutes, and
16	please proceed when you're ready.
17	
18	PRESENTATION
19	MR. KAPLAN: This is Edward Kaplan speaking.
20	This consolidated case concerns Appellants' deferral gain
21	realized from the sale of buildings and vineyards in Paso
22	Robles, California. It's referred to throughout these
23	proceedings as the Paso Property.
24	To obtain tax deferral on property sales, Section
25	1031 provides three general requirements:

One, is the taxpayer must have completed an exchange.

2.4

Two, the exchange must have been of like-kind property.

And three, both the relinquished property and the replacement property must be held for qualified purpose, either for investment or for use in a trade or business.

Parties agree that both the like-kind and holding agreements have been met in this case. The question asked today is a factual one, whether Appellants have met the exchange requirement. The answer lies in this panel's determination as to the identity of the seller.

Respondent agrees that in form Appellants were the sellers but asserts that for tax purposes, the sale of the Paso Property should be attributed to Arciero Wine Group, LLC, referred to for the rest of this hearing as AWG.

Appellants contend the facts clearly establish that they were the sellers in both form and substance. There's no material dispute between the parties on the chronology of events in this case and what took place. The stipulation of facts and submitted documents and exhibits layout that chronology and contain all the documents relevant to the sale of the Paso Property. Declarations have been provided by a number of individuals involved in the subject transactions, and their statements

have never been questioned or disputed.

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Frank Arciero Jr. and Rudy Silva, whose declarations are at Appellant's Exhibits 5 and 7, are here today to more fully explain the background of the sales of the Paso Property and AWG's inventory and how they were accounted for. The primary purpose of their presence, however, is to be available to answer any questions the panel may have. Unfortunately, Frank Arciero Sr., who was president of both Appellants and the primary negotiator and drive of the sales at issue, passed away in 2012.

Respondent has failed to recognize in its briefing, appreciate or understand that there were two sales made to Saphire. One was a sale of the Paso Property. The other was the sale of AWG's wine inventory. The parties agree that AWG sold its inventory to Saphire. Those assets remain in the hands of AWG until the sale. The Paso Property, however, consistent with AWGs members' internal discussions and the knowledge and approval of the buyer, Saphire, was distributed to Appellants and AWGs other two members to allow them to make their own sale to Saphire and follow that with their own exchanges into replacement properties, if they chose to do so.

Exchanges were intended early in their discussions of the sale. And as you will hear from the witness -- witnesses, no sale of any kind would have

occurred in the absence of making sure it was eligible for Section 1031 deferral. Again, Respondent does not contest that the form of the sale of the Paso Property was a sale by Appellants. It argues, however, that in substance the sale should be attributed to AWG.

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Although the parties agree that a substance over form analysis is the proper tool to determine the seller for these purposes, such an analysis requires consideration of all surrounding facts and circumstances. Respondent has purposefully ignored several key facts and documents to reach its desire to an erroneous conclusion. Nowhere in its opening brief, its reply brief, or even its prehearing conference statement does Respondent make a single mention of the Seller Substitution Agreements signed by Appellants and by Saphire, the buyer, three days prior to the signing of the Asset Purchase Agreement.

These agreements formally put Appellants into the shoes of AWG for purposes of the sale of the Paso Property prior to signing of any sale agreements. And those agreements are located at Appellant's Exhibits 13 through 16. Respondent doesn't dispute the existence or contents of these agreements signed by all parties. They are concluded in the stipulation of facts, yet it does not attempt to explain the relevance or effect in its analysis of who was the actual seller.

Further, no mention can be found of the exchange agreements Appellants signed to initiate the process for handling their deferred exchanges, as required by Section 1031. These agreements evidence not just their intent and desire to enter into their own exchanges but are actions to move that process forward. Again, all happening before the date of the -- that the Asset Purchase Agreement is signed. In its favor, Respondent has not completely ignored the escrow instructions signed by Appellants, AWG, and Saphire, which also make clear that the Paso Property sale is being made by Appellants.

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But it's mentioned. It's limited to only the first page, Respondent's Exhibit L. The one page that deals only with mortgages and lease liabilities. The remaining 59 pages of the instructions, which are included as Appellant's Exhibit 18, address each of Appellants' individual exchanges and ensure that the proceeds were properly allocated between the inventory and the Paso Property and that the proceeds from their individual sales were placed directly into their accommodator's exchange accounts.

These errors of omission by Respondent are not simple oversights. Respondent's position can only succeed in this case if a substance over form analysis is done on an incomplete set of facts and ignoring of all the

documents, especially, those executed so closely in time prior to the Asset Purchase Agreement. Appellants' position on each of the facts and applicable law as it applies to these facts is completely laid out and stated most succinctly in their supplemental brief filed last September. Rather than repeat its contents, I'll simply say, as we sit here today equally as firmly on that position, when all the facts are considered, the substance is clearly shown.

2.4

AWG, Appellants, and AWG's other members,
Saphire, the escrow officer, the exchange accommodator,
the title insurance company, all acted and reported
consistently throughout. There's no cross pollination in
this case where AWG received any portion of the sale or
proceeds from the Paso Property. There's no altering of
the transaction after the fact. There's no action taken
that is not completely aligned with the sale of the Paso
Property by Appellants for the interest it received by
only changing their form of its ownership, not by changing
any substance of their ownership.

In short, there was never a crystallized plan for AWG to be the seller of the Paso Property of Saphire.

From the outset, Appellants were not going to let that happen. Appellants planned a drop and swap transaction of the Paso Property and fully executed it.

There's a second issue involved here that frankly, we do not understand. Respondent has argued that even if Appellants are found to be the sellers of the Paso Property for Section 1031 purposes, they must still report income from AWG under an assignment of income theory. Putting aside the questions of whether the assignment of income doctrine can override the statutory requirements of Section 1031 with the form of the transaction dictates its tax consequence and whether the doctrine's principles appropriately apply to flow-through entities, Appellants do not understand how, if they are determined to have sold the property for 1031 purposes, AWG would have any income from that same sale that could be assigned to them.

2.4

As the sellers, Appellants received the sale proceeds and realize the gains, not AWG. AWG is not the seller. It has no income to assign. Further, we do not understand how such an assignment would affect their 2007 tax returns even if Respondent's theory made sense.

Appellants cannot be required by Section 1031 to defer their gain and, yet, the subject current tax on the exact same dollars that Respondent asserts should be assigned to them.

Any flow-through of additional income from AWG not deferred would simply be double counting the same dollars. There can only be one seller of the Paso

1	Property. The facts clearly establish this was the
2	Appellants. They are entitled to their claim of deferral
3	gain from their sales as valid tax-free exchanges or
4	tax-deferred exchanges under Section 1031.
5	And I think at this point we're going to ask Rudy
6	Silva to provide a little more information. Mr. Guterman
7	will be handling the bulk of the questions to Mr. Silva
8	for the benefit of the Reporter, so she knows who is
9	talking.
10	JUDGE LAMBERT: Okay. This is Judge Lambert. I
11	can swear in Mr. Silva.
12	Mr. Silva, can you please raise your right hand.
13	
14	<u>rudy silva</u> ,
15	produced as a witness, and having been first duly sworn by
16	the Administrative Law Judge, was examined and testified
17	as follows:
18	
19	JUDGE LAMBERT: Thank you. Please proceed.
20	MR. GUTERMAN: Yes. This is Mr. Guterman who
21	will be doing a questioning of Mr. Silva.
22	
23	DIRECT EXAMINATION
24	BY MR. GUTERMAN:
25	Q Mr. Silva, can you explain to the panel, and

1 state what your professional experience is? 2 I'm a Certified Public Accountant licensed in 1962. 3 And --4 0 5 And I had practiced as a CPA the entire time. Α Is it your own practice? 6 Q 7 I have a partner. My daughter is also a CPA. Α How long did you know Frank Arciero, Sr.? 8 Q 9 Α I met Mr. Arciero about 1962. And since then, 10 I've been his outside CPA for all of his businesses. Did you and Mr. Arciero, Frank, become good 11 12 friends? Yes. We were very good friends. I knew him very 13 Α 14 well. Did you see him on a regular basis? 15 16 I would probably see him two to three times a month, normally, in his office at Foothill Ranch. We 17 would meet for half an hour to 45 minutes to discuss 18 19 business, and then we would have lunch and continue. 20 Is it fair to say that you're the Arciero Family tax adviser and accountant? 2.1 22 Α Yes, it is fair to say that. 23 Which members of the family do you prepare the tax returns or advise? 2.4 25 A All of the members, even the grandchildren of --

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1
               So you --
           Q.
                -- of Mr. Frank Arciero, Sr.
2
 3
                So did you prepare the tax returns for Arciero
           Q
      Wine Group?
 4
 5
                Yes, I did.
           Α
               Arciero Winery and General Partnership?
 6
7
           Α
               Yes.
8
               For Arciero & Son, Inc.?
           Q
9
           Α
               Yes.
10
               F.A.R. Investments, Inc.?
           Q
11
           Α
               Yes.
12
               Frank Arciero, Sr.?
           Q
               Yes.
13
           Α
14
               Frank Arciero, Jr.?
           Q
15
           Α
               Yes.
16
               Philip Arciero?
           Q
17
           Α
               Yes.
18
                Did you also prepare the tax returns for Kerry
           0
19
      Vix?
20
               No, I did not.
           Α
21
               Okay. Did you advise Frank Arciero, Sr., or
22
      other members of the family in a 1031 or like-kind
23
      exchange transaction prior to the sale in 2007?
2.4
               Yes. We had entered into other 1031 exchanges, I
           Α
25
      would say, three or four times before this one.
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1	Q Were there any did any of those transactions
2	involve what we call a "drop and swap" transaction?
3	A There was one involved in a drop and swap on a
4	property in Lancaster that was owned by Arciero & Sons and
5	one in Roissy [sic].
6	Q And what happened in that transaction? Do you
7	recall?
8	A Yeah. It went through as a 1031 exchange.
9	MS. KUDUK: Hi. I'm sorry. We didn't we
10	weren't able to hear that last five minutes. The video or
11	the audio cut out. Can you please repeat that?
12	MR. SILVA: Repeat five minutes' worth?
13	MR. KAPLAN: The last five minutes?
14	MR. GUTERMAN: Five minutes?
15	JUDGE LAMBERT: Well, I had no problems hearing
16	the audio. But, FTB, you had problems with audio?
17	MS. KUDUK: Yeah, especially, 'cause he's
18	speaking down. So we can't even see what he's saying.
19	JUDGE LAMBERT: You're saying
20	MS. KUDUK: So I'm sorry. I I could not hear
21	what he just said about
22	JUDGE LAMBERT: Oh, like
23	MS. KUDUK: from the drop and swap onward.
24	JUDGE LAMBERT: So speak up louder.
25	MR. SILVA: Yeah, I did a this is Mr. Silva.

1 I did a drop and swap for --2 MS. KUDUK: Okay. Is it --3 MR. SILVA: -- Arciero & Sons. MS. KUDUK: Is it possible to look into the 4 5 camera, because I -- I don't see you, actually. 6 would be helpful if I could see what you're saying. 7 you. MR. KAPLAN: We'll spin him around. 8 9 MR. GUTERMAN: Yeah. Come over here. 10 MR. SILVA: Yeah, I did a drop and swap for 11 Mr. Arciero -- or Arciero & Sons and their partner probably 10 years before this one on a property in 12 Lancaster, California. 13 14 BY MR. GUTERMAN: Did there become a time in April or May of 2007 15 16 when you met with Frank Arciero, Sr., and discussed an 17 offer he received from Saphire Advisors LLC? 18 Yes, I did discuss that with Mr. Arciero. 19 And do you recall the nature of that Q 20 conversation? What was discussed? 21 What I discussed is the potential tax in the 22 event that the sale was made by the LLC. Potentially, 23 federal and state tax would be a substantial amount. 2.4 Mr. Arciero would not have sold that property on that basis. He hated paying taxes as many, many businesses do, 25

1 and he would not have written that check. I can guarantee 2 you. Did you offer him a tax planning solution to --3 to paying all those taxes? 4 5 Well, I did mention the drop and swap again. 6 I told him that was a way out, a way of deferring the tax 7 on this gain. And what was his reaction to it? 8 9 Well, he said that sounded like a plausible 10 solution. 11 And as a result of that, was he going to continue 12 the negotiations with possibly the Saphire group? 13 Yes, he said he would continue on that basis. Α 14 Did there come a time in mid-July of 2007 that you participated in a discussion or a meeting involving 15 16 the sale -- the sale of the property and the winery? 17 Α Yes. There was a meeting at the Arciero offices 18 with all of the partners of -- or members of the LLC 19 except for Youngs. They were all present. And we 20 discussed the 1031 exchange at that time and explained to 2.1 them how it works, and they all understood. 22 The president at that meeting was Frank 23 Arciero, Sr.? 2.4 Α Kerry Vix. 25 And who is Mr. Vix? 0

1 Mr. Vix was a general manager of the winery. 2 Did he own interest in Arciero Wine Group or 3 Arciero Winery, I should say? Yes. He owned a five-percent interest in the 4 5 Arciero Wine Group. Do you recall at that meeting if the terms of the 6 7 sale to Saphire Wines was fully negotiated at that time? 8 I'm not sure if it was fully negotiated, but they Α 9 had gone a long way towards that. 10 Did you explain a like-kind exchange transactions 11 to the other members during that meeting? 12 Α Yes, I did. 13 And had all the members -- were all the members 14 familiar with doing like-kind exchanges? 15 No, they were not familiar with it. 16 Frank, Sr., was probably the only one at that meeting that 17 was familiar with that. 18 Did you explain to them how a drop and swap 19 transaction would save them taxes? 20 Yes, I did. I explained that it would be a 2.1 deferred tax. It would eventually be payable when the 22 up-laid property was sold. 23 And did you discuss how that transaction had to be structured? 2.4 25 Yes, I did.

Α

1 And what was the key -- do you recall the key 2 requirement? 3 Well, the key requirement was that the property had to be meted out to the individual members first before 4 5 it was transferred to the buyer. 6 So who had to be the sellers of the property? 7 The sellers had to be the individual members. Α And that was discussed during that meeting? 8 Q 9 Α Yes, it was. 10 Was there -- in the course of that meeting, was 11 there an agreement that they would -- that the individual 12 members would be willing to sell the property? 13 Α There was an agreement, yes. 14 Did any of them indicate a consensus or that they wish to also participate in 1031, a like-kind exchange? 15 16 They all did. Youngs Market was not present So I had no idea if they would do that or not. 17 there. 18 What was your understanding of what -- at the end 19 of the meeting as to where the structuring or negotiations of the sale had to proceed from there? 20 2.1 Well, my understanding was that they had to 22 verify that the money was there, that the buyer had the 23 funds available to close the deal. Did they want you to proceed with -- or so the 2.4 25 members could sell their -- a proportionate interest in

1 the property and do like-kind exchanges if they so choose? 2 Yes, they did. 3 What did you do or after that meeting to facilitate that transaction? 4 5 Well, we prepared the exchange agreements and the 6 Seller Substitution Agreements for each member to sign and 7 for the buyer to sign. 8 Before that, did you have conversations or sent Q 9 e-mail correspondence to the attorney for the transaction 10 and advise him they were going to -- the individual 11 members were going to sell? 12 Α Yes. I sent Jon Cantor, the attorney for Arciero Group, an e-mail the very next day advising him of the 13 14 intent to do a 1031 exchange. Who was the driving force or the decision maker 15 16 regarding the sale of property? 17 Well, it would have been Frank, Sr. Without 18 Frank, Sr., the approval of the sale would not go through. 19 What did Frank -- and Frank, Sr., he would only 20 sell the -- if he was the seller of the property is the 2.1 only way the transaction would have gone through? 22 That's correct. Α Your implementation was first you spoke to Mr. --23 2.4 you e-mailed Mr. Cantor and told him that he had -- you 25 were doing a 1031 exchange, and the members would be

1 selling the property; is that correct? 2 That's correct, yes. 3 Did you read -- and the next thing was you prepared an exchange agreement and the Seller Substitution 4 5 Agreements for each of the partners for Arciero and for 6 the two Appellants; is that correct? 7 Α That's correct. In doing so, did you reach out to Mr. Vix or 8 Q 9 ascertain whether the buyers had agreed to this type -- to 10 do the individual selling of the property? 11 Α They had agreed to do that. Yes. 12 And you knew that because? Q 13 Because Mr. Vix told me that. Α 14 And did you need that information to complete the 0 15 Seller Substitution Agreements or the exchange agreement? 16 I needed that for the seller substitution. And I 17 needed the name of the responsible party for the buyer, 18 which was Jeff Hopmayer, I believe. 19 And do you recall about when you received that? Q 20 Α Not exactly, no. 2.1 If I showed you -- take a look at Exhibits 13, 22 14, 15, and 16. Exhibit 13, that's the seller 23 substitution, an exchange agreement involving Arciero & 2.4 Sons, Inc., and a company called CPA Exchange Corp. 25 is CPA Exchange Corp.?

1 That was a company that was owned by another Α I did not own it. 2 party. 3 And what did it do? They just did 1031 exchanges. 4 5 It was called -- what's called a qualified -- act 0 6 as a qualified intermediator or an accommodator? 7 Α That's correct. 8 Okay. So I ask you again, by looking at this Q 9 document, does it refresh your recollection as to when it 10 might have been signed? It was dated the 23rd of July. So it's probably 11 12 the date. 13 Okay. And I have you look at the Seller 14 Substitution Agreements, which is behind it. Who are the 15 parties that were selling it for this one particular one? 16 True Sellers, Arciero & Sons, Inc. 17 And you thought you signed on behalf of CPA 18 Exchange Corp.? 19 Α Correct. 20 Q And Mr. Hopmayer payer signed on behalf of 2.1 Saphire Wines, LLC? 22 That's correct. Α 23 Q And they signed it because? 2.4 Α He was the, I guess, the managing member of that 25 LLC.

1 So is it fair to say at this point he knew that 2 Arciero & Sons was selling its interest in the Paso 3 Property to this company? Well, yeah. I mean, it's right next to his 4 5 signature. So I'm sure he knew that. 6 And he prepared each of these other agreements as 7 well, the one for Appellants? 8 Α Yes. 9 Item Number 14. And you did also prepare the --0 10 this is the seller substitution that you prepared? 11 Α Yes. 12 And you prepared this after meeting with the 13 Arciero family in Tustin on or about mid-July? 14 About a week later, yes. 15 What did you do with the agreements once you got 16 them signed? 17 I gave a copy to the escrow officer handling the 18 sale. And her name was Frances Martin. 19 And did you discuss the nature of the transaction 20 with her? 2.1 Α Yes, I did. 22 Did she --0 23 She understood that the sellers were going to be the individual members of the LLC. 2.4 25 Q Did she have experience in documenting or

1 handling escrows involving, if you will, drop and swap 2 transactions? 3 She said she had done them before, yes. In addition to talking to Mr. Cantor, having him 4 5 execute exchange agreements and seller substitution of 6 these, were there anything else you did as part of this 7 exchange transaction and acting as an accommodator? For 8 example, did you open up bank accounts? Oh, yeah. We opened up individual bank accounts 10 for each seller in the name of CPA Exchange where the funds were held at Pacific Western Bank. 11 12 Did you work regularly with the appeals officer -- no, excuse me -- work regularly with the escrow 13 14 officer to move the transaction forward to document the 15 exchange transaction? 16 Yes. I had many conversations with her. 17 And did you work on issues involving title or 0 18 anything like that? 19 There weren't any issues involving title, that I 20 was aware of. 2.1 In addition to the sale of Paso Property, were 22 any assets -- other assets of Arciero Winery being sold? 23 They were also selling the inventory and the 2.4 equipment.

They, meaning the --

25

1 Α On a separate basis, yes. 2 And who was the seller of those assets? 3 That was Arciero Wine Group, is the seller of those assets. 4 5 Were you involved in the sale of those assets? 6 Α No. 7 You were involved strictly within the context of 0 8 the sale of property; is that correct? 9 Α That's correct. 10 Did you have an opportunity to review the escrow instructions in the transaction? 11 12 Α Yes. 13 In that regard, you're acting as qualified 14 intermediary; is that correct? 15 THE STENOGRAPHER: I'm sorry. I did not get an 16 answer to that last question. 17 MS. KUDUK: Yeah. 18 MR. SILVA: I said, "Yes." 19 MS. KUDUK: I'm also wondering if we could have 20 the witness look into the camera. It gets really muffled 2.1 when he's looking down, and I can't understand it either. 22 Sorry. 23 THE WITNESS: Okay. No problem. 2.4 MR. KUDUK: Thank you. MR. GUTERMAN: You should understand that the 25

1 microphone is not where the camera is. The microphone is 2 right here. When he looks down, he's looking into the 3 microphone. 4 MR. KUDUK: Sorry. 5 JUDGE LAMBERT: Also, if anyone has technical 6 issues, try to bring them up as soon as possible, you 7 know, so we can address them right away. Thank you. 8 BY MR. GUTERMAN: 9 Do you recall when the sale of the Paso Property 10 was deeded from Arciero Wine Group to its members? 11 I believe it's either the end of July or 12 beginning of August. 13 Okay. If I show you -- I think it's Exhibit 17. 14 I refer you to Exhibit 17. Is that the deed that you were 15 discussing? 16 Α Yes, it is. 17 And see what date -- do recall or see the date 18 that it was signed on? 19 It was dated July 30th, and it was notarized on 20 July 31st of '07. 21 Do you recall when the sale of the Paso Property 22 closed? 23 I believe it closed the 3rd of August. 2.4 Okay. I'm referring you to Exhibit Number 20. Q Does that look familiar? And what is that document? 25

That's the grant deed, and it's transferring the property 1 2 from the individual members to Saphire Wines; is that 3 correct? That's correct, yes. 4 Α 5 And can you see the date that it was recorded on 6 or signed? 7 It was signed July 31st, 2007, recorded on Α August 2nd, 2007. 8 So that would have been at the close of the 10 transaction; is that correct? 11 Α Yes. 12 In conjunction with the closing of the sale, did 13 you receive any funds from the proceeds from the sale of 14 the property? 15 Yes. All of the funds was received by the 16 exchange corporate and deposited in the exchange accounts 17 for each member. 18 And at that time you were acting as an 19 accommodator for who? 20 For all of the members except Youngs Market or 2.1 Youngs Holding. 22 And what did you do with those funds? 23 Α I --2.4 Well, let me ask you this. What did you do with 25 Appellants' funds?

A They stayed in an account until they found their replacement property, and then the monies were wired to those escrows, and they acquired the uplands.

Q As you sit -- you were the accountant for Arciero Wine Group; is that correct?

A Yes.

2.1

2.4

Q And do you prepare the tax returns for Arciero Wine Group?

A Yes, I do.

Q I'd like us to go through how you went about preparing the tax returns? Did you -- can you explain to the panel how the sale was recorded in the general ledger of Arciero Wine Group?

A Well, I made an adjusting journal entry that came off of the escrow closing statement to record the sale and also, to record the distribution of real estate to the individual members. That adjusting entry was then posted by the in-house accountant on the general ledger of the Arciero Wine Group. And then from that general ledger, I prepared the tax return.

Q So I ask you to look at Exhibit 19, which is the Chicago Title final closing statement. Is this, when you said you made the adjusting journal entry off the closing statement, is this the document you were referring to?

A Yes, it is.

1 Are those your initials? Q 2 Yeah, those are my notes. 3 And then you took this information. And now I Q refer you to page 48 and 49 of Exhibit 5, which is your 4 5 declaration. Can you explain to the Judges what this is? 6 Yeah. That is a journal entry that I prepared to 7 record the sale of assets and withdrawal of real estate from partnership by members. 8 9 And does this tell you what date you reflected 10 the withdrawal of the property by the members? 11 Well, the adjusting entry dated August 2nd, which 12 is the date of the sale. But that was the sale, but did you -- so that's 13 14 the date you made the adjusting journal entry; is that 15 correct? 16 Α Yes. 17 But the property was distributed out before that? 18 Yes, that's correct. Α 19 Then after you did that, then next what did you Q 20 do? 21 Well, then I waited for the in-house accountant Α 22 to record the journal entry on the general ledger so that 23 I could prepare the tax return. 2.4 And, again, I refer you to Exhibit 5 and probably 25 starting at page -- it's Exhibit 3 of Exhibit 5. Can you

1 tell the panel what this is? 2 That's a balance sheet of Arciero Wine Group dated July 31st, 2007. 3 And what does it show? 4 It shows the assets and liabilities as of that 5 Α date. 6 7 Did their assets and liabilities include the property? 8 Α No, it did not. 10 So then effective July 31st this balance sheet 11 shows that the property had been distributed to the members? 12 13 That's correct. Α 14 And what's behind the balance sheet? 0 15 The income statement of the Arciero Wine Group. Α 16 Again, as of July --0 17 31st. Α 18 I'm referring you to Exhibit 4. What is that? 0 19 That's the balance sheet as of August 31st, 2007. Α 20 And what does it reflect? 0 2.1 It reflects that all the property is gone, the 22 land is gone. It still shows inventory, some cash. 23 That's about it. 2.4 How did you take this information and use it to 25 prepare the tax returns for Arciero Wine Group?

So Arciero Wine Group did not pay the prorations

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1 through -- and from what date did the prorations were 2 effective as of? 3 Well, they were effective as of the 2nd of August. 4 5 But they started from what date? 6 Α July 1st, 2007. 7 So the mortgage interest expense from July 1st 0 8 through August the 2nd was deducted from the Arciero --9 the Appellant's share of the closing proceeds? 10 They were. Right. 11 And were these other title charges -- were the 12 title charges deducted from the Appellant's share of the 13 closing statement? 14 Yes, they're all deducted. Okay. How about expenses related -- how about 15 16 payoffs related to the inventory? 17 I don't see any payoffs related to the inventory. Α 18 But those would have been expenses that have been 0 19 recorded on --20 Α By the LLC, yes. 2.1 I refer you to Stipulation of Fact -- let me get 22 that -- in particularly, the Stipulation of Fact Number 23 The Stipulation of Fact is how you recorded the closing expenses on the books of Arciero Wine Group and 2.4

the Appellants. Take your time and take a look.

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1	A So what's the question?
2	Q It would appear, and you had verified, that of
3	the \$4 million of the purchase price is allocated to the
4	inventory?
5	A And equipment.
6	Q And inventory?
7	A Yeah.
8	Q And that there were certain expenses taken off
9	though, deducted from the allocation to the inventory, and
10	the net sum that was paid to Arciero Wine Group was this
11	figure of \$99,400. Is that your understanding?
12	A Yes, it is.
13	Q Turn to the second part of the Stipulation which
14	is on page would you take a look at that?
15	A Yes.
16	Q Does that reflects your understanding as to how
17	the balance of expenses and prorations were used and
18	offset the proceeds to be paid to the Appellants?
19	A Yes.
20	MR. GUTERMAN: We have no further questions.
21	Thank you, Mr. Silva.
22	I would like at this time to call Frank Arciero
23	as a witness and seek his testimony.
24	Your Honor, do you want to swear him in?
25	JUDGE LAMBERT: Yes. Thanks.

1 Mr. Arciero, could you please raise your right 2 hand. 3 4 FRANK ARCIERO, JR., 5 produced as a witness, and having been first duly sworn by 6 the Administrative Law Judge, was examined and testified 7 as follows: 8 9 JUDGE LAMBERT: Thank you. 10 MR. GUTERMAN: Again, it will be Mr. Guterman 11 doing the questioning and Mr. Frank Arciero will be 12 responding to the questions. 13 14 DIRECT EXAMINATION 15 BY MR. GUTERMAN: 16 What's your current position with Arciero & Sons? 17 Currently I think I'm the secretary of 18 Arciero & Sons. And just to clarify I'm Frank Arciero, 19 Jr. 20 Jr. That is right. Frank Arciero, Jr. That's 2.1 true. And your position, Frank Jr. -- I guess your 22 nickname is Bush. Can I call you Bush for the purposes of 23 this questioning? 2.4 That's fine. Α 25 What's your position with F.A.R. Investments,

1 Inc., now? I'm an officer there too. And I don't know 2 3 exactly, to be honest with you. I mean, it's the family deal. So I think -- I think I'm secretary there also. 4 5 Okay. Then back in 2007 who was the president of 6 Arciero & Sons? 7 In 2007 it would have been my dad Frank, Sr. Α 8 And with F.A.R. Investments, Inc., was it your Q 9 dad? Yes, sir. 10 Α 11 Okay. I'd like to refer you to Respondent's 12 Exhibit E. It's a chart. It's an organizational chart. 13 Do you have it there before you? Yes, sir. 14 Α 15 When I look at this chart, it looks like the 16 entire family is involved in these companies, except for 17 two; one individual and one company. And you said that --18 who is Mr. Kerry Vix? 19 Kerry Vix was the general manager of the winery. Α 20 Q Was he also a partner in Arciero Winery too? 2.1 Α He was one of the members of the Arciero 22 Winery -- the Wine Group, yes. 23 Right. Right. So he had an interest in the 24 property as well? 25 Yes, he did.

Α

Q How did Youngs holdings become involved with the Arciero family?

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A I met Mr. Underwood, who was the president and CEO of Youngs Market years ago. Right after, we were looking for another distributor, because the distributor we had just said they wanted — they said they were going to close their doors, and we needed to find another home. And I happened to meet him through a friend of mine. And from that day forward, I mean, we became very good friends over the years, and sometime — and I don't recall the exact date.

But, I mean, at one time me and Kerry Vix got together and talked about how are we going to grow the case good sales for the winery. And I was in charge of sales and marketing. And so we made a decision then to go with Youngs Market. And through the years with Youngs Market things were going fairly decent, but we needed to grow a lot more rapidly than -- than what we anticipated. And especially with my dad hammering down on us all the time as to grow the business.

I approached Youngs Market and asked them if they would like to be a partner hoping that if they said yeah, that that would really help me expand the business. And they said yes, and so we made an agreement. And we had -- you know, after that point, you know, had the attorneys

1 write up the agreement and stuff, and they became a 2 partner of ours. 3 So the formation for Arciero Wine Group was to merge the property owned by the Arciero family with Youngs 4 5 in a joint enterprise at that point? 6 That's correct. 7 And do you recall how much Arciero Wine Group you owned -- the family owned collectively? 8 9 Well, the family -- when you say the family, my 10 immediate family, which would be Arciero & Sons, which I'm 11 a stockholder and my brother is. And then F.A.R., which 12 is owned by the grandchildren as well as me and my brother, and my dad was there. I think we probably owned 13 14 close to 75 percent, if I'm not mistaken, or more. 15 And did your Uncle Phil --16 I'm sorry. Α 17 Excuse me. And did your Uncle Phil own part of 0 18 it? 19 Yes. My Uncle Phil, I think, owned 17 percent 20 plus or minus of the winery. 2.1 Could you take a few minutes and tell the panel 22 about your father, what he was like then and how he ran 23 the family and ran his businesses? 2.4 Yes. My dad, I get emotional every time I talk

about it. But anyhow, long story short, he came from

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Italy when he was 14 years old and lived in Detroit. And by the time he was 18 him and my grandfather didn't get along, so he moved out to California and went to work for an Italian fella here building — doing concrete, and then decided to start his own company. He was kind of a self-made man and built up a concrete company in Southern California.

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And then he decided during the late -- in the 60s, that he wanted to be an alfalfa farmer. So he bought 4,000 acres up in the High Desert. He farmed alfalfa, and then he sold the ranches. And then after that he wanted to build a winery. So he -- he was, you know, the head honcho, if you want to say it. Everything went through him. If he said no, then we didn't do anything. If he said yes, then we all put our thoughts and hard work together and did what he said. So he was kind of a leader, you know, with the family business.

Q How was Arciero Wine Group managed? I mean, was there weekly meetings? I mean, how were different family members, such as yourself for example, involved in the management of Arciero Wine Group?

A Okay. Well, in 19 -- I think it was the early 80s, '81. He bought land up in Paso Robles and decided he wanted to build a winery. So we had a meeting, a family meeting. And he just sat there and says okay, we're going

to build a winery. And he looked at his brother, my Uncle

Phil who was a year -- a couple years younger than my

dad -- and says, you're going to be in charge of the

construction.

And he looked at me and told me I'm going to be in charge of sales and marketing, which I had no idea what I was doing. So that's kind of how we started. And he started planting grapes, and then the winery opened in 1984. So in about 1982 we started the groundbreaking to build the winery to be able to make our own wines and market it.

Q That history, is that the same property and the same history that was contributed to the Arciero Wine Group when you formed the business relationship with Youngs?

A Yes, it is.

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Q Did you and your father go on a regular basis to the winery?

A Yes. My dad was up there in the beginning for the first 10, 12 years maybe two days a week, and I would go up one day a week every week. And then we would have family meetings. When I say family, the family as well as the department heads at the winery. We would have a monthly meeting. And then Rudy Silva would also come up with us.

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And then my dad would go over all the issues that he wanted to talk about in regard to cost, you know, why are we not selling more wines. And that -- that happened on a monthly basis. And then later on, I'd say probably before he passed away in 2012, I say probably about in 2000, he started going up there three to four days a week. He would be down here one day on Monday and then leave on Tuesday morning to go up there and come back on Friday.

- Q Directing your attention to 2007, was the winery being marketed for sale?
 - A No. No. We never marketed the winery for sale.
- Q Were there any discussions about selling them independent -- ever discussions about selling the winery?
 - A No, not at all.
- Q So there have been no discussion regarding selling the market -- the winery. And so you got a phone call from Jeffrey Hopmayer; is that correct?
- A Kerry Vix got the phone call from Jeffrey Hopmayer.
 - Q And then when -- okay. I'm sorry. Go ahead.
- A So Kerry and me worked real close together. I mean, just a side point is most of the people up there were afraid of my dad. He was -- not because he was mean, but he had that -- I mean, he had a very deep voice and everything else. So people were kind of a little afraid

of him. Kerry after a while became -- you know, understood. So anyhow, long story short, Kerry got a phone call and called me and says, "I had a call that somebody is interested in purchasing the winery."

And I says, "Well," I says, "You know what

Kerry," I says, "What you need to do is you need to try to

vet this guy to find out who he is, where he's from, and

if, in fact, he has the wherewithal to purchase it, even

if we thought about selling it. And then when you find

that out let me know, and we'll tell my dad and my uncle."

And that's kind of what happened. He vetted them out and found out that there was an interest, that he had the wherewithal to purchase it. So that's when we sat down with Kerry and my dad up at the winery. And then we had another couple of meetings up there and then the subsequent meeting that we had in Tustin at our main offices at that time.

- Q And when you said, "meeting in Tustin," you're talking about the meeting in mid-July of 2007?
 - A Yes.

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- Q And you were at that meeting?
- A Yes, I was.
 - Q Do you recall what was discussed at that meeting?
- A I -- I think the main thing that was discussed was the fact that -- I think my dad asked the questions of

Rudy as to, you know, what are our liabilities if we do sell and questions like that. And Rudy gave him the explanation as to what would happen if we sold and stuff. So at that point in time, my dad, you know, in his mind told the family that, hey, if we're going to sell this, we're not going to sell it unless we have an opportunity to go buy another piece of property someplace. And if we don't, then I'm going to squash the deal. I'm not going to sell it.

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I mean, his intent all the time was to keep that winery in the family.

Q Did your father like paying taxes?

A Well, I mean, he paid taxes. I don't want to -I don't want a bad, you know, image to go out here. But
no, he did not like -- he worked -- he worked his entire
life. Okay. And he -- every penny he made went towards
either improving his business or helping people out. And
he just didn't like giving money away to people, you know,
that weren't going to use it properly.

Q You heard during the hearing about Mr. Silva's testimony at the July 27th meeting where we talked about maybe the members having to sell the property to do a like-kind exchange and the consequences of that. That's something you wanted to participate in too? You thought it was a good idea to participate in?

A Well, I mean, to be honest with you I had no say. So, I mean, I went along with it only because that's what my dad wanted, and we thought it was a good idea.

Q We're talking about the meeting in mid-July of 2007; correct?

A Yes, we are.

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Q What was your involvement in the sale of the winery after that meeting or even throughout the process? How involved were you?

A I mean, I was involved. Every meeting that we had, you know, I was involved with. But in regard to once we knew that we were going to go forward with the deal and have the partners sell their interest in the winery, you know, I was just there to support my dad at the meetings. So if there were any questions, you know, that he needed answers in regard to what's going on with the winery and stuff like that, I was there to answer them as well as Kerry.

But I didn't have any -- how do you say it? I wasn't directly involved to tell my dad, no, don't do it or, yes, do it. He was going to do it, and we just needed to go along with him.

Q And during this process, were you in communication with Youngs Holdings about the sale?

A Well, I mentioned to Vern that there was an offer

for our part of the winery, and I just told him. And he 1 2 took it from there and turned it over to his people. 3 I think Dennis Barnett or somebody from Youngs Market or Youngs Holdings Company is the one that contacted Rudy and 4 5 then also probably contacted Kerry and talked to them. 6 But he wasn't in on a day-to-day basis, no. 7 Focusing your attention on the closing of the sale. And, really, the period between the Tustin meeting 8 9 and when the transaction closed. Did anything come to 10 your attention or understanding that the property was 11 going -- the Paso Property was going to be sold -- was 12 going to be sold by AWG, Inc., entity? No. I'm sorry. I thought you got cut off. 13 Α 14 ahead. One more time. 15 JUDGE LAMBERT: I think we have some reverb going 16 on. Is everyone muted? 17 Is it from us? MR. GUTERMAN: 18 JUDGE LAMBERT: It's gone now. Can you still 19 hear it? Okay. I think maybe it's gone. Thanks. 20 THE WITNESS: Okay. 21 MR. GUTERMAN: Maybe we need to move the 22 microphone. 23 BY MR. GUTERMAN: 2.4 During the period from mid-July 2007 to when the 25 transaction closed, do you recall any conversation or any

1 understandings or changes in the structure of the deal so 2 that Arciero Wine Group was going to be the seller of the 3 Paso Property? I mean, my understanding was that we had to 4 5 have each member of the LLC sell their interest. 6 that's the way I had it from that time forward. 7 Is that because that's the way your father wanted the deal done? 8 9 That's the way he wanted the deal done, and we 10 went along with it. 11 "Them" being the individual members selling the 12 property; correct? That's correct. 13 Α 14 MR. GUTERMAN: I have no further questions. 15 MR. ARCIERO: Okay. 16 MR. GUTERMAN: Thank you, Judge Lambert. 17 JUDGE LAMBERT: Okay. Thank you everyone and 18 Mr. Arciero and Mr. Silva. 19 We'll just take a 10-minute break now. So we'll 20 come back at 2:30, and while we're on break just mute your 2.1 microphones and stop your video. Thanks. 22 (There is a pause in the proceedings.) 23 JUDGE LAMBERT: We're going to go back on the record now. 2.4 25 And we're going to ask -- give FTB the

1 opportunity to ask the witnesses questions. FTB, maybe 2 take 20 minutes, and then I'll check with the ALJs if they 3 have any questions, and then we can go back to you, if we have some after that. 4 5 So please proceed with your questions of the witnesses at this time. Thanks. 6 7 MR. GUTERMAN: Is the FTB speaking? I can't hear them. 8 9 MS. KUDUK: Hi. Can you hear me now? 10 MR. GUTERMAN: Yes. 11 MS. KUDUK: Okay. Great. Yeah. My name is 12 Carolyn Kuduk, and I'm with the Franchise Tax Board. And 13 I just wanted to ask Mr. Silva and Mr. Arciero a couple of 14 questions, but first I think Mr. Silva. And I'll keep it 15 very brief. Okay. 16 MR. SILVA: Okay. 17 MS. KUDUK: The only thing I ask, Mr. Silva, is 18 for whatever reason your voice is slightly soft. So we're 19 having trouble hearing it. So if I ask you to repeat an 20 answer, please don't get offended. 21 MR. SILVA: Go ahead. I'll try to speak louder. 22 MS. KUDUK: Okay. Great. Thank you. /// 23 2.4 /// /// 25

1 CROSS-EXAMINATION 2 BY MS. KUDUK: So you were the president of the CPA Exchange in 3 Q 2007, is that correct, when this deal was done? 4 5 Α Yes. 6 Okay. Q 7 Α That is correct. 8 That is correct. So and then you -- would you Q 9 personally review the paperwork with the qualified 10 intermediary and Appellants signed, or would somebody else 11 review that paperwork? 12 I don't understand the question. 13 As in your capacity as the president of CPA 14 Exchange, did you review the qualified intermediary 15 paperwork? Like --16 Yes, I did. 17 Okay. And so the exchange agreement is a 0 Yes. 18 common agreement in a 1031 exchange; is that correct? 19 Α Yes. 20 Q Okay. So probably every 1031 exchange needs to have an exchange or agreement; is that correct? 2.1 22 Α Yes. 23 Okay. And the Seller Substitution Agreement is also common in any 1031 exchange; isn't that correct? 2.4 25 In most of them, I think. Α

Q Okay.

A I've seen some done without it.

MS. KUDUK: Okay. Okay. Those were the only couple of questions that I wanted to ask Mr. Silva. And then I have one question for you, Mr. Arciero.

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CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MS. KUDUK:

Q So you testified that you were at the July 15th meeting where -- where your father and Philip Arciero and Kerry Vix met. Is that correct you were at that meeting?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay. And then at that meeting you -- so the partners and Arciero Winery and you, who was not a partner in Arciero Winery, decided to accept Saphire's offer and to purchase the assets. And then you were going to divvy up the Paso Robles Property in -- to do a 1031 exchange via tenant-in-common interest; is that correct? So it was at that time on July 15th you decided to accept the offer and then distribute the property?

A Well, at that time it was -- the understanding was the property was going to be distributed because of the exchange. In regard to a final negotiation with Saphire, I don't -- to be honest with you, I don't recall if we -- if that was the final say to say this is what the

1 amount was going to be and, you know, and talking about opening the escrow and all that stuff, I don't recall 2 3 that. Okay. But, certainly, by the time on July 27th, 4 5 when the Asset Purchase Agreement was signed, everything was finalized; right? 6 7 Α By the 27th, yes, because the escrow closed five or six days later, seven days later. Something like that. 8 9 MS. KUDUK: Okay. All right. That was the only 10 three questions. I appreciated your testimony about your 11 father. That was -- that gave us a lot of insight into 12 your dad. 13 MR. ARCIERO: Thank you. I appreciate it. 14 MS. KUDUK: Okay. Thank you. 15 JUDGE LAMBERT: Okay. Thank you. 16 And now I'll turn to the panel to ask if they 17 have any questions of Appellants or the witnesses or 18 Mr. Guterman or Mr. Kaplan. 19 Judge Akin, do you have any questions? 20 JUDGE AKIN: Thank you. I do have a couple of 2.1 questions, and I'm not entirely sure who best to direct it 22 So let me ask the question, and Appellants can decide 23 who may be the best person to answer it. My first 2.4 question is, since you've made it clear that the

individual members intended to sell the Paso Property and

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intended to do like-kind exchanges, I'm wondering why the July 27th, 2007, Asset Purchase Agreement didn't reflect them as sellers and instead reflected Arciero Winery Group as the seller of everything, including the Paseo Property -- the Paso Property.

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MR. KAPLAN: Well, I think that if you look at the -- if you look through the Asset Purchase Agreement, you'll see that it is primarily concerned with the sale of AWG's wine inventory. There's virtually nothing in there related to the Paso Property. In everyone's mind, buyer, sellers, whether it's the LLC members, or the LLC; everyone understood that the property was not part of the asset sale with respect to what AWG was doing. Everyone knew that piece was already moved out.

And that's what the Seller Substitution

Agreements from three or four days before said. There

certainly wasn't anything that happened in that three to

four-day period in between those events to alter the terms

of the deal. And there's certainly -- you know, and

similarly there's nothing that happened in the four or

five days after the signing of the purchase -- the Asset

Purchase Agreement until the deal closed where everything

does, you know, reflect clearly that these are

tenant-in-common interest that were sold.

The deal didn't suddenly change back to

tenant-in-common interest. It was that way all the time. The Asset Purchase Agreement deals almost exclusively with the sale of the winery, and it appears to me that not a great deal of attention was paid to that document. It was -- it was not -- it was not as specific as it could be. There are blanks in there for certain numbers. I think there were still questions as to everything regarding the wine inventory other than a \$4 million figure applicable to that.

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But it's just -- it dealt with the wine inventory. And I think I'm speaking -- I should not probably be the one to answer this, but Frank, Sr., is not here to answer it. But I think in everyone's mind with the Seller Substitution Agreements and the acknowledgment of all the parties that with respect to eight -- the tenants that the members stood in the shoes of AWG with respect to the Paso Property.

So if AWG was signing an agreement, the part of the agreement that related to the Paso Property was really the members. The document does not make that as clear as it could be.

MR. GUTERMAN: Barry Guterman speaking. If I may, I have just one point. When you look at the Asset Purchase Agreement, look at the fact in the initial articles of that agreement. The purchase -- the amount in

consideration and when the consideration is to be paid for the Paso Property is not mentioned. There's no closing date mentioned. The signature page deals with an agreement, a draft, that was done seven times earlier where it referred to a purchase of partnership inter -- membership interest.

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There was no real -- as much effort as they put into that agreement, no one gave it any mind. It was the inventory. If you want to ask, Mr. Arciero can answer to it, even Mr. Silva. They didn't even spend any time but looking at the agreement. No one gave it any time to that agreement. That agreement dealt with the inventory. That was something that attorneys had to deal with in terms of representations and warranties. But that was the point of that agreement. It's not in isolation. You have to take all of it into account. And all of the accounts shows a bifurcated sale; sale of inventory and other assets, for inventory and a sale of the Paso Property by the individuals.

JUDGE AKIN: Okay.

MR. KAPLAN: And I think -- I think to a great extent -- this is -- this is Mr. Kaplan speaking. And again, I apologize for stepping on your toes, Judge Akin.

I think that -- that the transaction, although, it involves a large amount of money, is not terribly

complex. Once you agree upon a value for the property, the paperwork is the paperwork. It will get done. And once you agree on the valuation of the inventory, it gets done. And what the agreement is concerned with primarily is what are the checks and balances on determining the value of the inventory, in case once title is transferred to that, are adjustments in that purchase price going to need to be made.

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But it's not a terribly complex transaction. The property, here's how much. Fine. Move it over there. What's left? We got the inventory. That's more of a moving target just in terms of trying to determine its true value because it -- it fluctuates. I mean, the business was still operating. There was -- what is in the inventory today may not be in the inventory tomorrow. Things when title transfers, we thought we had, you know, 100 cases here. It turns out they've all gone bad. So they're going to be taken out of -- you know, that's where adjustments would be made.

But it's not a terribly complicated transaction, and it's not all that surprising that nobody paid quite as much attention to the documents, you know, as consequence of that. And I think what Mr. Guterman pointed out, if you look at the signature page, it talks about the sale of an interest. It doesn't talk about the sale of -- you

know, it's -- it's language that came from the original 1 2 draft, which was always related to -- you know, it flowed 3 from the original offer, which was for the membership interest of AWG. 4 5 JUDGE AKIN: Okay. Thank you. That does answer my question. I did have one additional question which 6 7 is -- so the grant deed that conveyed the tenant-in-common interest in the Paso Property to the individual members. 8 9 Looking at it, it was dated July 30th. But then it looks 10 like it was notarized on July 31st, 2007, but was not 11 recorded until August 2nd, 2007. I guess I'm just 12 wondering why the delay in recording it. 13 MR. SILVA: No -- no reason that I can think of. 14 It was given to the escrow officer when it was signed. 15 MR. GUTERMAN: Were there any instruction to 16 withhold recording it? 17 MR. SILVA: No. We did not ask her to withhold 18 recording. 19 I'm not sure what day of the week. MR. KAPLAN: 20 MR. GUTERMAN: It's the middle of the week. 21 MR. KAPLAN: Let's see. The 2nd of August in 22 2007 was a Thursday. So I guess that means the 31st was 23 Tuesday, so two days later. 2.4 JUDGE AKIN: Okay. Thank you. That answers my

questions, and I don't have any additional questions at

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this time.

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JUDGE LAMBERT: Thank you, Judge Akin.

Judge Le, do you have any questions?

JUDGE LE: This is Judge Le. I have no questions for Appellant's rep at this time.

JUDGE LAMBERT: Okay. Thanks.

I think I have a couple of questions. And maybe it's related to what you already, so you don't have to repeat what you already said. But you were stating that their sales agreement was a sale of assets. When I look at it, I can see that there's attachments stating what assets were included. There are buildings included there. So I'm not sure. Maybe you could point to how we can make it clear that, like, your argument that this is a bifurcated sale.

You know, when I look at the Seller Substitution Agreement, I can see how it's facilitating the 1031 exchange, but it doesn't look like, necessarily, a sales agreement between, you know, Saphire and the parties. So can you please just comment on those issues, maybe explain how it's bifurcated and what evidence we have about that.

MR. GUTERMAN: So Barry Guterman speaking. When we make the reference to bifurcated, we meant that there are two different -- two set of sellers. One was the seller of the -- the entity was the seller of the

inventory, and the individual members were the seller of the Paseo [sic] Property. But you can't look at the Asset Purchase Agreement and the Sellers Exchange Agreement necessarily, it was a combined package. It reflects two transactions going along on the same track moving in the same — in the same direction but with different sellers. That's what we mean by the bifurcation.

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There were different sellers. The asset -- the seller of the inventory was different than the seller of the real property. True, there are representations of the -- in warranties. That was buyer's representative knew about the bifurcated sale. It seems to me the buyers entered with the one that was controlling the drafts of the agreement. If they were concerned about who was making representations and warranties, it would have been to buyer's own counsel to, you know, to make adjustments.

It's clear that the buyers' attorney, we weren't drafting this. The Appellants weren't drafting these agreements. It was the buyers. We were making comments, but it doesn't reflect an exclusion. It reflects that there are two different — two type — two sales going on at the same time that are closing at the same time. And, again, that's evident by the seller closing — escrow sale closing instructions. It reflects the separate interest of the entity and the Appellants.

Arciero Wine Group as the seller. It refers to the individuals dealing with the property as the exchangers. It takes into consideration of \$23,750,000 and allocates it into two buckets. One bucket, \$4 million for the industry. Another bucket, the \$19,750,000 to other assets in the Paseo [sic] Property. Deductions and prorated expenses are attributable to the inventory, is allocated to the \$4 million of consideration that was set forth in the agreement for the inventory.

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The \$500,000 holdback came out of the entities' portion of the proceeds. It didn't come out of the seller -- the members' portion of the proceeds. What did the members pay -- bear in the expenses? They bear the property tax prorations. They bear the lien, FCA West Mortgage, the interest proration through the date of closing. They paid for the title insurance. They paid for escrow insurance. They paid all those costs, including -- Mr. Silva can confirm it -- including the cost of the accommodator out of their proceeds before it was divided up amongst the five owners.

It reflects two transactions going along on parallel tracks closing at the same time. And that's why I called it -- why we refer to it as a bifurcated sale.

JUDGE LAMBERT: Thank you, Mr. Guterman. I had a

couple of other questions. FTB's argued that intent is not reflect to this matter that is at issue on the true seller or substance versus form. And I know that your arguments have involved around intent as well. And could you please address that and also provide any authorities or anything we should know regarding intent and its relevance to this matter of substance. Thanks.

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MR. KAPLAN: Mr. Kaplan speaking. I think
that -- I mean, Appellant certainly agreed that whether -whether you intend to do a like-kind exchange or not does
not mean whether you have. Intending to do is a great
thing. It's not going to happen unless you intend to, but
the fact that intention alone is not there. You know,
it's not there to take you over the finish line. If you
go back to Magneson, which is the keystone case for
Section 1031, it deals with -- directly deals with the
question of intent in holding a piece of property.

It takes a piece of property and says if you merely change the form in which you hold that property, hasn't increased in value, decreased in value. It is still the same identical owner who simply changes it from this form to that form. The intent in holding that property, the intent to hold it for investment or use in a trade or business does not change. It carries over. It is not possible to have the intent in holding the property

carry over if the ownership of the property doesn't carry over.

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It makes -- it simply makes no sense. Magneson cannot mean, oh, if you change the form, you're okay. But you changed the way you held it, so you now have a different party and 1031 does not apply. That, to my mind is an egregious misreading of Magneson, and it simply does not make sense to me.

The -- you have to take certain steps to effectuate a like-kind exchange. It's purposeful. There are things that need to be done. You cannot mistakenly engage in a 1031 transaction. Business considerations dictate when certain things can happen in that stream of events. Franchise Tax Board has always expressed its concern the things that happened right before the closing should not count because benefits and burdens didn't pass. Again, I go back to Magneson that, of course, the benefits and burdens passed because it's the same owner. Nothing has changed other than the form in which the property is held.

So I'm not sure if I'm answering your question completely, but I -- I -- I think that the question of intent in the sense of did you intend to hold the property for investment is what's paramount, whereas the -- I would readily agree that the intent to do a like-kind exchange

gets you part of the way there, because you have to had the intent, but it does not -- you know, I'll readily acknowledge that that doesn't mean you've met all the requirements just because you intended to.

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I think here they did meet all the requirements. And, again, I think going to your question about the meaning or what is or isn't in the July 27th Asset

Purchase Agreement, and that it is not as clear as it could be. I think what's much more unclear is what do you do with the Seller Substitution Agreements that each of the members of AWG signed, that Saphire the buyer signed acknowledging that it was aware of and approved of the fact that the Paso Property is going to be bought from the members. There's nothing in the Asset Purchase Agreement other than its — its boilerplate language that — that indicates that the parties changed the deal somehow.

I mean, we've heard, you know, from both

Mr. Silva and Mr. Arciero. This deal was not going to
happen with the sale of the property by AWG. It just

wasn't going to happen. No one was interested in selling
the winery and -- until there was a knock on the door, and
they received an offer too good to refuse. They thought,
okay, if we're going to sell, how do we -- how do we do

this? Well, I'm not going to sell it if I've got to pay,
you know, 30, 40 percent of it in tax. If there's a way

to do this without, you know, without incurring that immediate cost, that's what we'll do.

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Mr. Silva reminds Mr. Arciero, Sr. You remember 1031. It defers the tax. You don't pay it today. You can reinvest the entire amount of proceeds in similar property. You can buy other property. And that's what they chose to do, and what every step that everyone took was towards that -- that goal. And -- and I see nothing in the July 27th agreement that -- that somehow overrides every other fact and document and action that took place that clearly indicates everybody knew what was going on.

JUDGE LAMBERT: Thank you, Mr. Kaplan. I just have one more question, and it is kind of related to what we've talked about. But, you know, there's multiple individuals here, you know, Mr. Arciero, Jr., you know, and Mr. Kaplan. They were owners or worked for all the entities involved. So I guess, you know, there's always a question of when you're negotiating it's hard to tell if you're negotiating on behalf of AWG or maybe F.A.R.

Investments. And maybe you can say these exchange agreements, you know, kind of show that -- you know, I'm sure you would say that kind of per evidence that there was some -- something going on in these e-mails.

At the same time, we have the sales agreement, the sale from AWG to Saphire. First, it was from the

partnership. Then it was changed to be to the LLC. And I was -- I wonder if there's anything else we could point to. You know, we don't have an agreement, I don't think, that mentioned what was originally planned according to Mr. Silva that they were going to sell the members' interest. So is there anything else that we could look to kind of know -- have evidence that the members were being negotiated for, or that they were part of the negotiations?

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MR. KAPLAN: I mean, I think -- this is

Mr. Kaplan talking. I think the simple answer to that

is -- and we've asked ourselves throughout, you know, this

very lengthy process. This transaction was 14 years ago.

You need to know what happened in a situation like this

where -- where there is an overlap. The person who is

directing AWG is also directing each of the Appellants.

So you need to know which hat is he wearing when

negotiations are going on.

Legitimate question. Sometimes you just don't know and it's confusing. There's no confusion here. You know that he is negotiating on behalf of himself with respect to his tenant-in-common interest, not with respect to trying to sell AWG. That was never going to happen. What hat Frank Jr. was wearing was never -- never in doubt.

MR. GUTERMAN: Senior. Excuse me.

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MR. KAPLAN: I mean, it's -- it's -- if you -- if you look at the case and, you know, most closely analogous with this, which has been discussed, you know, at great length in the briefs, Appeal of Mitchell. That is a case where there is a very legitimate question as to which hat is the general partner wearing. Is -- is he representing the partnership in the sale of that piece of property, or is he representing the partnership and one of the partners with respect to their slice of the bill.

Much more difficult question than what we have here. And, yet, even with that difficulty, Office of Tax Appeals determined that the negotiation was equally on behalf of the individual, because the individual had always made it crystal clear, I'm not going to agree to this unless it's done -- unless I'm allowed to have it structured as a tax-deferred exchange. And I think that's exactly -- I mean, it's so much clearer here as to what hat was being worn. But it's a very legitimate question.

MR. GUTERMAN: Judge Lambert, may I add one point to that. This is Mr. Guterman speaking. For the Asset Purchase Agreement, to have -- to be given the weight that the Respondent wants, you'd have to go back from saying -- from the beginning. Frank Arciero, Sr., had in its mind the way the transaction is going to be done, and that's

the way it proceeded. And there's an oops, I'm going to go ahead and do everything that I wanted to do and undo it by signing an Asset Purchase Agreement that makes my company the seller. That wouldn't -- that makes no sense.

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And then after the fact they do an escrow sale of instructions that reflects the different interest.

There's a clear point from point A all the way through, there's a clear intent and an action by the individuals to effectuate separate sales. You can go from the -- before anything is signed or written off, there's discussions.

These are not discussions that are happening just before its closing. These are discussions that went on before anything was finalized.

MR. KAPLAN: Discussions wouldn't happen.

MR. GUTERMAN: It wouldn't have gone -- and you heard from Frank Arciero, Jr. talk about his father. You heard from Mr. Silva and his relationship. This transaction could only go one way. The parties didn't make an oops and go ahead and have the company sign it. And who goes ahead and signs the purchase agreement thinking it's going to involve their sale, when they don't even put in the purchase price for the -- for the asset and don't even demand and say when the purchase price for the assets to be paid.

Look at those blanks. Those are just not little

blanks about missing a date. Look in Article I. There's a huge blank where it talks about the payment of the purchase price for the property. There isn't. You only get that in the sales agreement -- in the sale and escrow instructions words to find. And what do you get? You get the fact that \$4 million had been allocated indicated to the inventory and everything else got allocated to the property.

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Okay. That's a continual through. It's like if you -- one of my guesses, I'd call it maybe a speed bump or something or mistake, you know. But it's the attorneys who are involved in it, it's not the clients. And again, the attorneys who are drafting this are buyers' attorneys. And it's not -- none is giving any effect. There's nobody in this transaction, other than maybe counsel doing a poor job of documenting, that understood anything different.

Everyone understood the individuals were selling it. There's nothing inconsistent with that. There's no single fact other than an execution of a poorly drafted document that caused issues -- that may cause one to pause in understanding it. Thank you.

MR. KAPLAN: I think if I can jump in for one last comment on this. This is Mr. Kaplan again.

I think there's an irony into -- into the question and the issue because we start in the normal 1031

disputes. You start with the issue of you meet the form, you didn't meet the substance. We need to look at the substance. Look at everything that happened, not just the document that can say whatever it wants to say, but we need to look at everything. If you look at everything here, there is one piece that does not fit perfectly into the jigsaw puzzle. It's the Asset Purchase Agreement.

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If the Asset Purchase Agreement obliterates all the other facts and circumstances, all the other documents, suddenly you've just elevated -- now we're back to form trumps substance. It turns it completely on its ear. It's necessary to look at everything. Look at the story. Look at the actions, and look at all of the documents. Where did the money go? Why are they opening exchange accountants? Why did the escrow, you know, the instructions say what they say?

It's all -- you know, the things that mattered were done correctly. Oddly enough, the thing that mattered the least was the actual sale agreement. But you cannot elevate a single form to override all the fact and circumstances. The irony of doing that in a substance over form analysis is ironic.

JUDGE LAMBERT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Kaplan and Mr. Guterman. I appreciate it. And, of course, Mr. Arciero Jr. And Mr. Silva, thank you so much for

making your presentation and answering the questions.

Now, let's go to FTB. And Ms. Mosnier and
Ms. Kuduk, you'll have 60 minutes to give your
presentation. You may proceed when you're ready. Thanks.

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FTB.

PRESENTATION

MS. MOSNIER: Okay. Great. Thank you.

Good afternoon. This is Marguerite Mosnier for

And I think one thing that Franchise Tax Board certainly agrees with the Appellants about is what happened matters. So in this case, the Appellants have not established that they made IRC Section 1031(a)(1) requirements. And they can't, because they are not the true seller or what we call the sellers in substance of the property. So let's talk about what happened here.

The stipulated facts tell us that AWG was the owner of the Paso Robles Property since 1999, that in May 2007 AWG received an offer to purchase the property and the business assets for \$20 million. That's in Kerry Vix's declaration and the e-mail, the May 2007 e-mail he forwarded to the partners is in the record in several places. One of them would be Exhibit 6.

And, you know, for the numbered exhibits, the individual page numbers in each exhibit are not numbered.

But what's been marked as from the PDF copy of the Appellant's reply brief that has all those exhibits attached. And so I can give you -- because this is a 500-page document -- I can give you PDF pages for ease of reference because I think OTA sent that document to FTB. So I presume you are working with the same PDF pages. So you'll see that on Exhibit 6, PDF page 160.

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And then what also happened is there was a meeting in mid-July, partner meeting in Fountain Valley, and sounds like AWG is good. Sell the property. And they would like their attorney, Jon Cantor, to revise the contract regarding the Section 1031 transactions. On July 23rd, the tenant-in-common holders, who are not yet tenant-in-common holders, signed Seller Substitution Agreements. Four days later on July 27th, AWG, as the sole seller, signed a contract to sell both the real property and inventory, and I think some equipment, personal property, for almost \$24 million.

We know from Mr. Arciero Jr.'s declaration that almost \$20 million of that amount was allocated to the real property, to the Paso Robles Property. On July 30th, AWG signed a tenant -- signed a deed granting tenant-in-common or TIC interest to the one actual owner of AWG, which was Youngs Holdings Incorporated, and then to, quote, "the owners" of the other owner of AWG. AWG

was not owned directly by the Appellants.

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And I would like to -- if the technology will help me this time -- share with you -- let's see. Okay. Share. I would like to show you -- do you see a power point slide on your screens? Thumbs up anybody? Yes? Okay. Thank you.

This is the property that is the subject of the appeal. It was owned 100 percent by AWG an LLC. In turn the LLC was owned in round numbers 9 or 10 percent by Youngs Holdings, a corporation, and by a partnership, Arciero Winery. Arciero Winery in turn was owned by Kerry Vix, Philip Arciero, and our two Appellants, Arciero & Sons, Incorporated, and F.A.R. Investments. So the TIC deed from AWG down here, did not go to the owners of Arciero — it did not go to its owner, Arciero Winery.

It went right through the winery to the four holders partnership partners of Arciero Winery. And then the last TIC interest was granted directly to the approximate 9 percent owner, Youngs Holdings. So that was the structure.

Okay. I'm going to stop sharing here if I can figure out how to do that. Oh, wait. Hang on. How do I get out of this? I know this is -- this is it. Okay. Here. Oh, thank you. I know. This is it right here. Sorry. I'm working on getting back to -- okay. Just a

minute here. Where are options? I don't know how to. --1 2 JUDGE LAMBERT: If I could interject for a 3 second, I don't --4 MS. MOSNIER: Yes, please. 5 We didn't discuss previously that JUDGE LAMBERT: we'd have a power point presentation, and I'm not sure 6 7 what is going to be in these slides. MS. MOSNIER: That was it. 8 9 JUDGE LAMBERT: Okay. 10 MS. MOSNIER: It was just a visual of the 11 structure that is set out in the -- in the thing. But I 12 tell you, honestly, the problem I'm having is I can't get 13 back to the big screen to get out of the -- to get out 14 my -- of this -- of the power point. 15 JUDGE LAMBERT: It's in upper right-hand corner. 16 MS. MOSNIER: That's what everybody says. Ah, 17 here we go. No. It's right here. Okay. Share. Thank 18 you. Stop sharing. Yes, thank you. 19 JUDGE LAMBERT: I just want to make sure that --20 MS. MOSNIER: I apologize for that -- yes, my 2.1 understanding was that -- that FTB had communicated, was 22 talking to OTA about that. And I apologize that --23 JUDGE LAMBERT: Okay. 2.4 MS. MOSNIER: -- it wasn't -- that you didn't 25 know ahead of time. I just thought the visuals would be

easy to understand facts that were not at issue. 1 2 are no new facts. There's no argument presented there. 3 JUDGE LAMBERT: Okay. I just want to make sure Appellants have the opportunity to be aware of anything 4 5 beforehand, or if they have any objections or disagree 6 with the information. That's all. 7 MS. MOSNIER: Okay. If you would, like, right now to check with them if they disagree with the 8 9 information shown, that was shown on these power points, 10 that's just fine. 11 MR. KAPLAN: This is Mr. Kaplan speaking. 12 what I could see on the screen, it did not look like we 13 had anything that we would object to. It looks very 14 similar, if not identical, although more nicely drawn up 15 and in color, the organizational chart that's already in 16 the record. No one has ever disputed who owns what and 17 how the -- how the family tree spreads. 18 JUDGE LAMBERT: Okay. Thank you. 19 I have no reason to believe that MR. KAPLAN: 20 what was just shown to us is -- is not exactly what is 21 correct. So --22 MS. MOSNIER: Right. 23 JUDGE LAMBERT: Thanks. 2.4 Ms. Mosnier, please proceed.

MS. MOSNIER: Okay. Thank you.

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See on July 31st, AWG had a TIC deed, a grant deed deeding interest in the Paso Robles Property to the owners of Arciero Winery and to Youngs Holdings. That deed wasn't recorded until August 2nd. So into escrow all \$24 million come in, and all 20 of it was allocated to the real property. Although, the Appellants argue that at this point the Asset Purchase Agreement was almost something we really shouldn't pay attention to, it was a document that solidified a \$24 million contract.

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months later after escrow closed of state court
litigation, not having to do with the real property, with
other assets that were sold. So I will say that the
parties, in particularly Arciero Wine Group, which was the
plaintiff in the state court action — and that
information in our briefs. And Arciero Wine Group did
rely on the Asset Purchase Agreement as a final document.
Paragraph 7.8 of that agreement indicates that it is the
entire agreement.

And page -- in the description of assets that are conveyed pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement is the assignment of AWG's lease-hold interest in a singular cellular tower that's located on the real property. Now, under my understanding of real property law, that would be considered a fixture. You wouldn't just sign your

lease-hold interest in that contract, unless you were, in fact, conveying the real property on which that fixture was located.

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The list of inventory and assets attached as schedules to the Asset Purchase Agreement, also includes, as you know to Judge Lambert, buildings and including, I presume, the winery building. Again, those are fixtures. If they were not -- if the real property were not conveyed through that agreement, there's no other agreement that has been put into the record pursuant to which anyone, any entity, or individual, sold that property to the purchaser.

So we have more or less a swap and drop. Usually with a swap and drop, you see the property dropped directly from an entity to its owner, not to an owner of an owner. But this follows, generally, a drop-and-swap fact pattern. So to defer gain under Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code, you have to show three things. You have to show that you meet the exchange requirement, which is that the same taxpayer must relinquish the property and acquire replacement property. You have to meet the holding requirement, which is that the property must be held for investment or productive use of business. And you have to meet the like-kind requirement that you have exchanged property for like-kind property.

We agree with the Appellants that the holding requirement and the like-kind requirement are not at issue, only the exchange requirement. Whether the same taxpayer relinquished the Paso Robles Property and purchase replacement property has been satisfied, on that issue the taxpayer has the burden of proof. So they -- it is not on FTB to show that the Appellants were not -- were the true sellers of the property. It is on the Appellants to show, in fact, that they were.

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And they have that burden because the issue of who the true seller is an issue of fact. And we know that from Bolker versus Commissioner and from Waltham Netoco Theatres versus Commissioner, First Circuit case. And this gets us to the general concept of taxation. We agreed with Appellants that taxation follows the substance not the form. In some cases, the substance is the same as the form. It was in this case. Let's start with the U.S. Supreme Court case, Court Holding versus Commissioner, all the way back to 1945, I think.

In that case the court refined the concept of the substance over form doctrine. You determine who the seller in substance is. In that case, a corporation negotiated to sell its property, determined it would have pretty high tax consequence if it did so. And that might sound familiar. And so it decided to liquidate,

distribute the property to the owners, to its shareholders, and let them complete the purchase. And so that's what they did.

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The Internal Revenue Service said no corporation. You're the true seller. You bear the -- you negotiated the contract. There was nothing left for the shareholders to do but put their deeds into escrow. And, you know, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with them and said, yes, you follow the substance not the form. You may have one form of legal document, but the substance of the transaction is what dictates the tax consequence.

We know from Chase versus Commissioner and from Appeal of Brookfield Manor that the seller in substance doctrine applies in 1031 transactions. And you always have to determine that first before you reach the other requirements. Because until you know who the real seller is, you wouldn't know who to analyze, for example, to see if they had met the holding requirement. And so the Appellants are not the true sellers or sellers in substance under cold holding -- excuse me -- Court Holding, Chase versus Commissioner, Bolker versus Commissioner, Brookfield Manor, or under a non-precedential opinion, FTB cited in its reply brief, Giurbino, Appeal of Giurbino.

So I'd like to start with -- we discussed Court

Holding. And in that case the court considered the following in its determination that the sale was really a sale by the corporation rather than an exchange or a sale, frankly, by the shareholders. The court considered the terms of the sale between the shareholders and the purchaser were substantial the same as the terms between the corporation and the purchaser. The court also considered the short time period between the transfer of assets of the property to the shareholders and their subsequent transfer to the purchaser.

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So let's apply those to this case. Appellants are not even listed as sellers in the Asset Purchase Agreement. And I believe it was Mr. Vix's declaration — in one of the declarations, the declarant stated that there were many, many drafts of this agreement. In other words, there were many opportunities to identify Appellants and the other TIC holders as sellers. And they didn't do that. There were less than two days between the transfer of the tenant—in—common interest to Appellants and their transfer to the purchaser.

And when they were recorded, when those deeds were recorded, there was less than one minute between the recording of the tenant-in-common deed to Appellants and other TIC holders and the recording of the deed from the TIC holders to the purchaser. Under a Court Holding

analysis, AWG and not Appellants was the true seller.

Years later in -- or about five years later in Cumberland,
the U.S. Supreme Court went the other way and said, no,
really, these shareholders, they are the true holders.

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And let us tell you why. Let us tell you why it's not like Court Holding. Because in Court Holding -- because in Cumberland the power company, Cumberland Power Company couldn't compete against a rival offered to sell assets. The purchaser wasn't interested. So Cumberland just dissolved. It didn't have anything left to do. It dissolved, and it distributed the assets to the shareholders who subsequently independently negotiated their own contract with that same entity, the same purchaser, and completed the sale.

And the Supreme Court said, well, look at that. The entity dissolved having nothing to do with the sale. They simply decided to dissolve and distributed the assets. There was independent negotiation by the new owners of the property with the purchaser. So when we apply those facts and that analysis to the facts of this case, they don't meet the standards of Cumberland to be determined a true seller.

And we'll move forward to Bolker versus

Commissioner 1983 case. There are two opinions: The

first at the Tax Court level; the second at the Ninth

Circuit level. In the Tax Court judge considered both the exchange requirement, whether Mr. Bolker himself was the true seller and the holding requirement, whether he held the property for investment or for profit in a business, and held that Mr. Bolker had satisfied both requirements.

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On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, only the holding requirement was at issue. And in that -- in the Ninth Circuit case, in the Ninth Circuit opinion, and in Magneson also, the court discussed what Mr. Kaplan, what Counsel has alluded to, as a reason to determine that the Appellants are the true sellers, and that is that there's no change in economic position. It's merely a change in the form of ownership. And that is what the court said in Ninth Circuit in Bolker, and it's what the court said in Magneson. But that has to do with the holding requirement.

We have a stipulated fact that the holding requirement is not at issue in this case. So the Ninth Circuit Bolker decision and Magneson are simply not applicable to this appeal. I will note that in Giurbino Opinion, the non-precedential opinion by the Board of Equalization and very similar facts in Giurbino, the Board of Equalization said Magneson and Maloney, they were not relevant to an exchange requirement analysis.

Let's move on to Chase versus Commissioner, a

1989 Tax Court case. The facts in this appeal are remarkably similar to the facts in Chase versus Commissioner. An entity signed a sales contract, even though it was the taxpayer who was an owner of that entity, signed in his capacity as an owner of the entity and not individually, received a TIC distribution early. And that sale fell through, but he held on to, never recorded. Several months later found another buyer. The entity found another buyer. The entity found another buyer. The entity signed the sales agreement. And when he knew that escrow would close, he recorded his deed, and the property was transferred.

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When the Chase court -- when the Tax Court looked at that transaction, the court said that the substance over form doctrine, when it is a fiction and it does not reflect the economic realities of the transaction, we're going to disregard it. So the economic reality in Chase was that the entity, the partnership owned the building, the partnership signed the sales agreement, and only when there was no risk, the partnership acted like the owner for months, the time period that Mr. Chase held the deed but did not record it, he did not act as an owner.

He didn't collect rents. He wasn't responsible to pay cost. He didn't notify whoever the lien holder was, the insurance companies. He acted just as a partner in a partnership, and the entity continued to behave as

the owner. Only when it was clear that escrow would close that he did record the deed. In fact, in that case, the Tax Court said -- and this is instructed -- petitioner's final argument regarding the substance issue is that the general parties acted as their agents, as the taxpayer's agent in negotiating the disposition of the property.

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This, they say, explains why they did not appear individually as parties in most of the documents to the transaction. We find petitioner's argument in this regard both self-serving and unsupported by the record. And the record shows us that there were many drafts, three at least, including the one that was signed of the Asset Purchase Agreement in the record. There was ample opportunity for Appellants to be named as sellers, and they weren't. There was an opportunity for them to negotiate their own sale, and they didn't. They sold the property pursuant to the terms set out in the Asset Purchase Agreement.

Under a Chase analysis, AWG and not Appellants are the true sellers. That's also true in the press -- if you look at the analysis in the precedential decision in the Appeal of Brookfield Manor, Brookfield owned and operated a mobile home park, started negotiations to sell, setup an escrow, listed itself as seller, and then decided, wow, that would be an expensive tax bill. So it

substituted its shareholders in escrow as the seller, and dissolved, distributed the property. And shortly after it did so, the shareholders completed the sales transaction.

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When the Franchise Tax Board determined that

Appeal of Brookfield was the true seller, we ended up

before the Board of Equalization, the Office of Tax

Appeals' predecessor, which said, gee, we start with court

holding, and we need to look at the substance over form

doctrine. The Board of Equalization said -- look to see

was the sale -- whose terms was the sale completed on?

Was there any new negotiations? And the answer was no.

It was completed on the same terms that the corporation

had negotiated for.

In this case, there are no other terms in the record. There's no evidence of any agreement independent of the Asset Purchase Agreement by which the real property, the Paso Robles Property, would be conveyed to the purchaser. Under a Brookfield Manor analysis, AWG and not Appellants are the true seller. And then I touched just for a minute on the Giurbino Opinion. FTB has — it's a non-precedential opinion, much the way that Mitchell is.

Although, FTB believes that the Office of Tax

Appeals should not follow the majority opinion in

Mitchell, that any opinion where three ALJs could not

agree on the application of the law to the facts of that case, is not an appropriate opinion to follow for an analysis and application for the fact of this case.

Additionally, that opinion rested on certain specific factual determinations that have not been made in this appeal.

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What we do see is that in the Appeal of Giurbino, very similar fact pattern. Entity negotiated to sell the property. There was -- there were tenant-in-common interest that were granted to the taxpayers, and they completed a sale. And the Board of Equalization said, well, we start with Court Holding and under the facts that the sale that was complete was started by Giurbino, that the terms were the same, that there was no recording of the Appellant's interest until shortly before escrow closed. Those all indicate that the substance of the transaction was a sale by the entity, not an exchange by the entity's owners.

And BOE went on to analyze this case under an assignment of income doctrine. And I will get to that in just a minute in a little more detail. But I will note that the Board of Equalization in Giurbino said two things. First, it said that the Giurbinos were not the true seller, that the LLC was. And second, it said that because the entity was the true seller, that there had

also been a prohibited assignment of income. So if you were to follow -- and the FTB would urge that the OTA follow the analysis in Giurbino and apply it to this case. And if you follow that, you would determine that AWG and not the Appellants were the true sellers of the property.

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We would also note that with respect to testimony and declarations that were submitted in this appeal, we would point out the number of years between the transaction, which occurred in 2007, the declarations in the record, which were submitted in 2019 and we are two years after that, this is a long time since the transaction, the conversations occurred. The fact that self-serving statements may be made now should be considered when analyzing this case.

And I would like to go then to the assignment of income doctrine. And I think this doctrine can be used two ways. The first is as a means to determine who the true seller is. And secondly, as simply a standalone doctrine. Which if the entity is determined to have made an improper assignment of income, then you have to think that from a tax perspective, all the income is assigned to the entity. And then there's no income in the hands of the entities' owners that could be deferred from gain from recognition taxation.

So as far as back as 1930 in the U.S. Supreme

Court Lucas v. Earl -- we are probably all familiar with it -- the case that says that income has to be attributed to the person who earned the income. And notably that the, quote, "The fruits of that could not attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew."

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In Salvatore, which were both -- there are two opinions of the Tax Court and, I think, it's the First Circuit -- is really the case we look to when we're talking about assignment of income. In that case Mrs. Salvatore, who owned a gas station, was considering an offer to sell it. And she met with her children -- her adult children, and they agreed this is a good sale. Try to negotiate a good deal and to ameliorate tax consequences if she alone were the seller and had to report all the gain.

They agreed to distribute -- she agreed -- they agreed she would distribute a 50 percent interest in the property to among her children. Shortly after that a contract was negotiated and signed. And anywhere from a few hours to two days before escrow closed, she deeded interest to her children, who then conveyed to the purchaser.

And the court said, well, wait a minute. Who had title to the property when the contract was sold -- or excuse me -- when the contract was signed? Well,

Mrs. Salvatore did. And the court noted, well, her kids had no interest in the property at all. And let's stop right there and think about the facts in this case. On July 23rd, 2007, the Appellants and Mr. Vix and Philip Arciero signed seller substitution agreements — exchange agreements and seller substitution documents. I think they are Exhibits 13 through 16 in the record.

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As of the date those documents were signed, no one signing them had any interest in the Paso Robles

Property. It was owned only by AWG on July 23rd until

July 31st when the deed conveying the interest in the property were delivered to the tenant-in-common holders, the TIC holders. It would not have been until then that those documents would have had any meaning. So from a practical and legal standpoint, you have to consider that those documents were meaningless until July 31st, which was four days after the property was -- the sale for the -- contract for the sale of the property was signed.

So Salvatore would tell us that AWG made an improper anticipatory assignment of income for all of the tenant-in-common holders. And then when you look at Giurbino, Giurbino tell us the very same thing. When the entity has negotiated a sale and subsequently deeds out interest in the property that is to be sold, it has made an anticipatory assignment of income that is prohibited.

it. And from a tax perspective 1031 and assignment of income, respective, it did not meet the standards. AW -- ASI and F.A.R. Investment did not meet the standards to be considered sellers. And so we end where we started, which is with the U.S. Supreme Court, which required FTB and now requires the OTA to determine who the true seller of the property was.

As the Supreme Court noted in the Moline
Properties way back in 1943, taxpayers, like Appellants,
who choose to structure their business affairs with
entities and receive advantages that are offered by the
entities, must also accept the disadvantages of their
entities. In this case, Appellants chose to structure
their business affairs with an LLC, a general partnership,
and corporations. And they were free to do so. The LLC,
which was AWG owned the real property and sold it. And
the tax consequences must follow the substance of that
transaction.

Thank you.

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JUDGE LAMBERT: Thank you, Ms. Mosnier.

At this time, then, we'll take a break for 10 minutes.

We'll go off the record now. Please turn off your monitor and mute. We'll be back at 3:55.

1 Thanks. 2 (There is a pause in the proceedings.) 3 JUDGE LAMBERT: All right. We'll go back on the record now. 4 5 And at this time, I'm going to turn to the panel 6 and ask if they have any questions for FTB. 7 So, Judge Akin, do you have any questions? JUDGE AKIN: Judge Akin speaking. I don't have 8 9 any questions for Franchise Tax Board at this time. 10 JUDGE LAMBERT: Thanks. 11 And, Judge Le, do you have any questions? 12 JUDGE LE: This is Judge Le. I have a few questions. My first one is whether FTB believes in form 13 14 whether Appellants are the seller of the property? 15 MS. MOSNIER: In form? 16 JUDGE LE: Yeah. 17 Well, yes. I think in terms in MS. MOSNIER: 18 form means that, you know, the legal documentation, then 19 yes. 20 JUDGE LE: Okay. 21 MS. MOSNIER: And I think that's one reason the 22 Court Holding and its progeny are important because it 23 sets out the difference between what happens legally and 2.4 what happens from a tax perspective, that they don't 25 always line up. And they didn't in this case.

MS. KUDUK: Well, I would say that the form -- I
mean, the -- the Asset Purchase Agreement was the contract
that sold the Paso Robles Property. Because it -- through
the Asset Purchase Agreement, property was distributed.

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THE STENOGRAPHER: I'm sorry. Ms. Kuduk, can you please get closer to the mic? I cannot hear you. Thank you.

MS. KUDUK: Sure. The buildings --

JUDGE LAMBERT: Also, Appellants, maybe Mr. Kaplan and Mr. Guterman, maybe you could mute your microphone to see if that could help. Thanks.

MS. KUDUK: Hi. Are we all settled now? Okay.

So the buildings were part of the fixtures that were sold in the Asset Purchase Agreement. The lease where the cellular tower that was located on the property was also transferred through that Asset Purchase Agreement, and AWG signed that agreement. So this is a little different than Court Holding because here the entity signed the contract. So in that regard the form and the substance are the same.

I think what Marguerite is talking about is that the TIC deeds were transferred on -- on the 31st, right after the purchase agreement was signed and then recorded on August 2nd, and a minute later that they were recorded to being transferred to Saphire. So I mean, I think

1 according to state law because that minute the TIC holders 2 had the property, and then it was transferred. But it's 3 clear that AWG signed the contract. They signed the 4 instrument that transferred the property. 5 JUDGE LE: Thank you. I have no further questions. 6 7 MS. KUDUK: Okay. Thank you. JUDGE LAMBERT: Okay. Okay. I guess, yeah, 8 9 let's see if I have any questions. So did you just say 10 that you think that the sellers are Appellants because of 11 the deeds? Or what was -- can you clarify that, because 12 that was something maybe you could explain. 13 MS. KUDUK: So I think under state property law 14 the person who holds the deed and transfers the property 15 is the seller, right. But that's not the case for tax 16 law. 17 JUDGE LAMBERT: Okay. 18 MS. MOSNIER: Right. If it were, for example, we 19 wouldn't have Court Holding. Because we would say, well, 20 the sellers weren't the shareholders. They were the one 21 who conveyed the deed to the purchaser. And, in fact, 22 they were the ones who conveyed the deed to the purchaser. 23 MS. KUDUK: But only for a minute. 2.4 MS. MOSNIER: Well, I'm talking --

Okav.

JUDGE LAMBERT:

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MS. MOSNIER: -- like -- and so right. That from a tax perspective, the U.S. Supreme Court said, well, no. You're not the seller for tax purposes, that the shareholders were not. You may be were the sellers for purposes of conveying legal title to the property, but you were not the sellers for tax purposes. It's a really important distinction that Court Holding and its progeny make.

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JUDGE LAMBERT: Okay. Thank you. I guess then that's interesting that you say that. So moving on -- on this assignment of income theory, I guess, are you saying that the tax result would be the same if AWG has to recognize the gain, and it would flow down? The Appellants were mentioning something that would cause double taxation. Maybe you could address these issues, because I'm not sure how much legal authority there is out there of applying assignment of income to 1031 exchanges. So maybe could you just address, like, Appellants' arguments on that matter, please?

MS. MOSNIER: It was addressed by the Board of Equalization in the Giurbino Opinion. That was a failed 1031 transaction. And the Board of Equalization said both that the entity was the true seller and that there had been a prohibited assignment of income. So there -- you know, there -- as I noted, it's not a precedential

opinion. Although, we feel the facts are similar to the facts in this appeal and that the analysis is spot on under law concerning 1031s.

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And so under -- assignment of income probably historically was used as it was in Court Holding to tag the entity the seller -- that the entity that distributed the property with the tax consequences. So but it's two sides of the same coin. Because if for tax purposes, the entity made a prohibited assignment of income, then it was the seller of the property if it has to recognize -- realize and recognize all the income.

And if that's the case, if it is the seller under an assignment of income theory, then the owners -- the technical legal owners of the property who deeded it to the purchaser cannot be the, quote, "true sellers" under a 1031 analysis.

JUDGE LAMBERT: Thanks. And there's, like, some cases I think was discussed in the briefing a little bit, like Ferguson and whether it has to be a fixed right to incomes. Would you say in this case when they -- when that agreement was signed, it became a fixed right to receive the income?

MS. KUDUK: I believe when the offer was accepted, which would have been July 15th, around there, when they all met and said, we're accepting this offer,

and then we're going to distribute the property. I -- I think that that was the actual date when the offer was accepted and then -- but, I mean, as you read these assignment of income cases, it could also be the July 27th date when the agreement was signed. That's why I made it very clear when I asked Mr. Arciero, "When did you agree to sell the property?"

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JUDGE LAMBERT: And what if the deal doesn't go through, you know? You know, they liquidated damages.

Anything could happen. So is it really fixed, or is it just an expectation?

MS. MOSNIER: Well, I think contract law would govern there if you have a fully executed contract. If a party to the contract doesn't meet its obligations, then there are rights and remedies under the law. So I think in that way, yes, it is fixed.

MS. KUDUK: The assignment of income isn't only used in property to determine property. It's also used in gifts and trust law. So I would think it's the anticipation of income. So when, you know, whether or not they've received that income maybe is a moot point in this case because they did receive it. The contract did go through.

JUDGE LAMBERT: Okay. And I just noticed these expenses that AWG paid for during this small period of

time. I think if you allocate it to three days, it's only like \$2,000. And, you know, in the briefs it was discussed that, you know, they took these benefits and risks of the property because they paid these different expenses. Do you think it matters that the amount is very low? And, you know, like in the Appellants' briefs, you know, its' kind of like very minimal and so small, maybe it's not really material. Could you address, like, whether the fact it's only \$2,000, you know, has an effect on that point.

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MS. MOSNIER: I don't think that the -- I don't think that the amount matters, Judge. I think what, for example, what the Chase court looked at was who acted as the owner. And whether you were the owner for two days, two weeks, or two months, you are still the owner.

Someone slipped and fell. You could be sued. So it is incumbent on the owners then to behave as owners.

And I'm glad that you asked that question because one thing I forgot to mention earlier is I think there's a distinction between owning up to the fact of ownership and taking responsibility to pay these expenses up front, rather than reimbursing someone else on the back end through escrow. AWG was evidently reimbursed for these costs. That's different from never having had to pay them to start with. Do you see what I mean?

Technically, if it was a cost that ran with ownership by AWG, then it was born by AWG and simply reimbursed in the escrow. I think that's a -- it's a very fine distinction, but I do think it's an important one.

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MS. KUDUK: Maybe it would be the principle of the matter, right, who -- AWG really operated and owned this property until the day it was sold.

JUDGE LAMBERT: Okay. Thanks. Let me think if I have one more question. Oh, I think, Ms. Kuduk, you mentioned that -- you asked the witnesses if the Seller Substitution Agreements were common. And maybe -- did you want to, like, elaborate on that? Do you think that they don't outweigh the sales agreement that's signed by AWG, you know, whereas the Appellants kind of argue that -- are arguing that there's bifurcated contracts here? Maybe could you -- if you could elaborate, I mean, would you do that? Or, Ms. Mosnier, you could do it too. Thanks.

MS. KUDUK: I'm on mute. Sorry. So I think it's important that the Seller Substitution Agreements were common in 1031 exchange, and I -- they were not an amendment to the Asset Purchase Agreement. And they were assigned for -- when this ASI and F.A.R. didn't even have title to the property. So they were technically not a contract. They could not really contract something they didn't have. So I don't think it's very relevant to show

who the true seller was.

JUDGE LAMBERT: Okay. Thanks. I think that's all the questions I have for now.

So let's allow Appellants to give their closing remarks for 10 minutes, and you can address FTB's remarks or say whatever you want to say to conclude your presentation. Thanks.

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CLOSING STATEMENT

MR. KAPLAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

I do have a few comments about the FTB's presentation. Before i get into the specifics, there were a couple of comments made that are more general that would apply to more than this case that I find very troubling. First, I'm now being educated that only unanimous opinions from the Office of Tax Appeals should be looked at and used as any kind of guidance for future — for future decisions, that a two to one decision as you found in Mitchell should simply be ignored because it was not unanimous. That's an interesting notion to me and something, I guess, for the Judges to think about in the future.

The second sort of overall general comment is the seeming attack on the witness' memory. To hear testimony from 2 people who have waited 14 years to be here to

provide it, and then say it should be discounted because it can't be trusted due to the passage of time, is also troubling to me.

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The fact of the matter is that all of this information has been in the hands of the Franchise Tax

Board since the very outset of the audit. There's nothing new that has been presented. There have been no facts that has been refuted. There is nothing that was heard today that is inconsistent with what has been told to the Franchise Tax Board from day one. The story hasn't changed.

Is it possible that over time memory diminishes, and you can't quite remember with -- with the level of specificity you could, you know, as opposed to something that happened yesterday? Absolutely. But here we have a number of touchstones in time where this information continually is being presented to the Franchise Tax Board and has continually been consistent and was continually consistent today. So the notion of attacking a witness' testimony because it relates to events that happened a long time ago is bothersome to me.

The -- I won't take the time to address the multitude of cases that were mentioned by the Respondent.

All of those have been addressed fully in the briefs that we filed. In each case there may be one or two exceptions

to this, but I think we're in agreement with the holdings with every one of the cases cited. We think they were cited correctly. We also recognize they were cited on their own facts. Facts which are not facts. Close to what we have here today.

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A number of those cases involve two parties. One is a corporation. One is a shareholder. The economics of the determination of who owns something is significant when you got the two -- the two tax obligations of the corporation and its shareholder. It is less so when you have flow-through entities where the economics are -- are essentially identical. The reliance on Giurbino, which seem to be mentioned more than any other case, is strange to me. I think a lot of things about this case is strange to me, but that's -- that's one of the strangest.

The facts in Giurbino are an LLC sold a property, and the LLC reported itself that the sale was its own and was a taxable sale. There was an individual member -- I don't remember if it was a membership, an LLC, or partnership. But one flow-through investor in Giurbino filed their own tax return, inconsistent with what the partnership had reported on the K-1 and claimed that it received the proceeds from the sale of its tenancy-in-common agreement.

This is not our case. This is but another in a

long line of cases where parties are playing different games. And Giurbino is one of the most abusive in the sense that the entity reported the transaction. How do you report something inconsistent with -- with how the entity reported? You're obligated to report it the same way. So the notion that -- that there's anything in that case that has any relevance here is -- is an odd one to me.

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Again, the case that is most like this one is
Appeal of Mitchell. The fact that only two judges out of
the three decided in favor of upholding the claimed
exchange treatment, well, it would have been nice to have
had a unanimous decision. Maybe it would have been
precedential. Although, the more I thought about it, the
more I realize it shouldn't be precedential because it's
based on facts. It doesn't create new law. It simply
applies to existing law to the particular set of facts
presented there. The same as this case does.

This case is not about the drop and swap. Is this allowable? Is it not allowable? This is simply a factual determination under the law us using the substance over form analysis, which we heard at length from, Respondent, as if Appellants did not agree that that was the proper test. The descent in Mitchell, which is really what, you know, the Respondent was hoping for. If you

read the descent, I personally disagree with it, but I think it's at least well-reasoned.

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They key difficulty that Judge Rosas had in the descent was the fact that the buyer never knew of the existence of one of the -- of Ms. Mitchell. At no point did she enter into the negotiations. She was just not -- she was not a player. She had no influence over the transaction in any way shape or form. All she did was inform the general partner; I want to do a 1031 with my portion of the property. She had no ability to stop the transaction, if that wasn't going to happen as would happen here.

The general partner accommodated her.

Distributed out a tenancy-in-common interest, and that

little slice was transferred, was sold along with the remaining interest still held by the partnership. It was bothersome to Judge Rosas that the buyer did not know who they were buying from, that Ms. Mitchell was not a part of the negotiations. Was nowhere. Was just not a player in the transaction at all. And yet even two of the three judges decided that all the requirements of the 1031 were met, and the concerns of Judge Rosas disappeared when looked at the facts in this case.

The buyer knew who they were buying from. Even if you agree -- which I strongly do not -- that the Seller

Substitution Agreement should not be given any effect at all because it resigned at a time that they couldn't be effective. What they were effective for at an absolute minimum, is informing the buyer who they were acquiring the property from. Whether it turns out at the end of the day, oops, nope. It's not from them. It's from AWG. It's irrelevant. The buyers knew it was the tenancy-in-common.

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The tenants-in-common did all the negotiations for this transaction. There is no difference between the tenant-in-common off to the side and what the general partner is doing. This is Frank Arciero, Sr., who is saying this is the deal I will agree to. If we can do this deal, we're going to do this deal. If we can't, it's not going to happen. And the touchstone of this deal was, I need to do a 1031 transaction. And the only way to do that is to get the asset distributed out to the individual members to allow them to -- to effectuate their own exchanges.

We went through. I discussed previously. The questions is what hat was he wearing. Again, there is no question what hat he was wearing. There's no question who was negotiating on whose behalf he was negotiating. So I think that even if Judge Rosas were on -- on -- if our facts were presented to the same panel, I do believe we'd

have a unanimous decision, and maybe something that the FTB could rely on.

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I think that the comment that --

JUDGE LAMBERT: Mr. Kaplan, by the way, it's been 10 minutes. Did you want to take extra time to wrap up?

Maybe five minutes or so?

MR. KAPLAN: Could I -- I think -- I think I'll probably shut up now and let Mr. Guterman take over because I could go for a long time and --

JUDGE LAMBERT: We're ahead of schedule. So if you want to take some -- like, five minutes to give some closing remarks.

MR. GUTERMAN: Your Honor, I wanted to just make one point before we sum up our closing remarks and focus on one thing. Respondent's position is that the escrow agreements and the seller substitution needs have no legal effect because they were signed and executed by the parties prior to the parties owning the property. If you go -- that's just wrong as a matter of law, and that's proven by the sales agreement.

If you'll -- I draw your attention to Exhibit 18.

The second page of Exhibit 18, which is the seller instructions, and I read the following to you. "Please be informed that Saphire Wines LLC buyer has opened an escrow in Chicago Title Company for the concurrent resale of all

or a portion of the property that is subject to this escrow."

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The buyer had already contracted to sell the property before it ever acquired it. The buyer had already committed to selling to this somebody. So why is this -- why is our Seller Substitution Agreements nonbinding and illegal but, yet, in the same contract in the sale escrow instructions, which are entered into after we have title, which talk about all the terms for conveyance of the property by our individual clients and recognize that the buyers also entered into the contract to sell the property.

They are binding. The seller substitute must have been -- had to be given legal effect at the concluded -- at the -- included on the sale and just like in this transaction. That's a false narrative that they don't have any legal effect because, quote, "Legal title to the Paso Property hadn't passed until a few days later."

Thank you.

JUDGE LAMBERT: Thank you, Mr. Guterman and Mr. Kaplan.

At this time, I'm going to ask my co-panelist if they have any final questions of either party.

Judge Akin, do you have any questions?

Thank you, Judge Lambert. 1 I don't JUDGE AKIN: 2 have any questions at this time. 3 JUDGE LAMBERT: Thanks. And, Judge Le, do you have any questions? 4 5 JUDGE LE: This is Judge Le. No questions from 6 me. Thank you. 7 JUDGE LAMBERT: Thanks. 8 I don't have any questions either at this time. 9 No more questions. So if there's nothing further, I'm 10 going to close the record and conclude the hearing. 11 want to thank everyone for appearing today, including the 12 witnesses, Mr. Arciero, Jr., and Mr. Silva. 13 We will issue a written opinion within 100 days. 14 Thank you. This hearing is now closed. 15 (Proceedings adjourned at 4:24 p.m.) 16 17 18 19 20 21 2.2 23 2.4 25

1 HEARING REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 2 I, Ernalyn M. Alonzo, Hearing Reporter in and for 3 the State of California, do hereby certify: 4 5 That the foregoing transcript of proceedings was 6 taken before me at the time and place set forth, that the 7 testimony and proceedings were reported stenographically 8 by me and later transcribed by computer-aided 9 transcription under my direction and supervision, that the 10 foregoing is a true record of the testimony and 11 proceedings taken at that time. 12 I further certify that I am in no way interested 13 in the outcome of said action. 14 I have hereunto subscribed my name this 16th day 15 of August, 2021. 16 17 18 19 ERNALYN M. ALONZO 20 HEARING REPORTER 21 2.2 23 2.4 25