BEFORE THE OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS STATE OF CALIFORNIA

| IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL OF: |) | | |
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| CITIES OF FILLMORE, ET AL., |) | CASE NO. | 18011887 |
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| APPELLANTS. |) | | |
| |) | | |

CERTIFIED COPY

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Sacramento, California

Thursday, December 15, 2022

Reported by:

Maria Esquivel-Parkinson, CSR No. 10621, RPR

Job No.: 39620 OTA(B)

| 1 | BEFORE THE OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS |
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| 5 | IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL OF:) |
| 6 | CITIES OF FILLMORE, ET AL.,) CASE NO. 18011887 |
| 7 | APPELLANTS.) |
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| 15 | TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, taken at |
| 16 | 400 R Street, Sacramento, California, |
| 17 | commencing at 1:05 p.m. and concluding |
| 18 | at 4:00 p.m. on Thursday, December 15, 2022, |
| 19 | reported by Maria Esquivel-Parkinson, |
| 20 | CSR No. 10621, RPR, a Certified Shorthand |
| 21 | Reporter in and for that State of California. |
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| 1 | APPEARANCES: | |
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| 2 | | |
| 3 | Panel Members: | SHERIENE RIDENOUR, Lead ALJ ANDREW WONG |
| 4 | | SUZANNE BROWN |
| 5 | | |
| 6 | For the Petitioners: | JANIS VARNEY, Representative |
| 7 | | |
| 8 | For the Appellant: | MICHAEL CATALDO, Attorney |
| 9 | | |
| 10 | For the CDTFA: | OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS |
| 11 | | CHAD BACCHUS, Tax Counsel SCOTT CLAREMON, Tax Counsel |
| 12 | | CATHY STOCKER, Hearing Representative |
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| 1 | Sacramento, California; Thursday, December 15, 2022 |
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| 2 | 1:05 p.m. |
| 3 | |
| 4 | ALJ RIDENOUR: We are opening the record in the |
| 5 | appeals of City of Fillmore, et. al., OTA Case No. |
| 6 | 18011887. Today's date is Thursday, December 15th, |
| 7 | 2022, and the time is approximately one o'clock. The |
| 8 | hearing is being conveyed [sic] at Sacramento, |
| 9 | California. |
| 10 | Today's hearing is being heard by a panel of |
| 11 | three administrative law judges. My name is Sheriene |
| 12 | Ridenour, and I'm the lead judge. Judges Andrew Wong |
| 13 | and Suzanne Brown are the other members of this Tax |
| 14 | Appeals panel. All three judges will meet after the |
| 15 | hearing and produce a written decision on equal |
| 16 | participance. Although the lead judge conducts the |
| 17 | hearing, any judge on this panel may ask questions. |
| 18 | For the record, will the parties please state |
| 19 | their names and who they represent starting with |
| 20 | appellant. |
| 21 | MR. CATALDO: My name is Michael Cataldo, with |
| 22 | Cataldo Tax Law, and I represent the Appellant City of |
| 23 | Fillmore. |
| 24 | ALJ RIDENOUR: Thank you. |
| 25 | MS. VARNEY: Janis Varney, vice president of |

Sales and Use Tax for MuniServices representing the
Petitioners Cities of Los Angeles, Ontario, Palm
Springs, San Jose, San Diego, and County of Sacramento.

ALJ RIDENOUR: Thank you.

And CDTFA?

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MR. BACCHUS: Chad Bacchus with the Department's legal division. And seated behind me are Scott Claremon also with the legal division, and Cathy Stocker with the Department.

ALJ RIDENOUR: Great. Thank you.

As we discussed and agreed upon by the parties at the prehearing conference on November 14th, 2022, and as stated in my minutes and orders dated November 17th, 2022, there are two issues in this appeal. They are whether the reallocation of tax is barred under the equitable doctrine of laches and whether the disputed amount of local tax allocated as sales tax directly to Appellant should be reallocated.

The following facts are agreed upon by the parties: That the Fillmore office is the only California location at issue as a possible place of business of retailer, that the storage tanks were not owned or operated by retailer, and the fuel located in the storage tanks were commingled with fuel owned by other persons.

1 (Reporter interrupted)

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ALJ RIDENOUR: No, don't apologize.

The following facts -- I'll start there? Does that work for you?

THE COURT REPORTER: Yes.

ALJ RIDENOUR: Okay. The following facts agreed upon by the parties: That the Fillmore office is the only California location at issue as a possible place of business of retailer, that the storage tanks were not owned or operated by retailer, and that the fuel located in the storage tanks was commingled with fuel owned by other persons. When the jet fuel was delivered to customer, title passed and the sales occurred in California.

As for exhibits, each party's exhibits are listed in the exhibit log, which was attached to the minutes and orders as well as in the exhibit binder which was emailed to the parties if any party did not get that, would they please let -- raise their hand.

All right. Hearing none. Appellant submitted Exhibits 1 through 16; Petitioner submitted Exhibits P-1 and P-2, and CDTFA submitted Exhibits A through D. During the prehearing conference, none of the parties raised objections to other parties' exhibits. As such, pursuant to my minutes and orders, Appellant's Exhibits

1 1 through 16 were admitted into evidence, Petitioner's 2 Exhibit P-1 and P2 were admitted into evidence, and 3 CDTFA Exhibits A through D were admitted into evidence. 4 (Appellant's Exhibits 1 through 16 admitted.) 5 (Petitioner's Exhibits P-1 and P-2 admitted.) (CDTFA's Exhibits A through D admitted.) 6 There will be no witness 7 ALJ RIDENOUR: testimony today. The presentations will consist solely 8 9 of oral arguments. 10 Also indicated in my minutes and orders, at the close of the hearing, the record will be held open to 11

allow the parties to brief on the issue of buying companies which was recently raised by Appellant.

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While I originally indicated that Appellant would have 30 days from today to submit its brief, I have since realized that Appellant's 30-day deadline would fall on a Saturday of a holiday weekend. So in an effort to allow the parties an equal duration of further briefing on this new issue, I will instead give each party 40 days.

As a reminder to the parties, during our prehearing conference, we decided that Appellant will have 60 minutes to make its presentation, followed by Petitioners who will have 20 minutes, and then CDTFA who will have 30 minutes. Then Appellant will have minutes

| 1 | to provide closing remarks if it chooses. Each party is |
|----|---|
| 2 | encouraged to monitor their own time. And I also remind |
| 3 | the parties that the taxpayer in this matter shall be |
| 4 | referred to only as "Retailer." |
| 5 | Does anyone have any questions before we move |
| 6 | on to presentations? |
| 7 | Mr. Cataldo? |
| 8 | MR. CATALDO: No questions. |
| 9 | ALJ RIDENOUR: Thank you. |
| LO | Ms. Varney? |
| 11 | MS. VARNEY: No questions. |
| L2 | ALJ RIDENOUR: Thank you. |
| 13 | And Mr. Bacchus? |
| L4 | MR. BACCHUS: No questions. |
| 15 | ALJ RIDENOUR: All right. Thank you. |
| L6 | Again, Mr. Cataldo, you have 60 minutes, and |
| L7 | when you're ready, please begin your presentation. |
| 18 | MR. CATALDO: Perfect. Thank you very much. |
| L9 | |
| 20 | PRESENTATION |
| 21 | BY MR. CATALDO, Attorney for Appellant: |
| 22 | So I just want to give you a little overview of |
| 23 | the topics that I'm going to be covering in my |
| 24 | presentation today starting with just a summary of the |
| 25 | case, identifying the agreed facts of the case |

ALJ WONG: Mr. Cataldo, can you pull the mic closer, please. Thank you.

MR. CATALDO: How's this? Okay?

ALJ WONG: Great. Thank you.

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MR. CATALDO: So I'm going to start with a summary of the case, then lay out the agreed facts, then discuss the evidence in this case, then the economic development agreement, followed by a discussion of buying companies and Regulation 1699 -- it was (h), it is currently (i). There's recently been an amendment to the regulation that just moved the ordering -- as well as legislation specifically dealing with jet fuel, local sales tax allocation where there's one place of business. Then I'm going to go through the Board of Equalization review of the reallocation petitions and the regulations, followed by the laches argument, then applying the local sales tax allocation laws to the undisputed facts in this case, and then concluding with several ways that this panel can decide the case in favor of Fillmore.

So for a summary of the case, the airline in this case -- and I'm just going to refer to it as "airline" -- established Retailer as a jet fuel-buying company. Retailer entered into an agency agreement with Inspired Development, LLC, where the retailer asks

Inspired to establish and conduct a jet fuel sales administration office in Fillmore.

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The retailer purchased jet fuel from various third parties and resold the jet fuel to the airline through its Fillmore office pursuant to a master sales agreement between the airline and the retailer. So that is just the -- sort of summary of the case.

Appellant contends that the local sales tax applies because the jet fuel sales were made by Retailer from its Fillmore office, and Appellants's position is supported by both ample evidence in the record as well as the settled law on local sales tax allocation with respect to jet fuel sales sold by buying companies with a single place of business.

CDTFA and Petitioners, from what I understand, their arguments are really aligned, so I don't have to address separate arguments from Petitioner and CDTFA.

We all seem to be -- they're all advancing the same arguments. So if I refer just to "CDTFA argues," I think you can fairly say that I'm also saying "Petitioner argues." There's no other separate arguments. For example, Petitioners were at one point arguing that there was more than one possible place of business because of the storage tanks, but as Judge Ridenour just mentioned, that is sort of off the

table now.

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So what CDTFA is contending is that the jet fuel sales in question here were subject to a local use tax because it claims that those sales were made by a retailer from Houston. Now, CDTFA must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the sales were made from Houston in order to reallocate. And that's Regulation 1807(b)(2), now 35056(c)(3), where the preponderance of evidence standard is.

They're won't be able to do that. The CDTFA really ignores all of the evidence in the case showing that the sales were made by Retailer from Retailer's office in Fillmore.

The agreed facts in this case. The retailer was a buying company. This was acknowledged in -- at Exhibit A, page 1, in the Decision and Recommendation, second sentence. What is a buying company? A buying company is defined under Regulation 1699(h). I'll be referring to it as (h). A buying company -- and this is not the entire regulation. I'll be getting into it later. But the gist of it is that a buying company, quote, shall be issued a seller's permit and shall be regarded as the seller of tangible personal property it sells or leases.

Another agreed fact is that the Board of

Equalization issued Retailer a seller's permit in 2006 for the Fillmore location.

2.4

Now, before I proceed any further, I just want to make clear when I'm referencing the Board of Equalization -- there's a lot of different parties and the Taxpayer Transparency and Fairness Act kind of added some complications to who I'm going to be referring to. But during the time at issue in this case, there was no CDTFA and there was no Office of Tax Appeals. Both of those roles were handled by the State Board of Equalization. So the State Board of Equalization was in charge of administering the sales tax, issuing regulations, which is now what the CDTFA does. The Board of Equalization also heard tax appeals, both sales tax as well as income tax appeals, which is now what the role of the Office of Tax Appeals is.

So the Board of -- the Board of Equalization issued a seller's permit to Retailer for the Fillmore location. It now seeks to retroactively revoke that sales permit and it -- so it needs that to happen in order for its entire theory to hold together.

And I will just note right now that I'm not aware of any authority that allows the State Board of Equalization to retroactively revoke a seller's permit.

Sellers' permits when they're issued, there's

rights and responsibilities to having a seller's permit, and the CDTFA's own publications will tell you that.

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Then there's -- under the Code, there's revocation proceedings and hearings before a seller's permit can be revoked. It's actually a misdemeanor to sell without a permit. And accepting and issuing the sale for resale certificate, these are all things that show you can't just retroactively revoke a seller's permit.

The point -- because I am in the agreed facts here, the point is that the BOE issued the retailer seller's permit. Now, I know they'll probably disagree as to whether they can revoke it or not, but I just wanted to point that out here.

Again, the retailer had no other place of business in California. So we've agreed to that.

And finally, title to the jet fuel at issue passed in California.

The evidence in this case, the evidence that this panel will need to look at to decide this case is -- there's a handful of things. One is the agency agreement between the retailer and Inspired, and that's at Exhibit A-1.

The master sales agreement between the retailer and the airline, which governs the sales of the jet fuel

in this case. The purchase orders and authorizations received at the Fillmore office. Those are at Exhibit A-7. The master sales agreement, by the way, is at Exhibit A-5. And the invoices received at the Fillmore office, which is at Exhibit A-8, at page 13.

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There's also an economic development agreement, which the CDTFA has pointed out in its D&R. So the economic development agreement really is not relevant evidence as far as how the law should be applied; however, you certainly need to know about it because it's relevant to looking at the buying company issue.

The economic development agreement was between Inspired and Fillmore. The economic development agreements of localities are legal, and there's been no suggestion that this is not something that can be legally done.

The economic development agreement split the local sales tax revenue that was -- would be generated as a result of placing a place of business in Fillmore, 50 percent to the retailer, 15 percent to the City of Fillmore, and 35 percent to Inspired.

There's been some discussions and questions about Ryan's involvement, and they're were a tax consulting firm who assisted. And under the agreement, they're were referenced as having a separate agreement

with Inspired, which we didn't have. It was asked for. CDTFA wanted to see it. We don't have it. Suffice it to say, there's some economic development agreement. Ryan was involved. It's our position is how Ryan gets compensated under this economic development agreement has no bearing on this case.

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Buying companies. So this is going to be a bit of a mouthful, but I think given the importance of this regulation, I'm going to go ahead and just read the buying company regulation currently at 1699(i). here it goes. The definition, For the purposes of this regulation, a buying company is a legal entity that is separate from another legal entity that owns, controls, or is otherwise related to, the buying company and which has been created for the purpose of performing administrative functions, including acquiring goods and services, for the other entity. It is presumed that the buying company is formed for the operational reasons of the entity, which owns or controls it or to which it is otherwise related. A buying company formed, however, for the sole purpose of purchasing tangible personal property ex-tax for resale to the entity which owns or controls it or to which it is otherwise related in order to re-direct local sales tax from the location(s) of the vendor(s) to the location of the buying company shall

not be recognized as a separate legal entity from the related company on whose behalf it acts for purposes of issuing it a seller's permit.

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"Such a buying company shall not be issued a seller's permit. Sales of tangible personal property to third parties will be regarded as having been made by the entity owning, controlling or otherwise related to the buying company. A buying company that is not formed for the sole purpose of so re-directing local sales tax shall be recognized as a separate legal entity from the related company on whose behalf it acts for purposes of issuing it a seller's permit. Such a buying company shall be issued a seller's permit and shall be regarded as the seller of tangible personal property it sells or leases."

There's more, but not that much.

The elements of a buying company. "Elements. A buying company is not formed for the sole purpose of re-directing local sales tax if it has one or more of the following elements: (A) adds a markup to its cost of goods sold in an amount sufficient to cover its operating and overhead expenses." And (B), issues an invoice or otherwise accounts for the transaction."

Now, we're not claiming that we meet A, adds a markup. That's not a fact in this case. But "B"

certainly does apply, "Issues an invoice or otherwise accounts for the transaction." The record and the evidence in the record, there's an ample amount of evidence to show that retailer otherwise accounted for the transaction.

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So to understand why buying companies are so important to this case and really dispositive of this case, we need to look to the history of the buying company regulation.

So back in -- it was in 2001, the State Board of Equalization opened up a regulation project to deal with buying companies. There had been a lot of uncertainty, a lot of audit disagreements regarding the establishment of the buying companies and whether they're valid or not. And they were looked to sort of common law and income tax concepts of substance over form, sham transactions, and it was not really a workable solution.

And I will point you to -- it's Exhibit 1 on page 6. I'm just going to read from it. You don't have to go there if you don't want to.

But this is at page 6 of 13. It's at the last paragraph. "There are many factors" -- oh, this is a "Initial Discussion Paper of the SBE for this Regulation Project."

Quote, There are many factors that must be considered when questioning the validity and the existence of a buying company. These items include but are not limited to, the breadth of customer base; invoicing methods of the buying company; whether or not it achieved profit margins; whether those are reasonable; assumption of fiscal and legal liabilities; the existence of a distinct separate identity; employees, accounting, and banking; whether or not the buying company has a propriatory interest in its own facilities; carries its own insurance; and the nature of economic relationship between the buying company and the vendors and the buying company's parent entity.

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The intent was to address the local sales tax allocation involving buying companies. So very similar to the case we have here, one of -- the concern that the CDTFA had with buying companies was their establishment, which could redirect the local sales tax to one location instead of it being allocated to many jurisdictions.

Staff even recognized -- at Exhibit 4,
page 3 -- they even recognized the use of economic
development agreements by cities and other localities to
do this understanding that it was legal to do this.
That's at Exhibit 4, page 3.

At Exhibit 4, page 5 -- excuse me. I knew I

brought these for a reason.

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So Exhibit 4, page 5, again, this is -- this is a formal issue paper issued by the State Board of Equalization.

They wanted to ensure uniform application of the regulation. And the importance of that is that we need to treat all cities and localities equally. We can't have one be provided a certain result and another a different result even though the facts are substantially the same.

The reg project was initially proposed under Regulation 1802, but as the project went forward, staff agreed that 1802 was not the proper place to address the buying companies. It was at 1699 for issuing permits.

Staff proposed standards to a buying company which are much more stringent than what was ultimately -- ultimately adopted in the regulation. And at Exhibit 2, pages 10 and 11, and Exhibit 3, page 3, they list a variety of different additional requirements that the staff was proposing.

The project was well-publicized. There were 28 submissions by interested parties, according to the SBE. And ultimately the Board adopted on -- in February of 2002, the Board adopted the buying company regulation as it exists today.

One of the things that the staff wanted was not such a certain definition. In the buying company regulation, it talks about for the sole purpose of redirecting sales tax. That's where a buying company will not be recognized under the current regulation, what the sole purposes is.

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easy, if you will. They wanted something with principle, but that didn't really meet the problems that they were dealing with, which is the uncertainty. If we have principle instead of sole, we're still going to have all of these fights. So they went with sole. And they also defined what the sole reason for reallocating would be. And if -- if you were involved in invoicing or involved in the transaction under 1699(b) that's going to be enough to be treated not as solely set up to reallocate.

So after this regulation was passed, this agreement between the City of Oakland and United came to light. And you'll see as I sort of describe what's going on and it's been described in the exhibits that I've provided, the agreement is strikingly similar to the -- the issue we have today. And it's not surprising because as a result of this Oakland-United agreement, the State Board of Equalization looked at that agreement

and was asked to reject the -- the -- the impact of it, the local allocation of it. And it didn't.

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The Board of Equalization was asked to repeal the buying company regulations in order to do that. It refused to do so. The Board of Equalization was asked to amend the buying company regulation because of this agreement, and it also refused to do so. What it did do was it instructed staff to go ahead and set up another regulation project to reexamine what was going on with the buying companies.

So the Oakland-United agreement. Jet fuel sales from a buying company and United, were made pursuant to a master sales contract, much like here. The buying company was a subsidiary of United much like here. The buying company was issued a seller's permit at its Oakland location, which was its only location. That office had -- it was a 580-square-foot office in Oakland manned by a single person.

The airline issued monthly purchase orders to the buying company for estimated jet fuel needs pursuant to the master sales contract, and the monthly purchase orders were mandatory under the master sales agreement in order to have the title pass, much like the case here. Title to the jet fuel passed in California, as they have here.

Much was made of the economic development agreement between United and Oakland because, much like here, there was an economic development agreement in that case where Oakland retained some of the additional sales tax revenue. United also received some of that sales tax revenue.

There's a quote -- and this was from -- it's at Exhibit 8, page 3. I'll just read it to you.

And this is -- excuse me. Okay. So this is a quote from a spokesperson for United, and this, what I believe, is what sort of started this whole process of some of these other cities and localities saying this -- we -- this can't stand. It's actually -- I'm sorry. I said page 3. It's the top of page 4, where the quote starts. And I will just read it.

"The beauty of the arrangement, United spokesman Jeff Green said, is that reallocation of the subsidiary is essentially paperwork. The company would open a one-person sales office at Oakland International Airport. The deal requires neither construction, nor the transfer of a single drop of jet fuel into or out of Oakland. The deal would just consolidate purchasing the company does for the West Coast work that can be handled by one additional employee. Although United has major operations in both San Francisco and Los Angeles, it is

unlikely either city would offer the same business incentives."

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So there was some outrage about this from many of the parties, which is what led to this -- the petitions of the -- the Cities of -- City and County of San Francisco as well as the County of San Mateo.

They -- in December of 2004, they filed a petition with the State Board of Equalization using this

United-Oakland agreement as a basis -- basis for its petitions. And it asked the Board to repeal the regulation retroactively. The Board looked at it, considered it, and denied repealing it in March of 2005. That's when it ordered the staff, the business tax committee, to consider some possible amendments.

The staff did actually open a regulation project in April of 2005, and it held interested parties meetings in July and September of that year. They -- the -- at Exhibit 11 -- Exhibit 11 is -- it's the business tax committee -- business tax committee discussion.

And there it -- the business tax committee sort of laid out the various proposals. There was -- SB staff had its proposal, and City, County of San Francisco and San Mateo had some alternatives. San Francisco and San Mateo wanted this repealed

retroactively and effectively undoing the United-Oakland agreement.

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At the time the State Board of Equalization's staff's position was that applying this retroactively would be unfair, so their proposal was to apply it -- apply it effective August 31, 2006, was at least the draft.

However, this draft never got anywhere because the business tax committee voted to abandon the regulation in November of 2005. And there was a reason for that, and that reason was that the legislator had -- the legislature stepped in. They knew what this issue was. They were aware of the Oakland-United agreement and how it impacts allocation of local sales tax.

And they passed AB 451, which put an end to having jet fuel companies have a buying company in a single location. And the key to why this Oakland-United deal, like, works under the law is there's only one place of business so there's a retailer with one place of business with a sale's permit. There's no question that in that instance the sale -- it's a sales tax and all of the sales, local sales tax, is allocated to where that place exists.

Then on September 29th, 2005, the Legislature passed AB 451, and the key point of that for this case

is that they made it effective January 1, 2008. Our years at issue here are -- actually this is the periods and there's the second, third, and fourth quarters of 2007. So this application of AB 451 doesn't apply until 2008.

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Now, we should think -- I want to talk about some prior legislation, which actually didn't pass, which is kind of telling. And this is AB 2466. I -- it's essentially identical to AB 451 as far as changing where local sales tax is allocated for jet fuel sales where there is a single place of business.

This was proposed, but it was vetoed by the Governor. The -- part of the legislation said that we need a study by the State Auditor to see what the impact is of -- of changing this on the localities and their revenue and the agreements that they have entered into. The Governor said we need more time to study the impact on local incentives and development agreements. And you can see that at Exhibit 14, page 5. That was the reason it was vetoed.

Then 451 came along with an effective date of January 1, 2008, for that very reason, to allow the localities -- to give time for the legislature to discuss the impact. Because these localities rely a lot on the local sales tax, and the reason there was this

delayed effective date was to make sure we're not pulling the rug out from under these -- these localities who have entered into agreements.

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So AB 451 resolves the buying company issue for jet fuel sales beginning in 2008. So the United and Oakland deal was allowed to go through, and until 2008 AB 451 ended it.

Revenue and Taxation Code 7224 requires that each local jurisdiction has the right to have the law administered in a uniform manner. Oakland and United, theirs was -- their -- their agreements were respected up until 2008 when the law changed. There's no basis to treat Fillmore any differently than Oakland.

Now, I do want to -- I'm kind of switching gears here now and going to the reallocation petition regulations.

The panel has asked about -- specifically about whether any parties demanded that a -- a -- a decision be rendered under 35056(c)(4) within six months of the date the petition was received. So at this time -- at the time that a petition was issued, we were under the regulation 1807(b)(3), as the panel has noted. There's some slight differences in the language, but I'm just going to look to the 1807(b)(3).

And it just says if the allocation group does

not issue a decision within six months of the date it receives a valid petition, then whoever's making this argument can demand that a decision be issued within 90 days, irrespective of the investigation.

Now, how does this impact the laches argument, was the question. And I'll say that neither -- these were not options for either Fillmore or the petitioners. And that's because the allocation group issued a decision within less than six months. And I'm just going to kind of go through now the process of what happened.

So first we have the incorrect distribution of local petitions which were filed by the petitioners, and that's at Exhibit P-1, on March 28th, 2008. On May 7th, 2008, there was a visit of the Fillmore office, apparently. That's at Exhibit A-6. This is the "scribbled note" exhibit, which is -- I guess the auditor or whoever made the visit wrote down that they showed up May 7th, 2008, at the Fillmore location. The door was locked. That note also says they called the landlord, who'd never heard of Retailer.

Now, we can look at Exhibit D, which kind of lays out what happened. Exhibit D kind of has all of the -- all of the letters and correspondence. So March 28th, 2008, that's when the petition was filed.

August 4th, 2008, the allocation group sent a letter to Fillmore stating the Fillmore office was not a valid sales office. The sales were negotiated in Houston and that they're reallocating the local sales tax. It was a use tax. You can appeal if you disagree by requesting an appeal conference.

2.4

So tax or -- pardon me. Fillmore responded

August 28th, 2008, asking for a 30-day extension, which
was granted. Then on October 3rd they filed their
response objecting to the allocation group's August 8th
letter, also suggesting that an appeals conference may
have been premature.

October 29th the allocation group sent a letter saying, "We're moving the matter to the appeals section," and then followed up again with a letter on the 10th saying that you're -- you -- you're going to appeals. The decision had already been made.

So this question of laches and the delay was not at the very beginning. At the very beginning they acted very promptly. In fact, too promptly because I don't know how you could even do an investigation acting so quickly, but they seem to rely only on the auditor who made this office visit in 2008 as a basis for saying that the -- it was a use tax and it was going to be reallocated.

So after November 10th, 2008, everything went silent. There was nothing going on, no response, no correspondence from appeals, was just told Appeals will contact you. Been waiting for appeals.

The next thing we have is a response to an information request on April 16th, 2012. And then by September 26th the decision was rendered. The decision recommendation, that's at Exhibit A, pages 9 and 10, kind of detail what happened.

And what happened was the regulations -- the 1807 regulations. So Part (a) is just a bunch of definitions. Part (b) is reviewed by the allocation group. And the section -- it's (b)(3) this is where this if it -- no decision was made within six months, but a decision was made within six months, so there was no option for that.

What happened was the allocation group kind of just didn't do anything. They just kicked it over to appeals. And there it sat for over three years before anything got done. And what I mean by "anything got done," is that any questions were even asked.

So we have a period over three years where there's no explanation that's reasonable for it. And the delay is certainly prejudicial, especially in this case where there's so many facts being asked about.

CDTFA has noted that there's no evidence for X, Y or Z. Think of what's happened over the three years. The -- so Inspired Development, LLC, that in that course in time has gone away. The single person who ran Inspired Development passed away in 2012, I believe it was. And the retailer was acquired in a pretty large transaction.

So documents get lost when time passes, when three years go by with nothing being done other than the auditor shows up at the door, it's locked. Okay. You know what? We can't allocate sales tax here. That's all the evidence there was. And 2008, that office was closed down. So there really was nothing to find out in 2008. We're talking about periods of 2007.

So the laches defense -- and we've cited it.

The Department has cited cases as well. I don't think there's much of a disagreement about what it applies to. It's a defense where there's unreasonable delay, and as a result of the delay, there's prejudice. And I think that we clearly met that here. The delay was unreasonable.

There was no reason for the allocation group to not do its job, which was to actually to investigate the petition, gather evidence. They didn't do it. They said this is just going to appeals. Why are we skipping over half of the regulation? I don't know.

But then some three-plus years later, I think somebody at CDTFA realized, hey, we didn't -- we messed this up. This has got to go back. And it did go back. And that cost a lot of time, which cost inability to have all of the evidence, to get all of the evidence. Evidence deteriorates over time, for the reasons I stated. People pass away, companies get acquired, document policies. They don't -- companies don't keep documents forever.

Okay. So just looking at the agreed facts in this case, since the retailer was a buying company and it had only one California place of business, CDTFA properly issued a retailer seller's permit, because it's its only location. You can't issue a seller's permit to no location. You have to have one location.

And why this whole arrangement works in a way that directs the local sales tax to where the retailer is located is because there's only one location, and that's where the seller's permit is is at that location.

And if you look at Regulation 1802(a)(1), it's pretty plain. "If a retailer has only one place of business in this state, all California retail sales of that retailer in which that place of business participates, occurs at that place of business."

So as a result, all the jet fuel sales made by

Retailer through its only California place of business are subject to sales tax and the local portion allocated to that place of business in Fillmore.

12.

So now I'd like to get into Regulation 1620(a)(2)(a). And this is -- so Fillmore's office was a place of business of the retailer that participated in the jet fuel transaction. Now, if we just look at the buying company regulation, one location, I think you can decide this case based on that alone. However, the CDTFA didn't look at the buying company regulation. It didn't really -- did not mention it at all throughout all of this time. And instead, it's focused on Regulation 1620 to argue that there was no place of business in Fillmore and that that office didn't participate in these sales.

And even if the -- the 1699 buying company regulation doesn't dissolve -- dispose of this case, we can look right to this regulation and the facts of this case and conclude that the Fillmore office was the place of business.

So just to address some of the contentions.

One of the things that CDTFA is contending is that no place of business in Fillmore, and what they say is,

"Hey, Inspired was in Fillmore because Inspired had the lease of the location," but that was Inspired.

That's -- that's -- that's not the retailer. So it's not the retailer's location.

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And this just ignores agency principles that are pretty well-established in California. The Inspired and -- and the retailer had an agency agreement specifically to open an office and run an office out of Fillmore. So anything that Inspired did was as an agent of the retailer. And as a result of that, the retailer had a place of business where Inspired was.

Now, we can set that aside for the moment and say even if, even if the law in California weren't clear that agents can act for their principal, Inspired leased the facility. There was a lease that Retailer entered into. It was an actual lease. So we don't really even need to rely on the notion of "agency."

And I want to just read one part of the 1620 regulation. It's specific about agents. Sales tax applies when the order for the property is sent by the purchaser, which is what has happened here, to any location, branch, office, outlet or other place of business of the retailer in this state or agent or representative operating out -- operating out of or having any connection with such local branch, office, outlet, or other place of business and the sale occurs in this state, which everyone agrees it did.

So to ignore the agent's agency is just incorrect. But again, it's sort of a who cares because retailer has its own lease.

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Now, they've talked about, that is CDTFA has tried to discredit this lease and say it's invalid and it shouldn't be considered, and they've sort of gone to some great lengths to try and show that by submitting a sample lease of another with an -- with the landlord and a different tenant. And the purpose of it is to say, "Hey, look. This lease had a provision that prohibited subleasing without written authorization."

This is -- well, I don't think you can really even consider that as evidence. But it doesn't matter. You don't need to. Because even if there were a provision in the -- in the lease that prohibited subleasing without written consent, that doesn't make the lease void. It's voidable. It's voidable at the election of the landlord.

And there's a case on this that's been cited hundreds of times. It's People v. Klopstock, K-l-o-p-s-t-o-c-k, 24 Cal. 2d, 897 pin cite 9/01/1944.

The successive assignments, though made without the written consent of the lessor were merely voidable, not void. There was no ipso facto termination of the lesse by reason of the lessee's failure to obtain

lessor's written consent to assignment. So this is kind of no reason to be chasing down this road because there's no evidence in the case that the landlord voided -- voided the lease. Because the landlord has to actually take action to void the lease. There's no evidence that -- of that.

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Now, the last thing I'd like to address is the question of whether the retailer participated in the sales, and I think the evidence is overwhelmingly, yes, the retailer participated in the sales. They have the master sales agreement. Under that master sales agreement, you could not transfer title to the jet fuel without purchase -- purchase orders and authorizations. And you can look to the master sales agreement itself at Exhibit A-5, page 8. Negotiations and execution of the master service agreement was done in the Fillmore office.

Now, a lot has been made of this with the -the declarations signed under penalty of perjury that
there was the execution and negotiations of the master
service agreement in Fillmore. But that's cumulative
evidence. That's -- yeah, it -- it helps to show that
there was participation at the Fillmore office because
that happened, but it's not essential. What's essential
is the purchase orders, the authorizations all going to

the Fillmore office, the person working at the Fillmore office releasing the -- writing the purchase orders, receiving the purchase orders. That is where the participation -- participation -- participation is shown. So it really doesn't make much of a difference whether the MSA itself was negotiated or executed at the Fillmore location even though the undisputed evidence shows it was.

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There's testimony under penalty of perjury signed that -- that says so. CDTFA wants to discount that because they believe the people who signed it who are employees of Ryan cannot be honest because they have some sort of financial stake. And there's no evidence that the employees of Ryan have a financial stake in the outcome.

And I don't know if it's very reasonable to say if someone has a financial stake in the outcome, we can't have their testimony. We would have a lot less declarations if that were the case in cases that are before you as well as in the court. In the courts declarations are often used and are valid evidence signed under penalty of perjury. And very often it's, you know, an employee of a company giving it to provide evidence when there's otherwise none to be found because, you know, so much time has gone by, we sort of

had to go to the -- go to the declaration. Because that -- declarations are used a lot when evidence is missing try and fill in the gaps.

2.4

So in closing, there's just -- I wanted to provide the panel with a few ways I believe they could conclude here to -- to find that no reallocation is proper. One is laches, unreasonable delay, and prejudicial. I don't think there's any dispute that this delay was unreasonable. It doesn't matter that the petitioners were not involved, did not -- were not at fault for the delay. It's unreasonable delay and prejudice.

A second -- and these are all independent ways the panel can go to decide this. You could just say, Laches, case over. I don't even need to get into any of the other stuff.

The second one is another simple one, which is to say there is insufficient evidence that sales occurred in Houston to apply a use tax. We have quite a bit of evidence about what's gone on at the Fillmore office, but the evidence is very light that anything happened in Houston to apply the sales tax.

A third independent way to conclude that there should be no reallocation is that you cannot retroactively revoke the retailer's seller's permit

because having the seller's permit and one location means that's where the sales are allocated. So the CDTFA needs to retroactively revoke the Retailer's seller's permit for any of this -- for any of their positions to work.

Fourth, the buying company regulations, the Oakland-United deal, and AB 451 show a clear intent by the legislature as well as the State Board of Equalization making the regulations that these arrangements are to be respected until January 1, 2008.

And fifth and finally, Fillmore office was a place of business of Retailer and that it did participate in the jet fuel sales. And this is kind of where all of the CDTFA's argument lies is in fifth -- in my fifth point. The fifth way you could find for reallocation is it was a place of business. The evidence shows it was a place of business. The evidence shows that the retailer participated in the jet fuel sales transactions, but there's no evidence that it did not. And that's all I have.

ALJ RIDENOUR: Thank you, Mr. Cataldo.

I do have some questions for you, and they are lengthy, so please be patient with me.

MR. CATALDO: Okay.

BY ALJ RIDENOUR:

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Q First, I don't believe there's any dispute among the parties that retailer is a buying company. And if, you know, Petitioners and CDTFA feel differently, please let me know during your presentation.

So having said that, is it Appellants's contention that because it's a buying company it's automatically entitled to a seller's permit?

A Because -- well, if you -- let's look at the regulation .

O Um-hum.

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A And I'm just going to pull it up right now.

So here's the important thing is -- that's why I read this whole regulation. I did not want to, but I thought it was important. We have to look at -- what is -- what is the definition of a buying company. What is it doing? It's performing administrative functions, including acquiring goods and services. That's what was done here. That's what retailer did here.

And then there's a lot of words about when it is and when it is not going to be respected. Those words are the sole purpose to redirect. Now, if you -- if it's not -- if the sole purpose of the buying company is not to redirect the local sales tax, it shall be issued a seller's permit and shall be regarded as the

seller of tangible personal property it sells or leases.

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Again, the retailer was acquiring goods at the location in Fillmore. The United-Oakland deal discussed this almost exact situation. So because there's only one place of business, yes, I believe under 1699 under the buying company right, if you -- in our case, if you meet this regulation because this was -- this was being done at Fillmore, that, yeah, the sales have to be allocated to Fillmore, the only place of business.

Q Okay. So, yes, you agree it first needs to be found a place of business?

A Well, yes. Like, for example, if there's a buying company in some far remote place that does all this stuff, it's not in California, there's no seller's permit that's going to be issued.

Q Okay. Just wanted to clarify. Thank you. Okay. As for your laches argument, is it -- just to clarify, is it Appellants's position that Petitioners caused any delay?

A Well, the Petitioners filed the petition and then did nothing else. They didn't actively prosecute their claims. They were coming to the Board to say, "Hey, we have a problem. We have a claim," and now we filed our petition and then did nothing.

They let the CDTFA kind of run with it, but

they ran a really strong burst for a little bit and then
stopped. And I have to look and say, Well, you know,
three years in -- three years go by. Did the
Petitioners do anything to say, "Hey, what's going on
with our claim that we have?" There was nothing.

So to the extent that they sat on their hands and did nothing, yes, they have some fault in this.

Q Okay. So --

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A But it's not required. I'm sorry. I didn't mean to interrupt.

Q Right. I'm sorry. Go ahead.

A It's not -- I don't think laches requires that. It's unreasonable delay and prejudice. Those are the two things. It's not someone got a benefit or didn't get a benefit. Unreasonable delay, which I think the record shows clearly there was, and prejudice, which is, I mean, if you find that, "Hey, all of this evidence that's CDTFA is kind of picking at and complaining about not showing what it really shows and, therefore, it's a use tax. And it's a use tax to Houston."

There's prejudice there. We would have had the opportunity to look into and get the evidence if three -- more than three years didn't just evaporate.

Q To follow up on that, so on March 29th, 2008, CDTFA received Petitioner's petition. And then on

August 4th, 2008, CDTFA noticed Appellant that it 1 2. intended to reallocate. 3 As to that, I don't understand your position as 4 to how Petitioners caused any delay. 5 Α How Petitioners caused any delay? 6 0 Correct. 7 Okay. So there was a -- let me go to the -- I Α want to make sure I'm answering your question. 8 9 Q Thank you. 10 Α So August 28th, 2008 they requested an 11 extension. I'm sorry. Can you repeat again where what 12 13 So if am correct in my timeline, in March of 2008 CDTFA received Petitioner's petition. 14 15 Α Right. And they were, you know, taken by CDTFA -- I'm 16 17 just going to refer to BOE as CDTFA. 18 Α Okay. That's fine. 19 And then on August 4th, 2008, CDTFA Q Yeah. 20 noticed Appellant that it intended to reallocate well within the timeline for it to issue its decision. 21 22 so at that point I am kind of unsure as to how 23 Petitioners caused a delay if they gave their petition, 2.4 CDTFA notified Appellant and then Appellant filed on

October 3rd, 2008, its petition for that against that

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notification.

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A Right. So the Petitioner in these reallocation cases, I mean, other than file your petition, there's no obligation for them to do anything. So it is the CDTFA's responsibility to run it through the regulations. The allocation group is supposed to look at it. The only way I can point to the Petitioners and say, "It's your fault," is not through that period but from the period November 2008 all the way through 2012. I mean, the years that had gone by. And this is the Petitioner's claims and you didn't say anything, you didn't ask, "Hey, how's our claim going? Should we be worried about it?"

So to the extent we can point the finger at Petitioner, it's really limited to that doing nothing --

- Q Okay.
- A -- in that period of time.
- Q Right. Thank you very much. Appellant asserts that the four-year delay caused unreasonable and prejudicial because business operations in Fillmore had since closed and many documents are no longer available and witness testing -- memories had waned; is that correct?
 - A Yes.
 - Q Okay. According to the records, CDTFA received

Petitioner's petitions on March 29th, 2008, and then
just four -- over four months later, on August 4th, 2008
CDTFA notified Appellant that it intended to reallocate
the local tax at issue; correct?

A Let's check Exhibit D because intended -- does it say "intended"? Sorry.

Okay. So I'm looking at the August 4th, 2008, letter. "Based on information in our possession" -- and this is August 4th. It's from the State Board of Equalization to Fillmore. Based on the information in our possession, it is the Board's position that the registered location is not a valid sales office.

"It is our opinion that the taxpayer's sales are negotiated in Houston; therefore, no local tax should" -- "should is do" -- I'm reading it -- "the City of Fillmore. Accordingly, based on our date of knowledge, March 27th, 2008, and we propose to reallocate the local tax. If you do not agree with our position, you may appeal this decision by requesting an appeals conference."

So that's what was sent to --

- Q So I misspoke. Not intended, but proposed.
- A Yes. Yes. Proposed.
- Q Okay. To which then Appellant did file a petition against that for that -- of that notification

on October 3rd, 2008 in response.

A Yes. Yes. They were a little confused when they it. Like, "Why are you skipping through this whole process? Shouldn't we be looking at it at the allocation level? Why are you just suddenly going to appeals?" But they did. They responded to it and said they didn't agree in their letter, and then they got two letters -- got a letter back on the 29th saying, "No. Appeals --"

Oh, yeah.

Q Okay. Mr. Cataldo, I'm going to stop you. I do -- I have learned this case inside and out so I know all the letters, notifications, everything, but I'm going to keep continuing with my laches questions.

When Appellant received that August 4th, 2008, notification, what steps did Appellant take to obtain documentation, testimony, et cetera supporting its position at that time?

A At that time they looked at it and they said, "Okay. Well, this is the United-Oakland deal. This is what we have to do in order for this to work. We have all the documents that we need." And they did have all the documents that they needed, and it's their position to this day all of the documents that they needed they have. But the CDTFA's position is that these documents

are not good enough and that we need more information. And it is -- if that more information is what causes Fillmore to lose this, then that would be prejudicial.

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Q I understood the argument to be that because there was a four-year delay, you were unable to get the documents and everything. But now you're saying you had it in -- Appellant had it in 2008. So can you please clarify?

So we had the documents that are actually Α essential to deciding the case, like the -- the agreements, the agency agreement, the -- the purchase agreement. But information and details that we didn't have, if you look at a lot of the information requests after, like in 2013 and '14, once they actually started picking up the case and the details information -- which frankly, that information is sort of irrelevant to the It doesn't change it. But they are asking for it. And if they're concluding all this info that you don't have, we're going -- even though it's our view that this info is not relevant, if they say it is -- and you're going to decide or they're going to decide based on this lack of information you lose, well, then, we maybe would have been able to get that information three and a half years earlier.

Q To which I then ask you if you had the

documentation in 2008 and submitted it -- I'm saying "you." I know you were not the representative at the time. If you had given CDTFA that documentation in 2008, CDTFA probably -- and you can address this -- had been able to in 2008/2009 looked at the documentation and then been able to provide those questions for additional documentation.

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So, again, this lapse in time of Appellant giving CDTFA the documentation when it was notified in 2008 of this potential reallocation, I'm having a hard time wrapping my head around. So if you could please clarify?

A Let me -- yes. And I think it was just the tone of these letters. One paragraph, very little investigation and just the definitive, "We've decided that this" -- "It's going to get reallocated. And you can appeal. Go to the appeals conference."

So if you're the Appellant and you're looking at this and you're reading the correspondence, they said, "Hey, why are you jumping the gun?" They even brought it up. "You're jumping the gun." But there was no response to that. It was just, "You'll be contacted. You will be contacted by the appeals division," is what the letter said.

In the letter before that Fillmore sent, they

said, "Hey, we've got this stuff. We're gathering this
stuff." And then their response was, "You'll be
contacted."

Does that answer your question? Because I feel like maybe I didn't answer it.

Q Okay.

2.4

A Like, okay, the November 10th, 2008, letter. "They will notify you of the time and place of the conference." They didn't say, "Can you give us the information?"

Q Well, Appellant did -- sorry to interrupt Appellant did indicate in its October -- it's an October 3rd, 2000, petition that it was in, quote-unquote, in the process of obtaining copies of documentation and that it expected to provide that information within 30 days. And then there was a three and a half year lapse between that letter and when Appellant gave the documentation.

A Right. So let's -- because that's interesting. We expect within 30 days to give you this information. We're gathering it, whatnot. But then what happened was within less than 30 days we got the letter from the State Board of Equalization. That's the October 29th letter. "We feel this issue can be best addressed at the next level of the appeals process. Therefore, we're

forwarding your appeal to our appeals section. You'll be contacted regarding the scheduling of an appeals conference at a later date."

No "Can you provide us information?" No questions. None of that. And then on the 10th, they kind of say the same thing. "This is to acknowledge your appeal of our proposed reallocation. You didn't give us any new information. Your appeal didn't present any new information." I mean, this is on the 10th. Like they hadn't even asked for the info and they're already saying, "We decided and you can go to appeals." Like, honestly, it seemed like they just didn't want to do this.

Maybe they're -- I mean, they mentioned staffing in the D&R. I don't know what it is. What I do know is, at least from the documents I'm looking at, the allocation group didn't really do any work on this and it got sent to appeals. And then eventually someone in appeals looked at it and said, "Hey, wait a minute. We forgot to go through the whole process that the allocation group's supposed to do. Let's kick it back down to them." And that was three-plus years.

Q And during that time Appellant didn't find it -- Appellants's been in this position more than once. They've had such cases. And so I'm just kind of

curious, like, why they just wouldn't submit the documentation so that they could have it.

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A So I'm speculating now because there's nothing in the record about this. But if it were me and I'm looking at it and they say, "We've already decided," at the allocation group." And we send a letter saying, "Wait. Wait. What about the rules? What about the regulations? What about the allocation group performing an investigation of any kind?"

But, no, they already decided. And, "You'll be notified. We're sending you to appeals." Who's notifying me? Where do I send it to? Normally in most -- now, this is a reallocation case. It's very unique. But typically when you're representing a taxpayer, you're at an audit. You get IDRs, and then you answer the IDRs. And if you don't in a timely fashion, the Department of Revenue, whoever you're dealing with -- CDTFA, FTB -- they don't just disappear for three years and not say, "Hey, where are your responses?" They say, "Where are your responses?" And that didn't happen here. So that's a long-winded way of trying to answer your question.

Q Okay. No. I appreciate it. Okay. It is indicated in the record that this matter was one of eight CDTFA appeals, to which Appellant was concurrently

a party. And Appellant, having participated with CDTFA and deciding the prioritization of the appeals gave several other appeals higher priority because CDTFA had not distributed some of -- that amount that were reported to Appellants's pending the outcome of appeals.

What is Appellants's position on this? And especially in the context of laches.

A So I'm not aware of anything in the record where Appellant said, "Hey, just ignore this case." I'm not aware of anything. And they say in the D&R, they say there was some scheduling. But I don't see anything. I'm not aware of any sort of document or letter saying, "We're going to back-burn this case."

Q Okay. Thank you. And then one more question with regards to laches. I understand the unreasonable delay, but it -- in general laches is defined as the neglect or failure of a plaintiff to assert a right for such a period of time that results in prejudice to defendant requiring that the plaintiff's cause of action would be barred in equity.

Would you agree with that?

A Well, not in this case because we don't have a plaintiff in this case. If that's what you're getting at, like, you have to be a plaintiff for laches to apply. I don't think that's the case. I think it can

be applied against a government agency.

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You know, one of the things -- and I was looking at this case -- maybe just pull it up. Yeah. It's cited at Brown vs. State Personnel Board. So they were talking about laches in the context of a local administrative agency exercising quasi-judicial functions. And one of the things they said is unreasonable delays as a matter of law when there's no statute of limitations. And you think about the reallocation regulations. Other than what the panel had pointed out earlier about, "Hey, you know what? You have a right to say issue a decision now within" -- if it's within 90 days.

Well, once that's done and that opportunity is over, there's no statute of limitations. We could sit here forever. There's no -- nothing to compel the Board's acts. So in those cases -- and this was at -- it's that Brown case at page 1160. That's kind of like where you would apply laches.

Like, normally you have the statute of limitations that's supposed to protect you from these long delays. Like, what's the policy behind the statute of limitations? Its, you know, evidence disappears over time. Where there's no statute of limitations is where laches is particularly applicable, and that does apply

here.

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Q I've read the case, but if you could please remind me, was the government agent -- or the agency not asserting a right in that case?

A Were they not asserting a right?

Q Were they asserting a right? Because my question is, is that -- the reason why I'm trying to -- CDTFA, in all intents and purposes, was not a party to this reallocation. They are pretty much a first-tier tryer of fact as to whether the reallocation. They aren't, you know, receiving the money. They aren't -- it's not a NOD. It's just they have -- CDTFA is deciding who gets the money. It's -- so, therefore, it's not asserting a right to the money.

Can you expand on that, your position?

A Well, I thought I saw something that said that they were a party, in the reg -- in the reg. But, yeah, I mean, I think -- yeah. Okay. So this is -- I'm just going to refer to 35056 -- (a)(9), "Party" means the jurisdiction filing a petition for redistribution, any notified jurisdiction, and the assigned section." The assigned section of CDTFA. So I think under -- at least under this regulation, they're a party.

- O Okay. Thank you very much.
- A You're welcome.

1 Now we're on to place of business. 0 2 Α Oh, boy. All right. 3 Like I said, I went through this file inside 0 4 and out. 5 Α Excellent. I appreciate it. Let's see. The meeting regarding 6 0 Of course. 7 the master sale agreement, which I'll refer to hence forth as MSA, took place in late September before the 8 9 October 1st sublease between Retailer and Inspired. 10 it Appellants's contention that the Fillmore office was 11 Retailer's place of business when that meet took place? 12 Α Yes. 13 And can you expand on how that is? 0 14 Α Agency. 15 So your -- so is it Appellants's contention 0 that an agency's place of business is transmuted into 16 17 the principal's place of business? 18 Α When the agency agreement is explicit and the 19 whole purpose of the agreement is to set up a place and 20 that is the place, then yes. And that's the case here. The entire purpose of the agency agreement was to set up 21 22 the office. So Inspired did that, and while they were

And I will point out that I don't think that

there, they were acting as the agent and that was their

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place of business.

is -- like I said, it's cumulative, that evidence, as far as participation in the sales, the invoicing, the purchase orders, the authorizations. That is enough for participation in the orders. Participation in any way, any way.

Q Well, we'll get to participation of sales. Believe me, I've got it all figured out.

So do you have legal authority as to the 2006 agency agreement transmuting agency's place of business by principle by just merely having that agreement?

A Just general agency principles. I mean, I don't have it right now, but I don't think it would be hard to find. I mean, you could look at the Civil Code. I don't have it right now. I don't. So I couldn't point it to you. But, I mean, the Civil Code is full of definitions about what agency is. Contractual rights. If we look at the actual contract, the agency agreement's a contract. If you look at the contract, what does it say? The agent acts for the principal. Like they're doing it as if the principal is doing it itself.

Q Okay. Thank you.

A I mean, we could look at -- I mean, in a tax case, we have the Borders case. That's been mentioned.

And, you know, Scripto, if we want to go all the way

back to the Supreme Court talking about the distinction between an independent contractor, employee, for tax purposes. It's irrelevant.

Q Okay. Thank you. Just again, a lot of these questions are just so I can wrap my head around it when I write -- when we write the opinion.

A Happy to have the questions.

Q Thank you. Does Appellant have any evidence demonstrating that retailer ever intended itself, not through its agency, or intended or that it ever did physically use the Fillmore office? Like, did it have employees that were an agent work out of it? Did it ever -- Retailer itself, not agency, make use of the office and have external indications tending to show the office is its place of business? Like external signage, advertising, websites, any of that?

A So my answer is, again, agency, and I'll explain. The people working for Inspired Development who were there at the office were acting as agents of Retailer. So the fact that there was no employee of Retailer there, if that is even a fact -- I don't know for sure. There's nothing in the record, but it doesn't matter that place was operated under an agency agreement and people who were fulfilling the obligations were in that office.

1 We have to think about this No signage. 2 transaction. This is a captive jet fuel purchasing 3 So it's not like we're looking for foot 4 traffic to sell jet fuel. So the notion that, you know, 5 the signage and business cards or whatever, that -- I don't think that is relevant to this case. 6 7 Thank you very much. And now Okay. participations in the sales. We're almost -- I know. 8 I understand -- I understand that it's 9 10 Appellants's contention that the MSA was negotiated at 11 the Fillmore office. There's been a couple dates 12 mentioned, September 27th, September 28th. Can you please clarify Appellants -- which date Appellant is 13 14 contending? 15 Α Which date that? 16 Q The meeting took place. I'm just looking for the -- pardon me. 17 Α 18 looking for the declaration because it says it in there. 19 Take your time. No worries. Q Okay. 20 I believe it's the 28th. Α

Q Twenty-eighth? Thank you. Can you please expand on what exactly was negotiated at the Fillmore office? And any evidence that a real negotiation took place during that meeting?

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A I don't know. I only have what you have as far

as the evidence. I will say that I don't think the -- I mean, let's look at the law again for a second, single place of business.

Q Get closer, please.

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Oh, okay. Single place of business. So if Α there's a single place of business, it goes there. It's allocated there. Like, we don't need to go to this question of, "Oh, well, there's two competing. one do we go to? Well, there was the principal sales negotiated?" That isn't a thing that we even need to deal with because there's not two, there's just one. Well, what happened at that office when they -- when they executed these agreements and what are these declarations really saying about what happened there? I mean, I don't know. I read the declarations. And just like -- like -- like you can read them, and that's kind of all I can see from it. But what I can say is that it's really, like again, cumulative evidence of participation in the sale.

Q Speaking of the declarations, I did read them. And the declarants each say that the meeting took place on September 28th. Yet according to the travel documentation provided, Mr. Kersey (phonetic) and Mr. Jones each checked out of their hotel on September 27th, the day before, and Mr. Logo (phonetic) flew out

of LAX, which is approximately 60 miles from the City of Fillmore, the morning of September 28th at 10:55 a.m.

I was hoping you could please help me understand the discrepancy between the statements made in the declarations and the declarants' travel itineraries.

- A I'm going to admit, I didn't look at that one.
- Q Yeah. I told you I looked at everything.

A Let me -- I really don't have any comment on it just because there's -- I mean, I have to find it. Let me see. Where is the travel itinerary?

There it is. Sorry.

Q Okay.

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A I'm looking at the travel itinerary now. Check in, check out. This is a hotel, I think Expedia. 28th, check -- I'm looking at -- okay. I'm blind. Where are my glasses? There we go. Zoom it. Check in, 26, check out, 27th. Okay. I see what you're saying. I don't know. I don't know.

Q Thank you. Let's see --

A I mean, I'm looking at one that says check out the 28th. I mean, there's one that says the 27th, but then now there's one that says the 28th.

- O Would that be Mr. Logo (phonetic).
- A That's Mr. Logo, yes.

1 Thank you. And I understand you --2 Appellants's position is that the negotiations isn't 3 really relevant; however, I still have a couple more 4 questions about it, please. 5 Α Okay. So I was looking at the MSA and it is all typed 6 7 except for the gallon amounts, which Appellant's position is that, you know, it was negotiated at this 8 9 meeting. So I'm just having a hard time wrapping my 10 head around why all but just the gallon amounts would be 11 typed up if it was negotiated at the meeting. Well, I think it's because they don't know the 12 Α 13 exact amount they're going to have. It's just a 14 requirement. And, I mean, if you look at the -- not 15 agency agreement but the master sales agreement --That's Exhibit A-5; correct? 16 Q 17 A-5. So, I mean, it talks about -- like we Α 18 don't know exact -- the specific quantity. Like --19 okay. So let's start with -- it's A-5, page 3. 20 Let's look at number 2, quantity and limits. 21 "Buyer and seller agree that although the specific quantity of aviation fuel, equipment, supplies, and 22

It's not fixed by this contract.

other related items the buyer is under obligation to

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purchase --"

1 -- "buyer is obligated to make purchases of at 2 least 2.5 million to 15 million gallons." So that's 3 what they were obligated to do. But it recognized the 4 specific quantity was not fixed by the contract. Yeah. 5 And then 6, when known or capable of estimation --So, I mean, I think there was just an 6 understanding that they didn't know exactly the amount 7 but that there was a procedure in place for -- for 8 9 placing the orders. 10 Okay. So to follow up on that, are you saying the only things that were negotiated or talked about at 11 12 the meeting were the gallon amounts? 13 Α Well, I -- no, I'm not saying that. Maybe it 14 is; maybe it's not. I don't think the evidence said 15 limits it. It could have been. I mean, the -- the declarations are the only things in evidence about what 16 17 happened there. 18 Thank you. Before I continue with the 19 rest of my questions, I want to acknowledge that the 20 parties disagree whether the documentation Appellant 21 provided were actual purchase orders authorization to 22 release inventory. 23 Having said that, OTA will use those terms when

discussing the documentation for ease of reference.

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Okay?

Regarding the purchase orders, Appellant contends that the purchase orders from customer were regularly and systematically reviewed, processed, and approved at the Fillmore office and that the review of the purchase orders include checking them against the MSA, authorizing the release of fuel only if that -- the orders were consistent with the terms of the MSA.

Do I have that correctly?

A I think so.

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Q Okay. So I've reviewed the purchase orders, and the range in each purchase order is inconsistent with the maximum -- the minimum gallon amount delineated in the MSA. And so -- and Ms. Cooperman (phonetic) said that, in her declaration, that she reviewed orders, ensured the orders were within the prescribed requirements set forth by the MSA. And if a purchase order was not correct, it was her duty to reject the order and notify customer as to the bases of the rejection.

Is there any evidence that Ms. Cooperman rejected an incorrect purchase order?

A There is no evidence of that. And, you know, I don't mean to go back to laches now --

Q Okay.

A -- but it's the perfect, like, example of where

it would matter. Like, there's no evidence now of that.

Q Okay. Thank you.

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The purchase orders indicate that Retailer will sell aviation fuel to the customer pursuant to its order, but there's a wide range. So could you please help me understand based on that, how Retailer would know how much fuel to sell to customer?

A How Retailer would know how much fuel to sell to customer?

- Q Yeah. You know, like by looking at that purchase order, Retailer is going to have to provide customer fuel at different locations, different airports. And, you know, different amounts of gallons different days.
 - A Mm-hmm, Yeah.
- Q So based on that purchase order, which Appellant is contending is a purchase order, how would -- can you please help me understand how Retailer would know the amounts and the locations based on that purchase order?
- A I think the amounts, the specific amounts -you know, I don't know because there's no evidence in
 the record as to how the specific amounts were
 determined.
 - Q Okay. Thank you. Give me a minute, please.

1 All right. I'm going to just go into invoices and this 2. will --3 (Reporter interrupted) I'm going to move on to invoices. Thank you. 4 0 5 It appears from the evidence that the invoices were sent subsequent to the month the fuel was sold, for example, 6 bring that invoice dated May 4th, 2007. It's denoted as 7 the monthly billing for the sale of fuel in April 2007. 8 Is it Appellants's contention that billing 9 10 activity done after the sale qualifies as participation 11 in the sale? 12 Α Yes. 13 Okay. And can you please expand on that. 0 14 Participation in the transaction in any way. Α 15 So that's one of the things that I think is part of participating in the transaction. It's just one. 16 17 not the only one. It doesn't carry the whole day. 18 mean, there's other things as well. But that would be, I think, included. 19 20 Perfect. Thank you, and that concludes my Q 21 questions. We'll do questions with the panel, and then 22 we'll give the stenographer a break. Would that work? 23 THE COURT REPORTER: Yes. 2.4 Okay. So, Judge Wong, do you have any Α Yes. 25 questions?

EXAMINATION

BY ALJ WONG:

Q I do have a few questions for Appellant, mostly regarding -- sorry -- mostly regarding the buying company regulation in 1699 at the time (h), right? So part (h). But before that, could you give me some background on Fillmore? Where is it located, like just --

- A It's in Ventura County.
- Q Okay.

A I don't -- I -- I mean, I'm not sure, like, other than it's in Ventura County what -- I don't know. Like I could check Wikipedia and see what it says. I mean, that's kind of what I've done. So there's nothing about it that jumps out at me as particularly, like, different or relevant to -- for this case, but --

Q Yeah. I'm just -- I'm just wondering what its relation to selling -- buying and selling jet fuel is.

A Oh, it's -- well, I mean, we -- you kind of got to go back to the United-Oakland agreement and how that was borne out of the adoption of the regulation in the first place. And the back and forth, what should the regulation say, what should it not say, there were, you know, cities and counties saying, "This is too loose."

There were others saying, "Hey, the localities should be

able to negotiate these economic development agreements." So it's like -- part of the economic development agreement was having an office in Fillmore.

The connection between Fillmore and the jet fuel? Like there's -- no jet fuel passed through Fillmore. The jet fuel went -- or went or it was in the storage tanks in the airport. But, I mean, if you look at the regulation and the United-Oakland deal, the Board's reaction to that, and then AB 451, you don't need to have a connection with the locality for the jet fuel.

Q Was one of the reasons why Retailer was formed, was it for the purpose of redirecting local taxes, like one of the purposes?

A So -- okay. So there's stated purpose of -- okay. There was the sales tax refund claims and this was in the briefing. That was one of the purposes for the setup. There was an economic development agreement. So part of the reason was this economic development agreement. That's permissible.

I mean, the legislature recognized -- if you look in the exhibits about the AB 451 as well as the prior legislation that was vetoed, everyone there in the descriptions, these agreements are legal. The localities are allowed to enter into economic

development agreements, and they can do it how they want to do it. And they can compensate how they want to.

They're independent in that way. And the CDTFA can't go in -- there's no state law prohibiting it. CDTFA can't prohibit it. And they can't do policies that would influence or mess with the contracts that these localities entered into.

- Q Was Retailer's sole purpose redirecting local sales taxes?
 - A No. No.

- Q Okay. What were the other purposes it was formed for?
- A To facilitate the refund of sales taxes on jet fuel that were ultimately used in international travel. So before -- and I think they're still doing this actually, even though this whole reallocation single place of business has been changed because of AB 451, they're still doing this because certain jet fuel used in international travel is not taxable, but having a single entity file all the returns, they can get the refunds back versus going to the supplier, all the different suppliers, and having to do it that way.
- Q Retailer -- did Retailer cease to exist or close down shortly after the law was changed that you're referring to? I'm specifically referring to Regulation

1 1802 -- at the time it's -- I think it's (b)(6)(B),2 which changed where the sale of jet fuel takes place. 3 And it became effective like January 1st, 2008. 4 understanding is that Retailer stopped doing business in Fillmore shortly after that order.

That is correct. And, you know, I kind of want to follow up on the last question.

Q Sure.

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- Because you were asking about the sole --Α
- Q Yeah.

And it's in the regulation itself. The buying А company is not formed for the sole purpose of redirecting local sales tax if it has one or more of the following elements and I'm going to skip that markup. That's one of them, that's not relevant in this case. The other is issues and invoice or otherwise accounts for the transaction.

So not a lot has to be done for it to not be the sole purpose. Now, we've done that, so it's not sole purpose, but there is other purposes besides redirecting that was here. Nevertheless, I understand where you would say, "Hey, you know what? You can't come here and say that " -- and I don't even think redirecting is the right word. It's just this is where it's allocated. And you located in Fillmore. If part

of the reason and part of the incentive of relocating -or locating in Fillmore was the sales tax allocation
deal, that's permissible. And I think by the fact that
they closed up shop in 2008, January 1, kind of tells
you it's significant but not sole.

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Q Pretty clever. But -- so my other question is, it goes to Judge Ridenour's question regarding negotiations. So my understanding is Retailer and its customer, its main customer, is it the only customer it had?

A Yes. Well, pretty much. I mean, there was affiliates as well. But for the most part, it was just the airline and its affiliates. Those were the only --

Q But they share common ownership; is that correct? Like --

A Yes. Yeah. They complete -- yeah. It's captive. Like, the airline owned the retailer 100 percent.

Q Okay. I know CDTFA in their decision or supplemental or maybe both even, they mentioned this. But, like, in what sense was it a negotiation if both parties are related? Like -- yeah, in what sense is it a negotiation?

A Yeah. I mean, that's a good question. Like a negotiation as far as, like, hemming and hawing back and

forth, offer, counteroffer. I don't think the word "negotiation" requires that level of counteroffer.

Like, and I thought about this scenario. Like, I always go to the hardware store and you're going to go buy a hammer, as like the simplest application of sales tax you could possibly come up with.

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And I go in to buy a hammer, and the hammer costs, I don't know, \$12. I pull it off the shelf. I'm not hemming and hawing. I'm not saying, "How about nine?" I'm just paying it. That's kind of like the negotiation of what's happening and why sales tax is allocated to that place.

Q That's all the questions I had for now. Thanks for your presentation.

A You know, I would like to kind of follow up on one thing that you mentioned because you did mention that the setup was clever. And it was. Fillmore wasn't the one who set it up. I mean, Oakland-United kind of did this. And then it came to light, and then the legislature sort of stopped it. So it's like this has been done before, and Fillmore and I don't know how many other cities said, "Okay. Well, if Oakland's going to get this and X city is going to be able to do this, we should be able to do this too." And I think the law requires they are treated equally. So I just wanted to

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| 1 | put that in there. |
| 2 | ALJ WONG: Thank you. |
| 3 | MR. CATALDO: Thank you. |
| 4 | ALJ RIDENOUR: Thank you. |
| 5 | Judge Brown, did you have any questions? |
| 6 | ALJ BROWN: I do not have any questions. Thank |
| 7 | you. |
| 8 | ALJ RIDENOUR: All right. It's 2:45. We're |
| 9 | going to take a five-minute recess. We're off the |
| 10 | record. And thank you. Oh, you know what? We'll have |
| 11 | a ten. Give thank you. Ten-minute break. |
| 12 | (Break taken at 2:46 p.m.) |
| 13 | ALJ RIDENOUR: Welcome back. We're back on the |
| 14 | record. |
| 15 | Petitioners, you have 20 minutes. When you're |
| 16 | ready, Ms. Varney, please begin your presentation. |
| 17 | MS. VARNEY: Thank you very much. |
| 18 | |
| 19 | PRESENTATION |
| 20 | BY MS. VARNEY, Representative for the Petitioner: |
| 21 | In an effort to be sensitive to time and also |
| 22 | not to be overly repetitive in terms of a lot of |
| 23 | information that's already been exchanged and questions |
| 24 | you asked and so forth and things that are already |
| 25 | submitted in the record on our briefs, I'm going to kind |

of touch on some of the points that were -- are, you know, important to me as brought forward by Mr. Cataldo.

First and foremost I wanted to bring up the fact that the CDTFA or SBE, they're contracted by the local jurisdictions here in California to collect and remit the local tax on their behalf and then distribute it and fund it back to them. So in that regard, they are constantly reviewing and monitoring and so forth on behalf of the jurisdictions because they are paid to do so by those.

Our role is to kind of backstop that process in that we also monitor and look to make sure that, based on our knowledge of laws and regulations, that the local tax is being allocated to the proper jurisdiction.

One of the important points, I think, also is to note that when a business applies for a seller's permit, the information that may be provided at that time may not, you know, be fully complete in the sense that it may not -- it may say that it's going to be sales, but in terms of the greater details in terms of that office's operations or so forth. So when a seller's permit is registered and issued by the State Board of Equalization and then is -- by virtue of the address that is registered, they issue the tax area code that then tells them where they're going to distribute

the local tax to once the taxpayer files the return. So the address becomes relevant there in terms of how the CDTFA knows where to fund that local tax based on the tax return.

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So one of the things -- one of the comments that Mr. Cataldo made is referencing to revoking the seller's permit. This case was not about revoking a seller's permit. It was more about determining what the proper place of sale was. Is that the City of Fillmore? Was it registered properly? Is that where the local tax belongs? Or should the seller's permit be registered to another location, in this case, potentially their out-of-state headquarters? So MuniServices, on behalf of the Petitioners, we first became aware of the offices in the city of Fillmore back in -- starting in 2006 and filed one case back in 2006 on behalf of a retailer and then subsequently filed on seven other retailers in 2008, of which this case is relevant to one of them.

As was discussed, many of these cases were going through the process simultaneously, so a lot of the investigation and work that was being done not only by ourselves on behalf of Petitioners but also CDTFA was a lot of overlapping of case investigations, et cetera.

We had visited Fillmore in February of 2008 prior to our filing our petition and also done thorough

investigation of the facts that we could obtain in terms of where the point of sale would be related to the sales of jet fuel involved in this case.

One of the other points I wanted to touch on was the issue of the timing on the letters that were brought forward and that somewhat translated into the Appellants's discussions about laches is the fact that there was also a change, a regulatory change, on 1807 that changed the different levels of appeal. And so I think what occurred at that time was when they initiated the original letter advising the City of their proposed reallocation in this action, they realized that they needed to step back and run it through the appeals process, and that subsequently ended up with a separate decision to us and the -- the -- ultimately the D&R.

I don't think that the Appellant can in any way make comment as to what we were doing or not doing on behalf of our petitioners during the time that this case was under investigation by the CDTFA. Again, there's no way he would know what actions we may or may not have taken in terms of trying to be involved in resolving the issue as we do every day on behalf of all of our -- all of our clients and all the petitions that we file. A Couple of the other things is that the arguments being made in this case are repetitive of arguments made in

the other cases of which the Appellant was denied. And the key dispute in this case was whether or not the office in the city of Fillmore was a place of business of the retailer and whether or not actual sales negotiation occurred at that. And without belaboring that, we disagree that either of those things apply in this case for all of the, you know, regulations in terms of place of sale -- and I apologize. I'm mumbling probably a little bit here -- but for a sales office to be considered a place of business.

(Reporter interrupted)

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MS. VARNEY: 710.0013 states that for a field sales office to be considered as a place of business for the purposes of the Bradley Burns, the retailer must have proprietary interest in that office space.

In this case I think that we have discussed and determined that the retailer did not have propriatory interest in that office space at the time that they claim that the MSA was negotiated in September prior to these -- the lease to the retailer from Inspired occurred.

Also, using that office on occasion for the purposes that they claim still is somewhat unsubstantiated. The documentation as presented in this case does not actually -- is not an actual purchase

order, and it doesn't actually identify the specific number of gallons that are going to be purchased, nor do their claim of the invoices that are supposedly generated at that office do not identify specific amounts that were purchased and utilized at the different airport locations during the periods in question.

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Also, at the appeals conference, the prior conference that had been held, statements were made by the retailer that the negotiations of that MSA was not -- was merely just to -- let me -- that the actual terms of the MSA were not being -- that the gentleman that he delegated the authority to was only to execute the document at that time. It did not authorize them to actually determine the terms of the MSA. And as we've already discussed, the supposed -- or the alleged purchase orders, again, all of them were the same. noted the same minimum and maximum, which we've already established did not match the terms in the MSA as did the purported invoices do not specify how many gallons were actually utilized, and, therefore, how could that be an invoice when you don't -- you aren't invoicing for an actual amount?

Also, we -- I wanted to state that we don't have any disagreement with the issue of the buying

company, and so I won't be addressing anything further on that issue in this and that we are in agreement with the CDTFA's decision in the supplemental -- the D&R and the supplemental D&R, that it is a use tax and that for those contracts that were -- and purchases in excess of the \$500,000 limit, that those allocations would go directly to the petitioning jurisdictions balances being allocated through the county by pool. So I believe that's all I have right now.

2.4

EXAMINATION

BY ALJ RIDENOUR:

Q Thank you very much. To expand on your argument regarding execution versus negotiations, can you please expand as to the authorization to execute an agreement. Would that be same as to allow them to negotiate an agreement?

A Again, I will speak to that only in the sense of reiterating the statements that were made by the retailer at the -- so Mr. Meissner who was an officer -- or manager of the retailer said that he delegated his authority to sign the agreement. And in this authorization he delegated them to execute it, but gave them no authority to negotiate the terms. So that was the basis of that comment.

| 1 | ALJ RIDENOUR: Thank you. That's all the |
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| 2 | questions I have for now. |
| 3 | Mr. Wong Judge Wong, do you have any |
| 4 | questions? |
| 5 | ALJ WONG: I do not. Thank you. |
| 6 | ALJ RIDENOUR: Thank you. |
| 7 | Judge Brown? |
| 8 | ALJ BROWN: I do not have any questions right |
| 9 | now. Thank you. |
| 10 | ALJ RIDENOUR: Thank you. And with that, we |
| 11 | will move over to CDTFA, who I believe has 30 minutes. |
| 12 | So please begin your presentation. |
| 13 | MR. BACCHUS: Thank you. |
| 14 | |
| 15 | PRESENTATION |
| 16 | BY MR. BACCHUS, Tax Counsel: |
| 17 | I'm going to give the bulk of the presentation |
| 18 | and at the end Mr. Claremon is going to address a few |
| 19 | points. But before we get to the substance of the |
| 20 | appeal, we first want to clarify, the Department's role |
| 21 | in these local tax matters. |
| 22 | The Department administers the allocation of |
| 23 | local tax between the various jurisdictions that impose |
| 24 | taxes pursuant to the Bradley-Burns uniform local sales |

and use tax law. When there is a dispute regarding the

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allocation of local tax, it is appealed via petition to the Department's local revenue branch and then to the appeals bureau but the parties in a local tax appeal are the petitioning jurisdiction, and the substantially affected jurisdictions.

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We also note that there are other jurisdictions that are not parties in this local tax appeal in that they are not present here but will otherwise be affected financially based on the outcome of this appeal, as described in our Exhibit A, the decision and recommendation.

There was mention of Regulation 30506 that lists the applicable section within the -- within the Department as a party, but that is just for purposes of naming who's involved in the appeal process, not that the Department is a party, meaning that the Department would not benefit one way or the other with any financial gain or loss based on the outcome of these local tax appeals.

With that in mind, Fillmore's contention that the Department's delay in gathering evidence should bar any reallocation under the equitable doctrine of laches misses the mark. Laches provides a defense or bar to claims by those who neglected to assert their rights in a timely manner when the delay has caused prejudice to

the party claiming the laches defense.

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Here, the petition jurisdictions timely filed their petitions. There was no delay by a party to this action and any determination that the reallocation of local tax is barred by laches would punish petitioners for a delay they did not contribute to. Accordingly, there is no basis for applying the doctrine of laches to these facts.

As to what specifically occurred during the period of August 4th, 2008 and September 26, 2012 in its October 3rd, 2008 petition, Fillmore indicates that it was in the process of gathering documentation to submit to the Department. The Department acknowledged the petition in letters dated October 29, 2008 and November 10th, 2008 and indicated that it was referring the matter to the appeals bureau.

In December 2008 the Appeals Bureau returned the matter to the Department for the issuance of a decision. The appeals bureau recognized, as was pointed out in the October 3rd, 2008, petition that it was premature to refer these -- this appeal to the appeals bureau prior to the issuance of a -- of the Department's decision and/or supplemental decision.

In February 2012 the Department again requested documentation from Fillmore, which Fillmore responded to

by email dated April 6th, 2012 and letter dated

April 16th, 2012. The Department issued its decision on

September 26th -- 26th, 2012. There's no formal record

of what transpired between January 2009 and February

2012, however, as has already been mentioned, this

matter was one of eight local tax cases involving the

City of Fillmore that were all happening at the same

time.

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Some of the other matters involved local tax that the Department was holding in abeyance pending the outcome of the appeals. Also unlike here, the amount at issue in those cases continued to accrue each quarter. Therefore, the parties informally agreed that the Department would prioritize the other appeals ahead of this appeal at issue today. The -- and during 2009, '10, and '11, the Department worked to complete the other appeals before working on this appeal, and at that time Fillmore's representative was representing Fillmore in all the appeals. So it was beneficial to -- not only to Fillmore to handle the cases where the local tax was held in abeyance, but also to representatives and to basically everybody that was involved. There had to be some type of prioritization to the cases so that they could start working them through and getting them resolved.

Appellants here today have mentioned a few times in relation or in regard to this argument about laches, that a lot of the evidence that could have been gathered wasn't gathered, and that's the prejudice that the City of Fillmore experienced that they didn't know or couldn't foresee what evidence they needed to retain for when this case eventually came to an appeals -- to the appeals bureau and eventually to the Office of Tax Appeals, which we find a little surprising given that that the City of Fillmore was on notice in 2008, that this -- that the -- that the local tax was -- now I forget -- I forget the term from the -- from the -- from the original letter, but that they were proposed to reallocate the tax from Fillmore to these other petitioning jurisdictions. And -- and the questioning that has happened today kind of touched on -- on the fact of why wouldn't -- why didn't or why wouldn't Fillmore have -- in anticipation of -- of this matter going forward, why wouldn't they have kind of set aside the evidence as opposed to just kind of letting it go wherever it went? So the Department is a little bit surprised by that admission.

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Turning now to the substance of this appeal, as I will explain in greater detail, the allocation of local tax to Fillmore was correct only if the applicable tax was sales tax rather than use tax and the place of sale was a location of the retailer in Fillmore.

Pursuant to Section 6051 and Regulation 1620(a) and (b), a retail sale is subject to sales tax if two conditions are satisfied. First, the sale occurs in California, which there's no dispute about that; and two, there's participation in the sale by a California location of the retailer. Here, there's no dispute that the sales occurred in California when the jet fuel was delivered to customer at the respective storage tanks at airports in this state; therefore, the critical question is whether there was participation by any California location of Retailer.

It is undisputed that the storage tanks were not owned or operated by retailer and that the fuel located in the storage tanks was commingled with fuel owned by other persons. The storage tanks for the airport were not place of businesses of the retailer.

Accordingly, the only location that could qualify as a place of business of the retailer is Inspired's Fillmore office. A place of business must be a place where the retailer actually conducts business and generally must be a place the retailer has a proprietary interest in or otherwise hold out as its place of business.

You can see Annotations 701.0013 and 710.0024, "Where an agent working out of its own place of business performs activities on behalf of a principal, the agent's business location is generally not the business location of the principal."

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Here, pursuant to agency -- to an agency agreement between retailer and Inspired Development, which is in Exhibit 1 to our Exhibit A, Inspired was required to lease or purchase -- or purchase commercial space necessary to create a regional sales administration center in Fillmore. The space was to be leased in Inspired's name and not as retailer's agent and did not require retailer to make any payments. or about September 28th, 2006 representatives of retailer and its customer met at Inspired's Fillmore office at 751-F Ventura Street in Fillmore. October 1st, 2006 retailer entered into a nine-year lease with Inspired for the nonexclusive use of office space at that location for a monthly rent of \$100. That's in Exhibit 2 to Exhibit A. However, Inspired, not Retailer, is listed as the occupant on the signage displayed on the building and door at the office location. They see pictures in Exhibit 3 to Exhibit A.

On May 7th, 2008, the Department visited the Fillmore office and found the doors locked and no one

present, which is in Exhibit 6 to Exhibit A. The Department also telephoned Inspired's landlord who stated that he had never heard of Retailer.

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There's also no evidence or contention that retailer's employees ever worked at the Ventura Street location. Instead, activities at the office were conducted by Joyce Cooperman who, in her declaration, stated that she was the office manager at Inspired's Fillmore office. That's in Exhibit 12 to Exhibit A.

In summary, there is no evidence that retailer ever held this office out as retailer's place of business in any way. The only time a representative of Retailer was at that location was prior to the term of its lease as one of two parties invited by Inspired to meet at that location. At no time during the lease of -- during the term of the lease did the retailer occupy or use the location in any way. Accordingly, the Fillmore office did not constitute an actual place of business of retailer. As such, no place of business of retailer participated in the sales at issue and, we're, the applicable taxes, use tax, which is properly allocated through the Countywide thorough the jurisdiction's of use where the storage tanks were located.

While the -- while the foregoing is

dispositive, we also address whether Fillmore -- whether
the Fillmore office participated in sales.

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Participation is a transaction necessary -participation in a transaction necessarily means that
the local place of business of the retailer must have
some meaningful effect on the sales process, that is,
the participation must serve some real purpose in the
actual sales process and involve some genuine physical
interaction from the sale of that location. Activities
that are not necessary for the sales process and/or that
take place after the sale is complete, do not constitute

In addition, general business activities that support a retailer's sales activities do not constitute participation in any particular sale.

participation in the sale.

Fillmore's first contention is that it negotiated the master sales agreement for all monthly sales at the Fillmore office on or about September 28th, 2006. As explained in greater detail in Exhibit A, both parties at the meeting derived their authority to sign the agreement from the same person — that's Exhibit 8 to Exhibit A — and the MSA was seemingly prepared prior to the meeting with the only information added to the MSA at the meeting were being handwritten notations specifying the minimum and maximum limits of gallons to

1 be purchased each month and the parties' signatures.

2 And that comes from the declaration of Bill

3 | Kersey (phonetic) of Ryan, LLC, which is in Exhibit C --

4 | no. Sorry. That comes not from his declaration but

5 | from the appeals conference transcript, which is in

Exhibit C.

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Yet there's no evidence that the parties negotiated those limits, meaning the minimum/maximum gallons of fuel per month at the meeting or that they were authorized to negotiate at the meeting at all. Rather the declaration relied on by Fillmore, found in Exhibit 11 to Exhibit A which is Mr. Jones' declaration, makes the uncredible and unsubstantiated statement that the entire agreement was negotiated there. As such while we have no reason to dispute that the MSA was signed at Inspired's Fillmore office, there is insufficient evidence to support that any negotiations took place there. And as previously stated, it was, in fact, Inspired's office, not retailers, especially not on September 28th, 2006, which was prior to the commencement of retailer's \$100 a month sublease for the office space. And regardless, the MSA was not negotiated at the Fillmore location.

Fillmore next contends that participation in these monthly statewide aviation fuel purchases occurred

at that location through the actions of Ms. Cooperman who we again note was an office manager at the Inspired office.

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The MSA required customer to order goods by notification to Inspired, including the quantities to be -- quantities to be furnished. Specifically the MSA reads, quote, Customer shall notify retailer or Inspired when specific deliveries are required. Customer's delivery order shall indicate the delivery location, manufacturer, model number, quantity desired, and preferred delivery date, end quote. This shows that the orders required were received by retailer at its Houston headquarters when the amounts of fuel needed -- that actual amounts of fuel needed, were provided by customer. Mr. Corsi confirmed at the appeals conference that the fuel needs were communicated by customer to retailer at the Houston office. That's, again, in Exhibit C.

Customer would then issue a document to retailer indicating a range of how much fuel it needed for the subsequent month, Exhibit 7 to Exhibit A.

These documents were issued a few days prior to the start of the month and were signed by Ms. Cooperman some days later. In response to these documents on the same day she signed it, Ms. Cooperman would issue an

authorization to release inventory, which is the name of the form, which indicates the maximum amount of fuel Retailer was authorized to sell to customer for any given month.

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According to her declaration found in Exhibit 12 to Exhibit A, Ms. Cooperman stated that, quote, If the document was not correct, it was my duty to reject the order and notify the customer as to the basis for the rejection. If the document was deemed acceptable, I would notify retailer via an authorization to release inventory that it was permitted to release inventory to customer, end quote. Whereas the communications to the Houston headquarters put retailer on notice of the fuel requirements, any document received and inventory release form completed by Ms. Cooperman at best serves only as unnecessary reminders. The documents she received stated an identical range each month, which actually incorrectly indicated the minimum and maximum monthly gallon amounts per the MSA. Yet Ms. Cooperman never rejected the orders indicating that the orders and Ms. Cooperman's actions bore no real purpose or had any real effect on the sale.

In addition, for several months -- for several of the months at issue, retailer released fuel prior to

receiving the release forms, and each month retailer released more gallons than was authorized on the authorization forms. Again, indicating that the authorization forms were not actually necessary to the sales process. Based on this information, which is explained in more detail in Exhibit A, these orders and releases served no real purpose in the sale process and, we're, do not constitute participation in the sales at issue.

As to the argument regarding buying companies, I just wanted to make one -- kind of make one statement about that, and then we'll reserve our further analysis of that argument in post hearing briefing. But there's no dispute that retailer is a buying company and that as a buying company Retailer is recognized as a separate legal entity entitled to hold a seller's permit for any location that meets the criteria of Section 6072 and Regulation 1699. However, there is no authority for the proposition that a different standard applies to buying companies with regard to what constitutes participation or a place of business of the Retailer.

We note in the Board of Equalization memorandum opinion Cities of Agoura Hills a similar argument was raised by the City of Fillmore that a retailer's location was entitled to a seller's permit even though

it did not meet the basic requirements of Section -- of Regulation 1699. As stated in that memorandum opinion subdivision (h) of Regulation 1699 does not and cannot abrogate other legal requirements to the issuance of a seller's permit, including particularly as to the location to which a permit can attach.

To summarize, the Fillmore office was never a place of business of retailer during the relevant periods at issue. Moreover, the September 2006 meeting and the actions of Ms. Cooperman did not constitute participation in the sales at issue within the meaning of Regulation 1802. For each of these reasons on their own, the applicable tax for the sales at issue was use tax, which was properly reallocated to Petitioners and the other jurisdictions through their respective countywide pools. Accordingly, Fillmore's appeal should be denied.

And I'll let Mr. Claremon make statements.

MR. CLAREMON: Thank you.

PRESENTATION

22 | BY MR. CLAREMON, Tax Counsel:

Good afternoon. To -- to briefly respond to some of the arguments that have been raised by the City of Fillmore here, as Mr. Bacchus has explained, the

issue here is based in the application of basic allocation rules, specifically was there a place of business of a retailer? And did it negotiate or otherwise participate in the sales? Appellant here today -- or excuse me -- the City of Fillmore here today has made a number of assertions as to why the application of those rules does not apply in this particular appeal or applies differently in this particular appeal, including the buying company rules under 16 -- under Regulation 1699(i) formerly (h), which Mr. Bacchus addressed? None of those arguments are valid. For example, Regulation 1620 allows for participation by an agent, but only when working out of, quote, such places of business such referring to a place of business of the retailer.

Regulation 1802(a)(1) states that if there is a sole and state place of business of the retailer, it is the place of sale for all sales in which it participates. That is stated in that subdivision. So in both cases, the basic rule still applies. It must be a place of business of the retailer and that place of business must participate in the sale.

Likewise, with regard to jet fuel, Regulation 1802(b)(6) discusses when allocation is to the place of delivery prior to 2008. It does not dictate when

allocation is to another location. And in fact, the subdivision concludes in subparagraph (e) with the statement that "otherwise taxes allocated as provided elsewhere in this regulation."

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With regard to Fillmore's discussion of another matter involving the sale of jet fuel, we note that the allocation of local tax is based on the facts and circumstances of each particular appeal or allocation. It is not the CDTFA's position that a buying company's office cannot be the place of sale. The question is whether in a particular circumstance the facts support that conclusion. For example, if a buying company actually placed an employee at its in-state office, held out -- held out that location as their place of business, and that employee genuinely took orders that had a necessary and meaningful impact on the transactions, then we would conclude that that buying company's office was the place of sale. As Mr. Bacchus has discussed, that is not the case here. It is the equal application of the allocation rules to different -- a different set of facts and circumstances.

With regards to negotiations, I note that the City of Fillmore has asserted here that they -- these were essentially the same company, that these were not arm's length transactions, but rather a captive

arrangement that's how he described it. And this position is not just at odds with the idea that the MSA was negotiated at the Fillmore office on September 28, 2006, but that it was subject to deliberation at all at that point if we are talking about essentially two entities that are acting as one. The contention here is that after internally developing this purchase agreement, this master sales agreement for however long it took, this key element of the agreement, the actual range that's going to be purchased, was left to the weekend before it was to take effect.

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And that, again, as Judge Wong has alluded to, it's hard to understand what form negotiation would take in this instance, but more than just negotiation, the fact that this wasn't already settled.

This was an internal deliberation essentially two parties acting as one. It's somewhat unreasonable given the way it's been described here today with regard to the buying company's arguments, that not only this would be left to be negotiated but that it wouldn't have already been decided in this internal deliberation. So, again, we do not believe that any negotiation of the master sales agreement took place in Fillmore.

And then finally I note that whether a location has been issued a seller's permit is not determinative

of local tax allocations. The allocation analysis is based on the actual facts of the transaction. In almost all local tax allocation cases such as this one, when a retailer is attempting to direct local tax to a specific location, it obtains a seller's permit for that location. It is a fact or a circumstance of pretty much all local tax allocation cases like this one, and it is simply not a relevant fact in determining the proper allocation of local tax. Local tax is based on the facts of the transactions themselves and the nature — and the actual nature of the office itself as whether it's an office of the retailer. Thank you.

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ALJ RIDENOUR: Thank you. Thank you.

MR. BACCHUS: I did -- I did want to clarify. I made a misstatement in my conclusion when I said that the use tax was properly reallocated to Petitioners and the other jurisdictions to their countywide pools. That's not accurate. Some of them were directly allocated for those transactions that were over \$500,000. So I just wanted to clarify that we had some direct reallocation and some through the countywide pool.

ALJ RIDENOUR: Thank you very much for the clarification. I do have a couple of questions, Mr. Bacchus.

EXAMINATION

BY ALJ RIDENOUR:

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Q I just want to have it for the record, does CDTFA dispute that retailer was a buying company?

A We do not dispute they were a buying company.

Q Thank you. And I know you touched on laches and you spoke about it, however, can you please respond to Appellants' assertion that because it went from like allocation group to appeals back to allocation group there was this misunderstanding and miscommunication to Appellant and, we're, they weren't able to -- or did not provide the documents? Department, please give us a response to that.

A Sure. We don't -- we don't dispute that there was -- that it was prematurely sent to the appeals bureau in -- at the end of 2008. And in discussing it with the appeals bureau, our understanding was it was returned within a few weeks, that that was -- that error was noted -- was noticed and -- and it was sent back.

I'll just reiterate what I said before. The -the -- the Department just finds it hard to believe that
a jurisdiction knowing that local tax was proposed to be
reallocated, that they would not retain documentation or
evidence that could potentially stop that reallocation
during the appeal process.

The amount of time that seemingly no work was being done or that we don't have any formal documentation that work was being done on this case, it was -- it was a long time, abnormally long. But, again, there were other Fillmore cases for other companies, other retailers that -- that were being worked through. So the fact that Fillmore is arguing that it was prejudiced by the -- by the fact that they did know to keep the documentation when they were going through these cases, these other cases, and knowing that there was a proposal to reallocate the tax for this particular case is hard to believe.

Q Okay. Thank you. And I have one more question. I don't know if it would be best answered by you or Ms. Stocker, so I will let you guys decide after I answer the question -- ask the question.

So in my minutes and orders I asked the parties to address the 90 days of that. So my question is: The regulation says, "If the assigned section does not issue a written decision within six months of the date received it a valid petition, the Petitioner may request the signed section issue to issue its decision," etc.

So then I looked up what "Petitioner" means, and so Petitioner means jurisdiction that has filed a timely and valid petition. So then I went, "Okay.

Well, what's the definition of a 'petition'?" And petition, the definition includes as well as a jurisdiction's written objection to a notification that local or district tax previously distributed to the jurisdiction was incorrectly allocated and distributed to be redistributed. So my question is, is what CDTFA's position Appellant becoming a Petitioner once State Appellant filed that -- you know, filed the written objection, does that start a 90-day clock for which a notified jurisdiction can ask for written decision?

A I will confer.

So our understanding or how -- how it works is, the petitioners when this case the jurisdictions that were petitioned that that allocation to Fillmore, that's one way to petition, and then once there is a decision or determination that the local tax would be reallocated, the objection to that is also a petition.

So in this case we have petition -- the petition jurisdictions and then we have City of Fillmore who is also a Petitioner. I think we have -- there's two kind of petitions and we have both in this case. So we have the -- the petitions that were filed by certain jurisdictions, which are the first kind of petition to get -- get that money that was allocated somewhere else. Then for other jurisdictions, they did not file a

petition and -- but we -- but we, CDTFA, notified the City of Fillmore that we would reallocate that money. We gave them notification. And then they filed an objection to that, which also became a petition. So they are also a Petitioner. I think that is the petition. So I'm not a hundred percent sure what the question is, but -- so the six-month clock would start -- if that's the question -- would start at that point in terms of after six months, they can request an update --

(Reporter interrupted)

A Request that the decision be issued within 90 days.

Q Okay. And I did miss -- my apologies. I misspoke. When I read the regulation, I jumped -- I jumped the six-month --

A Yeah.

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Q -- first. So I guess to clarify my question, once CDTFA, the allocation group did not issue a formal decision in response to Fillmore's petition and they did not -- if -- and correct me if I'm wrong -- they did not issue that decision within that six-month period. I was wondering if at that point the six -- the 90-day clock starts for which Fillmore could then use that 90 days to ask for a decision to be issued.

| 1 | A I do not think so. I think that they would |
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| 2 | have had to so their objection constituted a petition |
| 3 | under 30506(b)(11). They would have had to make a |
| 4 | request for a decision under 30506(c). |
| 5 | Q Four? |
| 6 | A Four. |
| 7 | Q So they |
| 8 | A Correct. And those are not the same thing. |
| 9 | Q Okay. But Fillmore is I guess because I've, |
| 10 | you know, I understand petitioners definitely asked for |
| 11 | that decision to be made after six months, my question |
| 12 | is, would Appellant also have that right? |
| 13 | A Any any yeah, I'm not (c)4 says only |
| 14 | the Petitioner would have that right. |
| 15 | ALJ RIDENOUR: Thank you. Just wanted to make |
| 16 | sure. |
| 17 | MR. CLAREMON: Okay. |
| 18 | ALJ RIDENOUR: Thank you very much. Those are |
| 19 | all my questions for the Department. |
| 20 | Judge Wong, do you have anything to add or |
| 21 | questions, please? |
| 22 | ALJ WONG: Is Ms. Varney allowed respond? I'd |
| 23 | like to hear |
| 24 | MS. VARNEY: Well, I apologize because I missed |
| 25 | addressing that previously, but I I do want to |

clarify a little bit. I think that there was some overlapping in terms of our petitions and there was also appears there was a petition that was filed by the City and County of San Francisco. And so I think that precipitated the original letter that went to the City of Fillmore back in August -- that original letter where they were proposing the reallocation. And it's almost like the dates were identical of the petition. know from our perspective when there wasn't a decision -- and this is generally how we would view it -- just addressing why we wouldn't have asked for it, a decision to be issued, if it wasn't within that time period as called for in the regulation is because we've just found that all that does is push an issue forward into the appeals process before the Department has had the opportunity to really investigate the facts. And you aren't really gaining anything other than, you know, trying to accelerate it before it's ready, and we never, you know, have found that to be, you know, favorable to the jurisdictions or anyone in that case. It's more important that the investigation be able to be completed and so forth, which was the reason that we did not ask relative to our petitions to have a decision to push it forward during that process.

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ALJ WONG: Thank you. I don't have

1 any other questions. 2 ALJ RIDENOUR: 3 Judge Brown, do you have any questions? 4

ALJ BROWN: No, I don't have any questions.

Thank you.

Thank you.

ALJ RIDENOUR: Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Cataldo, if you like you may make a brief closing statement in response to Petitioner CDTFA's arguments for -- further address any of the questions asked by the panel, but it is not required. Would you like to make closing remarks?

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CLOSING STATEMENT

BY MR. CATALDO, Counsel for Appellant:

Excuse me. Yes. Just a few comments. The first comment is it seems that CDTFA and Petitioner just want to disregard agency. Inspired by note says already. I'll say it again. It's pretty important. Inspired Development entered into a agency agreement with Retailer. The agency agreement was specifically to open an office. They just want to disregard that fact when they're trying to -- trying to apply the rule of place of business. Place of business was where Inspired Development was. It was there on behalf of Retailer. So that's one.

Secondly, with respect to buying companies, just because -- like, I said this before earlier in response to one of your questions. No. Just because you meet the definition of a buying company alone doesn't mean you have a place of business. You could have a buying company in Antarctica. It's not going to get a California seller's permit. But here, there's only one location. It's a buying company, and we have ample evidence of its location being in Fillmore, ample. As a result of that, the conclusion is that the sale -- the local sales tax, because there's only one location, permitted location, one, it has to go there. And that's kind of the beginning and end of this.

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Just commenting on the Agoura Hills case, that was a question of, "Okay. So you're a buying company, but you've got more than one location." You don't just get to just pick your location. That's kind of what I read that case as. We don't have that situation here. There's one location or CDTFA/Petitioner's position none. We say one. There's no, "Hey, where are you going to go between locations in California?"

The seller's permit, if there's one location, you have to -- a seller's permit is issued to a location in California. I don't think you're going to issue a seller's permit to an office in Houston.

This gets me to sort of stepping back and looking at the standard that you have to apply here to decide whether you're going to reallocate or not, a preponderance of the evidence. And we've talked a lot about all of the evidence that is pointing towards Fillmore. Now, I know they've picked apart little pieces, bits and pieces of this here, there's no sublease, that wasn't allowed, things of that nature. But what I'm not seeing is any evidence of the main contention, which is: It's use tax because it happened in Houston. I don't think you can reach -- can find by a preponderance of the evidence that with what's in the record.

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Oh, I did want to at least respond to

Petitioner's comment, which is true, I do not personally
know what Petitioners did during this time. This is the
laches argument. I don't know. All I know is what's in
the record, and the record shows nothing.

As far as who's a party and who's not, there's a definition of party, and CDTFA is in it, if that matters for laches. I don't think it does.

Unreasonable delay and prejudice are the two things you have to find. That is all that I have.

ALJ RIDENOUR: Thank you, Mr. Cataldo.

There was a couple of arguments made from CDTFA

that I was hoping you would be able to respond and give your response to. One was in regards to the -- that the released authorization forms weren't really a participation in the sale because they were sometimes issued after the 1st of the month and -- and I believe they said also that the maximum amounts authorized to be released were in -- the released fuel was actually in excess of the maximum amount authorized by the release. And so can you please provide Appellants' response to that?

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MR. CATALDO: Yes. So, again, we've got to look to the master sales agreement. That kind of lays out of all the rules. And if you don't do -- if these things were not issued, then you don't have a sale. If you don't have the authorization and POs issued, they're not a sale. The agreement recognizes that it's -- a lot of these things are estimates and they're not going to be a hundred percent accurate at the time.

Another thing just -- I want to point out. I mean, we keep saying participation in the sale, or I hear -- I keep hearing that. And maybe that's just shorthand, but when you evaluate this, I would urge you to actually look closely and just read the letter of the law. The actual regulation talks about participation in the transaction in any way, any way by the local office,

| 1 | branch, or outlet is sufficient to sustain the tax. I'm |
|----|---|
| 2 | not sure if I answered your question. Maybe I have not. |
| 3 | ALJ RIDENOUR: Yeah, you did. |
| 4 | MR. CATALDO: Okay. |
| 5 | ALJ RIDENOUR: Thank you. |
| 6 | Judge Wong, do you have any questions? |
| 7 | ALJ WONG: I do not. Thank you. |
| 8 | ALJ RIDENOUR: Thank you. |
| 9 | Judge Brown, do you have any questions? |
| 10 | ALJ BROWN: I do not. Thank you. |
| 11 | ALJ RIDENOUR: Okay. I really I wanted to |
| 12 | first ask since it seems the parties addressed buying |
| 13 | companies, I wanted to see if any party still wanted to |
| 14 | brief the issue? |
| 15 | Mr. Cataldo? |
| 16 | MR. CATALDO: We would be happy to brief the |
| 17 | issues. |
| 18 | ALJ RIDENOUR: Okay. That's fine. I'm not |
| 19 | thank you. All right. I want to thank everyone for |
| 20 | participating. Oh, I'm sorry. Mr. Bacchus. |
| 21 | MR. BACCHUS: I'm sorry. Mr. Claremon would |
| 22 | like to clarify one of his answers just to make sure |
| 23 | there's no confusion. Because we think there may be |
| 24 | just little confusion with regard to the who can |

who can pull the trigger on those.

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1 Thank you. And not even sure MR. CLAREMON: 2 I'm still actually responding to the question. But just 3 to be clear, the City of Fillmore was a petitioner in 4 this case, and particularly since one decision was 5 issued for all Petitioners in this case, they could have requested a decision within 90 days pursuant to (c)(4). 6 7 ALJ RIDENOUR: So to clarify, Appellant could. 8 MR. CLAREMON: I mean they --9 ALJ RIDENOUR: As a Petitioner. 10 MR. CLAREMON: They could because they were a Petitioner. And, again, even though they're a 11 petitioner for part of the case, there was one decision. 12 13 So any petitioner could have requested that decision. 14 ALJ RIDENOUR: Okay. Thank you for the 15 clarification. 16 MR. CLAREMON: Thank you. 17 MR. CATALDO: Can I respond to that? 18 ALJ RIDENOUR: Yes, of course. 19 MR. CATALDO: And just quickly. But the 20 decision happened before the -- the decision happened 21 like in an instant. So they became a petitioner, but 22 the decision happened. There was no occasion or ability 23 to ever apply that because the decision was rendered. 2.4 Like: We're done here. You're going to appeals.

happened well within the time frame. The thing we're

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complaining about as far as the time and the laches argument is after that the three-plus years after that, what happened.

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ALJ RIDENOUR: Okay. Thank you very much.

All right. I want to thank everyone for participating in the Office of Tax Appeals' first local tax hearing. If there is nothing further, I'm now concluding the hearing.

The record will remain open to allow additional briefing on the issue of the buying companies. Each party's additional briefing is limited to this issue buying companies and its applicability to this matter. Any portion of a party's brief that addresses additional issues will not be considered by the Office of Tax Appeals.

The deadline for Appellant to submit its additional briefing is Tuesday, January 24th, 2023, which is 40 days from today's hearing.

Petitioners and CDTFA shall both have 40 days to separately file a reply brief from the date that Appellants' additional briefing is acknowledged. That would conclude the briefing process. That would conclude the additional briefing process unless additional briefing is requested by OTA. At the conclusion of the additional briefing period the record

| 1 | will be closed. The judges will then issue a written |
|----|--|
| 2 | decision of our opinion of our decision within a |
| 3 | hundred days from when the record is closed. |
| 4 | Today's hearing in the Appeals of City of |
| 5 | Fillmore, et. al, is now adjourned. This concludes the |
| 6 | hearings for today. Hearings will resume tomorrow at |
| 7 | 9:30 a.m. Thank you, everybody. |
| 8 | (Conclusion of the proceedings at 4:00 p.m.) |
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| 1 | REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE | | | |
|----|--|--|--|--|
| 2 | STATE OF CALIFORNIA) | | | |
| 3 | COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO) ss. | | | |
| 4 | I, MARIA ESQUIVEL-PARKINSON, do hereby certify | | | |
| 5 | that I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, and that at | | | |
| 6 | the times and places shown I recorded verbatim in | | | |
| 7 | shorthand writing all the proceedings in the following | | | |
| 8 | described action completely and correctly to the best of | | | |
| 9 | my ability: | | | |
| 10 | CASE: In the Appeal of Cities of Fillmore, et. al. | | | |
| 11 | DATE: Thursday, December 15, 2022 | | | |
| 12 | I further certify that my said shorthand notes | | | |
| 13 | have been transcribed into typewriting, and that the | | | |
| 14 | foregoing pages 1 through 110 constitute an accurate and | | | |
| 15 | complete transcript of all my shorthand writing for the | | | |
| 16 | dates and matter specified. | | | |
| 17 | I further certify that I have complied with CCP | | | |
| 18 | 237(a)(2) in that all personal juror identifying | | | |
| 19 | information has been redacted if applicable. | | | |
| 20 | IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have subscribed this | | | |
| 21 | certificate at Sacramento, California on this 9th day of | | | |
| 22 | January, 2023. | | | |
| 23 | mairas on | | | |
| 24 | Maria Esquivel-Parkinson CSR No. 10621, RPR | | | |

25

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