BEFORE THE OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL OF	,)
)
R. JACKSON and A. JACKSON,) OTA NO. 19024287
APPELLANT.)
)

TRANSCRIPT OF ELECTRONIC PROCEEDINGS

State of California

Wednesday, February 9, 2022

Reported by: ERNALYN M. ALONZO HEARING REPORTER

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14	Transcript of Electronic Proceedings,		
15	taken in the State of California, commencing		
16	at 9:40 a.m. and concluding at 10:49 a.m. on		
17	Wednesday, February 9, 2022, reported by		
18	Ernalyn M. Alonzo, Hearing Reporter, in and		
19	for the State of California.		
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1	APPEARANCES:	
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3	Panel Lead:	ALJ ANDREW KWEE
4	Panel Members:	ALJ ANDREA LONG
5		ALJ ANDREW WONG
6	For the Appellant:	R. JACKSON M. JACKSON
7		111 0110110 011
8	For the Respondent:	STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TAX AND
9		FEE ADMINISTRATION
10		COURTNEY DANIELS
11		STEPHEN SMITH JASON PARKER
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1		I N D E X	
2			
3		EXHIBITS	
4			
5	(Appellant's Exhibits 1-8 were received at page 7.)		
6	(Department's Exhib	its A-E were received at page 7.)	
7			
8	<u>PRESENTATION</u>		
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California; Wednesday, February 9, 2022 9:40 a.m.

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Appeal of Ronald A. and Angela F. Jackson. This matter is being held before the Office of Tax Appeals. The OTA Case Number is 19024287, and today's date is Wednesday, February 9th, 2022. The time is approximately 9:40 a.m. So this hearing is being — well, it was originally noticed for Cerritos, California, however, it is being conducted electronically with the participants, with the agreement of the participants.

Today's hearing is being heard by a panel of three Administrative Law Judges. That's myself,
Judge Andrea Long and Judge Andre Wong. My name is Andre Kwee and I'm going to be the lead judge. All three judges, we will meet after the hearing, and we'll discuss the case and produce a written decision as equal participants. Although the lead judge, that's myself, will be conducting the hearing today, any judge on this panel may ask questions or otherwise participate in today's proceedings to ensure that we have all the information decided -- all the information that we need to decide this appeal.

So for the record, I'll just ask that the parties

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1
      state their names and who they represent, starting with
 2
      representatives for the CDTFA.
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               MS. DANIELS: Hello. This is Courtney Daniels
 4
      representing CDTFA.
 5
               MR. SMITH: This is Steven Smith representing
 6
      CDTFA.
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               MR. PARKER: And this is Jason Parker also with
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      CDTFA.
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               JUDGE KWEE: Okay. Thank you.
                                               Three
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      participants for CDTFA and three boxes.
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               So for the taxpayer, would you please state your
      name for the record.
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13
               MR. JACKSON: Ronald Jackson.
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               JUDGE KWEE: Okay. Thank you.
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               So we have one -- just as a reminder, a recap --
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      we have one witness scheduled to testify today, and that
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      is Ronald Jackson. And CDTFA does not have any objections
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      to Mr. Jackson testifying.
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               Is that correct? Is that still correct,
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      Mr. Jackson?
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               MR. JACKSON: Yes.
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               JUDGE KWEE: Okay. And for CDTFA, is that still
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      correct that you have no objections?
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               MS. DANIELS: That's correct.
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               JUDGE KWEE: Okay. Thank you.
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1 As far as the exhibits, I did send out a copy of the exhibit binders for both parties after our most recent 2 3 prehearing conference that we held on, I believe, the 18th of January. So those exhibits included A through E for 4 5 CDTFA and 1 through 8 for the taxpayer. And my 6 understanding is that there were no objections to 7 admitting any of the exhibits that were submitted and 8 distributed after the prehearing conference. There're no 9 objections to admitting those evidence into the record. 10 Is that correct for CDTFA? 11 MS. DANIELS: This is Courtney Daniels. 12 that's correct. 13 JUDGE KWEE: Okay. And was that correct for the 14 taxpayer? 15 MR. JACKSON: Ronald Jackson. Yes. 16 JUDGE KWEE: Okay. Thank you. So with that, I 17 will admit the evidence. That's A through E -- Exhibits A 18 through E for CDTFA and Exhibits 1 through 8 for the 19 taxpayer. I'll admit those into the evidence -- into the 20 record. 21 (Appellant's Exhibits 1-8 were received 22 in evidence by the Administrative Law Judge.) 23 (Department's Exhibits A-E were received in 2.4 evidence by the Administrative Law Judge.)

And as far as -- oh, and I was, actually, just

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going to disclose, because in reviewing the record, I noticed that the seller's last name was the same as my last name, Kwee. So I did want to disclose for the record that I have no known relationship with that seller. I've never heard of them until today's hearing while researching for today's hearing. So I just wanted to mention that for the record.

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And then just a reminder about the issues that are being heard today, we have two issues before us. The first was whether California use tax applies to Appellants' purchase and use of the vessel; and then the second issue that we're being asked to decide is whether Appellants' established a basis to relieve the liability.

So the time estimate that we have today was approximately 90 minutes, and that was going to be 45 minutes for the taxpayer's opening presentation, 20 minutes for CDTFA's opening presentation, and then each party will be allocated five minutes for any closing remarks that they wish to say.

Are there any questions before we move on to the presentation aspect?

MS. DANIELS: Courtney Daniels. No questions for the Department.

JUDGE KWEE: Okay. Thank you. So with no questions from either party, I will first start by

swearing in the witness, Mr. Jackson.

And then after that, you may go ahead, and you have 45 minutes to say anything that you wish to say about this case. So, Mr. Jackson, would you please raise your hand.

RONALD A. JACKSON,

produced as a witness, and having been first duly sworn by the Administrative Law Judge, was examined and testified as follows:

JUDGE KWEE: Okay. Thank you. Please proceed with your testimony.

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PRESENTATION

MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, first of all, I want to tell you that I have Parkinson's disease, and it affects my speech a little bit. So if I'm stammering, I'll get through it, but I'm going to have a little problem speaking. So I just want to let you know that that's coming.

First of all, I want to address the issues regarding the presumption that's triggered by the vessel being returned to California within one year of the close, which to our contention is in May of 2010.

Section 1620(b) sub (5) sub (a) sub (1) creates a rebuttal presumption that if a vessel is purchased outside of the State of California and is brought back to the State of California within 12 months of the purchase it was acquired for use in California, and the tax is due.

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So I'm going to present evidence necessary as part of our case. And on this issue, it kind of gives a historical background to show what actually happened. On September 13th of 19 -- or 2009, I turned 70. My -- I was a lawyer. My practice was a sole practitioner, and my practice was limited to representing people charged with driving under the influence and related matters in the Department of Motor Vehicles. The reason why I -- I'll demonstrate why that's relevant a little later on.

I was in sole practice in Ventura, California, for 15 years prior to December 2009. We had an office condominium where an office was on the -- our office was located on the first floor, and we lived in an apartment on the second floor of the building. I had a secretary. Her name was DeVonne Saunders, and DeVonne was a legal secretary as well as office manager. She had control of the office -- the functioning of the office. She had to write checks and pay bills, that kind of thing. And again, I'll make that relevant a little later on.

A couple years before 2009 I was diagnosed with

cancer Waldenstrom macroglobulinemia, which is cancer that has -- it's a bone marrow cancer, and it affects your immune system. At the time of the diagnosis and treatment, we were told that the average life expectancy for a person with Waldenstrom was about seven years from the date of diagnosis. I had chemo treatment, and that was doing pretty well for me.

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Over the years before this time, we had vacationed in Baja, California, in Loreto and Port of Escondido. Loreto is located about 700 miles south of the California Mexico border on the Sea of Cortez side. And Port of Escondido is about 17 miles south of Loreto. It's a desert, tropical area. Very hot in the summer. Very — with 100-degree temperatures is common. It's also very humid.

So what happened was we decided to retire, given the circumstances of where we were. We were in fairly good health at the time, so we wanted to enjoy what we had left. So we decided to retire by buying a boat and moving to -- living on the boat in Port of Escondido. I had owned Catalina Yachts before, and so I contacted Bob Nahm who was a broker at Catalina Yachts regarding a purchase. I told him what I wanted. I wanted a California 42, and I described to him what would be necessary to do to the boat to make it usable in the weather situation in Loreto.

It was going to require air conditioning, a generator, revamping, you know, the air conditioning system, fans, new plumbing. A whole list of things which I described to him prior to ever getting involved in the sale of the boat. And so what happened was he had this boat for sale, and we agreed to purchase the boat on the condition that it was brought up to my circumstances that I described to him to make it livable in the tropics.

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The seller agreed, and this was an agreement as to all of the things, the sale of the hull as well as the condition -- bringing the boat up to condition that I needed for living in the tropics. So it's our position that what in fact happened here was the seller agreed to sell the hull and authorized and directed his or her agent Mr. Nahm at Catalina Yachts to do the work that we were requiring to be done. The boat was always in the possession of Mr. Nahm and Catalina Yachts until it was delivered to us in May of 2010 in Escondido -- Port of Escondido.

We did not pay Mr. Nahm anything. We never had anything to do with that. We did not supervise the construction and additions. It was all done by him based upon the instructions that we had given him prior to the sale. He's the one who explained to us the requirements for an offshore purchase so it would be exempt from sales

tax. So we agreed that we would want to be in compliance with those conditions, and that's how this was structured.

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And the structure was for us to obtain a loan, which we did, open an escrow, and the escrow would over a period of time, make the disbursements that are necessary to carry out the instructions that we had to purchase and improvements for the boat. We expected the improvements to be done some time close to end of January or early February. That didn't happen. And, ultimately, we moved to Loreto and lived with friends for a while until the boat arrived in the Port of Escondido.

So once we had started the process, we put our condo up for sale and decided to close the practice. The closing wasn't particularly difficult because my clientele were not my friends. The -- a DUI case is resolved relatively shortly, so in September we just stopped taking new clients and, ultimately, by the end -- the first of January, we were able to close the office and sell it to close the sale. We used the proceeds from the sale of the condominium to pay the difference between the amount of the loan and the ultimate sales price.

A boat has very limited storage space, so we had to sell everything. We gave most of our property to our children in San Jose and Toronto. So at the end of this process, we had no contact with California whatsoever; no

address, no phone number. The only contact we had was a post office box that was -- our accountant's post office box, and she monitored our mail for us. I resigned from the state bar. I did not pay my 2010 dues because I knew I was never coming back to California, and I was not going to be practicing law again.

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During the process we bought an insurance policy for the boat. And when you buy an insurance policy for a boat, you have to designate the place that the boat is going to be located and where it's going to be sailed.

And in the case of the tropics, you have to designate what's called a hurricane hole. So insurance was told.

And part of that insurance process we designated that the boat would be located for a year in the Port of Escondido.

Once we were down there, we a bought a moor. We bought a mooring fee for one year. There's certainly no intention demonstrated there to bring the boat back as we certainly would not pay in advance for a year of mooring fee if we intended to bring the boat back to California. It's our contention that these issues clearly rebut the presumption under 16 -- under the code section I previously cited. It's documentary, circumstantial, and direct evidence that clearly rebuts the presumption.

Now, there's another factor involved. Shortly after the time of the sale while this was going on waiting

for the boat to be delivered, I bought gas at a gas station and my credit card was rejected. So I ran a credit check and was totally surprised to find that I had all kinds of credit cards set up all over Ventura area in various businesses.

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So we did a further inquiry, and I had my accountant involved. We discovered that what was happening was my secretary DeVonne had been embezzling funds from me for over two years and ran up all kinds of bills that we didn't know anything about. And she was using the office income so we didn't discover this until we shut the office down to keep the credit cards current so that there wasn't -- we didn't discover this until we shut the office down and there was no income coming in for her to use to pay these bills. She was charged. We turned it over to the Ventura Police Department. She was charged with multiple counts of felony, fraud, theft, and identity theft. Ultimately, she pled guilty and was sentenced to one year in jail and five years' probation with restitution of over \$200,000.

The reason that this is relevant is because what happened was it forced us into bankruptcy. Well, the boat was part of our estate and was subject to the bankruptcy rules. But my attorney for the bankruptcy, her office was in the same building as the Ventura Yacht was. So she

went to talk to Mr. Nahm about what we could do about the boat, and he arranged to have a buyer. He had a buyer, and it was Catalina Yachts that sent a skipper to the Port of Escondido to bring the boat back to California. And the trustee released the boat so it could be sold outside of the bankruptcy proceedings.

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My point is that we never brought back this boat to California. It was brought back pursuant to the order of the bankruptcy trustee that it be sold, and it was totally out of our control. That, again, is evidence that at no time in this proceeding have an intent or a purpose to bring this boat back to California.

and discuss what goes on -- what went on as far as the acquisition of this property and the relevance there. The Code Section 1620 talks about a purchase, and the purchase applies to acquiring something and paying for it. The section also says that the amount of the tax is based upon the gross receipts from the -- from the sale. Gross receipts, that's the word used. Gross receipts. That's extremely important because it sets the parameters on which you evaluate a sale.

So what happened here was -- you can see the nature of the transaction. It was a single transaction. The purchase carried out through the loan application of

the escrow, and ultimately, the payment and delivery of the final fees, which occurred in May of 2010.

Originally, the Department in this case imposed a tax on the gross sale price of \$222,000 and change.

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It appears -- and what happened is that sometime after they imposed this tax on the gross amount of the sales price, they determined that this was not the appropriate way to tax. And my position is it was because they discovered and concluded that if they based the sales tax on the gross receipts, it would establish that this sale was an out-of-state sale and in compliance with the out-of-state sales provisions and no tax would be due. I can absolutely guarantee you that nobody at the Department decided that they would see if there was a way to reduce our tax liability out of charity, they felt for us. That didn't happen.

So what they did was they tried to impose tax where none was due by focusing on the transfer of the title of the property. And since that took place when the boat was in California, it negated the out-of-state sales provision. Well, that is absurd. If you look at all the circumstances of this case, it was clearly intent. And what was actually done was that this was a single transaction, not two transactions. We did not have a separate transaction for the purchase of the hull and then

the purchase of the improvements to be done to the boat.

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It's our contention that the determination by the Department that there was an out-of-state sale -- this complied with an out-of-state sale is a determination, and it's binding upon them. They made this decision, and it's the only reason -- the only reason that they abandoned taxing the gross sales price. So it's our position that once that's done it's binding. And, ultimately, it would be binding upon this court as well because that's the status of the evidence.

I'd like to give you an example I think that more clearly illustrates my position here. Let's assume that a buyer goes to a Chevrolet agency and tells the dealer that he wants to buy a 2000 Corvette Stingray, yellow in color with a 424 engine. And the dealer says, you know what, it just so happens that I have a 2000 Stingray on consignment, but it's black in color, there's no engine in it, and it has no tires, and the upholstery needs to be replaced, but we can do that all for you. The price of the body is \$10,000, and it'll be around \$30,000 to make the improvements that you're requesting to be made.

So the seller agrees to the \$10,000 and agrees that the dealer can make the improvements necessary.

Well, I think we all agree that the gross sales price is \$30,000 plus \$10,000, so about \$40,000. So the tax would

be based upon roughly \$40,000. However, if you add the fact that the buyer lived in Mexico and told the dealer to move — to bring the boat to Mexico when once it was finished in compliance with the delivery requirements of the code so it qualified as an out-of-state sale, then there would be no tax.

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Well, based upon what we've seen from the

Department in this case, they apparently would take the

position of, well, oh, no. No. No. You don't get away

with not paying any tax. You have to pay tax on the cost

of the body even though it was absolutely in no usable

condition at that time. So this illustrates our position

that the absurdity of the position of the Department that

the transfer of the title somehow changes this, what is an

out-of-state sale, to something that is not.

The boat in our case was equally as un-useable as it was to the buyer of the Corvette in this case. It had no equipment that would qualify it to make it usable or livable in a tropical area. So what our position is, is that the evidence in this case clearly establishes that the transaction in this case was a sole transaction with multiple parts, but not separate and not the basis for tax.

I'm asking you to find that this was the case, that it was an out-of-state sale, and there was no tax

due. And I agree that the boat was brought back to
California but not by us. And if there was a presumption
triggered, it was absolutely, clearly rebutted, and
there's no tax due.

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I'd also like to address briefly constitutional issues, which I think are important. We're contending that this process denies both due process and equal protection under the constitution. And I'd like to point out -- and I mean no disrespect to the Court in this regard -- but this is not an appeal. An appeal is done by -- if this was truly an appeal, we would have a transcript of what took place in the hearing with the Hearing Officer Ken, and I would be able to attack what he made in the basis for his findings.

This is really a trial de novo, even though it's entitled an Appellant situation, it is our position that it is not. And so it's a denial of our due process, and we were not given a proper appeal procedure. And, for example, in the -- if this was an appeal based upon the findings of the Hearing Officer, we would be able to point out to Mr. Kim that Mr. Kim made findings that were not based upon any evidence at all.

The issue of the one-year statute never came up in the hearing. It was not mentioned by anybody at any time, yet, Mr. Kim made findings on it. And, of course, I

was not given an opportunity to address that during the time of the hearing, and we would be able to show it's not fair and impartial and made findings on something that he had no right to do.

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The Department also has a financial incentive to make a wrong decision. What happens here is if a tax is imposed wrongfully, usually one or two things or three things; number one, if the taxpayer can't pay the tax, it never gets challenged because rules require that the tax be paid and all of the tax, penalties, interest, and fees be paid before you can appeal. We're in a good position here. That's what took place here. We couldn't do an appeal until after the money was paid and, consequently, counting on it the tax is not due.

What happens? The employees of the Department are exempt from damages. There's nothing that happens. All the State has to do is return the money, and it's had the use of the taxpayer's money for the year or several years as this takes place. So that's what happens. They have a financial incentive to make wrong decisions with no consequence whatsoever. In addition, it denies equal protection. The wealthy can afford to pay the tax and get the appeal.

In this case we were not able to do this. We had no money to pay this. And as you can see, the funds that

were paid were paid by my son, Paul. And he is the person who paid it, and without his generosity we would not even have this appeal today. So there's a denial of an equal protection issue as well.

I'm asking you to find, again, that this process was constitutionally deficient and because of that, the imposition of the tax was void and it should be returned. All the monies collected from my son and I should be returned. And I specifically ask you to find in our favor that you order the Department to make the funds -- to return the money to Paul, my son, instead of me. He was the one who paid. It's his money that you have -- the State has been using.

So that's my presentation. I thank you very much for your attention.

JUDGE KWEE: Okay. This is Judge Kwee. Thank you.

I will turn to CDTFA to see if CDTFA has any questions for the witness at this time.

MS. DANIELS: No. We do not have any questions.

JUDGE KWEE: Okay. Thank you.

So before I turn it over to the panel for questions -- and I believe there may be questions for both parties -- I would like to CDTFA to make their opening

25 presentation first.

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And CDTFA, if possible, could you also address the contention, which I believe might be a new one, that the rules prohibited the taxpayer from filing an appeal until the liability was paid. So with that, I turn it over to CDTFA for their opening presentation before we turn it over to the panel for questions.

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PRESENTATION

MS. DANIELS: Okay. This is Courtney Daniels for CDTFA.

Respectfully, this panel doesn't have jurisdiction to decide any constitutional issues. Office and Tax Appeal Regulation Number 30104 specifically says that, "The constitutionality of any California statute constitution is outside of the jurisdiction of this panel."

So I'm not clear as to how we can even decide this matter here. With that being said, I'll go ahead and present our argument.

So this case centers around Appellants' claim for refund on use tax assessed for their purchase and use of a 2000 Catalina 42 Yacht, herein after referred to as the vessel. Appellants' believe that the Appeals Bureau incorrectly denied their claim for refund. Appellants' argue that the taxes are not owed because the transaction

is exempt from use tax under Regulation 1620 because

Appellants allegedly took possession of the vessel outside

of California's territory waters.

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Here, the seller was not required to hold a seller's permit, thus, the applicable tax in this case is use tax. And that's Revenue & Taxation Code Section 6283. Every person storing, using, or otherwise consuming tangible personal property purchased in this state from a retailer is liable for the tax in the State of California. And that's Revenue & Taxation Code Section 6202 subdivision (a).

For an exclusion under Regulation 1620 to apply, Appellants must show that they purchased the vessel outside of California. See Regulation 1620(b)(5) subdivision(a). However, the facts of the timeline in this case did not support this conclusion. Appellants' argument hinges upon when title to the vessel was transferred from the seller to them. Specifically, whether title transferred while the vessel was in California or later when it was transported to Mexico, thus the facts surrounding the sale are imperative to deciding this matter.

Sometime in 2009, as Appellant said, he and his wife approached Catalina Yacht Anchorage, herein after referred to as the broker, to inquire about purchasing a

vessel. The broker informed Appellants about a listing for a vessel located at Marina Del Rey in California and owned by Margaret Kwee, herein after referred to as the seller. According to the vessel purchase and sale agreement, herein after referred to as the purchase agreement, see Exhibit B pages 1 through 5, Appellants offered to purchase the vessel from the seller for the purchase price of \$132,000, and the seller accepted the Appellants' offer.

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The purchase agreement was signed by Mrs. Jackson and the seller on December 1st, 2009. The purchase agreement indicates that the vessel will be sold, quote, "As is, where is," end quote with purchaser assuming responsibility for any necessary cost of servicing, repairs, or replacements. And that's at Exhibit B, page 3, Section 9. The purchase agreement also states, quote, "Should sales tax, use tax, or any other transaction tax be imposed on this transaction, buyer shall timely pay such tax in full," end quote; Exhibit B, page 3, Section 11.

So here the purchase agreement only calls for seller to deliver the vessel to Appellants as is, where is; again, Exhibit B, page 3, Section 9. There is no mention within the agreement of any repairs or foreign delivery. The only requirements for completion of the

sale were the exchange of funds for the vessel in its current condition and location.

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california law states that unless it is explicitly agreed that title passes at an earlier time or a bill of sale is delivered at an earlier time, a sale occurs at the time and place at which the retailer completes his or her performance with reference to the physical delivery of the property; Revenue & Taxation Code Section 6010.5. Also, see Regulation 1628(b)(3) subdivision (D).

The place of sale is the place where the property is physically located at the time of the act constituting the sale; Revenue & Taxation Code Section 6010.5,

Regulation 1628(b)(4). In order for a sale of a vessel to be considered made at a point outside of California, title must not have previously passed to the purchaser, and the delivery of the vessel must occur more than three miles from any point on the California coast. That's Regulation 1628(b)(3) subsection (D), and CDTFA's Annotation 585.0004.500. The evidence shows that title to the vessel passed to Appellants' on December 23rd, 2009. Again, see Exhibit B, page 6.

It is clear that the vessel was located at Marina del Rey in California at this time. The information -- this information is corroborated by an information request

that was signed by the seller under penalty of perjury stating that she sold the vessel on December 23rd, 2009, with a delivery location of Marina del Rey, California; see Exhibit B, page 12. The sales price for the vessel was also paid at the same time the bill of sale was executed.

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Appellants' recorded a mortgage on the vessel for approximately \$152,000 on December 23rd, 2009, and that's at Exhibit B, page 16. According to the abstract of title, Exhibit B, page 15, the seller satisfied her mortgage to PNC Bank, formally National City Bank, on December 31st, 2009, which strongly suggest that the sale had already occurred by that date, and that the proceeds from the sale were disbursed to the seller and was used to satisfy the seller's mortgage in this case. This is also corroborated by a FAX from Trident Funding Corp. And that's Exhibit B, page, which also indicates that approximately \$120,000 was paid to National City Bank to pay off the existing loan.

As previously stated, delivery and payment were the only prerequisites to the execution of the purchase agreement. Absent any other contingencies, title to the vessel passed at this time. Appellants argue that repairs and foreign delivery were prerequisites for the passage of title, but the evidence does not support this conclusion.

In fact, the information request, which again is signed by seller under penalty of perjury, states that the delivery location was, in fact, Marina del Rey, California, on December 23rd, 2009. Again, this is Exhibit B, page 12.

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Seller has provided an offshore delivery affidavit, but this document is not signed by the seller and was instead signed on May 7th, 2010, by an unknown individual purporting to be the seller's representative. And you can see this document at Exhibit B, pages 8 through 10. This document was executed five months after the transaction had already taken place. And quite frankly it does not suffice to show that the foreign delivery was agreed upon by the parties prior to the vessel's title transferring from seller to Appellants.

Moreover, Appellants' argument that the broker was acting as an agent and seller and making repairs and providing vessel transport to Mexico are also contradicted by the evidence that's before the panel. The purchase agreement specifically denotes that the broker was acting in a dual capacity in representing both seller and buyer. And that's at Exhibit B, page 4, Section 16. Once the sale of the vessel was completed on December 23rd, 2009, the broker was acting solely as Appellants' agent in making repairs and improvements to the vessel.

This is supported by first, the funding document

from Trident in the account disbursement document, both of which are Exhibit B, pages 7 and 11, indicating that Appellants paid for all repairs that the broker managed on their behalf. Second, the yacht delivery document, located at Exhibit B, pages 13 through 14, indicating that the customer is Appellants and not the seller. And third, Appellant stayed within their written July 8th, 2018, post-conference submission, at Exhibit B, page 21, that they had an oral agreement with the broker, not the seller, and that they instructed the broker, Mr. Nahm, to perform repairs on the vessel before they would take delivery from him.

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These facts show that the broker acted as Appellants' agent after the bill of sale was executed. Appellants directed all of the repairs and paid for them. They also directed and paid for the cost associated with the vessel's transportation to Mexico. As such, the evidence shows that Appellants purchased the vessel in December 2009, and that the vessel was in Marina del Rey at the time of the sale. The vessel remained in Marina del Rey for four months while the broker arranged for vessel repairs pursuant to Appellants' instructions.

Later in April 2010, Appellants had the broker deliver the vessel to them in Mexico. Because the vessel was in California at the time of purchase, Appellants'

purchase and use of the vessel is subject to use tax. For the same reasons, Appellants' request for relief from penalties, fees, and interest should be denied. Revenue & Tax Code Section 6592 and 6833 allow for relief of penalties only where the failure was due to reasonable cause and circumstances beyond a person's control and occurred notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary care and in the absence of willful neglect.

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Revenue & Tax Code Section 6593.5 subdivision (a) allows for relief of all or any interest imposed where the failure to pay tax is due in whole or in part to an unreasonable error or delay by an employee of the Department acting in his or her official capacity. Here, Appellants' request for relief is based on their contention that the Department incorrectly assessed use tax on their purchase and use of the vessel.

Since use tax was correctly assessed in this matter, they have not provided any basis for relief.

Therefore, Appellants' request for relief from penalties, fees, and interest should be denied. In sum, the facts in this case show the title to the vessel passed to Appellants while the vessel was located in California.

And as such, the use tax, penalties, fees, and interest assessed by CDTFA are correct.

For the foregoing reasons, we ask the panel to

affirm the Appeals Bureau's decision finding that

Appellants are liable for use tax on the purchase and use
of the vessel in California.

Thank you.

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JUDGE KWEE: Hi. This is Judge Kwee, and I just had a quick follow-up clarification for CDTFA. So at the start of your preparation you had mentioned that

OTA didn't -- CDTFA's position was that OTA did not have jurisdiction. And so I just wanted to clarify that. Were you saying that we don't have jurisdiction to address as equal -- the constitutional documents -- the taxpayer's constitutional documents, or that we don't have jurisdiction over the appeal to address the issue of tax and the request for relief of taxes, interest, and penalties, which were the two issues that were noticed?

MS. DANIELS: It's our contention that OTA does

not have jurisdiction to address constitutional arguments.

JUDGE KWEE: This is Judge Kwee. Thank you for the clarification.

So I did have one additional follow-up question on CDTFA's position, at least with respect to the issue that was before us for their request of taxes, interest, or penalties. And my understanding was that the taxpayer had brought up the contention that they were advised that they couldn't file an appeal until they had paid the

liabilities as one of the reasons for requesting relief. So I guess that was why I was wondering if CDTFA had a position on whether or not the taxpayer was advised that they cannot file an appeal until they paid the liability in full.

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MS. DANIELS: We do not have information as to the conversation that went on, other than the allegations presented by Appellants. I think it is of note that the amount had gone final and the time to appeal had already passed prior to the funds being paid and then this matter coming to the -- being appealed. So I mean, it is our contention that had the Appellant appealed this matter previously to the Notice of Determination becoming final, that probably would not have been an issue. This appeal was brought years after the Notice of Determination became final.

JUDGE KWEE: Okay. Thank you.

And I did have one additional -- or I did have one question for Appellant, Mr. Jackson. So I think the position that you had been taking in your presentation was that the vessel wasn't brought back into the state. Well, I guess it was purchased outside of the state, and it wasn't brought back into the state within the one-year period.

And for CDTFA, my understanding is the primary

position that they're taking is that the purchase occurred in California because they had various documents that title transferred in California even though possession didn't -- might not have transferred until later on in May of 2010. I think, for example, the title had been recorded on December 23rd, that the seller had filed a signed statement that the vessel was sold as is on December 23rd.

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And I was wondering if you could address briefly -- I guess it's your contention that the sale occurred outside the state of Mexico solely because possession transferred at that time, or do you have any arguments about when title actually transferred? Or are you contending that -- or do you concede, I guess, that title transferred in California, but you're focusing on when possession occurred?

MR. JACKSON: My position is that the title issue is irrelevant. It doesn't matter when title is passed because the tax has to be based upon the gross sales price of the transaction, and that's what wasn't done here. In fact, it was done here originally. And Ms. Daniels did not address the issue that the Department originally based the tax on the gross sales price of \$222,000-plus dollars.

And as I said in my previous presentation, I think that's binding on them. They made the

determination, and they had to change positions later when they discovered that if they stayed with that contention the terms and conditions of an out-of-state sale were met, notwithstanding the issue of the price -- of the title. What actually happened here is we told Mr. Nahm what we wanted to have done early on. I think the evidence clearly supports that we intended from the outset that this boat was going to have substantial changes made in order for us to be present.

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We relied upon him, and he is the seller's agent telling us what to do and how to do it. It is Mr. Nahm, the seller's agent, who showed us this was the -- the documents that we had to do. And this was done to accommodate the seller receiving the purchase price of the hull at an earlier time prior to the actual closing of the transaction. But it didn't close at the time, so the title passing is irrelevant.

If you follow the position of the Department here, no sale of a vehicle, vessel, or aircraft could ever qualify for out-of-state consideration under these circumstances because title is involved. Well, they originally discerned that title wasn't really important. The gross sales price is what the statute sets up. So I don't think that's the dispositive issue.

One of the things I didn't address to you earlier

is that I think you do have the ability to kind of split the award here. You can determine that the tax was due but not the penalties and interest. And, of course, that's part of our contention that we're entitled to at least that relief, if not all of the relief.

Thank you.

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JUDGE KWEE: Thank you. So I do have one additional follow-up question because I was just -- I was hoping you could explain one document to me, which was page 26 of 42 of CDTFA's exhibit package. It was titled Exhibit 8, page 2 of 3, CDTFA's Decision on the Appeal. And basically what that document was it identified Bank of America as the preferred mortgage, and it recorded a mortgage amount of \$151,000 -- \$151,920 on January 7th, 2010, with the sale date of December 23rd, 2009, and it listed you as mortgager, Ronald Jackson and Angela Jackson and Bank of America as the mortgagee.

So I'm wondering if you could explain, I guess, the mortgage to me, which appears to coincide with the date that CDTFA says the title transferred. So I guess since you were talking about the gross receipts aspect, I was wondering how that played a role in the sale.

MR. JACKSON: Are you addressing that to me?

JUDGE KWEE: Yes, I am.

MR. JACKSON: Well, what happened was there was an escrow opened, and part of this thing was to determine what the total amount that we were ultimately going to pay is, and so the mortgage was actually done. The final mortgage was done once we determined or at least the bank determined what the maximum amount of the loan would be after determining that was, you know, so much for the hull and then so much for repairs. They were only going to pay a percentage of it. So that percentage was not determined. The final amount was not determined until later as the dates on the document.

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But the process was at the beginning all of the money was going to be funded through a loan. We never — we never wrote a check to anybody until it was started — until the thing was done; all of the boat was delivered. So it's kind of — there's no documents that I know of to show how this progressed except that, you know, that there was a disbursement for — to the seller well before this mortgage was done, and I had the credits to cover that. And with the ultimate decision to be made as to the amount, then it was concluded and the mortgage done.

JUDGE KWEE: This is Judge Kwee. Thank you for the explanation.

I will turn it over to my co-panelists to ask if either of my co-panelists have questions for either party.

1 I'll start with Judge Wong. 2 Judge Wong, did you have any questions that you 3 would like to ask? This is Judge Wong. I did have some 4 JUDGE WONG: 5 questions for Appellant, Mr. Jackson. 6 I know you indicated that you thought when title 7 passed was an irrelevant issue, but I wanted to see if you 8 had a position on when title actually passed. 9 MR. JACKSON: This was all done by the broker 10 outside of our knowledge. We were not part of conducting 11 that part of the sale. 12 JUDGE WONG: I'm sorry. Mr. Jackson, I think 13 we're having connections issues with you. 14 MR. JACKSON: It looks like it. Yeah. 15 JUDGE KWEE: Can you hear me? I did not hear 16 about the first 15 seconds of your answer. Would you 17 mind --18 MR. JACKSON: I would be glad to. No. 19 JUDGE WONG: Thank you. 20 MR. JACKSON: My position is that the documents 2.1 speak for themselves. I do not dispute the accuracy of 22 the documents and the dates involved. But I don't have 23 any personal knowledge about how this occurred because all 2.4 of that was conducted by the broker. We had no 25 participation in the transfer of the title. That was

accomplished outside of our participation in this transaction.

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JUDGE WONG: Okay. Thank you. I also had a question about the -- let's see -- the purchase and sale agreement. Ms. Daniels had alluded to a clause that said that the boat would be purchased as is. Could you address that? What's your position with regards to that contractional provision?

MR. JACKSON: The broker came to us and said, look, this is what we need to do to accommodate paying the seller her part of the proceeds at an early stage. You know, as a lawyer you might think I should know better, and probably it is true because I really didn't review that, but this is — it was represent to us that this was the accepted procedure involved in this transaction. And he told us, you know, this did not affect the validity of the out-of-state sale.

He's the one who put it all together and told us all these things are consistent with what it takes to have a transaction that's not subject to use tax. And I agree it's use tax, not sales tax.

JUDGE WONG: This is Judge Wong. Thank you, Mr. Jackson. Have you purchased boats in California before or owned boats in California before?

MR. JACKSON: Yes.

JUDGE WONG: Okay. I just had another question and wanted to get your position on another contractual provision in the purchase and sale agreement. It said that broker was representing both the buyer and the seller. Could you address that?

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MR. JACKSON: That was never the -- you know,
Judge, there's sometimes the things that are boilerplate
in an agreement, and that was really part of what we had
here. I really didn't inspect the agreement to see the
terms. I relied upon Mr. Nahm and his representation that
these documents were consistent with what it took to
comply with the out-of-state sale. It might have been
negligence on my part, but I just relied upon him, and I
didn't inspect it thoroughly.

JUDGE WONG: This is Judge Wong. Thank you.

Another question I had is, so when the boat was
undergoing, I guess, refurbishment in the first part of
2010, where was the boat located, to your knowledge?

MR. JACKSON: It was located in either one of two locations. It went back and forth between -- at least that's what I was told. I never went down and was on the boat. I was not part of this. But they have two offices. Catalina Yachts has an office in Marina del Rey, and they had another office in Ventura. So according to Mr. Nahm, some of the work was done in the shop in Ventura, and some

1 of it was done in Marina del Rey. 2 JUDGE WONG: This is Judge Wong. Thank you. 3 Last two questions. I appreciate your patience. Do you have any documentary evidence that would corroborate your 4 5 testimony today that your purchase of the boat was 6 conditioned on its refurbishment, such as adding air 7 conditioning and whatnot? MR. JACKSON: 8 No. 9 JUDGE WONG: Okay. And you had just mentioned 10 that you had owned boats in California. Sorry. 11 Judge Wong. You had mentioned you had owned boats in the 12 past in California; is that correct? 13 MR. JACKSON: Yes. 14 JUDGE WONG: Are boats subject to property tax? 15 MR. JACKSON: I don't know. I don't think so, 16 but I really can't say for sure. 17 JUDGE WONG: Okay. Because I was wondering, 18 like, for the first part of 2010, if boats are subject to 19 property tax, who was liable for that property tax? 20 MR. JACKSON: All I can tell you is that to the 2.1 best of my knowledge, I was never assessed a property tax 22 for the boat. 23 JUDGE WONG: This is Judge Wong. Thank you very 2.4 much, Mr. Jackson. That's all the questions I had. 25 JUDGE KWEE: Okay. This is Judge Kwee.

turn it over to Judge Long. Judge Long, do you have any questions for either party?

JUDGE LONG: This is Judge Long. I have no questions. Thank you.

JUDGE KWEE: Okay. This is Judge Kwee. Then I will turn it over to the parties for their final five-minute presentations or final five-minute conclusions.

Mr. Jackson, you have five minutes to say anything that you would like to add in conclusion before we conclude.

And then after, CDTFA will have their five minutes, and then we'll conclude the hearing.

So I turn it to you, Mr. Jackson.

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CLOSING STATEMENT

MR. JACKSON: I want to reiterate my contention regarding the determination by the Department initially that the sales tax or the tax was due on the gross receipts. And it's our position that it's that provision of the code that requires the tax to be imposed on gross receipts is controlling, and that the Department is not entitled to disregard that issue. And once they originally determined that it was due on the \$222,000, it was the total amount, that's binding upon them. They have

not denied that.

I don't think to repeat all of my other contentions. I think I've made it clear what our position is, and I again request that you find for us. And I do want to repeat that while we think we are entitled to the return of the entire monies paid to the Department, the principal interest, taxes, and fees, that if you find the tax is due, I'm asking you to find that the interest, taxes, and penalties are not appropriate in the case and return that.

Thank you very much.

JUDGE KWEE: Okay. This is Judge Kwee. Thank you.

And now I'll turn it over to CDTFA. Would CDTFA like to make any closing remarks before we conclude today?

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<u>CLOSING STATEMENT</u>

MS. DANIELS: We would just say that I believe the original taxation amount was prior to the Department having the actual purchase agreement, and that it was modified when we had the actual purchase agreement to see that the vessel was sold on December 23rd, 2009, for -- closer to, I believe, was \$123,000 instead of the original purchase amount that they had thought it was.

I mean, we would just say the evidence shows that

Appellants purchased the vessel in December 2009, and that the vessel was purchased in Marina del Rey at the time of sale sold as is, where is, and that Appellants have failed to provide any evidence that repairs or delivery were a condition of the sale.

Moreover, they have not satisfied any of the requirements under Revenue & Tax Code Section 6592, 68334, 6593.5 subdivision (a) that would entitle them to relief from penalties, fees, and interest. So we would ask that you affirm the appeals decision in this matter.

Thank you.

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MR. SMITH: This is Stephen Smith. I'd like to get one more point into the record, I guess. The reason petitioner had to prepay the tax was because he didn't file a timely petition, and he didn't respond to the Department until we had intercepted a refund issued to him from FTB. And the penalty in this instance is the finality penalty for failure to timely pay or petition the liability.

In the request for relief of the penalties and interest, the grounds stated were that the tax isn't due, and that's not grounds for what -- you know, the penalty can only be relieved for reasonable cause. And reasonable cause hasn't been provided under statement of penalty and perjury.

1 Thank you. 2 JUDGE KWEE: This is Judge Kwee. Thank you. 3 I believe we're ready to conclude. Judge Wong, are you ready to conclude? 4 5 JUDGE WONG: This is Judge Wong. I'm ready. 6 JUDGE KWEE: Okay. And, Judge Long, are you 7 ready to conclude. 8 This is Judge Long. Yes, I'm ready. JUDGE LONG: 9 JUDGE KWEE: Okay. Great. So thank you 10 everyone. We're going to conclude this hearing. This 11 case is submitted on Wednesday, February 9th, 2022. 12 record is now closed. 13 So I thank everyone for coming in today. 14 judges will meet after today's hearing to discuss your 15 appeal, and we'll send a written opinion to the parties 16 within 100 days from today. So that concludes the hearing 17 in the Appeal of Ronald and Angela Jackson. This case is 18 now adjourned, and that concludes the hearing calendar for 19 today also. 20 I believe the next hearings are scheduled for 2.1 February 23rd, 2022. 22 Thank you everyone for coming in. Goodbye. 23 (Proceedings adjourned at 10:49 a.m.) 2.4 25

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1 HEARING REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 2 I, Ernalyn M. Alonzo, Hearing Reporter in and for 3 the State of California, do hereby certify: 4 5 That the foregoing transcript of proceedings was 6 taken before me at the time and place set forth, that the 7 testimony and proceedings were reported stenographically 8 by me and later transcribed by computer-aided 9 transcription under my direction and supervision, that the 10 foregoing is a true record of the testimony and 11 proceedings taken at that time. 12 I further certify that I am in no way interested 13 in the outcome of said action. 14 I have hereunto subscribed my name this 28th day 15 of February, 2022. 16 17 18 19 ERNALYN M. ALONZO 20 HEARING REPORTER 21 2.2 23 2.4 25