## BEFORE THE OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL OF,	)	
V TROPICAL BAKESHOP III, INC., VALERIO'S TROPICAL BAKESHOP VI, INC.,		19125594 19125596
APPELLANT.	)	

TRANSCRIPT OF ELECTRONIC PROCEEDINGS

State of California

Tuesday, January 25, 2022

Reported by: ERNALYN M. ALONZO HEARING REPORTER

1	BEFORE THE OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS
2	STATE OF CALIFORNIA
3	
4	
5 6 7	IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL OF, )  V TROPICAL BAKESHOP III, INC., ) OTA NO. 19125594  VALERIO'S TROPICAL BAKESHOP VI, ) 19125596  INC., )
8	) )
9	APPELLANT. )
10	)
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	Transcript of Electronic Proceedings,
16	taken in the State of California, commencing
17	at 9:30 a.m. and concluding at 10:43 a.m. on
<ul><li>18</li><li>19</li></ul>	Tuesday, January 25, 2022, reported by
20	Ernalyn M. Alonzo, Hearing Reporter, in and
21	for the State of California.
22	
23	
23	
25	
<u> </u>	

1	APPEARANCES:	
2		
3	Panel Lead:	ALJ JOSHUA ALDRICH
4	Panel Members:	ALJ SUZANNE BROWN
5	ranel Members:	ALJ ANDREW KWEE
6	For the Appellant:	GRAHAM HOAD
7		
8	For the Respondent:	STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TAX AND FEE ADMINISTRATION
9		AMANDA JACOBS
10		CARY HUXSOLL JASON PARKER
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

1		I N D E X
2		
3		E X H I B I T S
4		
5	(Appellant's Exhibi	ts 1-3 were received at page 8.)
6	(Department's Exhib	oits A-R were received at page 8.)
7		
8		PRESENTATION
9		DACE
10	Day May III and	<u>PAGE</u>
11	By Mr. Hoad	9
12	By Ms. Jacobs	26
13		
14		CLOSING STATEMENT
15		PAGE
16	By Mr. Hoad	50
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

1	California; Tuesday, January 25, 2022
2	9:30 a.m.
3	
4	JUDGE ALDRICH: So this is Judge Aldric

2.1

2.4

JUDGE ALDRICH: So this is Judge Aldrich. We are opening the record in the consolidated appeal of V Tropical III, Incorporated, and Valerio's Tropical Bakeshop VI, Incorporated, before the Office of Tax Appeals, OTA Case Number 19 -- or Case Numbers 19125594 and 19125598. Today's date is Tuesday, January 25th, 2022, and time is approximately 9:30. This hearing was duly noticed for a virtual hearing and with the agreement of the parties.

Today's hearing is being heard by a panel of three Administrative Law Judges. My name is Judge Aldrich. I'm the lead judge for purposes of conducting the hearing. At this point I'd like to ask my co-panelists to introduce themselves, beginning with Judge Brown.

JUDGE BROWN: Good morning. This is Judge Brown.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Thank you.

And Judge Kwee.

JUDGE KWEE: Hi. Good morning. This is Judge Kwee.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Great. During the hearing panel members may ask questions or otherwise participate to

ensure that we have all of the information needed to decide this appeal. After the conclusion of the hearing, we three will deliberate and decide the issues presented. As a reminder, the Office of Tax Appeals is not a court. It is an independent appeals body. The panel does not engage in ex parte communications with either party. Our opinion will be based on the parties' arguments and admitted evidence and relevant law. We have read the parties' submissions, and we are looking forward to hearing your arguments today.

2.4

For the Appellant we have representative Graham Hoad. Welcome.

For the Respondent, for the Department, we have Amanda Jacobs, Cary Huxsoll, and Jason Parker. Welcome.

Pursuant to our January 13th, 2022, minutes and orders of prehearing conference, the issues to be decided are: Whether Appellants have shown that their sales of hot meat-filled baked goods are exempt from sales tax; whether CDTFA timely issued the Notice of Determinations; and, whether relief from the failure-to-file penalty is warranted.

Mr. Hoad, is that correct?

MR. HOAD: Yeah. That accurately summarizes the issues.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Thank you.

1 Ms. Jacobs, this is correct? 2 MS. JACOBS: That's correct. Thank you. 3 JUDGE ALDRICH: Thank you. In the minutes and orders, we noted under the 4 5 notice section that it is undisputed that Appellants were 6 not subject to the 80/80 rule, and we also noted that it 7 is undisputed that there's no seating at either location. Mr. Hoad, is that correct? 8 9 MR. HOAD: That's correct. 10 JUDGE ALDRICH: And Ms. Jacobs? 11 MS. JACOBS: That's correct. 12 JUDGE ALDRICH: Also we allowed Appellant to 13 submit a CDTFA 735 or declaration to the same effect for 14 the third issue, which we indicated by January 14th, 2022. We received a CDTFA 735 on January 17th, 2022, which was 15 16 executed on January 11th, 2022, by Appellants' vice 17 president. 18 Ms. Jacobs, do you have any objection to 19 admitting the CDTFA 735 that Mr. Hoad provided? 20 I didn't hear you, but it looked like you were 2.1 voicing no objection. 22 MS. JACOBS: No objection. Can you hear me? 23 JUDGE ALDRICH: Yup. Thank you. Great. So that will be allowed. And next we'll 2.4 25 discuss exhibits. So pursuant to our January 13th, 2022,

minutes and orders prehearing conference, we admitted
ahead of time the hearing exhibits for Appellant. Those
are Exhibits 1 through 3 and also for the Department,
Exhibits A through R. Those were without objection and
previously admitted.

(Appellant's Exhibits 1-3 were received
in evidence by the Administrative Law Judge.)

2.1

2.4

(Appellant's Exhibits 1-3 were received in evidence by the Administrative Law Judge.)

(Department's Exhibits A-R were received in evidence by the Administrative Law Judge.)

Let's see. Does either party have additional exhibits that they would like for us to consider today?

MR. HOAD: No. I don't have any additional exhibits which need to be submitted.

Mr. Hoad?

JUDGE ALDRICH: Great. And then Department?

MS. JACOBS: No exhibits.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Great. So we plan for the hearing to proceed as follows. Appellants opening statement, which we estimated at 20 minutes, and then the Department will have a combined opening and closing for 20 minutes, approximately a 10-minute period for questions from the panel, and 5 to 10 minutes for rebuttal or closing from Appellant. If you need more time, please ask.

But do either of the parties or their

representatives have any questions before we move on to opening statements?

No from either. Okay. So we're ready to proceed with your presentation, Mr. Hoad. And please begin when you're ready.

2.4

## PRESENTATION

MR. HOAD: Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you all for joining us today for this Office of Tax Appeal hearing.

Valerio's Bakeshop III and Valerio's Bakeshop VI, Inc., dba Valerio's operates Filipino bakeshops offering a variety of ethnic goods in purely take-out form. Shop locations consist of a small retail storefront, unheated display cases, racks, and shelves upon which baked goods are offered for sale. Neither location offers tables and chairs, nor other seating facilities where patrons may consume goods purchased. No heat lamps or other devices are used to maintain the internal temperature of the baked goods until purchased, with the exception of a small portion of baked goods held in a small warming oven inside the store.

The baked goods include traditional non-meat items such as dinner rolls, pastries, and desserts, but also baked goods which include meat, such as pork and

chicken buns, empanadas, et cetera. Portion sizes range from two to five ounces and include about one to two ounces of meat filling.

2.4

Now, before I go on with my presentation, I would like to just go through the exhibits briefly and just give you an idea of what the Appellant is serving. If you can see the exhibit screen, these are chicken siopao and pork siopao. They are a Filipino bakery good. They're just a bun. You can see their net weight for 4 of them is 20 ounces. So they are about 5 ounces with 1 to 2 ounces of meat. We also have a tuna and a chicken pandesal. Again, these are 5 ounces with a very small portion of meat. The corned beef pandesal and tuna pandesal are here. They're also about the same size, 5 ounces.

This is a -- on the left-hand side, we have just a regular pandesal. These are not filled with any type of meat or any type of filling. Cheese pandesal -- and then you can see the cheese pandesal is 20 ounces in a package, but there are 6 of them. So you can see they are a little bit less than 4 ounces. On the right-hand side we have two pandesals, which are identical to the tag. Anybody who is coming in, you can see from the outside they look identical. One has chicken. One does not.

You can guess which one, if you want to play a game or flip a coin. But the one on the left is the

chicken pandesal. And on the bottom on the right-hand picture is the inside of chicken pandesal versus the inside of the regular pandesal. And you can see the inside of the chicken pandesal. Again, these are very small. They're about maybe three inches in diameter.

Again, cheese pandesal — the inside of a cheese pandesal. This is an empanada. Again, it's very small. It's about three inches in diameter. It has a little bit of meat filling, one to two ounces. Pork siopao. You can see the inside of a pork siopao.

2.4

So these are baked goods. The only difference between what the Department considers to be an exempt baked goods and these baked goods is that they contain a small portion of meat. It's ethnically -- there are other ethnicities that put meat in their baked goods. It makes no difference to them whatsoever. It's still a snack. It's not a meal.

This is a picture of the outside of the Filipino bakeshop. It's just a bakeshop. They don't serve any -- any kind of food other than baked goods. And we just have a variety of tuna, chicken pandesals -- and a pork meat pandesals. These are the items that are -- that the taxpayer sells -- the Appellant sells.

The second exhibit is the bottom of section 6359, and it refers to a case, Treasure Island Catering Company

versus State Board of Equalization. And the annotated portion of the case states that the sale of hot dog and hamburger sandwiches, even when served with beverages from sandwich stands or booths where neither chairs nor tables are provided for customers, does not constitute a meal within this section. A paper napkin is not tableware within this section, since the rule of ejusdem generis is applicable. I'm not going to get into the Latin definition of ejusdem generis because I could barely say it. But I'll leave it to you attorneys to -- to research that.

2.4

The third exhibit is the actual case of Treasure Island versus State Board of Equalization. And if you scroll down to approximately 5, one of the sections that I want to highlight is that the generally accepted concept of a meal is that it not only consist of a larger quantity of food than that which ordinarily comprises a single sandwich, but that it usually consists of a diversified selection of foods which would not be susceptible to consumption in the absence of at least some article of tableware, and which could not be conveniently consumed while standing -- while one was standing or walking about.

So we basically create a three-part test to determine what is a meal. It's a larger quantity of food. It usually consist of a diversified selection of foods

which would not be susceptible to consumption, the absence of at least some article of tableware, and it could not be conveniently consumed while one was standing or walking about.

2.4

So I think coming out of the gate, we can assume that these are not meals. They do not meet that three-part test of what is a meal. They can easily be consumed while standing or walking about. They don't need tableware. So the consumption of these under -- under Treasure Island, that these items of baked goods are not meals.

So one of the things that you're going to be asked to decide -- which I'll go over -- is, are these items, when they are served hot out of the warming oven, do they more -- are they more similar to hot prepared food products, which are taxable, or are they hot bakery goods, which are nontaxable. And the hot -- the examples that the CDTFA gives for hot prepared food products include sandwiches, pizza, barbecue chicken, soup, consommé, bouillon, steak, and so forth.

And so are these items the taxpayer sells more like these? Or are they more like bread, croissants, pastries, muffins, cookies, bagels, and the like. So this is really what we're deciding. Are these hot prepared food products, examples given here? Or are they hot

bakery goods, examples given here.

2.4

So now, I'm going to go into -- now, that we've covered that and, really, what we're talking about what the issues are, I'm going to go ahead and go into my written presentation. So the issue here is really whether the Department -- whether the petitioner appropriately relied on the Department' own guidance when he treated the sale of meat-filled hot bakery goods as exempt. So the Department -- or excuse me.

The petitioner relied on the following guidance. First, Regulation 1603, taxable sales of food products. Regulation 1603 discusses the application of tax to food products, specifically, paragraph E1 states -- and I want to read this into the record. Tax applies in the sale of all hot prepared food products, unless otherwise exempt. Prepared food items mean those items and components which have been prepared for the sale and heated condition and which is sold in a temperature which is higher than air temperature of the room or place where they are sold. The mere heating of a food product constitutes preparation of a hot prepared food product; example, grilling of sandwich, dipping a sandwich in a bun in hot gravy using infrared lights, steam tables, et cetera.

If the sale is intended to be of a hot food product, such sale is of a hot food product regardless of

cooling, which incidentally occurs. For example, a sale of a toasted sandwich intended to be sold in a heated condition when sold -- excuse me -- such as a fried ham sandwich on toast is a sale of a hot prepared food product, even though it may have cooled due to delay. On the other hand, a sale of a toasted sandwich which is not intended to be in a heated condition when sold, such as a cold tuna sandwich on toast, is not a sale of a hot prepared food product.

2.4

However, the regulation further states, tax does not apply to the sale for a separate price of bakery goods, beverages classed as food products, or cold or frozen food products. So bakery goods are not subject to tax when they are served hot. It's important to note that neither Regulation 1603 nor its corresponding Section 6359 make any distinction between hot bakery goods containing meat and non-meat products.

Furthermore, neither the taxpayer nor the patrons make any distinction between not -- between meat and non-meat products. They're treated exactly the same when baked. They are offered for sale side by side in non-heated display cases, in refrigerated condition far below room temperature and in some cases, from self-served warming ovens. Nowhere in Regulation 1603 does it state that by adding meat to a hot-bakery good change its nature

to a hot prepared food product.

2.4

Petitioner is a bakery selling only bakery goods and the regulation carves out a specific exemption for hot bakery goods. Petitioner reasonably relied on Regulation 1603 in determining that its sales met the definition of hot bakery goods and were, therefore, exempt.

Now, in addition, the second article, the guidance that petitioner relied on was Publication 22.

And this is a publication that reversed the dining and beverage industry. Publication 22 states in part that to-go sales of hot prepared food products are taxable.

See exception for hot bakery goods, for hot bakery items.

And it goes on to list some examples. The food product is considered a hot-food product if it is in a heated -- heated to a temperature above room temperature.

Examples of heating a product above room temperature include grilling a sandwich, dipping a sandwich in hot gravy, or using infrared lights, steam tables, or microwave ovens. Now, examples of hot prepared food products include -- and this is the slide I just showed you -- hot sandwiches, pizza, barbecue chicken, soup, consomme, bouillon, steak, and so forth. Food is considered hot even if it is cooled by the time of sale, and so it's intended to be sold as a hot-food item.

Exception, specifically stated in Publication 22,

sales of hot bakery goods are not taxable when sold to go unless they are sold as part of a combination package. So Publication 22 provides specific examples of hot prepared food products. However, none of the items listed remotely resembles a bakery good. Furthermore, no mention is made regarding a distinction between hot bakery goods and meat-filled bakery goods.

2.4

Publication interprets it -- excuse me.

Publication 22 interprets Regulation 1603 but goes a step further by highlighting the one exception to the exempt sale of a hot bakery good, and that is when it is sold as part of a combination package. From the taxpayer's perspective based on the guidance in Publication 22, the intent of Regulation 1603 is clear. The only instance where a hot-bakery good is taxable is when it is sold as part of a combination package.

Had the Department intended for taxpayers to treat meat-filled hot bakery goods as taxable, they should have said so by adding "or they contain meat" to the language of Publication 22 or Regulation 1603. However, they did not. Thus, the Department incorrectly interprets its own guidance by concluding that hot bakery goods containing meat are by their nature not exempt hot bakery goods. So that's Publication 22.

The next guidance is the Audit Manual. Audit

Manual Section 811.30 states in part, sales of hot beverages, such as coffee, tea, cocoa, or cider are not taxable if sold for a separate price on a to-go basis. Similarly, bakery items such as bread, croissants, pastries, muffins, cookies, bagels, and the like, are also not taxable if sold on a to-go basis. Now first, the guidance provided by the Audit Manual further confirms the nontaxable status of hot bakery goods.

2.4

But it also includes the phrase, "and the like," which without specifically excluding meat-filled items from the definition. So it includes "and the like," but it doesn't exclude meat-filled items from the definition. As mentioned previously, based on the Department's own guidance, there's no difference between a hot-bakery good containing meat and one without.

The next guidance is the annotations. Now, annotations don't have the force and effect of the law, but they do provide some guidance. This is Annotation 550.1775. The Department relies on Annotation 550.1775 and 550.1712 -- both have the same backup -- to compare the taxpayer's hot bakery goods to a Cornish pasty.

The annotation states, "Pasties. A pasty is not a bakery good within the meaning of Revenue & Taxation

Code Section 6359(e). It is actually an entire meal compacted into a form more convenient than the ingredients

would be if sold as a conventional meal on a plate or cardboard tray. Therefore, sales of pasties in a heated condition constitute taxable sales of hot prepared food products under Regulation 1603(e)(1)."

2.1

2.4

So the Annotation 550.1775 distinguishes a Cornish pasty from a hot-bakery good by noting that the Cornish pasty is actually an entire meal, and I just spoke about Treasure Island. We're going to go into that a little bit more. So let's talk about an entire meal. Section 6359 discusses a general exemption from the sales and use tax and, again, states the taxes do not apply to the sale for a separate price of bakery goods. At the bottom of the code section, the Department annotates the following court case, which is Treasure Island.

It states, "The sale of hot dog and hamburger sandwiches, even when served with beverages from sandwich stands or booths where neither chairs nor tables are provided for customers, does not constitute a meal within this section." A paper napkin is not tableware within this section, since the rule of ejusdem generis is applicable."

So as we noted before in the fact section, each baked good that we're presenting contains between one and two ounces of meat, but are otherwise indistinguishable from petitioner's non-meat filled goods. Furthermore, the

ingredients contained within the taxpayer's products would in no way be considered a meal if served as an entire portion of a conventional meal. As noted in 6359, the issue of whether a serving was considered an entire meal was litigated in Treasure Island versus the State Board of Equalization.

2.4

In that case, the taxpayer sold hot dogs and hamburger sandwiches during the Golden Gate Exposition. At issue was whether the hot dog and hamburger sandwiches constituted meals and were, therefore, subject to sales tax when sold. After July 1st of 1939 change in statute, the exemption for food products was not applicable to be meals served on or off the premises of the retailer. We went to a hot versus cold items interpretation or statute.

In its opinion, the court citing Samuel and Collins stated, as I mentioned before, the generally accepted concept of a meal is that it not only consists of a larger quantity of food than is ordinarily comprised -- comprising a single sandwich, but that it usually consists of a diversified selection of foods which would not be susceptible to consumption in the absence of at least some sort of -- some article of tableware, and which could not be conveniently consumed while one was standing or walking about.

So there's, again, Treasure Island creates a

three-part test: A meal is a larger quantity; it's a diversified selection of foods requiring tableware, and it's not conveniently consumed while standing or walking about. Taxpayer's own items, as you can see from the exhibits, obviously do not meet those definitions. So the backup to Annotation 550.1775 states that the reason Cornish pasties are taxable is that they're more properly meals sold wrapped in a pastry and not the kind of item the law contemplated to be exempt as hot bakery goods.

2.1

2.4

First, taxpayer's bakery goods are not entire meals as contemplated by either Treasure Island or Annotation 550.1775. They do not contain a diversified -- a diversity of ingredients that would ordinarily be recognized as conventional meals sold separately. And the portion sizes of the bakery good is not that which would ordinarily be considered an entire meal. Furthermore, hamburgers and hot dogs were not considered meals, even though they obviously contain meat.

Cornish pasties, on the other hand, are widely accepted as being an entire meal. They are generally served as a single portion meal on a plate with utensils and is often accompanied by a side of vegetables, et cetera. The portion sizes are more substantial than what the taxpayer sells, and they're generally advertised as a meal, not a bakery good. Taxpayer's baked goods, whether

meat filled or not, are generally eaten by hand.

2.4

So the Department's reliance on Annotation
550.1775 to demonstrate that the taxpayer's hot-bakery
item are meals and therefore taxable, is not supported by
Treasure Island case. Furthermore, annotations are to be
used as guidance only, and do not have the force and
effect of law. To wit no taxpayer seeking guidance on the
taxability of hot bakery goods would be reasonably
expected to seek the guidance of the backup of an
annotation and then draw the conclusion that its hot
bakery goods were taxable because they were akin to
Cornish pasties. This is an unreasonable burden on any
taxpayer, and it's misguided in the first place.

So that concludes my presentation for the first item, which is the taxable ability of the hot bakery goods that contain meat.

The second issue is whether the applicable statute of limitations should extend beyond the normal statute of limitations for taxpayers who file returns would have. So in each equities tend for taxpayers, the taxpayers file returns would have. So in each report of field audit prepared by the Department, the penalty and statute comments state, and I quote for the penalty comment, "No penalty is recommended. Due to the technicality of Regulation 1603(e)(1), hot prepared food,

and the taxpayer interpretations/understanding of the regulation, the penalty for this audit period is being waived. No intentional negligence was noted. Penalty will be assessed in future audits if the same errors will be noted."

2.1

2.4

Under the statute of limitations comment they state, "Start of the audit period was back dated to 7/01/07. Start of the business operation, taxpayer did not obtain a seller's permit until a scope team advised that there were -- that there are taxable items in the product line. Discovery date is 1/29/2014.

So as noted above, the taxpayer relied on the Department's own guidance in determining that its sales were not subject to tax. As result of the Department's misguided conclusion that the taxpayer's sales of hot bakery goods are taxable, the taxpayer was assessed tax for the extended tax statute of limitations under Section 6487, as well as a failure to file penalty.

In this audit an undue burden was placed on the taxpayer. First, by the Department's own admission, the technicality of Regulation 1603 and the taxpayer's reliance on the regulation created no basis for assessing a penalty. However, the taxpayer is not only being assessed a penalty in the form of a failure to file penalty, but it is also being assessed additional tax due

to the extended statute of limitations.

2.4

Had this taxpayer been required to hold a permit due to providing seating facilities, for example, the liability would be limited to the normal three-year statute, and the taxpayer would not have been assessed a failure to file penalty. To treat this taxpayer different than a bakery who holds a permit, or a restaurant, for example, is patently unfair and burdensome. In short, the Department admits that its regulation in its guidance is technical, and it says no penalty is recommended, yet assesses a penalty and an extended statute of limitations due to the taxpayer's reliance on the Department's own guidance.

Consequently, we believe that it is in the interest of fairness and uniformity that the taxpayer be afforded the benefit of a statute of limitations used for filing taxpayers, as well as relief from the penalty for a failure to file returns. In summary, taxpayer is a bakery selling baked goods. The Department's own guidance, including Section 6359, Regulation 1603, Publication 22, and even its own Audit Manual clearly state that hot bakery goods are exempt. Nowhere is there any guidance stating that hot bakery goods containing meat are taxable.

The Department replies on its own annotations, which do not have the force and effect of law to argue

that a meat-filled hot bakery item is taxable because a Cornish pasty is a meal. Yet, in their own annotated case, hot dogs and hamburgers are not meals because they are served in a napkin and not tableware, just as the petitioner's hot bakery goods, and despite containing meat. Due to its reliance on the Department's guidance, the taxpayer was also unfairly assessed a failure to file penalty as well as extended statute of limitation.

2.4

Guidance provided by the Department should be clear and unambiguous, and in this instance it is. Sales of hot bakery goods are exempt when sold for a single price. Consequently, we believe that the petitioner properly relied on the above guidance when he treated as exempt the sale of meat-filled hot bakery goods.

That concludes my opening statement. Thank you very much for your attention.

JUDGE ALDRICH: This is Judge Aldrich. Thank you, Mr. Hoad. Just as a notice that your second screen is still -- oh, it looks like you took care of that. Thank you very much.

So instead of going into questionings for the panel, I was going to transition to the Department for their presentation and defer the questions until after both parties have presented.

So, Ms. Jacobs, are you ready to proceed with

your opening and closing presentation?

MS. JACOBS: I am. Can you hear me?

JUDGE ALDRICH: I can hear you. Please proceed when you're ready.

MS. JACOBS: Great. Thank you.

2.4

## PRESENTATION

MS. JACOBS: This is Amanda Jacobs from -- for the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration.

The Appellants in this case are related entities under common ownership and operate bakeries located in California. Each location is comprised of a small retail storefront containing warmers, refrigerators, and unheated display cases, racks, and shelves from which food products are offered for sale. Appellants sell baked goods for take-out or to-go orders, including some pastry and bread products filled with meat and vegetables directly from a heated appliance called a warmer. None of the locations offer seating facilities or allow food consumption on the premises.

As part of the statewide compliance outreach program or SCOP, Appellant v Tropical Bakeshop III was visited by Department staff on January 29th, 2014; Exhibits G and M. During this visit the SCOP team determined that the sales of Appellants' meat-filled

pastry and bread products were taxable. Appellants' management was advised to obtain a seller's permit, and both Appellants were issued a permit in August 2014.

2.1

2.4

However, Appellants disregarded the Department's advice and reported all sales as exempt. Appellants were each audited; V Tropical Bakeshop III for the period of July 1st, 2007, through December 31st, 2013, and Valerio's Tropical Bakeshop VI for the period of January 1st, 2010, through December 31st, 2014. Appellants were each reaudited as recommended by the appeals decision.

The issue in this appeal -- the issues in this appeal are whether Appellants are entitled to further adjustments to the audit liabilities for the period of July 1st, 2007, through December 31st, 2014, in the matter of V Tropical Bakeshop III, Incorporated, in January 1st, 2010, through December 31st, 2014, in the matter of Valerio's Tropical Bakeshop VI, Incorporated, with the respect to the following: One, whether Appellants have shown that their sales of meat-filled baked goods from a warmer are exempt from tax; two, whether the NODs were issued timely; and three, whether relief of the failure to file penalties are warranted.

The first issue is whether Appellants have shown that their sales of meat-filled baked sales goods from a warmer are exempt from tax. Alternatively stated, whether

Appellants' sale of meat-filled pastry and bread products from a warmer are sales of hot prepared food products are subject to tax. We confirm that they are.

2.1

2.4

As you know California imposes sales tax on a retailer's retail sales of tangible personal property in this state unless the sale is specifically exempt or excluded from taxation by statute, Revenue & Taxation Code 6051. All of a retailer's gross receipts are presumed subject to tax unless the retailer can prove otherwise, Revenue & Taxation Code Section 6091. Sales tax generally does not apply to sales of food products for human consumption. That's Section 5359 subdivision (a).

However, sales tax does apply to sales of hot prepared food products whether served on or off the premises, Section 6359(d)(1) and (d)(7), and Regulation 1603(a)(2)(a). Hot prepared food product is defined as, quote, "Those products, items, or components that have been prepared for sale in a heated condition and are sold at any temperature that is higher than the air temperature of the room or place where they are sold," end quote.

The mere heating of a food product, such as by grilling or using infrared lights or steam tables, for example, constitutes preparation of a hot prepared food product. And if the sale is intended to be of a hot

prepared food product, such sale is of a hot prepared -is of a hot food product regardless of cooling which,
incidentally, occurs, Regulation 1603(e)(1).

2.1

2.4

While sales of hot prepared food products are subject to tax, there is an exception for hot bakery goods sold at a separate price. As an exemption it must be narrowly construed, Revenue & Taxation Code Section 6359 subdivision (e), and Regulation 1602 subdivision (a) (2) (a) and (e). It's been the consistent position of the Department that the sale of meat-filled pastry or bread products are not exempt sales of hot bakery goods.

Rather, it has been the Department's long-standing position that sales of items consisting of pastry or dough, filled with meat, and sold in a heated condition are taxable sales of hot prepared food products. For example, the 1995 sales and use tax Annotation 550.1712 states that while a fruit or cream-filled croissant is a bakery good within the meaning of Section 6359(e), a croissant filled with meat and cheese is not a bakery good, but is instead in more -- is more in the nature of a sandwich.

The backup letter further explains that, quote,
"In determining if a filled item is a food product, the

Department looks to the nature of the filling," end quote,
and gives several examples of food items and the

taxability of their respective sale based on how they are filled, including the fruit or cream-filled croissants versus hot meat and cheese filled croissants and also Cornish pasty.

2.4

Annotation 550.1712 is consistent with the Department's position that Appellants' meat-filled pasty and bread, such as empanadas, siopao, and pandesal are taxable sales of hot prepared food products. As you know a retailer's gross receipts are presumed to be taxable until proven otherwise, and the burden is on the retailer to establish that its retail sales are not subject to tax. Statutes granting a tax exemption are strictly construed to avoid enlarging or extending the concession by beyond the plain meaning of the language used in granting it. See Associated Beverage Company versus Board of Equalization 1990 case.

Appellants bear the burden of showing they come within the terms of the exemption by a preponderance of the evidence. See Regulation 35003(a), and Paine versus State Board of Equalization, which is 137 cal.app.3d 438. Appellants take issue with Appeals Bureau's citation of Annotation 550.1775, which shares the same backup letter as Annotation 550.1712, and which the Department states that Cornish pasties, a traditional meat and vegetable filled pastry, is not a bakery good within the meaning of

Revenue & Taxation Code Section 6359(e) when sold in a heated condition, but it's actually an entire meal.

2.4

And sales of pasties in heated condition constitute taxable sales of hot prepared food products under Regulation 1630 -- 1603(e)(1). Appellants cite the 1941 case, Treasure Island Catering Company versus State Board of Equalization, which was decided before the exclusion of hot prepared food products from the food products exemption, and the exception for hot bakery goods were added to Section 6359 in 1971. So Treasure Island was a 1941 case. Hot prepared food product was added to Section 6359 in 1971.

However, the fact that the annotation states that a Cornish pasty is a meal is not the dispositive distinction. There is no rule that an item must be a meal to be considered a hot prepared food product. The Department has consistently held that meat-filled pastries and bread products served warm are not exempt sales of hot bakery goods, but are taxable sales of hot prepared food products. The Department has been consistent in application of that standard dating back to at least 1995.

Appellants argue that the items at issue are exempt bakery goods, and the Department is incorrectly interpreting its own guidance. They cite to Publication 22 and the Audit Manual highlighting that they

do not make a distinction of meat-filled pastry in their mention of bakery goods. However, the evidence shows the Department has written guidance regarding its meat-filled pastry and bread products -- its position on meat-filled pastry and bread products. And it has been consistent in applying its position that the sale of meat-filled pastry or bread is not exempt -- is not an exempt sale of hot-bakery good. In fact, sales of such items are taxable sales of hot prepared food products under 6359(e) and Regulation 1603(e)(1).

2.1

2.4

In sum, Appellants have not met their burden and proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the items at issue come within the terms of the hot-prepared -- of the hot -- come within the terms of the food products exemption simply by stating so. We reiterate that Appellants' sale of meat-filled pastry and bread products from a warmer are sales of hot prepared food product subject to tax pursuant to 6359 and Regulation 1603.

The next issue in this appeal is whether the

Department issued Appellants timely Notices of

Determination. The evidence shows that timely NODs were

issued. According to Revenue & Taxation Code

Section 6487, in the case of failure to file a return, a

Notice of Determination must be mailed within eight years

after the last day of the calendar month following the

quarterly period for which the amount is proposed to be determined, and in case the failure to make a return for taxpayer's filing returns on an annual basis within eight years after the last day of the calendar month following the one year period for which the amount is proposed to be determined.

2.4

The Department issued in October 20th, 2016, NOD to V Tropical for the period of July 1st, 2007, through December 31st, 2014, and issued a November 21st, 2016, NOD to Valerio's for the period of January 1st, 2010, through December 31st, 2014; Exhibit B. There's an eight-year statute of limitations period in which returns were not filed and not made in V Tropical executing a valid waiver of limitations for the period of January 1st, 2007, through December 31st, 2007; Exhibit F. The statute of limitations remained open until January 31st, 2017, for V tropical and April 30th, 2018, for Valerio's. The NODs were issued well within this time -- before this time.

Appellants argue that in the interest of fairness and uniformity, the statute of limitations should not extend beyond the three-years limitation period for taxpayers who file returns. Appellants reference comments in the revised audit reports, Exhibits J and N, which recommend against the imposition of the negligence penalty due to Appellants' misunderstanding and misinterpretation

of, quote, "The technicality of Regulation 1603(e)(10)," end quote, to reflect that they consider -- what they consider to be a unique burden placed on them.

2.4

However, there's no basis to reduce the statute of limitations for these particular taxpayers.

Furthermore, applying Section 6487, which states the taxpayers in Appellants' situation are subject to an eight-year statute of limitations, ensures uniformity and fairness for all taxpayers. Also, any taxpayers uncertain of their reporting responsibilities are encouraged to request written advice from the Department regarding the application of tax to the tangible personal property they sell, which helps them avoid the risk of misinterpretation and misapplication of the law and exposure to potential tax liabilities.

The evidence shows that the Department issued Appellants timely Notices of Determination. As an administrative agency, OTA has no authority under the California Constitution to decline to enforce the clear and unambiguous provisions of the Revenue & Taxation Code Section 6487.

Finally, the last issue is whether relief of the failure to file penalties are warranted. We received Appellant's CDTFA or -- yes -- 735 on January 14th, 2022, and we relieved the penalties. The penalty amounts have

been adjusted off both V Tropical and Valerio's accounts as of the time of this hearing.

In summary, the sales of meat-filled pastry and bread products sold by Appellants from a warmer are taxable sales of hot prepared food products, and their sale is not exempt under Section 6359. Furthermore, the October 20th, 2016, NOD issued to V Tropical Bakeshop III and November 21st, 2016, NOD issued to Valerio's Tropical Bakeshop VI were timely.

Since Appellants have not otherwise disputed the audit methodology or audited measure, no adjustments to the Department's timely issued audit determinations are warranted. For these reasons, we request the appeal be denied.

Thank you.

2.1

2.4

JUDGE ALDRICH: This is Judge Aldrich. Thank you, Ms. Jacobs.

I'm going to refer to Judge Kwee. Did you have any questions for either party?

JUDGE KWEE: Hi. This is Judge Kwee. Yeah, I believe -- so just to make sure I'm understanding the issue that OTA is being asked to decide today. So, essentially, we have hot bakery goods sold for a separate price under Regulation 1603. Those can be, you know, nontaxable under certain elements if they're, you know,

sold to go, and the seller isn't meeting the 80/80 rule with things that are met here. And based on the decision of CDTFA and the annotations or annotation cited, if you add meats that basically drops it from being an excluded hot-bakery good and makes it into a hot prepared food product, which is taxable.

2.4

So, essentially, the issue that OTA is being asked to decide is whether adding the meat disqualifies it from being a hot-bakery good under that Regulation 1603 and the applicable statute of 6359. Is that, essentially, the gist of what we are looking at, or is that as far as my understanding is that what the parties are also understanding what we're being asked to look at?

MR. HOAD: I'll go ahead. I believe what the

Department is saying is that, yes, simply adding meat to a

hot-bakery good that would otherwise be exempt somehow

makes it a hot prepared food product.

If I can clarify something for a moment before we kind of get into that? I'd like to kind of rebut what the Department says just a little bit. If I can get maybe a couple of minutes, Judge Aldrich, is that acceptable to you.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Why don't you hold off on that for your rebuttal or closing argument, and then that way we can get through some questions and -- we'll certainly

give you time or an opportunity to make that rebuttal.

MR. HOAD: Great. Thank you.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

2.4

25

JUDGE ALDRICH: This is Judge Kwee. So I quess I was going to go to my questions then. So the first question -- and that was for Appellant -- is we had cited or you had cited to the Treasure Island case, which was interpreting, you know, the Retail Sales Act, which was the prior law. And then now we have the sales and use tax law -- the current sales and use tax law. So I was just to clarify, if I'm understanding the reasoning for citing the Treasure Island case, was that to get to the historical intent and to say that, you know, like, adding a meat product shouldn't it be something that's ex -causing it to be excluded from, I quess, qualifying as a bakery good. Is that essentially why you're citing the Treasure Island case? I'm just trying to understand what the --

MR. HOAD: No. No. The reason I'm citing the Treasure Island case is because the backup to Annotation 550.1712, which is what the Department is relying on, the backup to that annotation says that, "We determine" -- and this is quote -- "we determine at the time that such items were more properly," quote, unquote, "meals sold wrapped in a pastry, and not the kind of item the law contemplated."

So the back up to the annotation references that the reason Cornish pasties are taxable is because they are more appropriately meals. And, therefore, we have to look why did they -- where do they come up with the "it's more appropriately a meal and, therefore, taxable," the backup to that annotation, that language comes from the Treasure Island case. So the Department in the -- they're the ones that have referenced the Treasure Island case. So if you look to the back of -- if you look down below the -- as I mentioned, below the language of 6359, it references the Treasure Island case, which discusses whether a hamburger or hot dog sandwich is a meal.

2.4

So the reason we reference that is because the Department references it in their own case and says that a Cornish pasty is taxable because it is more properly a meal. So that's the Department's reference to that case, not mine. But I think it's appropriate.

JUDGE KWEE: Okay. I understand now. Thank you. And I did also want to clarify with you. So from my understanding, the way the Department determines the two bakeries' taxable sales of these type of pastry -- these types of products was they came up with some observation tests and the records, and then they came up with, like, 6.3 percent for one bakery and, like, 8.19 for another bakery based on the observation tests, and I just wanted

to clarify. Does Appellant dispute, I guess, how much tax was calculated, like, the percentage that was coming up with, you know, because -- or is that something that you're disputing that the amount is accurate or not accurate?

2.4

MR. HOAD: I -- I don't have any way to gage.
When the auditor went in and did the observation test,
that's what he found at the observation test. Subsequent
to those audits, the Appellant did remove the hot ovens,
and there is the question as to -- as to what date those
ovens were actually removed. We don't have actual
documentation of that. So in the subsequent audits there
may be issues that, you know, in -- like, for instance, I
went into the one in Carson and there was no hot -- there
was no self-serving warming oven, nor was there one in
Concord or other Northern California locations.

So they removed those, but the only issue is what date they removed them. But other than that, I don't really have a problem with the auditor's methodology. I do believe that when he went in and counted the sales that came out of the warming oven that those were accurate, and then those were projected over the audit period.

JUDGE KWEE: Okay. Thank you. And I also had a question or clarification for CDTFA's rep. So, you know, during your presentation, you were citing CDTFA's

longstanding position that adding meat essentially means it's a hot prepared food product as opposed to a hot-bakery good. I know that the regulation uses the term hot-bakery good and hot prepared food product. I was just curious. Is there — aside from the annotation, is there any authority in the regulation of statute which would specifically provide for drawing a distinction based on adding meat, or is that distinction based solely on, you know, the annotation that you have and maybe other published guidance but necessarily, you know, regulations or statutes?

2.4

MS. JACOBS: So -- hi. This is Amanda Jacobs for CDTFA. So the hot prepared food products in Section 6359(e) talks about hot -- like, hot sandwiches, hot pizza, things like that, with regard to hot prepared food products. And so that would be -- you know, we believe that our position is reflected in the statute. But as for other guidance, you know, there -- there's nothing that distinctly says, other than that annotation that I'm aware of, that says specifically meat, you know, that parses out meat. But it has been our longstanding position that the audit staff have used.

JUDGE KWEE: Okay. One other question. So I did notice that the statute says bakery goods, but the regulation says hot bakery goods may be exempt. I'm just

curious if you know the reason for it. You know, potentially the regulation seems to be more expansive there by allowing hot bakery goods to qualify. Do you know what the intent was in allowing that expansion?

Because the statute says bakery goods, but then the regulation says -- the regulation says hot bakery good.

Do you know why that was expanded to include hot bakery goods or the purpose behind that?

MS. JACOBS: Can you just give me a moment. I wanted to read it again quickly.

JUDGE KWEE: Okay.

2.1

2.4

MR. HUXSOLL: This is Cary Huxsoll for the Department. The -- are you -- I'm trying to follow the question in terms of your saying -- 6359(e) specifically says that if paragraph 7 of subdivision (d) does not apply to sale for a separate price of bakery goods or beverages, and that's referring to hot prepared food products. So the regulation talks about the sale of hot prepared food products for a separate price not being subject to tax.

Cold prepared food products would not be subject to tax for a separate price because it's a sale of a food product pursuant to regulation -- pursuant to

Section 6359. There would not be another basis for taxing that. It would be just a cold food product taxed in the same way as other cold food products.

JUDGE KWEE: Right. Yeah. I was just looking at the language in 6359 which says, you know, paragraph 7 subdivision (d) does not apply to the sale or a separate price of bakery goods or beverages. And 1603(e) it says hot bakery goods, and I am -- my understanding was that that was how you had that annotation, which was doing -- distinguishing, like, if you heated, you know, jelly, then that would be exempt, but if you heated meat, you're saying it's not exempt.

And I was just wondering if the history would have -- the regulation history and adding the word hot before bakery goods in the regulation, since that word isn't in the statute, might have potentially included some guidances on -- on what was intended to be covered and -- or specifically potentially excluded like meat. If you don't have that, that's fine. I was just curious what the -- if there was any history there that might have clarified the intent.

MR. HUXSOLL: I do not have the specific history. I just have the connection to the language of the statute. My understanding that that was why that was used, but I'm not -- I don't have any further information as to that.

JUDGE KWEE: Okay. Thank you. So I think that was everything that -- oh, I -- I'm sorry. I'm kind of hogging the screen here. I did have one last question for

Appellant, and this was in connection with the request for relief of the penalty form. So I saw you submitted that request for relief after the prehearing conference. And then during today's hearing you were also mentioning that, you know, they imposed the penalty but then you were relying on guidance by CDTFA. So, I guess, were you requesting relief of the failure to file penalty also on, I guess, a misunderstanding of the law or reliance on the available guidance by CDTFA? Is that what you were saying?

2.1

2.4

MR. HOAD: My understanding is that based on what the Department just mentioned that they have since deleted the failure to file penalty, so that issue is now moot.

JUDGE KWEE: Okay. I'm sorry. Okay. I got it. Thank you. Then I don't have any other questions. I'll turn it back to Judge Aldrich.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Hi. This is Judge Aldrich.

Judge Brown, did you have any questions for either party?

JUDGE BROWN: This is Judge Brown. I'll try to

be brief. I have a question for Appellants. I'm just wondering about the issue of the measure of use tax for fixed assets, which I know is not in dispute in this hearing. But I'm wondering how that fits in with the statute of limitations issues.

MR. HOAD: So the Appellant was unable to provide

records for the purchase of fixed assets that were beyond the regular -- the normal statute of limitations. So in the periods that were -- let's call it prior to the Notice of Determination date -- four to eight years prior to the Notice of Determination date, they were unable to provide records. So if the statute of limitations is revised down to three years, then those purchases of fixed assets will be beyond the statute of limitations.

2.1

2.4

I would note Section 1698 records does mention how long the records should be kept, and I believe it says four years. I'm looking at it briefly, but I don't think I can find it while I'm talking to you. But -- but they recommend the taxpayer keep records for four years, obviously, the extended statute of limitations would require. And the support that the fixed assets were tax paid at the source would require the taxpayer to keep records beyond that recommended period pursuant to Regulation 1698.

So if the statute of limitations is reduced to the normal three-year statute, then those items would fall off, and that is generally why. But other than that, we don't have any support for the purchase of fixed assets because they were, you know, five, six, seven, eight years prior, and the taxpayer got rid of their own -- got rid of those records.

JUDGE BROWN: I guess then -- this is Judge Brown. I understand your position about why Appellants didn't dispute the purchase of fix assets. quess I'm wondering the flip side is if we -- I'm just wondering if the existence of the issue about the purchase of fixed assets means that effects the analysis of whether the NODs were timely. I quess what I'm thinking about is if the taxpayers had to file, theoretically, because of they had this purchase of fixed assets issue. It would really, I guess, go to the failure to file penalty that they had if they had theoretically had this obligation. But since we just heard the failure to file penalty has been relieved, maybe it's not at issue. Sorry. I quess I kind of answered my own question.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

2.4

25

MR. HOAD: Yeah. So -- so if this was a restaurant, let's see they had a little -- like, you go to Cheesecake Factory, and there's a restaurant. And they have a little bakery good, you know, that sells cheesecake on the side. And those cheesecakes are -- let's just say they're hot bakery goods. If Cheesecake Factory got audited, then they get -- they have to pay the tax, and the Department said, oh, you have meat filled hot bakery goods. They are subject to tax. Then they would pay the tax for the past three years. There would be no failure to file.

But because this is a bakery selling hot baked goods, and they're not required to hold a permit under the law, when they -- when the Department comes in and tells them that their meat filled hot bakery goods are subject to tax, now they have an extended statute of limitations. So they're not being treated the same as a Cheesecake Factory that is required to hold a permit because they also own a restaurant. That's my point. They're not being treated the same.

2.4

So all I'm asking is that there be consistent uniform treatment between this taxpayer and a taxpayer that, say, held a permit because either they provided seating facilities, or they own a restaurant, or they sold a bunch of other taxable stuff; hamburgers. Hot dogs. Et cetera. So that's -- that's the point. We just want uniformity among all taxpayers. This taxpayer is being unfairly treated because they're being subject to the extended statute of limitations.

JUDGE BROWN: Let me move on to another question for Appellant. I'll just clarify that we understand that Revenue & Taxation Code Section 6596 is not at issue here. You're not -- which is a, you know, a separate thing because the taxpayer didn't -- the Appellants didn't -- don't meet the facts of that they've formally requested a written opinion on these facts. But Appellants are still

arguing reliance, and I'm just wondering what the legal theory is here.

MR. HOAD: We -- we're arguing reliance on the guidance which is in the form of the regulation, the Audit Manual, the publications, and the annotation. We are not arguing reliance on written advice issued by the Board --

JUDGE BROWN: Right.

2.1

2.4

MR. HOAD: -- under Section 6596. If I had intended for that to be our argument, I would have specifically stated we are relying on written advice issued by the Board under regulation -- under Section 6596. That is not the case. It's a matter of semantics perhaps. We are relying on guidance such as 6359, Regulation 1603, the Audit Manual, and the annotation. That is the guidance. I'm not arguing reliance on written advice under 6596.

JUDGE BROWN: This is Judge Brown. I understand that. What I'm saying is what's the legal theory that would allow us to -- that would allow OTA to say that reliance on, say, CDTFA's publication is the basis for finding that these sales were exempt.

MR. HOAD: Well, I mean, if you're a -- if you're a -- if you go into business and you're selling a widget, how are you supposed to know whether to charge tax on that widget. You go, and you look at the law. Are widgets

subject to tax? You go to the regulation, Regulation 1603 interprets 6359. Is a widget subject to tax? No, it's not. You go to the annotation. Is a widget subject to tax? No. Pasties are subject to tax, and ham and cheese croissants are subject to tax. But we don't -- we don't sell those. We sell widgets, and it doesn't say widgets are subject to tax.

2.1

2.4

You go to the Audit Manual. The Audit Manual doesn't say that widgets are subject to tax. So what's a taxpayer supposed to do? Nowhere in the Regulations, the code, the section, the Audit Manual, the annotations does it say that widgets are subject to tax. So I'm going to assume that my widgets are exempt. What -- I don't -- I guess other than that, I don't really understand the question.

JUDGE BROWN: This is Judge Brown. That's okay. I think I don't have any more questions at this time. Thank you.

MR. HOAD: Thank you.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Hi. This is Judge Aldrich. I have a question for the Department regarding the Cornish pasty. Would it matter if it were, say, a micro-Cornish pasty, a normal Cornish pasty, or a really large Cornish pasty as far as whether or not it would -- it's excluded from the exemption?

What matters is whether or not 1 MS. JACOBS: No. 2 it is filled with meat and sold in a heated condition. 3 JUDGE ALDRICH: Okay. And then so in a similar line, does a mere peppercorn of meat turn the hot bakery 4 5 item into -- excluded from the exemption? 6 MR. HUXSOLL: This is Cary Huxsoll. It -- just a 7 minimal amount of meat? Well, it's -- that's not before 8 us with respect to these products. These products are 9 similar to the ham and cheese croissants cited in 10 550.1712, which the Department found was in the nature of 11 something more similar to a sandwich and not a hot -- a 12 hot bakery good, and these products would be treated in the same manner. 13 14 As to your example of, say, doughnut with a 15 slight amount of bacon garnish, that's -- that's not 16 before us right now. The issue is these products, and 17 they should be treated the same way as the ham and cheese 18 croissant in the annotation. And that's consistent with 19 the Department's position for at least the last 27 years. 20 JUDGE ALDRICH: Thank you. 21 So Mr. Hoad, I believe you had wanted to do a 22 rebuttal or closing. I wanted to extend that opportunity 23 to you. Are you ready for that, or would you need --2.4 MR. HOAD: Yes. Yes, I am. Thank you.

Okav.

JUDGE ALDRICH:

25

## CLOSING STATEMENT

MR. HOAD: This is Mr. Hoad.

So the Department relies on the backup to the Annotation 550.1712, and they mention that -- that they look to the nature of the filling when determining whether an item is subject to tax or not. And they give -- the backup gives a specific example of looking to the nature of the filling. And it states, and I quote, "In determining if a filled item is a food product, we look to the nature of the filling. For example, liquor filled candy is a non-food product because it is filled with a measurable amount of an alcoholic beverage, which is excluded from the definition of food products."

So the reason that a liquor filled candy is a non-food product or is taxable is it is filled with a non-food product. So the nature of the filling is alcohol. It's a non-filled product, therefore, it's taxable. I don't think the Department would disagree that meat is not a non-food product. Meat is a food product. Cheese is a food product. And so, basically, when you're looking to the nature of the filling, if the filling is a food product, then the item would be not subject to tax.

And so -- and then, in addition, so the example that they give is clearly outside of the interpretation. You know, none of the taxpayers' items contain alcohol.

So it doesn't -- that's not dispositive. Furthermore, this discusses ham and cheese croissants and Cornish pasties. The taxpayer does not sell a ham and cheese croissant, nor do they sell a Cornish pasty.

2.4

The issue of whether a Cornish pasty is taxable because it's more like a ham and cheese croissant has to do with whether it's an entire meal, which we've already discussed that whether it's a meal or not has to do with a three-part test. It's a larger quantity, therefore, your previous question, would it matter? Yes. Under Treasure Island under this case, it would matter if it's a larger quantity because Treasure Island tells you that if it's a larger quantity it's a meal. And ours are smaller quantities. They're not meals.

Furthermore, they talk about this ham and cheese croissant sandwich. We know nothing of this ham and cheese croissant sandwich. We don't know whether it includes other ingredients such as lettuce, tomatoes, mayonnaise; whether the taxpayer that sold this ham and cheese croissant sandwich was a restaurant or actually a bakery. We don't know whether this ham and cheese croissant sandwich was listed on the menu as an appetizer item, or whether it was listed as entre item or a meal.

We know nothing of this -- of these items that the taxpayer is -- or that the Department is saying are

taxable and, therefore, the Appellants' bakery goods are taxable. So -- and, furthermore, annotations have the force -- do not have the force and effect of law. This is merely guidance. I think this backup to the annotation is wrong. I think it's bad. It's a bad annotation. It's poorly written. It explains a situation where the nature of the filling is -- makes the item taxable. But that's because the filling is a non-food item.

2.4

If you put a non-food item in a food item, obviously it becomes a non-food item. Alcohol is taxable as a non-food item. So I still -- I -- I don't understand when the Department says it's been their longstanding position. They're relying on an annotation which has patently wrong information on it. It's a bad annotation. And when you look at the regulation, the statute, the Audit Manual, the publication, all of these say that hot bakery goods are not subject to tax. The taxpayer doesn't sell any of the items listed in the annotation that the Department is relying on. And they cannot provide one example, other than this annotation, that hot bakery goods that contain meat are subject to tax.

That concludes my presentation for my follow up.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Thank you.

This is Judge Aldrich. I just wanted to reach out to my panel to see if they had any follow-up questions

before we conclude.

2.1

2.4

Judge Brown, did you have any questions?

JUDGE BROWN: This is Judge Brown. I don't think so. No.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Okay. And, Judge Kwee, did you have any follow-up questions?

JUDGE KWEE: This is Judge Kwee. I guess maybe just a quick question for CDTFA, since there was a lot of discussion about the Treasure Island case and the annotation, the backup annotation. I just -- does the CDTFA want to offer a position on, you know, the relevance of an annotation and the difference between annotation and the backup annotation, or to what extent that OTA would -- should -- or would give difference to either an annotation or a backup to the annotation?

MS. JACOBS: This is Amanda Jacobs for CDTFA.

I -- it's known that annotations don't have the force and effect of law, but it is -- it's also known that annotations are used by the -- I mean, the Department's position can be found in annotation, and we don't -- again, that annotation which is discussing this sales and use tax law and Section 6359, which was added in 1971, we don't believe that the Treasure Island case would apply to it, as Treasure Island was decided in 1941 in relationship to a different -- to the retail sales tax.

I don't know if Cary wants to add anything
further, but --

2.4

MR. HUXSOLL: This is Cary Huxsoll for the Department. The annotations are entitled to great weight, and to the Department longstanding interpretation with the Department. So your entitled to great weight, and they're construing a statute that the Department administers, and it's a longstanding interpretation by the Department. And so they are entitled to great weight by OTA. They don't have the full force and effect of law, but they are to be given that weight.

As to the backup letter versus the actual annotation, in this particular case, the annotation itself is clear that it contains the same language that the Department relied on in the backup letter as far as 550.1712. And so there does not need to be a distinction made between what the language is in the backup letter for that and the annotation itself. And I would just note that — that we look to the language of 5503.1712 for the guidance in this case, and that's been our position since dating back to at least 1995 for similar products to the ones sold by Appellants.

Because in that case, it was a filled ham and cheese croissants. In this case, it's -- it's dough filled with meat and cheese. The Department has taken a

longstanding position that that was similar vein to a sandwich, and that product is similar to ones that the Appellant is selling. And so we rely on that annotation. And like I said, it's entitled to great weight as longstanding interpretation by CDTFA.

JUDGE KWEE: Thank you.

2.1

2.4

I didn't have any further questions. I turn it back to Judge Aldrich.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Hi. This is Judge Aldrich.

Mr. Hoad, I'd like to give you the last word. And so if there's anything else you would like to add, please go ahead.

MR. HOAD: I think the only thing I would look to add is, again, the Department has no other, you know, they -- they mention 1971 as the date the statute changed to hot bakery -- to hot food items. If they wanted to add language that says that hot bakery goods that contain meat are subject to tax or excluded from the exclusion or exemption for hot bakery goods, they've had well over 50 years to incorporate that into 6359, 1603, Publication 22, to revise the annotation. Nowhere do they do that. They've had 50 -- well over 50 years to do that. They haven't done it because it's not what the intent of the law is.

My -- Appellant does not sell ham and cheese

croissants. They do not sell Cornish pasties. And there is enough ambiguity in this annotation and the backup to -- to allow an appellant to not have to rely on this annotation when determining whether their items are subject to tax.

It's been a long-held standing that hot bakery goods are not subject to tax. The taxpayer is a bakery. They sell hot bakery goods. That's all they sell.

Whether a bakery good has meat in it or not does not change the definition of a hot bakery good to a hot prepared food product under the law, the regulation, the annotations, or the publications.

So we believe that we are in the right. We believe the taxpayers properly relied on the Department's guidance, and that they should not be held responsible for tax on the sale of hot bakery goods that for all intents and purposes under the law are exempt.

Thank you.

2.4

JUDGE ALDRICH: This is Judge Aldrich. Thank you.

Thank you everyone for your time and for being flexible with the hearing format. We're ready to conclude the hearing, and the record is closed.

The panel will meet and decide the case based on the evidence and arguments presented today. We will send

both parties our written decision no later than 100 days from today. And while this hearing has concluded, there are more hearings today. The hearing calendar will resume at approximately 1:00 p.m. this afternoon. Thank you everyone. (Proceedings adjourned at 10:43 a.m.) 

## 1 HEARING REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 2 I, Ernalyn M. Alonzo, Hearing Reporter in and for 3 the State of California, do hereby certify: 4 5 That the foregoing transcript of proceedings was 6 taken before me at the time and place set forth, that the 7 testimony and proceedings were reported stenographically 8 by me and later transcribed by computer-aided 9 transcription under my direction and supervision, that the 10 foregoing is a true record of the testimony and 11 proceedings taken at that time. 12 I further certify that I am in no way interested 13 in the outcome of said action. 14 I have hereunto subscribed my name this 7th day 15 of February, 2022. 16 17 18 19 ERNALYN M. ALONZO 20 HEARING REPORTER 21 2.2 23 2.4 25