BEFORE THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

MICHAEL GEARY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

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)	Cage	No	21017159
) _)	Case	NO.	21017136
))))))))))) Case No.)

CERTIFIED COPY

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Sacramento, California

Tuesday, October 18, 2022

Reported by:

Maria Esquivel-Parkinson CSR No. 10621, RPR

Job No.: 38957 OTA(C)

1	BEFORE THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
2	OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS
3	COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
4	MICHAEL GEARY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
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6	
7	In the Matter of the Claim) for Reimbursement of:)
8) SHARON MITCHELL,)
9) Case No. 21017158 Claimant.)
10)
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15	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, taken at
16	400 R Street, Sacramento, California,
17	commencing at 3:13 p.m. on Tuesday,
18	October 18, 2022, reported by
19	Maria Esquivel-Parkinson, CSR No. 10621,
20	RPR, a Certified Shorthand Reporter in
21	and for the State of California.
22	
23	
24	
25	

1	APPEARANCES:
2	
3	PANEL MEMBERS:
4	ALJ MICHAEL GEARY
5	ALJ CHERYL AKIN
6	ALJ SARA HOSEY
7	
8	FOR THE CLAIMANT:
9	CHRISTINA WEED, ESQ.
LO	DIANA LOPEZ
11	
12	FOR THE FTB:
13	MARGUERITE E. MOSNIER, TAX COUNSEL
L4	CAROLYN S. KUDUK, TAX COUNSEL
L5	
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1	SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 18, 2022
2	3:13 P.M.
3	
4	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: Let's go on
5	the record, please. I'm going to repeat myself a little
6	bit. Good afternoon, everyone. This is the hearing in
7	the claim of Sharon Mitchell, Office of Tax Appeals
8	Case No. 21017158. Today is October 18th, 2022, and the
9	time is 3:13 p.m.
10	Will the parties please identify themselves by
11	stating their names and who they represent beginning
12	with Claimant.
13	MS. WEED: Good afternoon. My name is
14	Christina Weed, C-h-r-i-s-t-i-n-a, Weed, W-e-e-d. I'm
15	here with attorney Diana Lopez, D-i-a-n-a L-o-p-e-z, and
16	we represent the taxpayer Sharon Mitchell, S-h-a-r-o-n
17	M-i-t-c-h-e-l-l.
18	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: I see
19	Ms. Mitchell is also with you today.
20	Would the FTB please identify the
21	representatives.
22	MS. MOSNIER: Good afternoon. Marguerite
23	Mosnier for Franchise Tax Board.
24	MS. KUDUK: Carolyn Kuduk for Franchise Tax
25	Board.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: Thank you.
It's my understanding that Claimant is going to
be testifying today; is that correct, Ms. Weed?
MS. WEED: Initially I wanted to call
Ms. Mitchell, but I no longer need to call her as a
witness today.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: All right.
Thank you. And does FTB plan to call any witnesses?
MS. MOSNIER: No.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: Thank you.
The exhibits have been marked for identification in this
appeal, and they consist of Claimant's exhibits marked 1
through 4. Claimant did not submit an evidence package
as directed in the prehearing conference orders, so OTA
included in the hearing binder all of the documents that
Claimant submitted with briefs apparent support of the
claim.
FTB has not submitted any proposed evidence
and, in fact, indicated that it was not submitting any
documentary evidence.
OTA has incorporated all proposed exhibits into
an electronic hearing binder, which the panel has and
which should be in the possession of the parties.
Ms. Weed, have you confirmed that the exhibits

incorporated into the hearing binder constitute all of

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the documentary evidence that Claimant wishes to offer?

MS. WEED: Yes, your Honor.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: It is all of the evidence?

MS. WEED: I believe so. I -- we had uploaded quite a few documents to the portal. I'm not clear on what exactly was admitted versus not admitted. I thought it all was.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: No. I think you're probably referring to the exhibits and indexes from the underlying appeal --

MS. WEED: Yes.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: -- which I'll discuss in a minute. It was never my intention to admit those exhibits into evidence in this -- in this claim procedure. That -- that record stands on its own. I think I indicated earlier on that I expect and anticipate that the parties might want to refer to that record. They're free to do that. It was never my intent to offer those documents into evidence in this proceeding, which is why we just collected the documents that you had submitted in support of the claim with your briefs and made those part of the binder.

MS. WEED: Okay. Understood. Then, yes, with respect to the exhibits for this hearing, I believe it's

1 just the four exhibits. 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: All right. 3 Thank you. 4 Does FTB have any objection to the admission of 5 Claimant's Exhibits 1 through 4? I have one question. Are those 6 MS. MOSNIER: all -- exhibits all attached to the initial claim for 7 reimbursement? 8 9 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: I can't answer 10 that question. Perhaps Ms. Weed can answer it. 11 MS. WEED: Yes. These ones are the ones 12 attached to the initial claim. 13 MS. MOSNIER: No objection. 14 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: Thank you. 15 Then those exhibits are all admitted, 1 through 4. 16 (Claimant's Exhibits 1 through 4 admitted.) 17 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: This hearing 18 is a bit different than most hearings that we have at 19 OTA in that it's not a taxpayer's appeal from an adverse 20 decision by a tax agency. Here the Claimant invokes 21 OTA's original jurisdiction to determine whether Claimant is entitled to reimbursement for fees and 22 23 expenses related to an appeal that OTA decided in 2.4 Claimant's favor years ago. 25 We may refer to this earlier matter as the

underlying appeal. In essence, Claimant asserts that FBT -- FTB took positions in the underlying appeal that were not substantially justified.

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The first issue that OTA will address is whether Claimant is entitled to reimbursement from FTB for fees and expenses related to the underlying appeal pursuant to Revenue and Taxation Code Section 21013 and California Code of Regulations Title 18, Section 30702. If OTA decides the issue -- that issue in Claimant's favor, the panel will determine the amount of reimbursement to which Claimant is entitled.

Ms. Weed, do you agree with the issues as I have stated them?

MS. WEED: Yes, your Honor.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: And,
Ms. Mosnier, do you agree with the issues as I have
stated them?

MS. MOSNIER: Yes.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: Thank you.

The parties also discussed and agreed at the prehearing conference that FTB has the burden of proving the positions that -- that the positions it took in the underlying appeal were substantially justified. And Claimant will have the burden and has the burden of proving the amount of reimbursement to which Claimant is

entitled, if any.

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We discussed time estimates during the prehearing conference and it was agreed that the hearing would last about one hour and 15 minutes. We also agreed that FTB would present its argument first in this case and will have up to 30 minutes for its opening argument. Claimant will then have up to 30 minutes for its argument now that it is no longer offering testimony from Ms. Mitchell.

And, finally, FTB will have up to five minutes, approximately, for a rebuttal argument. And I think I indicated in my prehearing conference orders that to the extent FTB raises in its rebuttal or its final closing new or different arguments challenging the amount of reimbursement claimed, Appellant can then request some additional time to address those new arguments. I encourage the representatives to please keep track of your time. I will also try to keep track of it, but it's best that you also do that.

Any questions before we begin, Ms. Weed?

MS. WEED: No.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: Questions,

23 Ms. Mosnier?

MS. MOSNIER: Can we reserve any time we do not use from our initial 30-minute presentation to extend

1	the rebuttal period if necessary?
2	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: Yes.
3	MS. MOSNIER: Thank you.
4	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: Just let me
5	know that that's what you want to do and I'll make a
6	note of it.
7	All right. Ms. Mosnier, you can begin when
8	you're ready.
9	MS. MOSNIER: Thank you.
LO	To the court reporter, can you hear me okay?
11	THE COURT REPORTER: Yes. Thank you.
L2	
13	OPENING STATEMENT
L4	BY MS. MOSNIER, FTB Counsel:
15	Good afternoon. Marguerite Mosnier and Carolyn
L6	Kuduk for Franchise Tax Board.
L7	The Claimant's request for reimbursement of
18	attorney's fees and costs fails because the Franchise
L9	Tax Board applied longstanding relevant case law
20	including a precedential Board of Equalization decision
21	to the facts of Con-Med's 2007 sales transaction and
22	determined that Claimant had not completed a Section
23	1031 transaction and, therefore, could not defer gain
24	recognition. FTB's position was, therefore,
25	substantially justified, and the Claimant is not

entitled to reimbursement of attorney fees.

If, however, the OTA determines that the Franchise Tax Board's position was not substantially justified, the amount of fees and costs reimbursement sought is not reasonable and a lesser amount would be warranted.

I'd like to review the relevant facts of the underlying appeal and the law the Franchise Tax Board applied to those facts.

Con-Med is a partnership or was a partnership in which the Claimant was a minority partner. The partnership owned/developed commercial property and in 2007 entered into a contract to sell that property. The concept of a 1031 exchange was not mentioned in the initial offer, any counteroffers, or in the sales contract -- purchase and sales contract that was signed.

Many months later, just a couple weeks before escrow closed, the partnership signed a redemption agreement pursuant to which the partnership was authorized to redeem the Claimant's minority partnership interest, and in exchange for that interest, the partnership would deed her a direct ownership interest in the same percentage ownership as she had in the partnership. One day before escrow closed, the Claimant recorded the tenant in common or TIC deed it had

received from the partnership and the following day she deeded the property, her interest in the property, to the purchaser.

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She subsequently when -- on her 2007 return reported gained deferral pursuant to Section 1031. The Franchise Tax Board determined that she had not satisfied the requirements of 1031 and proposed additional tax of just over \$60,000.

The law for Section 1031 transactions is clear. A taxpayer wishing to avail itself of the deferral of in recognition must meet three requirements. They are known informally as the exchange requirement, the holding requirement, and the like kind requirement.

The exchange requirement is what is at issue here, and that requirement is that the same taxpayer who sells the relinquished property must be the taxpayer that purchases the replacement property. And the Franchise Tax Board's focus on this requirement reflects the dictates of the tax court's opinion in Bolker vs. Commissioner, of the opinion in Chase vs. Commissioner, and in Board of Equalization's decision in Appeal of Brookfield Manor that the first inquiry in a 1031 exchange is whether the taxpayer has met the exchange requirement.

So with that in mind, let's turn to the concept

of substantial justification. It is not defined in Section 21013 and it is not defined in any precedential case law. However, there is a similar statute in the Revenue and Taxation Code Section 19717, which authorizes reimbursement of attorney fees and costs in the context of litigation. And there is case law that has interpreted substantial justification in the context of that statute. And so we look to that for guidance.

It has -- substantial justification has been defined alternately as FTB is substantially justified when its position is justified to a degree that would satisfy a reasonable person or as a position that has a reasonable basis in law and fact.

It has also been described that if reasonable minds may differ, then the Franchise Tax Board is substantially justified. And so long as the position is one that a reasonable -- a reasonable person could think is correct, it maybe substantially justified even in the face of conflicting evidence. Those are all California Appellate Court cases.

So in the context of this -- in the context of this appeal, we'll start with the standard that if reasonable minds may differ, then the position is substantially justified. In the underlying appeal, the Office of Tax Appeals' opinion was a split opinion. The

minority opinion adopted FTB's analysis and conclusion.

So when we think of the Office of Tax Appeals and the administrative law judges, these are more than just even mere reasonable minds. These are tax expert minds. And we know that because the OTA tells us so on the home page of its website, "Tax disputes involving personal income taxes are decided by a three-member panel of administrative law judges, each of whom is an expert in tax law."

So if differing mere reasonable minds establishes substantial justification, it is certain that differing opinions by tax expert minds means that FTB's position, which was adopted by Judge Rosas in the minority, was substantially justified under the definition that the reasonable minds differ definition from Lennane vs. Franchise Tax Board and Fujitsu Holdings vs. Franchise Tax Board.

When you consider another definition for substantial justification, which is that it was justified to a degree that would satisfy a reasonable person which is the definition enunciated in the McDonnell Douglas vs. Franchise Tax Board decision.

As we've discussed, the Franchise Tax Board's position satisfied Judge Rosas in the underlying appeal, and we could consider him both a reasonable person as

well as a tax expert.

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And on those facts, FTB's position in the underlying appeal was substantially justified under the McDonnell Douglas, justified to the degree that would satisfy a reasonable person standard.

And independent of those two definitions, the Franchise Tax Board's position was substantially justified because it had a reasonable basis in law and fact. FTB applied law relevant to the exchange requirement and considered three cases particularly important to support its position.

Beginning with the US Supreme Court decision Commissioner vs. Court Holding, which held, among other things, that the substance rather than the form of a transaction dictates the tax treatment of the transaction.

Now, that case did not involve Section 1031 transaction, but the doctrine is applicable to Section 1031 cases. We know that from the tax court decision in Bolker from Chase vs. Commissioner, and from the Appeal of Brookfield Manor.

Now, the detailed facts of each of those cases are set out in FTB's -- in FTB's statement. And what's probably more important here, just to give a general description of the facts, the common facts to all three

of those, in all three an entity owned property and negotiated the sale of the property and shortly before escrow closed some or all of the interest in the property was transferred to some or all of the entity owners, and they, along with the entity if the entity still owned any interest in the property, completed the sale. And in all those cases the Courts and the Board of Equalization said that it was the entity and not any owner of the entity that bore the tax consequences of the transaction.

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Since Franchise Tax Board applied relevant law to determining whether the Claimant had met the exchange requirement, its position was substantially justified under the definition set out in the McDonnell Douglas decision.

Apart from a substance-over-form and true-seller analysis that you need for the exchange requirement if you're looking at it at the sale end of the exchange, the Franchise Tax Board also properly applied the assignment of income theory, which is set out in Salvatore vs. Commissioner to conclude that all sale proceeds should be attributed to Con-Med.

Here, again, the relevant law was applied to the facts of the transaction and FTB's position on this theory was substantially justified under the McDonnell

Douglas, the Fujitsu, and the Lennane cases. And although a substantive justification analysis considers the law at the time of FTB's actions, it's important to note that not only were FTB's legal analysis and position correct during the underlying appeal, the Office of Tax Appeal's 2021 precedential opinion, Appeal of Kwon affirms the Court Holding, Chase and Brookfield Manor are the relevant case law when analyzing the exchange requirement.

2.4

It's equally important to note that the Office of Tax Appeals rejected consideration of the Magneson Maloney Ninth Circuit Bolker opinion and Appeal of Rago -- R-a-g-o, for our stenographer -- Rago Development, because, as the OTA noted in Footnote 20 of that opinion, those cases addressed the holding requirement and not the exchange requirement.

So we see from -- by looking first to Court Holding, and then through to Chase and Brookfield Manor and Salvatore that the Franchise Tax Board applied the law that was relevant to a determination whether the Claimant had met the exchange requirement. Franchise Tax Board's actions were substantially justified under the very alternate definitions of substantial justification.

And a final note on the issue of substantial

justification. A determination by the OTA that the Franchise Tax Board's position was substantially justified is not inconsistent with the determination that the majority opinion in the underlying appeal was correct. The two are not mutually exclusive because they address and rest on independent legal issues.

Turning to the reasonableness of the requested fees, FTB believes it was substantially justified in its actions and that no attorney fees should be awarded.

And FTB makes this argument in the event only that the Office of Tax Appeals determines that FTB's position was not substantially justified.

Section 21013 limits reimbursement to reasonable fees. That term is not defined in 21013, so we look again to Section 19717 and we get guidance from that statute. That statute sets out an hourly cap rate of \$125 with adjustments for inflation for any award of attorney fees. In fact, it requires a showing of a, quote, special factor to authorize reimbursement at a rate that exceeds the \$125 per hour. A special factor is, quote, distinctive knowledge or special expertise needed for the specific litigation.

And we have to remember that reimbursement under either Section 19717 or 21013 will always be for representation in a tax dispute and the representative

will presumably be a tax expert or someone with tax experience. So there's a fair inference there that the legislature intended that a \$125 per hour cap was appropriate for reimbursement except in extraordinary cases where a special factor is shown.

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There is an issue in this case whether reimbursement above the \$125 per hour cap would be warranted in this case, and FTB rests on the more detailed arguments and discussion that's set out in its brief on that point.

And, finally, FTB notes that the proposed assessment was just over \$60,000. And the notice of proposed assessment, you can find it at Exhibit B -- bravo -- to the Claimant's opening brief in the underlying appeal. And the notice of action which affirms that same amount is Exhibit A to that same brief.

So the proposed additional tax was just over \$60,000, yet the Claimant asserts that she paid more than \$115,000 to her counsel for representation. FTB requests that any award of fees and costs be capped at the amount of the proposed additional tax. Thank you.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: Thank you,

Ms. Mosnier. I have basically 16 -- 16 to 17 minutes

used.

1 That's it. MS. MOSNIER: 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: Ms. Weed, who 3 is going to be giving the Claimant's argument? MS. WEED: 4 I will. 5 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: All right. 6 You can proceed when you're ready. 7 MS. WEED: Okay. Just one moment, your Honor. 8 9 OPENING STATEMENT 10 BY MS. WEED, Counsel for the Taxpayer: 11 So in Taxpayer Mitchell's motion for fees, the 12 facts in the underlying case are not susceptible of 13 dispute. The notice of proposed assessment in this case 14 was issued in 2012. The tax year in issue was 2007. 15 There has been, give or take, ten years of briefing. There's transcripts from the hearing. 16 The opinion and the underlying hearing made 23 17 18 findings of facts. There was no split decision in this 19 There was a majority opinion that governs the case. 20 The law has been properly decided in this outcome. 21 case. The FTB's petition for rehearing was summarily 22 denied. FTB now wants to litigate clearly established 23 facts and take a third bite at the apple with respect to

its erroneous legal arguments in the underlying case.

None of the FTB's attempts to relitigate this case

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should be given any further consideration.

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The only issue remaining is whether the taxpayer is entitled to attorney's fees, costs, and ultimately put in a position to make her whole. The taxpayer is entitled to reasonable fees and costs pursuant to Revenue and Taxation Code 19717. In order to be -- in order to recover these fees, Taxpayer Mitchell needs to be the prevailing party with respect to either the issue or the amount.

In this case, Taxpayer Mitchell prevailed with respect to every issue and amount in the case. The FTB is not substantially justified as it has no reasonable basis in law or fact for its position in the underlying case. There is no basis because the FTB failed to follow controlling public guidance.

The taxpayer's counsel disagrees that there is no authority with respect to what substantial justification is. Revenue and Taxation Code Section 19717 indicates there is a presumption that the FTB is not substantially justified to the extent it failed to follow controlling public guidance.

In this case, the underlying opinion indicated that the Ninth Circuit cases Magneson and Bolker are controlling. All of the other cases that were cited by the Franchise Tax Board were deemed to be wholly

inapplicable or from a lesser court than the Ninth Circuit.

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The FTB cannot claim to rely on a dissent issued at the time of the opinion in this case to justify over ten years of erroneous application of the law to the detriment and prejudice of the taxpayer. As cited in the Taxpayer's opening brief, there is strong policy against giving the FTB free rein to pursue issues that are not substantially justified.

The Fujitsu case cited in the Taxpayer's brief indicates that this is a very strong policy. If the FTB chooses to pursue frivolous claims and incorrectly applies the laws of this state, which is one of its primary tasks, they will continue to pursue frivolous claims if they are fairly certain that the taxpayer will never be able to recover their fees.

In this case, Taxpayer Mitchell's time and resources were wholly wasted. The underlying amount in this case is, you know, approximately 60,000, a little bit more. But to that end, the FTB had numerous chances to review the law, over 10 years of chances to review the law, the facts, and to possibly work out some sort of resolution outside of the Office of Tax Appeals.

In addition, the FTB in this case waited almost one year to object to the instant motion. Why did they

need to wait an entire year to respond to Taxpayer Mitchell's motion for fees? Are they waiting for additional case law?

2.

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Case law sought whether or not obtained is not relevant to whether the Franchise Tax Board was substantially justified in its application of the law -- its erroneous application of the law to Taxpayer Mitchell.

The FTB's entitled actions to pursue frivolous claims against taxpayers because they can rely on a taxpayer to rarely pursue a case to the end because of the individual taxpayer's limits to resources is wrong. It is abusive of this state's tax system, the laws of this state, the individual taxpayer in this case, and taxpayers generally. The taxpayer is the one who suffers.

Taxpayer Mitchell is 62 years old. She lost pretty much all of her 50s to this case. This case has helped taxpayers that I have assisted since this case was decided in which the FTB dismissed their claim. The FTB's assertion that they think the law in Mitchell is, therefore, wholly misrepresentative.

Taxpayer Mitchell's case has helped the public at large to understand the laws despite the FTB's numerous misapplications of the law over time. The

extraordinary fees in this case that taxpayer requests are based on the fact that there are complicated issues in this matter, often too complicated for a lay taxpayer to handle on their own. If the FTB is able to rely on a taxpayer's recovery of legal fees at a lower rate, it is further incentive for the FTB to act frivolously in its positions.

2.4

Once again, the taxpayers suffer because they don't get compensated for their actual fees incurred when they prevail. In this instance, Sharon Mitchell prevailed on everything.

Finally, the standard under Wertin v FTB Cal.App.2d December 21st, 1998 indicates that the respondent is required -- if the respondent fails to provide evidence to rebut the taxpayer's counsel's claim for fees, the only evidence that this court has to rely on is the taxpayer's pleadings and declarations.

I reserve any additional time for possible rebuttal.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: Thank you, Ms. Weed. I have that you used about eight -- eight minutes for your presentation.

Ms. Mosnier, you may proceed when you are ready.

MS. MOSNIER: Thank you.

REBUTTAL STATEMENT

BY MS. MOSNIER, Tax Counsel:

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At the prehearing conference, the parties agreed and the minutes and orders reflect that Claimant agreed to forego reliance on Revenue and Taxation Code Section 19717. That is the only section we've heard the Claimant speak of today. To the extent that there are analyses and subdivisions of 19717, they were not otherwise addressed by FTB as being analogous to 21013 and, therefore, relevant in the consideration of substantially justified in reasonableness of fees. The OTA should disregard any other provisions of 19717.

And I'd like to circle back to the concept of the exchange requirement because that is the issue that the Franchise Tax Board identified by the time of the hearing as the one it would focus on. And in the discussion section of the majority opinion, the OTA notes that the Franchise Tax Board is asserting that the Claimant did not meet the exchange requirement and it was, therefore, appropriate and necessary for the Franchise Tax Board to determine the law that is relevant to analyze the exchange requirement. And that is Commissioner vs. Court Holding, Chase vs.

Commissioner, and a precedential Board of Equalization opinion, Appeal of Brookfield Manor, that FTB was

required to consider and apply precisely because it was a precedential Board of Equalization decision.

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And so for those reasons, the Claimant's discussion of FTB's incorrect analysis and application of the law should not be given any weight. Thank you.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: Thank you, Ms. Mosnier.

Ms. Weed, both in my prehearing conference minutes and orders and at the beginning of this hearing I indicated that you could apply for additional time to argue in the event FTB made new arguments concerning the amount of the claim. I didn't hear any argument about the amount of the claim. Are you applying for additional time to offer further argument?

MS. WEED: I'm not sure I understand, your Honor.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: In my prehearing conference minutes and orders we talked about how much time would be allowed for argument. I realize you said that you wanted to reserve time, and I would have allowed you to reserve time to the extent you needed to rebut arguments made by FTB concerning the amount that your client is claiming in reimbursement, but I did not hear FTB make any such arguments in its rebuttal. So if you are applying for additional time to

1 offer further argument, I'd like to know what areas you 2 intend to offer argument on. 3 MS. WEED: With respect to the code section 4 cited by -- or FTB's counsel, as I sit here today, my 5 position would not be that 19717 does not apply. It's part of the Revenue and Taxation Code. Given that, I 6 believe the analysis under Code Section 21013 would be 7 8 the same with respect to the prevailing party and 9 substantial justification of the FTB. 10 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: Are you 11 applying for additional time to provide further argument 12 I'm not clear. or not? 13 MS. WEED: With respect to the fee amount? 14 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: With respect 15 to anything. If you're applying for -- if you're asking for additional time for argument, tell me how much time 16 17 you think you need, and I think you just described what 18 you intend to argue. How much time do you need to argue 19 that? 20 Less than five minutes. MS. WEED: 21 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: All right. 22 I'm going to allow it. 23 MS. WEED: Okay. 2.4 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: You may 25 proceed.

1 CLOSING ARGUMENT 2 BY MS. WEED, Counsel for the Taxpayer: With respect to Revenue and Taxation Code 3 4 Section 19717, Taxpayer's counsel believes that this is 5 still applicable to the motion for fees. In addition to Revenue and Taxation Code Section 21013, as I sit here 6 7 today I do not think it's appropriate to not include a California Revenue and Taxation Code section. 8 However, 9 if it is deemed that that is not applicable in this 10 place, Taxpayer's counsel would renew her arguments with respect to the prevailing party and whether or not the 11 12 FTB was substantially justified based on the same 13 analysis. 14 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: Are you -- are 15 you finished with your final argument? 16 MS. WEED: Yes, that's all. Thank you. 17 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: That's all 18 right. Thank you. 19 Ms. Weed, does your client submit the matter? 20 MS. WEED: We submit. 21 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: And FTB, do 22 you submit the matter? 23 MS. MOSNIER: Yes. 2.4 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GEARY: All right. 25 This case is submitted on October 18th, 2022, at

3:53 p.m. The record in this matter is now closed and this hearing is concluded. Thank you, everyone, for participating. In the coming weeks, the panel will meet to consider the matter, and OTA will send a written opinion within 100 days of today's date. This is the final hearing for OTA today, and the streaming can stop and we can go off the record. Thank you, everybody. (Proceedings concluded at 3:55 p.m.)

1		REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
2	STATE OF (CALIFORNIA)
3	COUNTY OF) ss. SACRAMENTO)
4	=	I, MARIA ESQUIVEL-PARKINSON, do hereby certify
5	that I am	a Certified Shorthand Reporter, and that at
6	the times	and places shown I recorded verbatim in
7	shorthand	writing all the proceedings in the following
8	described	action completely and correctly to the best of
9	my ability	7 :
10	LOCATION:	OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS
11		400 R STREET Sacramento, CA 95811
12	CASE:	In the Matter of the Appeal of: Sharon Mitchell
13	DATE:	
14	DAIE.	Tuesday, October 18, 2022
15	I further certify that my said shorthand notes	
16		of all my shorthand writing for the dates and
17	_	
18	I further certify that I have complied with CCP 237(a)(2) in that all personal juror identifying information has been redacted if applicable.	
19		
20		IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have subscribed this te at Sacramento, California on this 4th day of
21	November,	mairas of the
22		Maria Esquivel-Parkinson CSR No. 10621, RPR
23		COR NO. 10021, RPR
24		
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