## BEFORE THE OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS STATE OF CALIFORNIA

) NEUDOGRA TNG	
NEUDOCIZZ TNO 1010EC	
NEUROSKY, INC., ) OTA NO. 191256	515
APPELLANT. )	
)	

TRANSCRIPT OF VIRTUAL PROCEEDINGS

State of California

Thursday, October 21, 2021

Reported by: ERNALYN M. ALONZO HEARING REPORTER

1	BEFORE THE OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS
2	STATE OF CALIFORNIA
3	
4	
5	
6	IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL OF, )  NEUROSKY, INC., ) OTA NO. 19125615
7	)
8	APPELLANT. ) )
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	Transcript of Virtual Proceedings,
15	taken in the State of California, commencing
16	at 1:00p.m. and concluding at 2:19 p.m. on
17	Thursday, October 21, 2021, reported by
18	Ernalyn M. Alonzo, Hearing Reporter, in and
19	for the State of California.
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

APPEARANCES:  Panel Lead:  Panel Members:  For the Appellant:	ALJ SUZANNE BROWN  ALJ NATASHA RALSTON ALJ DANIEL CHO
Panel Members:	ALJ NATASHA RALSTON
Panel Members:	ALJ NATASHA RALSTON
For the Appellant:	
	STANLEY YANG
	CENER OF CALLFORNIA
For the Respondent:	STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TAX AND FEE ADMINISTRATION
	AMANDA JACOBS
	SCOTT CLAREMON JASON PARKER

1	<u>I N D E X</u>
2	
3	<u>EXHIBITS</u>
4	
5	(Department's Exhibits A-S were received at page 8.)
6	
7	PRESENTATION
8	PAGE
9	
10	
11	By Ms. Jacobs 24
12	
13	<u>CLOSING STATEMENT</u>
14	<u>PAGE</u>
15	By Mr. Yang 46
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

1	California; Thursday, October 21, 2021
2	1:00 p.m.
3	
4	JUDGE BROWN: We will go on the record. Good
5	afternoon. We are here for we're on the record for the
6	Appeal of NeuroSky, Inc. This is OTA Case Number
7	19125615, and today is October 21st, 2021, and it is about
8	1:00 p.m.
9	I am Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Brown, and
10	with me today are co-panelists Daniel Cho and Natasha
11	Ralston. I will start by asking the parties to identify
12	themselves for the record. I'll start with the CDTFA
13	representatives, if you cold each identify yourselves,
14	please.
15	MS. JACOBS: Amanda Jacobs for the California
16	Department of Tax and Fee Administration.
17	MR. CLAREMON: Scott Claremon, also from the
18	CDTFA.
19	MR. PARKER: And Jason Parker from the CDTFA
20	also.
21	JUDGE BROWN: And next for the Appellant,
22	Mr. Yang, go ahead please.
23	MR. YANG: Hi. I'm Stanley Yang from NeuroSky,
24	Inc.
25	JUDGE BROWN: Okay. Thank you all very much.

Mr. Yang, you had indicated previously that you're going to have another employee of NeuroSky participating as well, but I don't see her.

2.1

2.4

MR. YANG: Yeah. She's just sitting here to help me with the documents, but I'll be the main person.

JUDGE BROWN: Okay. Thank you. All right.

First, I will cover a few brief topics before we begin presentations. I will remind everyone that the Office of Tax Appeals is an independent agency. It is separate and distinct from the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration and, therefore, arguments and evidence that CDTFA heard previously are not necessarily part of the record before OTA. OTA's written opinion will be based upon the briefs the parties have submitted to OTA, the exhibits that will be admitted into evidence, and the arguments presented at the hearing today.

We held a prehearing conference in this matter, and I issued prehearing conference minutes and orders. As we discussed at the prehearing conference and we confirmed in the minutes and orders, the issue for the hearing today is whether Appellant has established that an adjustment is warranted to disallowed claimed nontaxable sales for resale.

Mr. Yang, that's -- is that your correct -- is that your understanding of the issue?

1 MR. YANG: Correct. And CDTFA, that is correct as well? 2 JUDGE BROWN: MS. JACOBS: 3 Correct. Thank you. Oh, and I did forget. 4 JUDGE BROWN: 5 I have not been doing this. I did forget to mention, to 6 help our stenographer, we should be identifying ourselves 7 before we speak. This is Judge Brown. My apologies, I will try to remember, and I will ask 8 Ms. Alonzo. 9 everyone to please identify yourselves before you speak. 10 All right. Next, we have documentary exhibits 11 that are proposed for admission into evidence. As I 12 explained during the prehearing conference, OTA's regulations require that proposed exhibits must be 13 14 submitted at least 15 days in advance of the hearing. 15 have received, and I marked as exhibits OTA -- CDTFA's 16 exhibits, they're marked as letters A through S. And I 17 have compiled these into a hearing binder that OTA sent to 18 the parties previously. First, let me just confirm that 19 those are the only documents that are either party is 20 submitting as exhibits into evidence today. 21 I'll start with CDTFA. Those are -- that you 22 have no additional exhibits; correct? 23 MS. JACOBS: Amanda Jacobs. This is correct. 2.4 JUDGE BROWN: This is Judge Brown. And Mr. Yang,

I will ask you the same question. Appellant has not

25

1 identified any additional documents other than the ones 2 that are in the -- that I've already mentioned as 3 Appellant's exhibits; correct? 4 MR. YANG: This is Stanley Yang, and that's 5 correct. 6 JUDGE BROWN: Thank you. 7 I will note as I mentioned previously, all of the briefs are part of what the panel will consider as well. 8 9 And I know Appellant submitted documents attached to 10 Appellant's briefs. But I've gone through them, and it 11 appears to me that all the documents that aren't briefs, 12 generally, seemed to be already covered in the exhibits 13 that we have. So Appellant's documents were just copies 14 of the documents that CDTFA has already submitted and that 15 we are already marked as exhibits. 16 And, Mr. Yang, does Appellant have any objection 17 to admission of any of these Exhibits A through S into evidence. 18 19 MR. YANG: No. 20 JUDGE BROWN: Okay. And if there's no objection, 2.1 I will admit CDTFA's Exhibits A through S into evidence. 22 (Department's Exhibits A-S were received in 23 evidence by the Administrative Law Judge.) 2.4 So now that I have admitted the documents and the

exhibits into evidence, we can move on to discuss the

25

witnesses. As we --

2.4

Mr. Yang, is it my understanding that you are the only witness that will be testifying for Appellant today?

MR. YANG: Yes, correct.

JUDGE BROWN: And I'll just confirm CDTFA is not planning on calling any witnesses; correct?

MS. JACOBS: Amanda Jacobs. That's correct.

JUDGE BROWN: Thank you.

This is Judge Brown. I will just go over briefly what the order of events will be today. First, I will swear in Mr. Yang as a witness, and after that we will hear Appellant's presentation and Mr. Yang's testimony. And then there will be questions for the witness. And then we will have CDTFA's presentation. And then there may be questions from the ALJs. And then Appellant has time for a rebuttal and maybe additional questions from ALJs, and then we will conclude. And we have the time estimates. I have 20 minutes for Appellant's presentation and also 20 minutes for CDTFA's presentation, and an additional 5 minutes for Appellant's rebuttal.

Does anyone have any questions about anything about this process or anything that you would like to raise that I have not yet covered? Then I will say if -- this is Judge Brown. If no one has any questions, we can proceed with Appellant's presentation. I'll remind the

other participants to please mute your microphones while Appellant's representative is speaking.

Mr. Yang, before you begin, I will swear you in as a witness. If you could please raise your right hand.

## STANLEY YANG,

produced as a witness, and having been first duly sworn by the Administrative Law Judge, was examined and testified as follows:

JUDGE BROWN: This is Judge Brown. Thank you very much. Mr. Yang, you can proceed with Appellant's presentation.

2.1

2.4

## PRESENTATION

MR. YANG: Okay. First of all, I'd like to thank everybody for being here for this matter.

We -- I'd like to clarify that this happened several years ago, and I was not involved in the process until we -- I was made aware of the case as CEO of the company. But since then, our CFO who was handling this case, Cherry Hu. She has retired, so not really anybody in the company was actually familiar with the actual documents that -- that went through. But I was present during the business transactions with these clients.

So let me kind of give a brief overview of what happened. We have had this client from -- or this customer from Massachusetts at the time. The company's name was called Mobe, M-O-B-E. And they purchased about \$600,000 worth of microchips from our company. So when we prepared the paperwork, my understanding was that we prepared it as shipping it to Massachusetts as an out-of-state sale. And we would process that paperwork and sales taxes accordingly with California to Massachusetts.

2.1

2.4

However, the reason why I said I was a witness, and I was there present at the business transaction was their CEO visited our office here in California, in San Jose right before -- right after we finished the negotiation and right before we shipped. So what happened was we invoiced them, and they were supposed to pay us. So we shipped. We started shipping the products.

Now, microchips are very small, so they come in two boxes. And since he was in our office -- actually, visiting us in California. I was meeting him for lunch. He said, hey, we -- how about -- I'm flying back. How about you give me one box? There are two boxes, and each box is very small. You ship one box, and I'll carry one box back so that we don't have to wait. My office doesn't have to wait. They can have the microchips, you know,

tomorrow. And I said sure. That's not a problem, I said, but I don't have it with me. What do I do?

2.1

2.4

And he said how about you ship it to my wife's sister's flower shop here in San Mateo near the airport so I can pick it up tomorrow morning, and I'll get on the airplane. And that's what we did. We ship one box to his office in Massachusetts and one box to this flower shop. That address was provided by him. So several years later we didn't think much of it.

Several years later it -- when we were audited, it was shown that this shipment went to a California location and the sales tax or sales transaction was not executed properly. However, we feel that it was -- we just following the instructions. And everybody can see a flower shop would not want to buy, you know, half -- basically, \$300,000 worth of microchips to use. They're selling flowers and plants. I was simply shipping it to this client, and that's -- that was all in our paperwork was a process as such.

But then when we are told that we have to -- the sales tax for this portion of the transaction was not done properly within California. Typically, we would -- we were instructed to ask the client to pay this California tax. Well, unfortunately, that client -- because this is several years later, they had gone out of business. And

we -- we spent over a year going after the -- them, the board members and the CEOs, but they were not very responsive.

2.4

They felt like they've done the appropriate tax transactions, what not, in Massachusetts, and this was a California to Massachusetts transaction. They didn't feel obligated to pay California tax, and here we are. We -- we feel it's unjust to ask NeuroSky to pay for the sales taxes for another company that they're supposed to pay for, but they went out of business. That's number one.

Number two, it was a shipment to a location they wanted us to ship to so that they could carry it back to their state. So the whole transaction, actually, went out of state, not in state. And that's why we felt this sales transaction -- sales tax in California or half of that transaction, which is the amount of \$300,000, is not quite correct because the end product actually arrived in Massachusetts.

So that was as a witness when I was in the meeting, that's what happened, and I was -- we were instructed by their CEO to ship that product to this flower shop near the airport in San Francisco so he could pick it up. Our shipping and receiving department recorded the transaction as shipped to this flower shop, not end destination as the Massachusetts company, and

that's what happened. I don't know what the details are personally as a witness beyond this because that's what -- what -- to the extent I was involved.

2.1

2.4

So the group of people that were handling this shipping and -- and finance side from our company has since retired or moved onto different companies. And I have a new set of employees here who none of them have any recollection of doing this particular transaction. Our marketing sales and myself, we remember this case that they specifically instructed us.

Now I'd like to say that there is no reason. We never sold anything to any flower shops in our existence over the past 14, 15 years. And none of -- no flower shop in the world is going to buy \$300,000 worth of microchips. So this is clearly an instruction from a client who just out of convenience, he wanted to carry the box back to Massachusetts, to Boston with him. And that's why we did it that way.

JUDGE BROWN: This is Judge Brown. Thank you, Mr. Yang. Is that your -- is that the end of your presentation at this time?

MR. YANG: Yes.

JUDGE BROWN: Okay. This is Judge Brown. Then I will ask -- turn to my -- actually, I guess I will first turn to CDTFA and ask if they have any questions for this

1 witness. 2 MS. JACOBS: Amanda Jacobs. No questions. 3 JUDGE BROWN: This is Judge Brown. Thank you. Next, I will turn to my co-panelists and ask if 4 5 they have any questions for Mr. Yang. Judge Ralston? 6 JUDGE RALSTON: This is Judge Ralston. I have no 7 questions at this time. 8 JUDGE BROWN: This is Judge Brown. Judge Ko 9 [sic]? I'm sorry. Judge Cho. I apologize. 10 JUDGE CHO: This is Judge Cho. Just a couple of 11 quick clarifying questions, Mr. Yang. 12 MR. YANG: Sure. 13 JUDGE CHO: So you said you were having lunch 14 with the CEO of Mobe, and then he had asked you to just 15 ship the second box of microchips to the flower shop; 16 right? 17 MR. YANG: Correct. 18 Okay. This is Judge Cho. JUDGE BROWN: And then 19 you were able to ship that to the flower shop? Or your 20 company was able to ship that to the flower shop, and then 2.1 the CEO -- Mobe CEO picked it up the next morning before 22 he flew back to the Massachusetts; is that correct? 23 MR. YANG: Yes. He told me so. So I called. used my cellphone to call our shipping department and say, 2.4

hey, ship one box to this address and the other box to

25

Massachusetts. And that's happened.

2.4

JUDGE CHO: This is Judge Cho. Thank you. And then so it's your testimony that the first -- the box that you shipped to the flower shop then went out to Massachusetts through the CEO -- through Mobe's CEO; is that correct?

MR. YANG: Yeah. Yeah. He picked it up because he was flying out of San Francisco Airport the next day. And the flower shop is in San Mateo, which is very close to San Francisco Airport. And that was -- that shop is -- was his sister's -- his wife's sister's shop. That's what he told me. So he was going to stay there and pick it up and fly out the next day.

JUDGE CHO: This is Judge Cho. Thank you. So did you ever get a confirmation that he actually took the box to Massachusetts through an email or some other kind of written documentation?

MR. YANG: That, I don't know. I -- I -- all we know is that they actually produced the same amount of products. It was a wristband. It was chips going into a bunch of wrist bands, you know, one of those step counter exercise wristbands. They produced the right number of wristbands because we have to supply some kind of software for them as well. So we knew the numbers were correct. That was not doc -- I don't have any documents saying he

picked it up and -- and flew out, but we knew that through the subsequent the -- because once we sold it, we have to support them. We knew that they received the entire amount of chips.

2.1

2.4

JUDGE CHO: This is Judge Cho. Thank you. Then
I guess -- I don't know if now is the right time to ask
this, but in one of exhibits I believe there's an email
from some -- from Julie Dormier. And she said that
Healthware still maintained some of the microchips for
sale in California. They said -- she said it was still in
inventory. That seems to be a little bit contradictory to
what you just stated right now. Do you know the reason
why she would say that?

MR. YANG: I don't know. I don't know. Because once we ship, it's out of our control. And it's -- it's highly doubtful that it would be in inventory somewhere because these chips don't just come in separate packs. They are vacuum sealed in a reel in tape. You can't just -- they have to go through machines to be opened and to be unloaded and to be soldered onto electronic boards. So it's very unlikely that they would open a box in a non-clean environment and risk of contaminating the chips.

So -- but since we sold them, we have no control of those chips. So I would not know why this -- they would say they still have inventory left. But I would

1 think, you know, you buy a little more than what you need, right? So you create -- let's say you need -- you 2 3 needed -- I believe they bought -- I can't even remember They bought a few hundred-thousand units. 4 the number. 5 And, basically, if we were to do something. 6 Let's say I want to build 100,000 units. I would buy 7 about 105,000 units just make sure if I have any defects I can still make up the 100,000 units. So you will always 8 9 have a little bit of inventory, but I doubt that inventory 10 is left in California. 11 JUDGE CHO: This is Judge Cho. Thank you for the 12 clarifying responses. Those are all the questions I had. 13 JUDGE BROWN: This is Judge Brown. Thank you. 14 Mr. Yang, I -- my first question is very basic. 15 I want to ask what this one box that you shipped to --16 that NeuroSky shipped to the flower shop in California, 17 that covers all of the tangible personal property sales 18 that are in dispute in this case; correct? It was just 19 that one box? 20 MR. YANG: Yes. We had one transaction, and they 21 come in two boxes. One of them was shipped to 22 Massachusetts. That part of it is not in dispute. 23 JUDGE BROWN: Okay. Okay. MR. YANG: It's -- it's the one box that was 2.4

shipped to the flower shop.

25

1 This is Judge Brown. And when you JUDGE BROWN: 2 say that you had lunch with your customer, at that time 3 the customer was Healthware; correct? 4 MR. YANG: I'm sorry. Can you repeat that? 5 JUDGE BROWN: What -- well, I guess, what was the name of the customer at the time that it got --6 7 MR. YANG: Mobe. 8 JUDGE BROWN: It was Mobe. Okay. 9 MR. YANG: Yeah. M-O-B-E. 10 Okay. This is Judge Brown. JUDGE BROWN: 11 Mr. Yang, do you know what experience your employees had 12 with the sales for resale process and resale certificates, 13 the employees that were handling this, like the CFO? 14 MR. YANG: Yeah. We have very good and extensive 15 experience in this. This came out of the audit as one 16 infraction out of the past, you know, over 10 years we are 17 in business. We had one infraction from the auditor that 18 was sent to our office. So I believe -- and we have -- I 19 don't know how many transactions we've done. So I believe 20 we have thousands, if not, tens of thousands of 21 transactions. This is the only thing that pop up. 22 And I still believe our shipping department --23 well, they didn't make a mistake. It was shipped to California, but it was intended for this total transaction 2.4

of doing business with a Massachusetts company.

25

JUDGE BROWN: This is Judge Brown. I think those
are all the questions that I have at this time. If my
co-panelists don't have anything further, then I will say
that we can -- Judge Ralston, do you have something?

JUDGE RALSTON: Judge Brown, yes. This is Judge Ralston. I do have a quick question.

2.4

So you stated earlier that the -- that NeuroSky provided support for the chips after they were -- made it to Massachusetts. Can you explain a little bit more.

Were there, like, different, I guess, requests? You know, would there be several different requests or -- or if you could just explain that process a little more. Thank you.

MR. YANG: Okay. So once they put the chips -when a customer buys a bunch, even though they buy -- they
buy samples way before that, and they build them into
products. When they buy a bunch of microchips, they would
do a test production run before they throw the whole thing
in just in case nothing is wrong. Otherwise, you just
wasted you're entire shipment that you bought, right?

So they would do a certain amount of production run. Maybe -- that's why they buy a little more than what they actually need, and they will always -- hopefully, they have a little more left in inventory. During this production run, there would be most likely -- nobody is very lucky. Very few in my years of experience, that your

first run is perfect. You usually have some problems. Sometimes it's our problems. Sometimes it's their problem. Sometimes there is a software problem or hardware problem.

2.1

So our engineers would work with them to make sure that their production running through -- that initial production run -- call that a practice, if you will -- is smooth. Now, during that time we also verify with them, okay, you have this many chips in your hands. So that's, you know -- if X number is what you need, you don't -- you don't build beyond that X number. You want to leave a little extra room for the X number plus -- maybe plus an extra 5 percent just in case.

Because even when you have everything down pat, when you go through a production process, you always would have a little loss, maybe 2 or 3 percent due to manufacturing defects. So we would work with them to make sure that they have the right amount. The reason is it's very difficult if they -- let's say they need 100,000 units of final products and they only made 90 -- 95,000, and they're short 5,000. It's very difficult for us to get 5,000 -- chips come in a lot.

You don't just take 5,000 and special -- I mean, you can do it, but very costly to do so. So we are very careful in working with them to make sure that they --

they're just right. If they need more, that would mean 1 2 they want another production run of the same equal amount 3 or more. 4 JUDGE RALSTON: Thank you. This is 5 Judge Ralston. 6 JUDGE BROWN: This is Judge Brown. Then I will 7 say if there are no further questions for Appellant at 8 this time, we can move onto CDTFA's presentation. 9 CDTFA, you can begin whenever you are ready. 10 And --11 MR. CLAREMON: This is -- oh, sorry. 12 JUDGE BROWN: -- so go ahead. 13 MR. CLAREMON: This Scott Claremon with the 14 CDTFA. Is it okay if we take, like, just a five-minute 15 recess, just because there's a lot of testimony there that 16 we want to make sure --17 JUDGE BROWN: Yes, that's fine. We'll take a --18 just five minutes is all you need? Five minute recess --19 MR CLAREMON: Is that okay? 20 JUDGE BROWN: Yeah, that's totally fine. 2.1 can --22 MR. CLAREMON: Okay. 23 JUDGE BROWN: We'll take a five-minute recess. 2.4 And we'll remind everyone to please mute your microphones 25 and turn off your cameras because we are still streaming

```
1
      to YouTube.
 2
               MR. CLAREMON: Okay. So just stay on the line
 3
      but --
               JUDGE BROWN: Stay on the line --
 4
 5
               MR. CLAREMON: Okay.
 6
               JUDGE BROWN: -- and mute and turn off your
 7
      cameras.
8
               MR. CLAREMON: Great.
9
               JUDGE BROWN: We will take a five-minute recess.
10
      I'll say it's almost 1:30, so let's say 1:35.
11
               MR. CLAREMON: Thank you, Judge Brown.
12
               JUDGE BROWN: We're off the record briefly.
13
                (There is a pause in the proceedings.)
14
               JUDGE BROWN: All right. We are back on the
      record in the Appeal of NeuroSky, Inc., after a short
15
16
      break.
17
               Can I just check in with CDTFA. Are you on the
18
      line, and can you hear me?
19
               MS. JACOBS: Amanda Jacobs. Yes, I can hear you,
20
      and I'm on the line.
21
               JUDGE BROWN: Okay. Mr. Parker and Mr. Claremon?
22
               MR. PARKER: I'm here.
23
               MR. CLAREMON: I'm here.
               JUDGE BROWN: And Appellant, Mr. Yang?
2.4
25
               MR. YANG: I'm here.
```

JUDGE BROWN: Okay. And I see my co-panelists. So I believe we can resume with the proceedings.

We had just completed Appellant's presentation and questions from the Administrative Law Judges. And next we're going to move on to hearing CDTFA's protection.

CDTFA, whenever you're ready.

2.1

2.4

## PRESENTATION

MS. JACOBS: Amanda Jacobs from CDTFA.

Appellant here is a developer and retailer of health and fitness electronics that sells various biosensor products, such as headsets, wristbands, and applications designed to monitor a user's biometric information. The sole issue is whether Appellant has established that an adjustment is warranted to its disallowed claimed nontaxable sales for resale with regard to two sales invoiced March 31st, 2015, and April 13th, 2015, made to Mobe LLC during the audit period of April 1st, 2013, through March 31st, 2016.

Mobe appears to be an out-of-state health and fitness adviser based in Franklin, Tennessee. The evidence shows that the property was shipped to Appellant's location in San Jose, California, and was delivered to an address provided by Mobe in South San Francisco, California; Exhibits K and L.

We're not exactly sure if Mr. Yang was discussing the same transactions at issue, given that the invoices we received from Appellant regarding these transactions, Exhibit K -- Exhibits K and L show there were two shipments to the South San Francisco address, and there were two pallets on each shipment showing 40 and 60 cartons, not the two mentioned by Mr. Yang.

2.1

2.4

It is undisputed that Mobe did not hold a California seller's permit at any time during the liability period and, specifically, when the two sales were made. It's also undisputed that Mobe did not provide Appellant with a single document intended to be a resale certificate for either sale. However, Appellant contended that the purchase order sales agreement and various emails, Exhibits J, M, P, and R, when considered together, contain the elements of a resale certificate as required by Regulation 1668.

As you're aware, under the Revenue & Taxation

Code Sections 6012 and 6051, sales tax applies to a

retailer's gross receipts from the retail sale of tangible

personal property in California, unless the sale is

specifically exempt or excluded from taxation by statute.

A retailer's gross receipts are presumed to be taxable

until proven otherwise. And the burden is on the seller

to establish that a sale is not a sale at retail, unless

the seller timely and in good faith takes a resale certificate from the purchaser; Revenue & Taxation Code Section 6091.

2.1

2.4

Subdivision A of Regulation 1668, which interprets and implement -- and interprets and implements Revenue & Taxation Code Sections 6091, 6092, and 6093 states that a resale certificate relieves the seller from liability for the sales tax and duty of collecting the use tax if taken in proper form as set forth in subdivision(b), and in good faith from a person who is engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property, and who holds a California seller's permit.

According to Regulation 1668(b), a resale certificate must contain these essential elements: The purchase's signature, name address, and seller's permit number, and a description of the property, and a statement that the property described was purchased for resale. The certificate should also contain it's execution date. However, an otherwise valid resale certificate will not be considered invalid solely on the ground that it's undated. A document containing these essential elements is the minimum form, which will be regarded as a resale certificate; Regulation 1668(b)(2).

According to Regulation 1668 subdivision (c), a seller will be presumed to have taken the resale

certificate in good faith, if the resale certificate contains these essential elements and otherwise appears to be valid on its face. As previously stated, Appellant has contended in its brief that the purchase order, sales agreement, and various emails, Exhibits J, M, P, and R, when considered together, contain the elements of a resale certificate.

2.1

2.4

It's undisputed that Mobe did not hold a

California seller's permit at any time during the

liability period. However, Appellant contends that a

March 27th, 2015, email from Nancy Tong, Exhibit M,

relaying the seller's permit number of True Life

Botanicals, LLC, fulfills this essential requirement. The

email states, and I quote, "Mobe's reseller ID number is

SRBH102-260812. Mobe is associated with True Life

Botanicals LLC, to which SRBH102-260812 is associated

with. In the event that NeuroSky is asked about this

issue, Mobe will confirm that this reseller number is

associated with Mobe LLC," Exhibit M.

This email is the only piece of evidence

Appellant has presented where a permit number was given

and Appellant was simultaneously informed that the permit

number belonged to a different entity. Appellant

apparently searched our website to verify the permit

number was valid, Exhibit N. It is clear, from both the

email and the sales and use tax permanent verification page, that the permit number belonged to True Life Botanicals, LLC, a separate legal entity from Mobe. And today Mr. Yang has further provided testimony that Appellant was informed by Mobe's CEO about the nature of True Life Botanicals, LLC, and -- so knew it was not the same entity.

2.1

2.4

A resell certificate only relieves the seller from liability if the purchaser holds a California seller's permit, which is one of the essential elements of a resale certificate pursuant to Regulation 1668(b)(1)(c). Specifically, it has been the Department's longstanding position that a resale certificate that contains the seller's permit number of a different entity does not qualify as a valid resale certificate as stated in Sales and Use Tax Annotations 475.0105, 475.0185, and 475.0511, which was highlighted by the panel before this hearing.

Accordingly, since the email sent to Appellant explicitly stated that the seller's permit number was associated with a different entity, and Appellant confirmed that to be the case and today tells us that he knew that to be the case, the documents provided by Appellant, even if taken together, lack the essential element of the purchaser's seller's permit number.

In additional to lacking a valid seller's permit

number, there are additional technical defects with the combination of documents Appellant has claimed -- was claiming as a resale certificate.

Regulation 1668(b)(1)(a) requires that a resale certificate must include the signature of the purchaser, purchaser's employee, or authorized representative. The Department does accept a scanned copy of the signature that is faxed or emailed to the seller or digital signatures that meet the requirements of Government Code Section 16.5 as described in the Compliance Policy and

Procedures Manual Section 150.050 and Publication 103 and

the Audit Manual Section 0490.50.

2.4

Here, however, the sender's name at the end of an email does not constitute a digital signature. I'm referencing Exhibits R and P. Additionally, Regulation 1668(b)(1)(d) requires the certificate state that the property is being purchased for resale. In the March 27th, 2015, email, Nancy Tong, Exhibit M, misidentifies a seller's permit number as a reseller's ID number. It does not actually state that the property was being purchased for resale -- quotes, "for resale," as is required by Regulation 1668(b)(1)(d). While Appellant claims that this is to be inferred from the term sheet, Exhibit J, the regulation specifically requires this statement. Other terminology, such as nontaxable or

exempt are specifically labeled as unacceptable by our regulation.

2.4

Responding to the panel's specific question before this hearing regarding how Annotation 475.0026.875 may apply to the facts in this case, we find it distinguishable. This annotation describes a situation in which we determined an out-of-state purchaser taking title to property in California did not need a seller's permit if it made no sales in California. In that instance, a seller may accept a resale certificate in good faith if the purchaser states on the certificate that they are not required to hold a permit pursuant to Regulation 1668(b)(1)(c).

Subdivision (b) (1) (c) states that if the purchaser is not required to hold a permanent because the purchaser sells only property of a kind of which the retail sale of which is not taxable, e.g., food products for human consumption or because the purchaser makes no sales in this state, the purchaser must include on the certificate a sufficient explanation as to the reason the purchaser is not required to hold a California seller's permit in lieu of a seller's permit number.

In both the Regulation and Annotation
475.0026.875, an explanation as to the exception must be
provided on the resale certificate. However, in this case

we have no evidence that Mobe provided such an explanation and, in fact, we have evidence that Mobe provided the seller's permit number of a different entity. Even amid the sundry of documents Appellant presented, essential elements of a resale certificate are missing, specifically, the seller's permit number or sufficient explanation as to why one was not required, the purchaser's signature, and a statement that the property was purchased for resale.

2.1

2.4

Since three of the five essential elements are not present, it is not reasonable to find that together these documents constitute a valid resale certificate. A seller is presumed to have taken a resale certificate in good faith if only the resale certificate contains the essential elements and, otherwise, appear to be valid on its face. Here, as I just discussed, Appellant was not presented with a single document that appeared valid on its face. Rather, Appellant received two emails over a month apart; one, which included an unsigned purchase order; and the other which explicitly provided the reseller ID number of a different entity, which Appellant confirmed by checking the Department's website, and which Appellant apparently new belongs to a different entity.

The various documents did not contain all the essential elements of a resale certificate. Accordingly,

there's no presumption that Appellant took a certificate in good faith and, in fact, it did not. Appellant, as we heard, is a sophisticated seller with approximately 10 years of experience with sales and use tax compliance prior to the sales at issue, and they could not take such a certificate in good faith.

2.1

2.4

The mere statement that True Life Botanicals was associated with Mobe is insufficient because it indicates that the seller's permit number did not belong to the purchaser. Therefore, again, it could not have accepted these documents in good faith. The situation is distinguishable from Annotation 475.0045, which was raised by the panel. That annotation addresses a situation in which a purchaser issued a single retail -- a single resale certificate. And the seller's permit number, while invalid, was, quote, "regular on its face," end quote. Which is to say it was not obvious it contained false or incorrect information.

Here, however, Appellant was told by the purchaser, Mobe, that the seller's permit number belonged to a different entity, a fact Appellant verified when it checked the Department's website. We're also not sure how much we rely on this annotation, which was published in 1986, with regard to the appearance of a legitimate seller's permit number, now that sellers have access to

the Departments' website to verify a seller's permit number.

2.1

2.4

Now, that sellers can easily check that a seller's permit number is valid, and in so doing, will necessarily see the name of the person holding the permit, absent the specific facts of that annotation, it doesn't seem likely that a seller can take a resale certificate in good faith that was held by a different entity. In sum, Appellant did not take a valid resale certificate in good faith.

Finally, if a seller fails to timely obtain a resale certificate in the proper form, Regulation 1668(e) offers relief of the viability only when the seller shows the property was, in fact, resold or being held for resale by the purchaser, and has not been used for any purpose other than retention, demonstration, or display while holding it in a regular course of business, or was consumed by the purchaser and tax was reported to the Department on the purchaser's sale and use tax return, or was paid to the Department pursuant to an assessment or audit.

A seller who does not timely obtain a resale certificate may use any verifiable method of establishing it should be relieved of liability for tax, including the use of an XYZ letter. That is a CDTFA approved form that

may be sent to the seller's customers inquiring as to the disposition of the property purchased and is discussed in Regulation 1668(f). However, a response to an XYZ letter is not equivalent to a valid resale certificate. And the Department is not required to relieve a seller from liability for tax based on a purchaser's response to an XYZ letter. Rather, it is merely an item of evidence which may help a seller prove that the sale was not at retail -- was not at resale, Annotation 475.0850.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

2.4

25

According to information provided by Appellant's former representative, Russell Lee, in his August 24th, 2017, email, which can be found in Exhibit Q, Mobe used the property as promotional items. Additionally, the August 17th, 2016, email from Mobe's chief financial officer, Julie Domer -- Julie Domier, Exhibit S, stated that Mobe had sold none of the property and was instead using it for marketing, testing, software training, and employee and client use in Minnesota and presumably Washington State where it allegedly filed and paid use tax. Appellant also obtained an XYZ letter from Mobe dated May 26th, 2016, which is found in Exhibit O, referencing only one of the two transactions at issue; the March 31st, 2015, invoice, which is Exhibit K, indicating that Mobe purchased the items for resale, and they were in resale inventory and had not been used.

However, the preponderance of evidence establishes the two transactions were sales at retail and, thus, subject to tax. There's no evidence supporting the statements that the property was originally purchased for resale and that some of it, according to Exhibit S, was still being held for future sale or use. Exhibits Q and S clearly indicate that none of the property was resold and at no time has Mobe held a California seller's permit. If Mobe intended to resell out of state, it could have indicated on that on a resale certificate in lieu of a seller's permit number but instead supplied an erroneous seller's permit number.

2.4

While Exhibit S indicates that as of
August 17, 2016, some of the property was being used in
Minnesota and possibly Washington State, there is, again,
no other evidence to support this claim or any claim that
the property was being used in Massachusetts. And such
use would not fall under one of the four scenarios listed
in Regulation 1668(e) that must be shown to relieve a
seller from liability. Accordingly, the preponderance of
evidence establishes that the property was purchased for
use by Mobe.

With regard to Mr. Yang's testimony today, unfortunately for Appellant, there's a significant legal difference between shipment in state and out of state,

even if the purchaser plans to take it out of state.

Regulation 1620(a)(1) and (a)(3) address that. Also, at no time today did Mr. Yang indicate that the sale was represented as a sale for retail -- sale for resale.

Appellant has, therefore, not met its burden of proving these transactions were not of retail. For these reasons, we request that the appeal be denied.

Thank you.

2.4

JUDGE BROWN: This is Judge Brown. Thank you, CDTFA.

I'll remind everyone now you can unmute, and I will ask my co-panelists if they would like to ask CDTFA any questions.

Judge Cho, would you like to begin.

JUDGE CHO: This is Judge Cho. Yeah, just a couple of quick clarifying questions, I hope. In the exhibits, Exhibit G, G as in Gary, if you look at page 4 of Exhibit G, the auditor states that the bill to customer is located out of state and no seller's permit or nexus in California. I was just wondering do you know how the auditor came to that conclusion? Was it based off the documents that were provided to the auditor at that time, or did the auditor go out and contact Mobe directly?

MR. PARKER: This is Jason Parker. Typically, the auditors will look to see if the customer is

registered in the state or required to have a permit in this state. So they are an Out of State customer. They may have come here to make purchases. However, if they were not making sales in this state, they were not required to have a seller's permit at that time.

2.4

JUDGE CHO: Okay. This is Judge Cho. So the reason why I'm asking this question is it goes back to the annotation that CDTFA brought up with respect to the out-of-state customer. I was just wondering whether there was sufficient -- whether the auditor found sufficient information contained in the documents. I believe it was -- give me one second. It was J -- Exhibits J, M, P, and R to make a finding that the customer did not have nexus in California.

Because I know CDTFA's position today is saying that, based on the documents, there is no evidence that this was an out-of-state customer who stated sufficiently in those documents that they had no nexus in California. But the question I have is well, the auditor made that conclusion in the audit working papers, and I was wondering where did he get that -- oh, sorry.

Where did he or she come to that conclusion? Was it based on the same documentation that CDTFA is looking at today? So I just want to make sure there's no real conflict here between your conclusion today and the

auditor's conclusion back in the audit working paper.

2.4

Does that make sense, that question?

MR. PARKER: This is Jason Parker. No, the -yes, your question does make sense. I believe that it is
the documentation that we have provided that they've
reviewed that they determined that they did not have -you know, I'm not sure that they made the determination
that they didn't have nexus. But based on the types of
transactions that Mobe did and, you know, they were the -it appeared they were the consumer of these types of items
as they didn't sell them. So they didn't make sales in
California. So I think they made that inference that they
were not required to hold a seller's permit in California.

Does that answer the question?

JUDGE CHO: This is Judge Cho. Yeah. That's a pretty good answer.

But, Mr. Claremon, did you want to add anything?

MR. CLAREMON: Yeah, I do. Again, I think it

goes to the fact that it is two separate questions because
as we stated under Regulation 1620, even if they are an

out-of-state customer, if the sale takes place in-state,

we're talking about the application of sales tax. So the

sales tax would still apply. So, you know, the auditor

can use all the information to see that they're not

required to hold a seller's permit or even a certification

of registration use tax in this state, but that's not to say a sales tax transaction to them wouldn't be subject to sales tax.

2.4

The question that -- or not the question. But the issue that annotation is addressing and that regulation, like, specifically provides for is when they make an affirmative representation that they will only be reselling these things out of state. Just the fact they don't have nexus doesn't -- doesn't -- is not a representation that they're going to resale these things out of state. They can very -- and, again, the facts of the case are that they have not resold any of these things out of state.

And so it's -- it's kind of a different issue we're talking about. This -- not just that they're an out-of-state company, but that they will be, in fact, reselling these things out of state as opposed to using them out of state or using them in state. Because they could be using them in state even as someone not required to hold a seller's permit or even someone without nexus, possibly. I mean, you could come up with scenarios where they don't have nexus, but that's less likely.

JUDGE CHO: This is Judge Cho. Thank you for explanation. Moving onto the issue of the XYZ letter, I just want to ask real quick. So the Department found that

the XYZ letter wasn't -- wasn't reliable based off of the email -- was it Exhibit S; is that correct?

2.1

2.4

MS. JACOBS: This is Amanda Jacobs. Yes. Partly based on Exhibit S, partly based on the fact that Mobe, you know, Mobe had -- gave false information as to their seller's permit number. And they also don't -- they never provided any evidence to back up the XYZ letter. So, typically, if you're responding with an XYZ letter and you're making a claim, you would then include evidence to support that claim. And that XYZ letter also doesn't cover all of the issues -- all of the transactions at issue. They only address one of the invoices, and there are two at issue in this case.

MR. CLAREMON: And this is Scott Claremon. I would add the representation of the XYZ letter is that it's being held in resale in the regular course of business. And the evidence here is that they've never held a reseller's permit in California, and that they, in fact, have never sold any of these products. So the preponderance of the evidence indicates that these were not — that these were not, in fact, being held for resale in the regular course of business.

The preponderance of the evidence is that they're being held possibly for use out of state, which is the evidence, at least before us, of what's happened with some

of these products.

2.4

JUDGE CHO: This is Judge Cho. Thank you very much. I believe that's it for now.

So I'll turn it back to you, Judge Brown.

JUDGE BROWN: Thank you.

This is Judge Brown. And now I'll ask

Judge Ralston, if you want to unmute, do you have any
questions for CDTFA?

JUDGE RALSTON: This is Judge Ralston. Not at this time.

JUDGE BROWN: Thank you.

This is Judge Brown. CDTFA, I guess I wanted to ask -- pick up on what you were just answering about the XYZ letter where you indicated that it wasn't -- the XYZ letter the Department found, it was not reliable based on Exhibit S, and based on the fact that Mobe gave false information about being able to use True Life Botanical's seller's permit, and also because there were -- Mobe didn't provide any evidence to back up its representation in the XYZ letter. I guess my question is, is there a reason why we would expect Mobe to know to present that evidence to back up its XYZ letter or expect Appellant to have that evidence to back up the XYZ letter?

MR. CLAREMON: I mean Mobe did -- this is Scott Claremon. Mobe did provide information. They, you know,

two years after the fact, they did provide information to Appellant, but the information does not -- that they provided does not back up the letter. The information they provided is that they have not resold any of these products. And the other information that is independent of that representation is that they have never held a California seller's permit.

2.4

And those are two pieces of evidence that when we're determining whether someone is actually holding something for resale in the regular course of business in California, those are two -- you would find those to be two compelling pieces of evidence that they are not doing so.

JUDGE BROWN: This is Judge Brown. Thank you.

I wanted -- I had wanted to ask about Annotation 475.0045. And Ms. Jacobs, I think you really did cover most of what I was going to ask anyway, and I appreciate that you're proactive in trying to address my question. I guess I wanted to ask to the extent that you're saying that now we shouldn't rely on the annotation because now we have the internet where this information can be verified.

I guess I wanted to follow up and sort of ask the same question about what's in the backup letter. Or I don't know if you're -- I know technically I know that we

just -- it's just technically the annotation and not the backup letter, but the backup letter does provide context for the annotation. And because there was some language in the backup letter to Annotation 475.0045 that I -- that was kind of striking where it says that the seller's permit number may otherwise be borrowed by the purchaser.

2.1

2.4

And I was just wondering that -- that seems to have a very different philosophy than the argument that you are making and the argument that's in Annotation 475.0511. I don't -- I understand that annotations are not law, and I understand the arguments about how much reliance we should give to them. I just thought is there something I'm missing about why these two annotations that are pretty close in time take such different philosophies, and how we have interpreted that for this case?

MR. CLAREMON: I can answer. This is Scott Claremon again.

JUDGE BROWN: Go ahead.

MR. CLAREMON: I think that's -- I do think that philosophy is somewhat informed by the fact that it is an older annotation, that it's -- it's -- the -- at this point in time, the seller's permit number is the most easily verifiable element on a reseller's certificate because you do just have to go on the website and see who it belongs to and that it's valid. But, again, when we're

talking with this annotation about whether it's applicable to this case, that annotation -- that backup letter does say, like, in the very last one is this is all, of course -- then it says, you know, assuming it's taken in good faith. Okay.

2.1

2.4

So I think you have to look at that in combination with the fact of this case. Which is that, whether or not it was borrowed or a related entity or a predecessor entity, they -- like, this Appellant knew it that wasn't theirs. As opposed to perhaps in the scenarios they're talking about there, it was borrowed and, again, it was represented as their own. And at that time, there was -- it was less easily to bear -- easy to verify, but it's certainly distinguishable in that fact. At least that fact exists in this case that then we don't know that fact is what they were contemplating there.

MS. JACOBS: And -- sorry. This is Amanda

Jacobs. I also wanted to point out that that annotation

discusses that the seller's permanent number or not -- I'm

sorry. The resale certificate is -- they used it in

quotes in the backup letter regular on its face, meaning

it contains all five elements, except one may be false.

And in this instance three, you know, two of the elements

are missing and one is false. And so I would argue that

it's distinguishable in that fact as well and that, you

know, this resale certificate compilation was not regular on its face.

2.1

2.4

JUDGE BROWN: This is Judge Brown. Thank you,

Co-panelists, do you have any further questions for CDTFA before we move onto Appellant's rebuttal?

JUDGE CHO: This is Judge Cho, just a one quick one. I know, CDTFA, you stated Mobe did not have a California seller's permit so, therefore, it could not be a retailer. But do you happen to have any information that Mobe didn't have a seller's permit in any other state? Could it still be a re -- or could it still have been a sell for resale if Mobe had a resale certificate in another state?

MR. CLAREMON: Again, no. This is Scott

Claremon. No, we don't. But so, again, we're just -based on the evidence that we have determining whether we
think it's being held for resale in California, as

Ms. Jacobs did point out, though, that if that were the
intention, they could very easily have just made that
statement in the email that, we don't need a seller's
permit because we're going to sell these out of state.

And that was not the representation that they made.

JUDGE CHO: This is Judge Cho. Thank you. That's all the -- that's the only clarifying question I

had.

2 JUDGE BROWN: This is Judge Brown.

Judge Ralston, if you don't have any further questions for CDTFA, then I will move on to hearing Appellant's rebuttal.

All right. Mr. Yang, you have --

MR. YANG: Yes.

JUDGE BROWN: Okay. It is now time for your rebuttal. And we had agreed you have five minutes, but we're not pressed for time. So I would just like to -- I would say if you are ready, you may proceed with your rebuttal.

And I'll just remind everyone else to mute your microphones if you are not speaking.

MR. YANG: Okay. Thank you, Judge Brown.

2.1

2.4

## CLOSING STATEMENT

MR. YANG: I frankly -- quite frankly, I'm -- it's out of my league to understand all the codes that was presented. And frankly, I'm a businessperson, and I was trained -- I went to college as an engineer. So I wouldn't know how exactly the seller and reseller permits go and all that. So that's why I have a team for that. But, unfortunately, that original team has gone, and then I have a new team. So I apologize for my ignorance.

But all I can say is that we keep talking about selling and reselling. These chips were not resale. Why would anybody buy our chip and resell it at a markup?

Whoever buys them would rather come to us and buy them.

It will be cheaper, right? So, obviously, they were built into something else. And, in fact, I know in this case they were built into wristbands, and those wristbands were not sold in California. I'm pretty sure because I -- I saw them. I know the exact end customer, and they were buying it for their employees for health tracking for the employees.

2.1

2.4

I know they weren't used in California. And, again, you don't buy a chip and resell a chip simply because whoever buys that can simply come to us and buy it for cheap.

Anybody who want -- if Mobe were to resell the chip, they have to make a markup, otherwise why make all that effort, right? And they wouldn't know how to support the chip, whoever buys the chip.

So it went into a wristband. So the chips were not resold. They went into a wristband, and the wristband were sold to an end customer. That's what I know. But I'm not sure how that applies to all the laws. All I know is — and just using my common sense, all I know is we were told to ship these to a flower shop, and we did. And

maybe that was my mistake. I have to admit that.

2.1

2.4

I shouldn't -- I should have -- I should not have called my shipping and receiving guy and say, hey, can you -- I'm having lunch with this guy, Dennis. Ship it to -- ship this half to this and ship the rest over there. Maybe I shouldn't have done that. That will be my mistake. But the truth of the matter is they all went and ended up out of state. That's all I'm saying.

So, you know, just perhaps it's my ignorance, but I wouldn't know the law so well like my finance department, shipping departments would. Maybe -- you know, this is a lesson learned. I would never tell my shipping guy to not ship something or ship something anymore. I'll just have them go by the books.

That's all I would like to say. Thanks.

JUDGE BROWN: This is Judge Brown. Thank you,
Mr. Yang. I think. I will begin with questions, and then
I'll turn to my co-panelists. Mr. Yang, so are you -- is
NeuroSky now arguing that these weren't sales for resale,
and that the panel should not -- does not need to examine
whether these were sales for resale.

MR. YANG: They were resale in a different form.

They were -- these were bought to be put into something to be resold in a different form, but it's not a direct resale. I don't know if that makes any difference.

1	That's all I'm saying. So, for example, if you bought our
2	chip, you wouldn't resell the chip. You would put it in a
3	health tracker or wristband or smart watch and then resell
4	it, sell the whole product that way.
5	JUDGE BROWN: I'll turn to my co-panelists now.
6	Judge Ralston, do you have any questions for Mr. Yang
7	following Appellant's rebuttal?
8	JUDGE RALSTON: This is Judge Ralston. Not at
9	this time.
10	JUDGE BROWN: Judge Cho, do you have any further
11	questions for Appellant?
12	JUDGE CHO: This is Judge Cho. I don't have any
13	questions. Thank you.
14	JUDGE BROWN: All right. Then I think that we
15	may have covered all of the presentations. All right.
16	CDTFA, do you have anything further?
17	MS. JACOBS: This is Amanda Jacobs. No, we do
18	not.
19	JUDGE BROWN: And Appellant, Mr. Yang, do you
20	have anything further?
21	MR. YANG: No. Thank you so much.
22	JUDGE BROWN: Okay. Well then thank you everyone
23	very much. This concludes this hearing. The record is
24	closed, and the case is submitted today.
25	The judges will meet and decide the case based on

the evidence, arguments, and applicable law. We will mail both parties our written decision no later than 100 days from today. This hearing is now adjourned, and we are off the record. Thank you everyone. (Proceedings adjourned at 2:19 p.m.) 

## 1 HEARING REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 2 I, Ernalyn M. Alonzo, Hearing Reporter in and for 3 the State of California, do hereby certify: 4 5 That the foregoing transcript of proceedings was 6 taken before me at the time and place set forth, that the 7 testimony and proceedings were reported stenographically 8 by me and later transcribed by computer-aided 9 transcription under my direction and supervision, that the 10 foregoing is a true record of the testimony and 11 proceedings taken at that time. 12 I further certify that I am in no way interested 13 in the outcome of said action. 14 I have hereunto subscribed my name this 10th day 15 of November, 2021. 16 17 18 19 ERNALYN M. ALONZO 20 HEARING REPORTER 21 2.2 23 2.4 25