

87-SBE-028

# BEFORE THE STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In the Matter of the Appeal of ) No. 84R-1356-VN DYNATECE FLUID TECHNOLOGY } CORPORATION, FORMERLY P M ) AMERICA, INC.

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Pot Appellant: Suren G. Dutia

President

MRespondent: Alison M. Clark

Counsel

#### OPINION

Th-is appeal is made pursuant to section 26075, subdivision (a), of the Revenue and Taxation Code from the action of the Franchise Tax Board in denying the claim of Dynatech Fluid Technology Corporation, formerly P M America, Inc., for refund of franchise tax in the amount of \$21,077.58, including penalty, for the income year ended July 31, 1980.

I/ Unless otherwise specified, all section references are to sections of the Revenue and Taxation Code as in effect for the income year in issue.

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Appellant Dynatech Fluid Technology Corporation was the successor corporation of P M America, Inc. (PMA), having acquired PMA's assets and business sometime after the income year in question. The issue presented for our decision is whether appellant is entitled to a bad-debt deduction for advances that PMA made in 1979 to a new company.

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In 1979, PMA was engaged in the business of marketing medical equipment and instruments from its business office in Sacramento. PMA also had an agreement with Hewlett-Packard to sell that company's equipment under a "quantity discounts. arrangement. (App. Br. at 2.) At a meeting on July 26, 1979, the board of dire& tars of PMA was advised that certain individuals were forming a **new** corporation to develop software with **medi**cal applications that was to be compatible with Hewlett-Packard hardware. Believing that production of the software would help increase PMA's sales of Hewlett-Packard equipment and thus improve its earnings under its contract with Hewlett-Packard, the board authorized PMA's president to work with the new company and provide it with loans of company funds to help create the software. PMA also had an option to purchase stock in the company that was to be formed, but the board indicated in the minutes of the meeting that it did not want an ownership interest in the corporation at the time.

On November 15, 1979, the ngw company was incorporated as Northwest Software, Inc. (NSI). The principal business activity of NSI was to be the development and marketing of "blood gas software." (App. Br. at 2.) The president of PMA became the concurrent oresident of NSI and the two corporations shared the same business address as well. The new corporation was to be managed by three individuals comprised of a software programmer, a computer salesman from Hewlett-Packard, and a sales manager. Each member of this management team was to invest in the corporation by purchasing NSI stock. The company, however, never issued any stock.

Hetween January and July of 1980, PMA advanced \$147,352 to NSI to help the new corporation start its

<sup>2/</sup> Appellant was acquired by, and merged into Cooperbiomedical, Inc., on April 2, 1985, after the appeal year.

operations. These advances were used by NSI to pay wages and payroll expenses, purchase inventory, provide expenses for salesmen, and fund the development of software. On their separate books and records, PMA treated the advances as loans under its accounts receivable ledger while NSI recorded the advances as liabilities under accounts payable. The parties did not execute any promissory notes. PMA also made the advances to NSI without obtaining any security.

In late July 1980, PMA learned that NSI had severe financial and operational problems. The company had yet to make a profit, having experienced losses since its inception. NSI had not developed any software products and did not expect to complete production of any software in the foreseeable future. While it had obtained a license to distribute the software created by an independent programmer, NSL had not received any finished software from him. Moreover, NSI salesmen found that there was very small demand far its medical software and the few software packages that they had sold were defective. Due to the many problems faced by NSI, its three managers refused to *invest* in the company. Consequently, to limit its own losses, PMA assumed control of the administrative functions of NSI, such as accounting, purchasing, and sales. By the end of 1981, NSI cease+**doing** business, PMA did not receive repayment of its 'advances.

On January 15, 1981, PMA filed its franchise tax return for the income year in question, but failed to pay the \$1'4,857 in tax due, Shortly thereafter, upon advice of its auditors, PMA decided to treat the advances to NSI as uncollectible debts in the appeal year. On June 2, 1981, PMA filed an amended return, claiming a deduction of \$150,695 for an addition to its bad-debt reserve which reduced its outstanding tax liability far the appeal year to \$200. Upon review, the Franchise Tar Board disallowed the claimed deduction. Subsequently, PMA paid \$21,077.58 in tax, interest, and penalty, but filed a claim for refund. Respondent's denial of the refund claim led to this appeal.

In support of its disallowance of the bad-debt deduction, the Franchise Tax Board contends that the advances made to NSI were contributions to capital rather than loans. As such, respondent argues, the loss resulting from the failure to recover the advances cannot be characterized as a bad-debt loss. In the alternative,

respondent urges that, even if the advances are found to have been loans, then appellant has not only failed to establish that the debt became worthless during the income year under appeals but also has made an improper retroactive addition to its bad-debt reserve. Appellant contends that the advances constituted loans which PMA expected NSI to repay from the proceeds of the sale of software.

Section 24348 allows as a deduction any debt which becomes worthless within the income year, or, in lieu of a deduction of a specific debt, a deduction for a reasonable addition to a reserve for bad debts. Section 24348 is substantially similar to section 166 of the Internal Revenue Code. Federal precedent is, therefore, persuasive in the proper interpretation and application of the California statute. (Meanley v. McColgan, 49 Cal.App.2d 203, 209 [121 P.2d 45] (1942).)

In order for a debt to be deductible under section 24348, it must be a bona fide debt; that is, one that "arises from a debtor-creditor relationship based upon a valid and enforceable obligation to pay a fixed or determinable sum of money,. -(Treas. Reg. § 1.166-1(c).) A deduction may not be taken for an advance which was made with no intention of enforcing payment (Hayes v. Commissioner, 17 B.T.A. 86 (1929)) or where there was no. reasonable expectation of repayment when it was made (Arrigoniv.. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 792, 799 (1980)). In addition, the debt must have become worthless in the taxable year for which the deduction is claimed, (Redman v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 319 (1st Cir. 1946); Messer Co. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 848, 861 (1972).)

A contribution to capita&is not considered a debt for purposes of the bad-debt deduction. (Treas. Reg. § 1.166-1(c).) Whether advances to a corporation represent capital contributions or loans is a. question of fact to be determined from all of the facts and circumstances with the taxpayer bearing the burden of proof. (Matthiessen v. Commissioner, 194 F.2d 659 (2nd Cir. 1952); Dunmire v. Commissioner, ¶ 81,372 T.C.M. (P-H) (1981).) When distinguishing debt from equity, the courts have relied on the presence of a number of criteria, including: (1) The formal indicia of debt, such as the presence of promissory notes or other documents showing indebtedness, the existence of a fixed maturity date, and the bookkeeping treatment of the

transactions: (2) the efforts to enforce payment of principal and interest; (3) participation in management as a result of the advances; (4) the intent of the parties: (5) adequacy of capitalization in relation to debt; (6) identity of interest between creditor and stockholder: '(7) the ability of the corporation to obtain loans from outside lending institutions; and (8) the risk of nonrepayment. (See Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394, 402 (5th Cir. 1972); Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 696 (3rd Cir. 1968), However, no single criterion nor any series of criteria can provide a conclusive answer to whether advances. are loans. (See <u>John Kelly Co.</u> v. <u>Commissioner</u>, 326 U.S. 521, 530 [90 L.Ed. 278] (1946).) These various factors are merely aids in answering the significant inquiry, whether the funds were advanced with reasonable expectations of repayment regardless of the success- of the business or were invested as risk capital subject to the fortunes of the corporate venture. (Gilbert v. Commissioner, ¶ 56,137 T.C.M. (P-H) (1956), 248 F.2d 399 (2nd Cit. 1957), on remand, ¶ 58,008 T.C.M. (P-H) (1958), affd., 262 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 359 U.S. 1002 [3 L.Ed.2d 1030] (1959); Fin Bay Realty Co. v. United States, supra,, 3398 F.2d at 69).)

Applying the above principles to the appeal before us, we are convinced that the advances made by PMA were contributions to capital. First, the advances lacked any of the formal indicia of indebtedness. While both PMA and NSI may have treated the transactions as loans on their respective account ledgers, the parties did not execute any notes or instruments showing interest rates, maturity dates, or repayment schedules, Moreover, there is no evidence that PMA even attempted collection of the advances. from NSI. In response, appellant has only stated that no one was willing to sign a promissory note and that interest did not accrue due to the improbability of collection, Here, the absence of any formal indicia suggests that there was no debt.

Second, appellant contends that the alleged loans from PMA were "secured" and would be repaid since NSI had plans to develop blood gas software and had acquired a license to distribute other software. The fact of the matter is that PMA made advances to help start a new enterprise and the advances were made without any security agreement. It is unlikely that an objective, independent creditor would have made similar unsecured loans. Moreover, since its president held the

same executive position in NSI, PMA should have been aware that the company was not otherwise capitalized and was using the advances to meet the daily requirements of the business. Under such circumstances, it is not reasonable for PMA to have expected repayment of the advances in the absence of NSI's success.

Third, appellant argues - that PMA intended to create a debtor-creditor relationship with NSI. lant explains that PMA, at that time, had already started merger discussions with Dynatech Fluid Technology Corporation and wanted to diligently avoid purchasing an equity interest in the new company in order to facilitate completion of those negotiations. The problem with this argument is that PMA had at the outset a direct role and monetary interest in the formation of the corporation. PMA's president served NSI in the same capacity and its advances were the only source of funds for the new . company whose products PMA hoped would increase its own sales revenue. Where, as here, advances are necessary to commence a new enterprise, a strong inference arises that the funds were capital investments not loans. LaFrance-Poamite Corporation v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. den., 365.0. S 881 [6 L.Ed.2d 192] (1961).) Finally, the fact that PMA took control of the management of NSI to avoid additional losses when it was apparent that the corporation was a failure further indicates to us that PMA had an ownership or equity/ interest in the company by virtue of the advances.

Based on **the** foregoing, we must'conclude that appellant has failed to carry its burden of proving that the advances were loans. Accordingly, we must sustain respondent's action in disallowing the claimed bad-debt deduction for the income year in question.

<sup>3/</sup> Since we find that the advances were capital contributions and not bona fide debts, it is not necessary to discuss the worthlessness issue or whether appellant made a retroactive addition to its bad-debt reserve.

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#### ORDER.

Pursuant to the views expressed in the opinion of the board on file in this proceeding, and good. cause appearing therefor,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, pursuant to section 26077 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, that the action of the Franchise Tax Board in denying the claim of Dynatech Fluid Technology Corporation, formerly P M America, Inc., fur refund of franchise tax in the amount of \$21,077.58, including penalty, for the income year ended July 31, 1980, be and the same is hereby sustained.

Done at Sacramento, California, this 7th day of April , .1987, by the Stake Board of Equalization, with Board Members Mr. Collis, Mr. Dronenburg, Mr. Carpenter and Ms. Baker present.

Conway H. Collis	Chairman
Ernest J. Dronenburg, Jr.	_, Member
Paul Carpenter	, Member
Anne Baker*	
	Member

\*For Gray. Davis, per Government Code section 7.9