BEFORE THE OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL OF:)
)
MCGARVEY-CLARK REALTY INC. AND) OTA CASE NOS. 18083623
AVIS BUDGET GROUP, INC.,	18083632
)
APPELLANT.)
)

CERTIFIED COPY

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Sacramento, California

Friday, December 16, 2022

Reported by:

Maria Esquivel-Parkinson, CSR No. 10621, RPR

Job No.: 39621 OTA(B)

1	BEFORE THE OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS
2	STATE OF CALIFORNIA
3	
4	
5	IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL OF:)
6	MCGARVEY-CLARK REALTY INC. AND) OTA CASE NOS. 18083623
7	AVIS BUDGET GROUP, INC.,) 18083632
8	APPELLANT.))
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, taken at
16	400 R Street, Sacramento, California,
17	commencing at 1:08 p.m. and concluding
18	at 3:40 p.m. on Friday, December 16, 2022,
19	reported by Maria Esquivel-Parkinson,
20	CSR No. 10621, RPR, a Certified Shorthand
21	Reporter in and for that State of California.
22	
23	
24	
25	

1	APPEARANCES:	
2		
3	Panel Members:	ANDREA LONG JOHN JOHNSON
4		ANDREW KWEE
5		
6	For the Appellant:	JEFFREY VESELY, ESQ. ZACHARY ATKINS, ESQ.
7		
8	For the CDTFA:	OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS
9		MICHAEL LAISNE, Tax Counsel
10		BRIAN WERKING, Tax Counsel TODD WATKINS, Tax Counsel
11		
12 13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

1	INDEX
2	
3	EXHIBITS
4	(Appellant's Exhibits 1 through 28 were
5	admitted on page 6)
6	(FTB's Exhibits A through AA were admitted on page 6)
7	
8	
9	
10	PRESENTATION
11	PAGE
12	By Mr. Vesely 7
13	By Mr. Laisne 25
14	By Mr. Werking 27
15	
16	
17	
18	REBUTTAL STATEMENT
19	PAGE
20	By Mr. Vesely 72
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

1	Sacramento, California; Friday, December 16, 2022
2	1:08 p.m.
3	
4	ALJ LONG: We are now on the record.
5	Good afternoon. I am Andrea Long, the lead ALJ
6	for this appeal. We are here today for the consolidated
7	appeals of McGarvey-Clark Realty, Inc., and Avis Budget
8	Group, Inc. The OTA case number is 18083623 and
9	18083632. It is Friday, December 16, 2022, and it is
10	1:08 p.m. The hearing is taking place in Sacramento,
11	California.
12	We will begin with the parties stating their
13	names and who you represent for the record, and we will
14	start with FTB.
15	MR. LAISNE: Michael Laisne, Brian Werking, and
16	Todd Watkins for Franchise Tax Board, Respondent.
17	ALJ LONG: And for Appellants?
18	MR. VESELY: Yes. Jeffrey Vesely and Zach
19	Atkins from Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman for
20	Appellants.
21	ALJ LONG: Thank you. And with me on the panel
22	today are Judges Andrew Kwee and John Johnson. And with
23	no objections by both parties, Judge Kwee is
24	substituting in for Judge Lambert.
25	I'm the lead ALJ for this appeal. I will be

1 conducting the proceedings in this matter, but my 2 co-panelists and I are equal participants. We will be 3 reviewing the evidence, asking questions, and reaching a 4 determination in this appeal. The parties have agreed 5 that the issues before us today are whether the Franchise Tax Board issued a timely notice of proposed 6 7 assessment to each Appellant, whether Appellants' transaction constitutes a statutory merger that 8 9 qualifies as a tax-free organization under IRC Section 10 368(a)(1)(A), and whether the late filing penalties were 11 properly imposed. 12 Appellant submits Exhibits 1 through 8 [sic] 13 which are hereby admitted without objection; and FTB 14 submits Exhibits A through AA, which are hereby admitted 15 without objection. (Appellants' Exhibits 1 through 28 admitted.) 16 17 (FTB's Exhibits A through AA admitted.) 18 ALJ LONG: Okay. I think we are ready to begin 19 each party's presentation. Appellants, you have 60 20 minutes to make your presentation, and you may begin 21 when you're ready. 22 MR. VESELY: I want to make sure -- you said 23 Exhibits 1 through 28, not just 8? I thought --2.4 ALJ LONG: Correct.

Okay. Thank you.

MR. VESELY:

25

PRESENTATION

BY MR. VESELY, Counsel for Appellant:

2.4

Good afternoon, and thank you for the opportunity to present our appeal today. As you are aware, the -- this appeal involves tax year 1999. There are three issues involved. First, whether the notice of proposed assessments, the NPAs issued by the FTB to Appellants, were time-barred by the statute of limitations; second, even if the NPAs were timely, which we do not concede, whether the NPAs are invalid because the AFLMC merger -- which I will define below -- qualified as a tax-free reorganization under IRC Section 368(a)(1)(A); and finally, third, whether the delinquent filing penalties assessed against Appellants are erroneous.

Now, the first issue, statute of limitations issue. It is Appellant's position that an NPAs which were issued in 2013 are more than 13 years after the returns were filed for the 1999 tax year are barred by the statute of limitations.

Under California law an NPA must be issued within four years after the return was filed. Balance returns for 1999 were filed in 2000. No general waiver of the statute of limitations was executed by Appellants for 1999. Only a limited waiver was executed. The

waiver was limited to adjustments resulting from a final federal determination or adjustments for 1999.

In order for the FTB's NPAs to be timely, there must have been a final adjustment made by the IRS to Appellants' gross income, penalty, credit or tax for the 1999 tax year related to the merger between PHH Holdings Corporation and Avis Fleet Leasing Management Corporation, which is AFLMC. And that is the AFLMC merger that we're talking about. There was no such final adjustment made by the IRS for 1999 related to the AFLMC merger. As such, the FTB's NPAs were untimely and thus are invalid.

The second issue is assuming without conceding that the NPAs were somehow not time barred, the FTB's NPAs are still erroneous because the AFLMC merger was tax-free. The merger occurred in 1999 and satisfy the requirements of IRC Section 368(a)(1)(A) and Treasury Regulations Section 1.368-2(b)(1) existing at that time.

In 1999 IRC Section 368(a)(1)(A) merely required that the transaction be a statutory merger or consolidation. In 1999 at the time of the merger, the Treasury Regulation Section 1.368-2(b)(1) simply stated that to qualify as a Type A reorganization or a tax-free merger, the transaction had to be a merger effected pursuant to the corporation laws of the United States,

or a state or a territory or the District of Columbia.

The AFLMC merger was carried out pursuant to the corporation laws of the state of Texas, thus the merger satisfied the requirements existing under federal law and California law -- excuse me -- in 1999 to be considered a tax-free merger.

And finally, the FTB's imposition of the delinquent filing penalty is improper as Appellants do not owe any additional tax for 1999 tax year. We will address each of these issues.

Now, the first issue is the statute of limitations issue. And under California law the standard statute of limitations for issuing an NPA is under Section 19057, which provides in pertinent part: Every notice of proposed deficiency shall be mailed to the taxpayer within four years after the return was filed.

Now, that statute of limitations may be extended by a waiver by the taxpayer, executed by the taxpayer. And that's under Section 19067. No general waiver of the statute of limitations was executed by Appellants in 1999. Only a limited waiver based on a final federal determination was executed. Appellants' Exhibit 2 is a copy of the waiver that we're talking about. We'll look at it a little bit closer in a bit.

Now, the statute of limitations for issuing an NPA resulting from a final federal determination has a number of statutes that we need to look at. And the one that's as important as anything in this case is 18622 of the Revenue Taxation Code. And subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part: If any item required to be shown on a federal tax return, including gross income, deduction, penalty, or tax for any year of any taxpayer is changed or corrected -- and those are key words, changed or corrected -- by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue results in a change in gross income or deductions, that taxpayer shall report each change or correction within six months after the due date of each final federal determination of the change or correction.

Now, it's important to note not only the change of correction language but also the word "final" that's in here. Only final federal determinations are required to be reported. And final means final. Initial positions by the IRS an audit that don't become the final determination are not final determinations, and that's important for this case -- excuse me.

Now, another statute that starts to get into the statute of limitations in this area is 19059(a), and it provides in pertinent part: If a taxpayer required by subdivision (a) of Section 18622 -- which we just

read -- to report a change or correction by the

Commissioner of Internal Revenue and does report the

change or correction within six months after the final

federal determination, or the IRS reports that change or

correction within six months after the final federal

determination, a notice of proposed deficiency

assessment resulting from those adjustments -- again,

key words here that we need to keep in mind, resulting

from those change or correction. If you step back and

look at the statutes, they equate change or correction

with adjustments, and that's what we've got to look at

here -- resulting from those adjustments may be mailed

to the taxpayer within two years from the date when the

notice is filed with the FTB by the taxpayer or the IRS.

2.4

Now, the next statute, 19060(b), is also relevant here, very relevant in this case, because it talks about the notification being after the six-month period. It provides: If after the six-month period required in Section 18622, a taxpayer or the IRS reports a change or correction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, a notice of proposed deficiency assessment resulting from the adjustment may be mailed to the taxpayer within four years from the date the taxpayer or the IRS notifies the FTB of that change or correction.

Now, in this case the AFLMC merger occurred on

June 30th, 1999. The IRS did not make any changes or corrections to Appellants' 1999 federal return related to the AFLMC merger. No adjustments. Thus under the plain language of Section 18622, 19059 and 19060, Appellants were not required to report any final federal adjustment or determination related to the merger with respect to the 1999 tax year since there was none.

2.4

Now, let's look at this a little closer about the reporting requirement, and it's very clear under the statutes that Appellants did not have a reporting requirement under 18622 with respect to the 1999 tax year related the AFLMC merger. Appellants' treatment of the AFLMC merger as a tax-free merger in 1999 on their tax returns was not changed by the IRS. The only final federal determination related to the merger was the federal closing agreement entered into by the IRS and Appellants for tax years 1998 to 2002 and signed on February 13, 2007. And that is Exhibit -- Appellants' Exhibit 1, and we're going to go over that one pretty closely here shortly.

Now, under California law and actually -- actually regulation 19059, a federal closing agreement is noted specifically under 19059(e)(1) as an example of what is a final federal determination. So it says the following: 19059(e) says: "A final determination is

irrevocable termination or adjustment on taxpayer's federal tax liability from which there exists no further right of appeal either administrative or judicial. For example." and then subdivision (1): "A closing agreement" -- as -- an example here -- "made under Section 7121 of the Internal Revenue Code finally and irrevocably adjusting and settling the taxpayer's tax liability." That's what we have here. We have a closing agreement under 7121.

Now, that same position with respect to that a closing agreement is a final determination here was also in Exhibit 21 for Appellants. We gave a copy of the Chief Counsel Ruling 2001-1278, which specifically states the same there. And there's been case law at the Board of Equalization that also confirmed that. One example is Appeal of Meyer. That was 96-SBE-012. All of these things say the same thing, that that is a final determination -- a federal determination, excuse me.

Now, in this case the federal closing agreement is crystal clear that the only tax year that the IRS adjusted was 2002. Appellants' 1999 federal tax return was not adjusted by the IRS under the closing agreement. A review of several key paragraphs of the closing agreement underscores the fact that the IRS did not adjust Appellants' 1999 federal tax return.

First, most importantly, nowhere in that closing agreement is there a final federal determination that the AFLMC merger in '99 was not tax-free. There's a lot of whereas paragraphs but not the conclusion that that was not tax-free. And that's page 5 through 7 of the closing agreement.

Second, there was no additional tax liability for the 1999 tax year under the closing agreement. Only for 2002, page 7, paragraph 8 is explicit in this regard.

Third, the additional income tax assessed by the IRS, which was approximately \$60 million under the closing agreement, was only for the 2002 tax year and was related to a settlement of a wide variety of issues. See pages 6 and 7 of the closing agreement.

Fourth, Appellants were not required to file an amended return for 1999 under the closing agreement.

Page 7, paragraph 7.

Fifth, indeed, Appellants were prohibited from amending their 1999 return to claim depreciation or amortization deductions, which if the AFLMC merger had been taxable would have otherwise been available to them. See page 7, paragraph 5.

Sixth, the sale of the European fleet assets in 2001 resulted in a gain of \$621 million, an amount

calculated using the original basis for those assets and not a stepped-up basis, cost basis, had the AFLMC merger been a taxable transaction. See page 6, paragraph 1.

Appellants were required to pay federal tax on the \$621 million gain on the sale of European fleet assets, an amount significantly larger than would have been the case if the merger, AFLMC merger, was not tax-free and the assets had a stepped-up basis. It's all in the closing agreement.

Number 7, Seventh, interest on the \$60 million tax amount due for the 2002 tax year only accrued from March 15th, 2003, the due date of the 2002 return, not from the due date of the 1999 return. Page 7, paragraph 9.

And finally, Appellants paid tax and interest totaling \$71.5 million for the 2002 tax year on June 15th, 2006. And that's at page 7, paragraph 10.

Now, notably, if the AFLMC merger was not tax-free, the gain from the transaction, the 1999 transaction, would have been approximately 1.5 billion, with a "B," dollars.

And the tax, the federal income tax on that amount would have been roughly 525 million with approximately 71 million of interest or a total of almost \$600 million rather than the 71.5 million

Appellants paid under the closing agreement. In all, the closing agreement is very clear that there was no adjustment, no change, no correction to the 1999 tax filing position of tax-free merger under the AFLMC merger under the closing agreement.

2.4

Now, the key case in California is an old one, and thank God it was before I started practicing. Even it's called Montgomery Wards vs. the FTB 1970. And it talks about the application of the predecessor of 19059. And in that case -- I won't read it all to you, but I strongly urge you read it again because it's a good one to look at of how the different statues of limitation kick in with respect to federal adjustments.

The FTB acknowledged in that case, at Footnote 10, that the extension of the statute of limitations under the predecessor of 19059 was limited to adjustments as may result from changes and corrections made by the IRS to the taxpayer's federal return.

Very important again: Results from changes and corrections made by the IRS. Same resulting from federal adjustment language. Throughout that decision, the Court of Appeal refers to deficiencies resulting from adjustments to the taxpayer's federal return, not to any return of a taxpayer but to "the" federal return.

And those are pages 168, 169, and 170.

2.4

Now, since Appellants' treatment of AFLMC merger as a tax-free statutory merger was not changed by the IRS under the closing agreement, i.e., the IRS made no adjustments to Appellants' 1999 return, federal return related to the merger, Appellants had no reporting requirement under Section 18622 for 1999. And since there were no final adjustments for 1999 related to the AFLMC merger, there was nothing for Appellants to report to the FTB for 1999 -- excuse me -- under 18622. As such, the standard four-year statute of limitations under Section 19057 for issuing an NPA applies in this case.

Now, since the 1999 return was filed on or about October 15th, 2000, the NPA for 1999 was required to be issued on or about October 15th, 2004, four years later. The FTB's NPA in this case was issued

November 20, 2013, or over nine years later. Now, as noted previously and this is a very important fact in this case, Appellants did not agree to extend the California statute of limitations for all purposes.

They only executed a limited waiver for the issuance of an NPA resulting from a final federal determination for 1999 to 2002.

Now, Exhibit 2 is a copy of that waiver, and it

is -- it is very important to take a look at that thing because that exhibit has three things on the face of it. At the top of it, it says -- the title says the "Consent to Extend Statute of Limitations When Federal Adjustments Reported." In the body of the waiver, it says -- makes references to Sections 19059 and 19060. Both the statutes deal with adjustments from final federal determinations.

2.4

And finally, at the bottom of the waiver on the right, it has the terms "RAR waiver." This -- and throughout the audit files it's very clear that the auditor recognized that. So what we have here is a waiver that was very limited. It was limited to simply the half -- from something resulting from a final federal determination, not for all purposes. So since there was no final federal determination for 1999 or adjustment under 1999 for -- '99 related to the merger, such waiver does not say the FTB's NPA for 1999.

So in conclusion, the NPAs for 1999 are untimely. There was no final federal determination or adjustment made for 1999 related to the AFLMC merger. Appellants' treatment of the AFLMC merger as a tax-free statutory merger on its '99 return was not changed by the IRS. Under Section 18622 there was nothing for Appellants to report related to the merger for 1999.

And finally, the waiver which was executed was a limited waiver and does not save the FTB's NPAs since there was no final federal determination or adjustments under '99 made in '99, related to the merger, thus the four-year statute under Section 19057 applies. The NPAs were due in 2004. They were issued in 2013. They're nine years late.

Now, I'd like to go to issue number two. So issue number two has to do with whether the merger was tax-free or not. And assuming without conceding -- and believe me, we don't concede this whatsoever -- that the '99 NPAs were somehow timely, the AFLMC merger qualified as a tax-free statutory merger under Section -- IRC Section 368(a)(1)(A) and Treasury Regulation Section 1.368-2(b)(1) in '99 when the merger occurred. Okay.

So what are the requirements? What did those provisions say? IRC Section 368(a)(1)(A) provided and still provides a quote: The term "reorganization" means a statutory merger or consolidation.

California conforms to that under Section 17024.5(a), 23051.5(a)(1), and Section 24451 of the Revenue and Taxation Code.

In 1999 -- this is key, a key fact here -- the Treasury Reg Section 1.368-2(b)(1) provided the following quote: In order to qualify as a

"reorganization" under Section 368(a)(1)(A), the transaction must be a merger or consolidation effected pursuant to the corporation laws of the United States or a state or a territory or the District of Columbia.

And we have a copy of that as Exhibit 11 in the files.

Regulations that the IRS -- or Treasury has promulgated are applicable for California purposes. As you well know, 23051.5(d) is the statute for that under the Revenue and Tax Code. Most importantly, for purposes of this appeal, in 1999 when the merger occurred, there was no requirement under the IRC or the Treasury regs that the target corporation had to be liquidated or otherwise cease its separate legal existence for all purposes.

Now, the AFLMC merger occurred on June 30, 1999, and was carried out pursuant to the corporation laws of the state of Texas which allowed the survival of both PHH Holdings and AFLMC after the merger, the two parties to the merger. Texas law, which was enacted in 1989 -- or ten years prior to this merger -- was in effect in 1999, permitted both entities in the merger to survive. We have Exhibits 19 and 25. Nineteen is actually the official notice taken by the Office of Tax Appeals of the Texas statutes, and 25 is -- gives

Section -- Article 5.01, which allows a little more color to it. But both of them are very consistent.

There was no requirement that the target corporation had to be liquidated.

2.4

Now, in this case there is no dispute that the AFLMC merger was done in accordance with Texas law. See FTB's opening brief at page 2. They do not take issue with that. So under the plain language of IRC Section 368(a)(1)(A) and Treasury Regulation Section 1.368-2(b)(1), which were in effect on the date of the merger June 30, 1999, the AFLMC merger qualified as a tax-free statutory merger under IRC Section 368(a)(1)(A).

Now, the straightforward conclusion right from the words of the statute and the regulations it is further supported by the IRS amendments to Treasury Regulation 1.368-2(b)(1) subsequent to 1999. Indeed, amendments to the Treasury regulations subsequent to '99 provide compelling evidence that the AFLMC merger qualified as a tax-free statutory merger under Section 368(a)(1)(A) of the IRC.

First, on January 23, 2003, almost four years after the AFLMC merger took place, the IRS amended its Treasury regs to add a liquidation requirement to the definition of the term "statutory merger or

consolidation."

2.4

Now, see temporary Treasury Regulation Section 1.368-2(t)(b)(1)(ii)(B), and that's Appellants' Exhibit 18. Now, what's important there is not only the addition of the liquidation requirement there is the effective dates, and those were -- those were crucial in this case. So the effective date of the amendment under the Treasury regulations, and indeed Subdivision (b)(1)(v) is explicit, says that it was January 24th, 2003. The temporary reg specifically provided that the amendment applied to all transactions incurred -- incurring on or after January 24, 2003. Prospective. Not retroactive, prospective. The regulations, temporary regs go on to say, Well, what about transactions before that date? What do you use?

And it's -- the regs say that taxpayer should apply Treasury Regulation Section 1.368-2(b)(1) as in effect before January 24, 2003. It's also on under (b)(1)(v) of the temporary regs. Now, that section should sound kind of familiar because that's the one that's applicable to our years. The Treasury Regulations 1.368-2(b)(1) in effect before January 24th, 2003, as I said before, did not have a liquidation requirement. That is the one that we need to be looking at for our case here.

Now, the IRS went on three years later, in 2006, January 26, 2006, and they issued final regulations in this area incorporating the liquidation requirement first introduced in the 2003 temporary regs. Exhibit 20 is a copy of those final regulations. And, indeed, what you want to look to is final Treasury Regulation Section 1.368-2(b)(1)(ii)(b) and that sets forth the liquidation requirement in the regs. But again, the key part for our case here today is that —the effective dates that are laid out there and they are under subdivision (b)(1)(v), again.

Effective date of the amendments was

January 23, 2006. And the final regs specifically
provided that the amendment applied to transactions
occurring on or after January 23, 2006 prospective.

Seven years after our -- six years -- six and a half
years after our transaction. For transactions occurring
before January 23, 2006, the final regulations, like the
2003 temporary regulations, instructed taxpayers to use
Treasury Regulation Section 1.368-2(b)(1) as in effect
before January 24, 2003. And that is under (b)(1)(v)
again. Again, that particular version of the
regulations, which is what's in effect during our years,
did not have a liquidation requirement. It was the
version that we need to be looking to here.

Now, stepping back, by amending the Treasury regs and making those amendments prospective, the IRS made it very clear that the liquidation requirement was a change in the law. This is further supported by the IRS specifically instructing the taxpayers with transactions occurring before January 24th, 2003, to use the Treasury regulations which were in existence at that time and which had no liquidation requirement.

In summary, with respect to the merger issue, the AFLMC merger was a tax-free statutory merger. It fell directly within the plain language of IRC Section 368(a)(1)(A) and Treasury Regulation Section 1.368-2(b)(1) existing at that time. The subsequent amendments to Treasury Regulations Section 1.368-2(b)(1) in 2003 and finally in 2006 confirm that result. The merger was tax-free for our purposes.

Now, the final issue is the penalty issue.

Now, the imposition of delinquent filing penalty in this case is improper because Appellants do not owe any additional tax for 1999 because the NPAs were untimely and thus invalid. Even if the NPAs were somehow determined to be timely -- excuse me -- the imposition of the penalty would still be improper because the merger was a tax-free transaction and no additional tax would be due for the 1999 tax year on that basis as

well.

Section 19036 provides the following:

"Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, any interest, penalty, or addition to tax, imposed under Part 10 (commencing with Section 17001) Part 11 -- (commencing with Section 23001) or this part may be assessed and collected in the same manner as if it were a deficiency."

Thus since there would be no tax deficiency in this case because of untimely NPA or that the merger is tax-free, the NPAs would be invalid in all amounts -- tax, interest, and penalties, which were imposed -- proposed to be assessed must be reversed. I would reserve the rest of my time for rebuttal. Thank you.

ALJ LONG: Thank you. We will go on to FTB's presentation. You may begin when you're ready.

2.2

PRESENTATION

BY MR. LAISNE, Counsel for FTB:

Good afternoon. Michael Laisne, Brian Werking, and Todd Watkins appearing on behalf of Respondent Franchise Tax Board.

This case is a case first and foremost about consistency, consistency for California tax purposes with the conclusion of an IRS audit resulting in an IRS

closing agreement and consistency of a revenue ruling with previous historical context, legislative history, case law, and IRS guidance.

2.4

There are three overarching issues in this appeal. First, whether the statute of limitations was open at the time the notice of proposed assessment was issued; second, whether the AFLMC transaction met the requirements for a tax-free statutory merger under IRC Section 368(a)(1)(A), also known as a Type A merger or statutory merger; and, three, whether the delinquent filing penalty applies.

In this case, as outlined in the briefs, an alleged tax-free statutory merger was entered into under the laws of Texas resulting in multiple entities surviving the merger in 1999. The IRS audited Appellants for tax years 1998 through 2002. One of the conclusions of the audit can be found in Form 886-A, Respondent's Exhibit G, which concludes that the merger failed both due to the law stated in Revenue Ruling 2000-5 and because it did not meet the continuity of shareholder interest requirements; however, a closing agreement was entered into by Appellants and the IRS which placed that liability in 2002.

I'll now let my co-counsel Brian Werking have the floor to discuss the statute of limitations issue

1 and the related facts in greater detail.

MR. WERKING: Thank you, Michael.

2.4

PRESENTATION

BY MR. WERKING, Counsel for FTB:

The first issue in this appeal is whether
Respondent mailed the 1999 proposed deficiency
assessment within a open statute of limitations. The
1999 proposed deficiency assessment mailed to Appellants
on November 20th, 2013, was timely mailed within an open
statute of limitations because the proposed deficiency
assessment resulted from a federal determination that
the 1999 AFLMC transaction was a taxable sale, and
Appellants timely executed a waiver to extend the
statute of limitations to assess additional tax for the
1999 tax year until December 31st, 2013.

Section 18622 requires taxpayers to report each change or correction to any item required to be shown on a return, including tax within six months after the final federal determination date. Subdivision (d) of that statute specifies that the final federal determination date that triggers the six-month period is the date on which each adjustment or resolution resulting from an IRS examination is assessed.

IRC Section 6203, the underlying regulations

and Revenue Ruling 2007-21 provide that the final federal determination date is the date on which the adjustment is reported as an assessment on an IMF or an account transcript. This interpretation of the final federal determination date has been affirmed by the Board of Equalization in its opinion denying a petition for rehearing in the appeal of Unified Precious Metals adopted on August 25th, 2015, and by the OTA in the appeal of Yazdinian adopted April 19, 2019, Appeal of the Estate of Chewning adopted July 9th, 2019, and the Appeal of Fonseca adopted November 5th, 2021, and should similarly be applied here.

If, after the six-month period required to report a federal adjustment, a taxpayer or the IRS reports the change or correction, Section 19060 allows Respondent four years from the date of the notification to mail a proposed deficiency assessment resulting from the change or correction.

Pursuant to Section 19067 where a taxpayer executes a state waiver before the statute of limitations has expired, Respondent may issue a proposed deficiency assessment during the waiver period.

In this case, the IRS examined Appellants' tax year -- tax returns for taxable years 1998 through 2002. During the examination, the IRS determined that the

AFLMC transaction that occurred in 1999 was a taxable sale and not a tax-free merger. The IRS determination is provided on the federal explanation of items,

Respondent's Exhibit G, page 4, captioned "Internal Revenue Services' Position," and within the recitals of the closing agreement, Respondent's Exhibit H, page 3.

Appellants and the IRS agree -- agreed in the closing agreement written precisely to address the taxability of the AFLMC transaction that occurred in 1999 and agreed the IRS would assess additional tax to Appellants' 2002 tax account to compensate the IRS for a gain that Appellants would otherwise have reported on an amended 1999 return.

On July 17, 2006, in accordance with the terms of the closing agreement, the IRS assessed the additional tax. Therefore July 17th, 2006 is the final federal determination date and Appellants were required to report the federal adjustment increasing its tax to Respondent within six months of that date.

Appellants do not dispute that they did not report the additional tax assessment attributable to the IRS determination that the 1999 AFLMC transaction was a taxable sale within six months after July 17th, 2006. Since Respondent did not learn of the additional tax assessment until it received the IRS revenue agent's

report explanation of items, on October 20th, 2009, Respondent had four years from that date to mail the proposed assessment resulting from the federal adjustment pursuant to Section 19060.

2.4

By the terms of Section 19060, Respondent is not limited to proposing an assessment facts for the same tax year that IRS assessed tax although the California tax effecting a federal adjustment, is usually in the same tax year as at the federal -- as the federal level, there are times when the California tax effect is in a different tax year. This may happen when there are differences between state and federal law with respect to a specific tax issue or as here, there was a settlement covering several taxable years that specified a tax effect attributable to a transaction that occurred in one tax year, in this case 1999, be posted to a different tax year account, in this case 2002.

Respondent's ability to propose an assessment for the 1999 tax year, the year in which the transaction occurred, is consistent not only with the result from authority in Section 19060 but also consistent with the federal determination that the 1999 AFLMC transaction was a taxable sale as provided, as the IRS's position in the explanation of items, Respondent's Exhibit G, page 4.

It is consistent with the recitals and the terms and conditions in the closing agreement. The closing agreement indicates: One, that the Appellants reported no gain or loss in 1999 on the AFLMC transaction; two, that if it had treated the AFLMC transaction as a sale, it would have had reported taxable gain from the AFLMC transaction; and three, the IRS determined the AFLMC transaction was not a tax neutral reorganization but instead a sale in 1999.

It is also consistent with the parties' agreement that instead of requiring appellants to file an amended return for 1999 to report the gain from the AFLMC sale as otherwise required, Appellants would pay additional tax on the 2002 tax year but be precluded from deducting the depreciation and amortization available from 1999 through 2005 from the 1990 [sic] transaction being a taxable sale but allow Appellants' amortization deductions beginning in 2006 through the remainder of the amortization period resulting from the 1999 transaction being a taxable sale.

Accordingly, Respondent correctly determined that the transaction underlying the additional tax assessed on Appellants' 2002 tax year account occurred in 1999 and should properly have been reported on Appellants' 1999 California return. Therefore, the

proposed deficiency assessments at issue for the 1999 tax year result from the federal determination and additional tax assessed on Appellants' 2002 tax account.

2.4

Pursuant to Section 19060, the statute of limitations to mail a proposed deficiency assessment resulting from the federal determination was October 20th, 2013, four years after the date Respondent received the RAR information informing Respondent of the federal adjustments.

On September 25, 2012, before the expiration of the statute of limitations to assess, Appellants' executed a waiver extending the statute of limitations until December 31st, 2013. Accordingly, the 1999 proposed deficiency assessment mailed to Appellants on November 20th, 2013, before the expiration of the waiver was timely made.

And with that, I will turn it back over to Michael to address issues two and three.

MR. LAISNE: Thank you, Brian.

Moving on to the second issue, the Appellants have met their burdens, the second issue as laid out in the briefs can be broken down into three sub issues. The first is whether Appellants showed Revenue Ruling 2000-5 should not be applied retroactively. The second is whether Appellants have shown that Revenue Ruling

2000-5 should not be given deference. And the third is whether the continuity of shareholder interest requirement was satisfied.

2.2

2.4

Regarding the burdens, the first item to note is that Respondent is following the federal conclusion in accordance with RTC Section 18622, so the IRS's determination is presumed correct.

Also, when California law conforms to federal law, federal rulings applicable to the IRC are highly persuasive authority. This revenue ruling is precisely that type of persuasive authority that governs because both California law and federal law are the same.

From a federal perspective, as noted by the Ninth Circuit Court in Walt Disney Company vs.

Commissioner, IRS revenue rulings are entitled to great deference and have been said to have the force of legal precedent unless unreasonable or inconsistent with the provisions of the IRC.

Moving on to a discussion of the law and guidance applicable to IRC Section 368(a)(1)(A), under the Internal Revenue Code a reorganization can qualify for tax-free treatment if it meets the requirements of IRC Section 368(a)(1)(A). IRC Section 368(a)(1)(A) defines reorganization to include a statutory merger or reorganization. The Treasury regulations effective at

the time of the AFLMC transaction stated a merger must be effectuated pursuant to the corporation laws of the United States or a state or a territory or the District of Columbia. Additionally, continuity of shareholder interest is required for a tax-free Type A merger.

2.4

The AFLMC transaction was not entitled tax-free treatment because the Texas statute used by Appellants resulted in multiple entities surviving the transaction, inconsistent with the law contained in Revenue Ruling 2000-5.

Now, moving on to Revenue Ruling 2000-5. It disallows tax-free statutory mergers completed pursuant to state merger statutes resulting in multiple entities surviving the transaction, such as the AFLMC transaction.

The revenue ruling provides a history of relevant statutes and discusses their applicability. It discusses reorganization as defined in the 1921 Revenue Act. It explains that in 1934 the 1921 provision discussing reorganizations was split into two with the 1934 predecessor to IRC Section 368(a)(1)(C) being an acquisition by one corporation of substantially all the properties of another corporation, which is the equivalent of the parenthetical the 1921 Act. The 1934 Act created a second category of statutory mergers,

which is the predecessor to the current Type A mergers.

2.4

Revenue Ruling 2005 explains that because most corporate law merger statutes ensure that one entity continues to exist after a merger, the surviving corporation automatically acquired all of the target corporation's assets. Historically, corporate law merger statutes have operated to ensure, as stated in Cortland Specialty Co. citing the ruling, that merged corporations cease to exist and the merging corporation alone survives, thus Congress did not need to add a substantially all of the properties requirement for Type A mergers.

Revenue Ruling 2000-5 reasons further that compliance with State corporate merger statutes is not enough and states that in addition to business purpose, continuity of business enterprise, and continuity of shareholder interest requirements, there's a requirement that only one entity survive the merger.

The ruling then explains the history of divisive mergers stating that Congress concluded that IRC Section 355 is the exclusive means of achieving a tax-free divisive merger and there is no explicit liquidation requirement for statutory mergers because Congress contemplated that only one entity would survive under state corporate merger statutes. Congress

addressed this in both 1954 and 1984 according to the cited Senate reports in the ruling.

2.4

In summary, Revenue Ruling 2000-5 provides that: One, state corporate merger statutes were generally meant to require only one surviving corporation; two, simply complying with a state merger statute is not enough to satisfy IRC Section 368(a)(1)(A); three, Congress intended for IRC Section 355 to be the only path for a divisive tax-free merger; and four, for these reasons a purported State statutory merger that does not satisfy IRC Section 355 as another merger type does not qualify for tax-free treatment. There appears to be no dispute that pursuant to the revenue ruling the AFLMC transaction is a taxable transaction if it applies.

A few other historical facts worth noting are that in 1920 the IRS stated in its solicitor Opinion 4 quoting a federal court decision that a merger of two or more corporations takes place when one of source -- one of such corporations retains its corporate existence and absorbs the other or others which, thereby, lose their corporate existence. And that's Respondent's Exhibit N.

Additionally, one of the purposes of the Revenue Act of 1934 was to present tax avoidance, including Congress's desire to prevent taxable sales

from being treated as tax-free reorganizations. At the time of the passing of the 1934 Act, one prominent commentator specifically noted that a statutory merger was a technical merger where only one entity survived the merger. Moreover, Black's Law Dictionary around the time defined "merger" as only one entity surviving.

2.4

Further, in 1984 the Senate and Joint Committee made the comment regarding the addition of IRC Section 368(a)(2)(G) when comparing a Type C to a Type A merger stating in the case of a statutory merger or consolidation the transporter is liquidated by operation of the law. This further shows that Congress was not anticipating and was not approving the idea that statutory mergers would be divisive in transactions like this one.

Also, the proposed regulations, temporary regulations and final regulations under Treasury Regulation Section 1.368-2(b) all adopt the requirement as contained in Revenue Ruling 2000-5. At the time of the release of the revenue ruling, one big partner and commentator went as far as to praise the ruling for its consistency.

Further, the American Bar Association did not criticize the addition of the requirement in the regulations, which one would expect if there were issues

with the ruling to the extent claimed by Appellants in the briefing.

2.4

Regarding retroactivity, generally revenue rulings apply retroactively. And as noted in Baker vs. U.S. cited by Appellants in their reply brief, the revenue ruling needs to be devoid of rational basis to not be applied. Given the history discussed earlier, the reasoning and conclusion of the revenue ruling should not have been unexpected.

The Anderson factors brought up by Appellants in the briefing are, one, whether or to what extent the taxpayer justifiably relied on settled prior law or policy and whether or to what extent the retroactive regulation alters that law; two, the extent, if any, to which the prior law or policy has been implicitly approved by Congress; three, whether retroactivity would advance or frustrate the interest in equality of treatment among similarly situated taxpayers; and, four, whether according retroactive effect would produce an inordinately harsh result.

In terms of the first factor, justified reliance on settled prior law and to what extent the retroactive regulation changes that law, there were several examples of legislative history and case law, as just discussed. Then there's the history of IRS

guidance and case law, the definitions used to define merger by practitioners, courts and dictionaries, the purpose of the 1934 Act to curb tax avoidance, and the fact that the only path to a tax-free divisive merger was through IRC Section 355. As stated by Congress, Appellants' reliance was not justified based on these points, and the revenue ruling did not change the law, it correctly interpreted the law.

2.4

As to the second factor, as mentioned, Congress in 1954 and 1984 stated that the only path to a divisive merger was through IRC Section 355. Further, the Senate and the Joint Committee made the statement that Type A mergers resulted in the liquidation of an entity by operation of the law. This further shows that Congress was not anticipating and was not approving the idea that statutory mergers would be divisive in transactions like this one.

In addition, when examining the second factor, the Court believed Congress did not give any indication that it wanted to change the law and found in favor of taxpayers in that case.

Here, this is not a law change. In fact,

Congress meant for IRC Section 355 to be the sole path

for there to be a divisive reorganization; therefore,

this factor is in favor of granting the ruling

retroactive treatment.

Regarding Factors 3 and 4, 3 being whether retroactivity would advance or frustrate the interest in equality of treatment among similar situated taxpayers; and, 4, whether according retroactive effect would produce an inordinately harsh result, there are many examples of legislative history, Treasury documents, and court cases that statutory mergers of this nature were not permitted.

In Plymouth (phonetic), the Court found in favor of the IRS regarding the third factor. Here, too, there is no unequal treatment of taxpayers. All taxpayers in the United States were bound by the same restrictions under Revenue Ruling 2000-5.

Finally, under the fourth factor, there's quite a bit of history behind the law, which would indicate that a divisive reorganization would not be permitted under the statutory merger provision. The reasonableness present in Revenue Ruling 2000-5 can be found in Appellants' own reason for their settlement.

In appellants' IDR response contained in Exhibit F, they stated that since the rules and their interpretation in this area of taxation are complex and not definitively conclusive, the IRS and the taxpayer decided to resolve the dispute via a settlement. For

all these reasons, Revenue Ruling 2000-5 should be given retroactive treatment.

2.4

The Appellants in the briefing next contend that the revenue ruling is not entitled to deference under Skidmore. The first factor is the thoroughness evident in the authority's consideration. The thoroughness presented in this case is acceptable given that one of the purposes of the Revenue Act of 1934 was to prevent tax avoidance and Revenue Ruling 2000-5 properly focused on items such as the requirement that Congress wanted Section 355 to be the sole path of a divisive merger as well as applicable case law cited.

The second factor is the validity of the authorities' reasoning. For the reasons stated previously regarding retroactivity and for Skidmore Factor 1, the reasoning is also valid.

The third factor is consistency with earlier and later pronouncements. Respondent notes that Revenue Ruling 2000-5 is consistent with earlier and later pronouncements. It's consistent with legislative history, case law, and IRS guidance. When considering the consistency with later pronouncements, the most relevant items to examine are the proposed temporary and final Treasury regulations under Section 1.368-2(b)(1) that were released around the time of the revenue

ruling. All these later pronouncements adopt Revenue Ruling 2000-5's conclusion regarding the survival of only one entity and lend a great deal of persuasive weight.

2.4

Additionally, the IRS pursued this case under 2000-5 and received a settlement. Further, for reasons stated in our retroactivity argument and then the first Skidmore factor, there is nothing that materially harms the consistency with previous and subsequent pronouncements.

The fourth factor considers all those factors which give the authority power to persuade, the blacking (phonetic) power to control. As discussed, there was a great deal of historical context to this revenue ruling and its conclusion. Further, at the time of the passing of the Revenue Act of 1934, one commentator specifically described the statutory merger as a technical merger under a state statute to complete a successful tax-free statutory merger with only one entity surviving the merger. For all these reasons, Revenue Ruling 2000-5 should be entitled to deference.

For the third sub issue regarding continuity of shareholder interest, the IRS closing agreement,
Respondent's Exhibit H, stated as a fact that PHH
Holdings received stock equal in value to only

11 percent of the total value of stock of holdings immediately prior to the transaction.

2.4

Eleven percent is far below the required minimum threshold for a retained proprietary interest for purposes of Treasury Regulation Section 1.368-1(e) as noted in Revenue Procedure 7737. The conclusion regarding the lack of continuity of shareholder interest in the transaction based on the retention of only 11 percent proprietary interest was also stated by the IRS in Form 886-A, Respondent's Exhibit G.

Third and finally, regarding the delinquent filing penalty: There appears to be no dispute if Respondent's assessments are sustained, the penalty applies and no defenses have been raised. In the end there should be consistency in what the IRS determined with the California tax liability. Revenue Ruling 2000-5 is consistent, fair, reasonable, and thorough and should be given deference and applied retroactively.

Finally, Appellants have not shown that the continuity of shareholder interest requirement was satisfied. For all these reasons, Respondent's assessment should be sustained.

Thank you. And we're happy to take any questions.

ALJ LONG: Thank you. Am going to turn to my

panel members to see if they have any questions. We'll start with Judge Johnson.

ALJ JOHNSON: Thank you. I do have a -- can you hear me okay?

THE COURT REPORTER: (Nods affirmatively)

ALJ JOHNSON: I okay -- a question for Appellants. Regarding the waiver of statute of limitations 3570(c) waiver, if there were no adjustments, federal adjustments to the 1999 tax year, why would Appellants sign a waiver extending the statute of limitations based on 18622 and 19060.

MR. VESELY: Well, there was an audit going on at the time, your Honor, that -- and the waiver covers 1999 through '02, and that was the audit the FTB was doing of Appellants at that time, and at that time the decision -- we weren't there, but our understanding was that the audit was going on and FTB was making whatever adjustments they were going to make, and the Appellants agreed to do a waiver but only agreed to do a waiver that was tied to federal adjustments, so not a general waiver. And I think that's the important part.

ALJ JOHNSON: Okay. Thank you.

And then some more questions. It's going to be for both parties, so I might go back and forth a little bit. I'll start with the Franchise Tax Board. Which

documents -- we have closing agreements the 886-A explanation items, the RAR is mentioned -- I don't know if we have it in the record or not as well as possible Form 4549 documents. Which are we looking at that represent the final federal determination?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

2.4

25

Well, the date of the final MR. WERKING: federal determination is located on the BMF in this That's Respondent's Exhibit J, page 28, Transaction 300. But the substance of what -- you know, why did the IRS assess this additional tax in 2008, it really is the IRS's determination that the 1999 AFLMC transaction was a taxable transaction. And where do we find that? Where do we see that. Which I believe is your question. And that is from the -- the -- the 886-A. We can see the IRS explains on page -- it's Respondent's Exhibit G, page 4. We can see the -- the IRS's position that they determined that the 1999 AFLMC transaction did not qualify as a reorganization. then we can also look to the IRS's reasoning in that document for why they agreed to their settlement, which is provided in pages 4 through 6 of that same exhibit, where the IRS compared the net present value of the potential additional tax that would be collected where the additional tax from determining the 1999 transaction was taxable being assessed in the 1999 taxable year and

Appellants' claim resulting in additional depreciation and amortization of goodwill for 1999 through 2014 compared with also treating the 1999 AFLMC transaction as a taxable transaction but assessing the additional tax in 2002 with Appellants being precluded from taking the additional depreciation and amortization deductions for the taxable years 1999 through 2005 and allowing Appellants to claim the remaining amortization deductions that are available through 2014 because the 1999 transaction was taxable and also foregoing a deduction for the payment of interest an additional tax payment in 2006. But based on the IRS's comparison, they would realize a greater value of additional tax assessing the tax in 2002 with these additional restrictions on Appellants than assessing the tax in 1999.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

2.4

25

We can also look to the recitals of
Respondent's Exhibit -- of the actual closing agreement,
Respondent's Exhibit H, and there the IRS determined
that the 1999 transaction was a taxable transaction but
would assess the tax in 2002 with those limitations on
Appellants, that they would only be able to claim
amortization deductions resulting from the 1999
transaction being a taxable transaction, but only for
taxable years beginning 2006 and forward. And this is

found in Respondent's Exhibit H, page 7, Number 6, paragraph 6.

2.4

So the explanation of items, the closing agreement, and referring to the BMF is where we can piece together what -- what is the basis for this final federal determination and what is the date of the final federal determination.

ALJ JOHNSON: Okay. Thank you.

And for Appellants -- and part of the reason why I ask this, I believe in your -- your briefs made a point that the RARs were not final, they're not part of the actual final determinations.

So same kind of question, are you looking at closing agreements and the 886-A as far as what constitutes the final federal determination?

MR. VESELY: The final federal determination is not 886-A. There's no way because that is not what the final determination was that's laid out in the closing agreement. Recitals in a closing agreement mean nothing. They're recitals. The actual determination in the closing agreement, and that is the final federal determination under the FTB's own regulations, that audit report, anything that's preliminary like that, unless that ends up being the final -- the final-final here, which it did not, you know, there's no way that

that is the final federal determination in this matter.

2.4

It's real interesting when you look at the BMF reports, your Honor. The date is really irrelevant for our purposes of deciding this case, whether it's the date of the -- of the closing agreement or the date it actually gets entered in the BMF report. It's not entered in 1999 in the BMF report. The liability, that's \$60 million plus the interest, is entered in the 2002 BMF report. There is nothing for 1999 related to this merger in the BMF report for 1999.

So whatever, you know, counsel is arguing about here, that's all well and good, but that doesn't get you there. That's -- you can't piece this together. I guess we go back to, like I said in my opening, if the liability -- you know, if the merger was taxable in 1999, it was 550 million, almost \$600 million with interest is what the tax liability was -- interest was, not, you know, 71 million like what was, you know, the final determination in the closing agreement.

I think that's the problem is that when you really parse through the closing agreement, where do you see that they adjusted anything having to do with the merger in 1999? And that's our problem with what the FTB did in this case.

And I'll be happy to talk more about that, but

1 that's -- that's our essence of our position. 2 ALJ JOHNSON: Okay. Thank you. 3 MR. VESELY: Oh, your Honor, one more thing. 4 I'm sorry. 5 ALJ JOHNSON: Sure. 6 MR. VESELY: Because counsel was referring to 7 the closing agreement, I think it is important to look at page 7, paragraph 7, "Taxpayer will not be required 8 to file an amended federal tax return for its 1999 tax 9 10 year to report its alleged \$1.5 billion gain." It's kind of important that the word "alleged" 11 that's in there. That's not a recital. 12 That is part of 13 the agreement. So I think we have to really parse 14 through that agreement very carefully to see what was 15 exactly determined by the IRS. On that note, regarding the 16 ALJ JOHNSON: 17 adding alleged to the value of the transaction there, 18 going further down, I believe it's paragraph 13 on the 19 same page. 20 MR. VESELY: One second, your Honor. 21 ALJ JOHNSON: Sure. 22 MR. WERKING: Okay. Exhibit H, page 7. 23 MR. VESELY: Oh, yeah. Okay. 2.4 ALJ JOHNSON: Could it be that that adding 25 alleged there was part of that paragraph 13 where the

IRS is making no statement as to the actual value, so, therefore, they're not making a finding but they're agreeing that this is the number that was discussed in paragraph 7?

MR. VESELY: Your Honor, I don't know -- I don't know. You know, when we enter into any kind of closing agreements or whatever, it's very common to not have -- nobody's is giving up anything, you know. And that's the way I've read that paragraph, frankly. You know, I don't know if it means anything more than that. But, you know, again, you know, we agree to disagree almost kind of thing, if you will. But I don't know that gets FTB off the hook here of the timing of all of this. That's the problem. And I think -- and I really do think that -- that and waiver that we were looking at before is really crucial here. So --

ALJ JOHNSON: I'm going to kind of the statements again about closing agreements, how they're structured, put together. Really, the purpose of the closing agreement is kind of forego further audit, litigation, attorney's fees and all that kind of stuff. You're not necessarily trying to nail down specificities as to how the tax law is being applied but more an end result goal that both parties will agree to to forego further costs and expenses. Seeing as how on this is a

Form 886-A closing disagreement, it's closing out an entire year, it's not a 906 that might close out specific issues, it's closing out '98 through 2002 resulting in one lump sum additional tax. It was applied to 2002 tax year, not to 1999, does that affect at all the impact of how this closing agreement that closes out 1999 and resulted in additional tax for the closing agreement in the aggregate. I guess you could say, does that show that potentially there were contemplations of tax effects for 1999 that resulted in changes?

MR. VESELY: Well, I think if you step back and think about that for a second, if, indeed, there was tax effects for 1999 that was contemplated here and they were contemplating saying that that merger was taxable, then the taxpayer would have been allowed additional depreciation -- or the Appellants, I'll use a general term -- additional depreciation, additional amortization and is specifically not, you know, allow to do that, which would have been there, you would have gotten a stepped-up basis.

You know so the 2001 transaction, which is referenced in there, which they ended up having to pay the whole tax on that, that thing in 2001 would have been a lot lower gain. That would have been -- that was

tied to the 1999. If the 1999 merger was taxable, there would have been increased amortization depreciation deductions, a stepped-up basis there. Generally speaking, what the IRS would have required is you've got to amend your 1999 return. They said, "Nope. You can't -- you don't have to do that." And, oh, by the way, you're prohibited from going back in there to claim additional depreciation and amortization deductions.

There are no adjustments in '00 and '01 in that closing agreement if you notice there. So when you step back and say, "Well, what did they exactly do here," what we do know is that they did not adjust 1999. They did not change the filing position of tax-free that the taxpayers had put forth in that closing agreement. And that is the final federal determination here. You know, that's the problem that FTB has, frankly, is that the closing agreement does make a determination for 2002, and that is the year that, you know, the amount is paid in tax. That was reflected in the audit with the FTB, that 2002 change and everything else.

So it's -- you know, I've looked at this thing inside and out and said, "Okay. Where's the '99 change?" And so you still -- you think about it for a second, and what FTB is trying to do in this case, which I think is very -- it's -- it's -- there really aren't a

whole lot of limits to how they can apply their final federal determination here, and kind of taken what I was going to say on rebuttal, but I'll say it right now is that they look at the "any year" language in 18622, and if you look at that "any year," that is only looking at the federal side.

So if we were to look at 18622, it talks about the Feds or the IRS making an adjustment in any year. And the reason it was "any year" in there always was that it was to deal with if they are going into an open year, which is no big deal, or a closed year. Can IRS go into a closed year? They can only go into it if it's a annual carryover issue so that you've got to go in to look at when was proper for the later years. Same thing with the credit carryover. And indeed, I'll go into this in more detail for you with the history, but, again, that "any year" does not apply to the FTB can assist, issue an assessment for any year.

So if I got an assessment that for federal purposes that's 2002 doesn't mean they can just go in willy-nilly to any year, which is essentially what they are doing here, frankly.

But the second part of it, and, you know, counsel just referred to resulting from the adjustments.

Wow. You know, let's think about that for a second.

So we're talking about resulting from the adjustments to 2002, which basically in that closing agreement says you don't do all these things that you would if it had been taxable in 1999. You don't get additional depreciation. You don't get additional, you know, amortization. You don't get a stepped-up basis. You don't -- and all of that that's in the closing agreement somehow results in them being able to assess in 1999 that the merger was taxable, you know, with all due respect, please. There's no limit to that. How would a taxpayer ever know what should be reported and when?

ALJ JOHNSON: And that's a question I'll have later on as well.

MR. VESELY: Okay.

ALJ JOHNSON: But going back to that point you mentioned earlier on, of course, giving up the step-up in basis, the amortization and the other, benefits that would happen later on were that 1999 AFLMC transaction be not deemed to be a tax-free merger. And Respondent earlier pointed to Exhibit G, page 6, I believe. And we had the last two paragraphs on there.

And what the IRS has done in that is the explanation of the items, again on the Form 886-A.

They've said, if we're going to pursue -- let me see

here -- the course of disallowing the merger as a 368(a)(1)(A) reorganization, if we're going to disallow that, they measured out the tax effect of that, what that would be.

2.4

Next paragraph, they went and compared that to what taxpayers were offering and -- which is a higher amount, actually, it looks like of tax that was going to be paid or due. And they said based on that, we agree to find taxpayer's resolution acceptable and we'll go with that option. And I think what you see then, perhaps, is in the closing agreement, they kind of put a stop on all the benefits you would get had the merger been seen as not tax-free, sort of to balance out -- balance out going with Appellants' position in the -- the closing agreement.

To that extent, does that add evidence or suggest that the closing agreement adjustments were based on what IRS saw as adjustments that should be made to 1999?

MR. VESELY: Well, I mean, I saw that as well, your Honor. I guess what hits me on this is we don't know what went on exactly in all the discussions. I mean, I wasn't there. You weren't there. You know, we got what this is. This is not a final determination though. I mean, this is -- this is, you know,

documents that -- that, you know, during the audit stage and so on and so forth. But let's think about that for a second though. When parties settle -- settle matters an old FTB lawyer once said to me, he said, well, you know, you know what, Jeff? You can go talk Italian to your clients and we'll talk French to mine and we'll come -- I don't care how we get to the number necessarily. So getting to the number is just fine, but the idea here is: What is the adjustment that is supposed to be tied to 1999? Is it really that you all of a sudden now have a taxable transaction in that year and you're relying -- and supposedly you're relying on this federal determination to issue an NPA for that year under a waiver that says resulting from the federal adjustments, not for all purposes? There's no limits to disposition. And as a result, I think they've got a problem, not only with whether this is really a tax-free merger or not, which we'll talk about more in my rebuttal, but the fact of the matter is, I think that they have a problem with their statute of limitations because it's not resulting from a federal -- they don't like the result in this closing agreement. That's the problem.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

I mean, let's cut to the chase. They want that five -- you know, they want the 12 and a half million

dollar assessment in 1999 because of the, you know, they didn't get it by following the federal determination here. So I -- I -- you know, they're asking you guys to really jump through a lot of hoops to get to their position, and I think that's a problem here. I think it's a problem both on the tax-free merger conclusion and the statute of limitations, frankly.

ALJ JOHNSON: Sure. And let me give Respondent a chance on his questions as well.

MR. VESELY: Sure.

2.4

ALJ JOHNSON: So you mentioned that the 886-A explanation of items is what you look at to explain what the federal adjustments were. Or I'm --

MR. WERKING: Partial.

ALJ JOHNSON: Partially, correct, okay. And then Exhibit H there, the closing agreement itself, if your sort of analysis was restricted just to that closing agreement and perhaps even not the "whereas" statements but the "hereby determine and agree to" statements at the second half of that, would you still maintain that this federal adjustment shows that the statute of limitations is open for a state sided adjustment to the 1999 tax year?

MR. WERKING: I would. I think -- sorry. Yes, I would. I think -- I think you can -- you can

garner -- even -- even not looking at the 886-A to rely on as a primary document to determine what the final federal determination is, you can gain some information by looking at 886-A as to what is and the reason why the information is contained in the closing agreement.

2.4

But, specifically, when you do look at -- I'd direct you to the closing agreement, page 7, and it is paragraph 6. That's an item that, you know, is earlier addressed in the 886-A to kind of give us an idea of what -- why is that there, what does that mean. That is one of those items that are -- the closing agreement is addressing that, yes, we're treating the taxable -- the 1999 transaction as a taxable transaction and, therefore, there's this resulting -- this -- this additional amortization deduction that will be available to Appellants.

And, you know, the paragraphs 4 and 5 above are also those -- those limitations that were placed on Appellants that were explained in the 886-A but are contained within the terms and conditions of this closing agreement, because taking the 1999 transaction as a taxable transaction, Appellants would otherwise be able to take those amortization and depreciation deductions.

So I think that information, you know,

clarifies and -- and indicates that, yes, the determination was that there is -- the 1999 transaction is a taxable transaction, but we're going to -- the IRS is going to take this position to allow the tax to be assessed in 2002 with the caveat that there's these extra limitations to make it their benefit. But I think it leans to show that, yes, that alone, that document alone does show that the 1999 transaction was determined to be a taxable transaction.

2.4

ALJ JOHNSON: Thank you. And to address part of the concerns that were raised by Appellant, if you have a closing agreement, that doesn't make actual concrete adjustments to the tax year 1999, you know, it makes adjustments to a different year, perhaps, that are all covered in the same closing agreement, sort of in general and perhaps to this case as well, what level of specificity is going to be required to put a taxpayer on notice that the requirements to inform FTB under 18622 have been triggered?

MR. WERKING: I mean, I think there you have to look at all the information that is available. And in this case, it was clear the adjustment that was being reviewed, the transaction, that was being reviewed was the 1999 transaction, whether that was a taxable transaction or a tax-free merger.

And so by looking at the explanation of items in this case, you know, it was apparent and is clear that the tax that results from that review of that item in this case being assessed in 2002, but it resulted from that examination of this particular item. And so that -- that puts the taxpayers on notice as to this is the actual transaction that -- that leads to the additional tax being assessed. And then you have to look to -- so under California law, if this is a taxable transaction in 1999 as the IRS determined, what is the resulting tax effect to report?

ALJ JOHNSON: Thank you. I guess under that same line of reasoning, obviously, Franchise Tax Board was not a party to the closing agreement, weren't at the table for those discussions and there might be some agreements that were made that -- between those two parties that FTB cannot try to enforce upon the taxpayers perhaps since that's not an agreement between the taxpayer and the Franchise Tax Board. So once the -- once those changes are made, the Franchise Tax Board, you're going to be looking at the California tax effects that were just saying. Is that correct?

MR. WERKING: Exactly.

ALJ JOHNSON: Okay. Is there -- was there a possibility -- maybe you don't know in this case -- of

FTB to just say, "We're going to do the same thing the 1 2 feds did and put it all in 2002?" 3 MR. WERKING: I don't want to speculate on 4 other instances, but in this case, because we had the 5 information that we knew, you know, what was the basis for this change, for this adjustment and additional tax 6 7 assessment in 2002, because we have that information, you know, the California tax effect of that 8 9 determination, that the 1999 transaction is taxable, 10 that, you know, should be placed in 1999. Perhaps with different information or less information an assessment 11 12 may follow the year in which the tax is actually 13 assessed. 14 ALJ JOHNSON: Okay. Thank you. 15 MR. VESELY: Your Honor, if I may respond to a 16 couple things? 17 ALJ JOHNSON: Yeah. Just checking the -- I 18 think that's my last question. 19 MR. VESELY: Sure. I'm sorry. 20 ALJ JOHNSON: Go ahead. Go ahead and --21 MR. VESELY: Okay. All right. 22 ALJ JOHNSON: -- if you want to add a few 23 points. 2.4 MR. VESELY: Well, a couple things that counsel just said were interesting. I mean, again, as I said in 25

my opening, that we've got to read that closing agreement carefully. There's a lot of things in there that we want to be real careful about here. And really, look at the last paragraph of the closing agreement on paragraph 18. It says, "The closing agreement contains the complete agreement of the parties."

We're not talking about that you all of a sudden kind of overlay the 886-A, which is not a final federal determination. Indeed, under their own regulations, a final determination is an irrevocable determination of regulation 19059(e), irrevocable determination or adjustment of the taxpayer's federal tax liability from which there exists no further right of appeal.

Under an 886, an RAR, that is not the case. Those are not irrevocable by any means. So when you really talk about those two things here, if a taxpayer is trying to piece together what do I need to report or not report, this is not appropriate notice. This -- that's what it's all about. I mean, you've got to give the taxpayers notice.

And, frankly, if you think about it, you know, the claim for refund statute from federal determinations, 19311, is tied to the same stuff we're talking about. So how would you know which years that a

1 claim for refund should be filed for? You know, should 2 I file for 2002? 1999? What should I do? Should I 3 take a guess? That's not the way to administer the law. 4 But anyway --5 ALJ JOHNSON: Okay. Thank you both. No 6 further questions. 7 MR. VESELY: Okay. 8 ALJ LONG: Thank you. 9 Judge Kwee, do you have any questions for 10 either party? 11 This is Judge Kwee. Yes. ALJ KWEE: 12 I'm just collecting my thoughts. So we have the \$60 13 million assessment for the year 2002. And then there 14 was the closing agreement, and I guess I'm just 15 wondering, you know, what the closing agreement, asserting it for 2002, and then we have IRC Section 16 17 18622, which is that, you know, if an amount reported 18 on -- or shown on a federal return for any years 19 changed, you have to report that to FTB. And I guess 20 looking at that "for any year" language, you know, you

assert that 18622 for a different tax year for 1999,

when for example, like, there's, you know, a federal

taxpayer's argument is that you couldn't -- FTB couldn't

have this 60 million assessment for 2002 for fed

purposes, but I -- it's my understanding of the

21

22

23

2.4

25

assessment for 2002 but it would impact it for the state purposes for 1999. And I guess if that's the position, I'm just wondering if there is any sort of a legislative history or something similarly --

MR. VESELY: Oh, I'd be happy to go through it with you in great detail. I've got -- we put it into the briefs as well. But the fact of the matter is 18622, the predecessor to that -- and this was before 1967. And there was a legal ruling that the FTB issued, and it's our Exhibit 3, Legal Rule 280 issued in 1964.

And that legal ruling was -- the reason for that legal ruling was, under the law as it read at that time, the taxpayer was required to report any adjustments made to the amount of taxable income federally. So the terms were amount of taxable income federally. The legal ruling looked at it and it also looked at the -- you know, analyzed the term "any year."

And if you -- if you look at 18622, your Honor, it's real interesting because I have to -- the more times we read all this jazz, you find something new.

And what 18622 says, and this is (a), "If any item required to be shown on a federal tax return, including gross income, deduction, penalty, credit or tax for any year of any taxpayer is changed" -- stop right there.

And it's "changed by the Commissioner of Internal

Revenue," I'm sorry. The "any year" is tied to the federal government looking at your tax returns, at those years there. And it's not to talk about that you can take an adjustment in 2002 and apply it to 1999. That's not what the statute says. There's no way -- no reading of that statute that gets you there.

And what was done in that legal ruling back in 1964 -- because it only referred to taxable income. What they had in the legal ruling was a net operating loss that -- well, the taxpayer had a zero taxable income. That's what the audit staff was asking about, zero taxable income. The feds made an adjustment there to disallow some deductions, but they were already at zero so there was nothing, you know, to add to it.

What the legal ruling concludes, it says, well, since it says taxable income and there's no adjustment to taxable income, the taxpayer does not have to report that under the predecessor to 18622. That led to a '67 -- 1967 amendment where they changed it from taxable income to gross income. And, you know, it's made a few changes since then, but that was to take into account the fact that if the IRS goes into a year and disallows, you know, deduction for some reason, however, it has no taxable effect for federal purposes because of NOLs or something like that, California can pick that up as a

report. The taxpayer has to report that adjustment under the current law for that year. That's really -- that's all it's really getting to. And what it has to is that where does this effect for other tax years come in? It's not just wide open, you know, well, wild west show to hit any tax year.

The FTB in their own Manual of Audit

Procedures -- actually, also in the other legislation

that came afterwards, which is in our briefs. There's a

Senate Finance report which I could -- I'll read for you

here that talks about, well, this carries over from

the -- if you've got carryovers.

So they make an adjustment, you know, in one year and there's NOL carryovers that actually affect then, the later years or a credit carryover in later years, those adjustments can be done. But that's the limited exception to the general rule that if the Feds adjust something in 2002, then California can adjust it for 2002 if indeed it follows the rules that way.

It doesn't mean you can just go into any year. The "any year" in that statute has to do with what the Feds are looking at, not what California can do. That's nowhere in there. And I think that's one of the problems with their position.

The second one is the resulting from federal

adjustments. Well, you know, by gosh. That -- that -- that -- that is a term that is being stretched and strained beyond recognition right now by them in this case. And resulting from federal adjustments, we're saying they could -- they could issue an assessment resulting from a federal adjustment where the Feds never took the position that the merger was taxable in that final federal determination. Not in the audit report, but the final federal determination. You know, that's not what the law provides. Simple as that.

So I'm not sure if I answered your question.

I'm sorry.

ALJ KWEE: Oh, yeah. You provided a very detailed answer. Thank you. And I apologize. I'm new to this panel. I'm new to this appeal so I was still trying to wrap my head around everything that was going on here.

MR. VESELY: Sure.

ALJ KWEE: My concern really was just if that were their interpretation of it could potentially, you ability, create a loophole where there's like an agreement to assess something for one year, a different year, or if there's, you know, like a difference between state and fed that, you know, potentially FTB would be, you know, out of luck there just because of the way it

1 was structured. 2 But I think you've answered it, and I will --3 I'll review the Exhibit 3 and the documentation that you 4 were referring to. 5 I'm sorry. I'm getting a note that you can't hear me or the parties can't hear me online. 6 But I did have one additional question and that 7 had to do with early on -- earlier on in your 8 9 presentation you were talking about the waiver. 10 MR. VESELY: Mm-hmm. 11 ALJ KWEE: And there were two aspects there. think one you had referred to at the very end, and I 12 13 think this was the Exhibit 2. I don't remember the page 14 number. On the very bottom right, there was the like it 15 indicated -- it was titled RAR, you know --16 MR. VESELY: Right. 17 ALJ KWEE: -- the revenue agent report. 18 MR. VESELY: Yeah. It's our Exhibit 2 and 19 actually FTB's Exhibit L, I think, or something like 20 that. It's the same waiver. 21 ALJ KWEE: Okay. Well, that wasn't -- I'll get 22 to my question again and then I'll let you --23 MR. VESELY: I'm sorry. I'm sorry. 2.4 ALJ KWEE: I'll tell you when, yeah, I have my 25 question.

But yeah. So I did see that. And then on the top right, I noticed on the top right of the title it's also referring to the, you know, the federal action or, you know, federal adjustments.

MR. VESELY: Mm-hmm.

ALJ KWEE: But if you look at the actual text of the waiver, it didn't seem to include any limitation on one -- it could be asserted by FTB, so it looks like, you know, I guess one interpretation might be that this was maybe the title they gave the form or the form that they used in this certain situation, but it didn't look like there was an actual limitation substantively, if you go to the actual text, that only applies. So I guess maybe I -- or maybe that's maybe where I'm asking, if -- if there was something -- if you wanted to address that, the actual text of the waiver seemed pretty extensive.

MR. VESELY: Well, it -- yeah. I mean, this waiver is a standard form for the FTB. This is not a form that was made up for this case. And this is a -- this is quite different than the normal waiver, the general waiver that exists. For example, in this waiver they actually refer to the two case statutes in this case, 19059 and 19060, right in the middle there. Those have to do with resulting from a federal adjustment.

1 And, you know, this particular waiver -- and, 2 indeed, Franchise Tax Board's audit -- auditor went 3 through an analysis in her reports -- or his reports. 4 I, forget who it is -- and talked about what is the 5 statute of limitations here, but resulting from the federal adjustments. This is not a general waiver under 6 California -- under FTB. You can ask them that 7 question. They'll have to concede that. This is not 8 9 anything other than a limited waiver. 10 ALJ KWEE: Okay. Okay. Thank you. I'm sorry. Judge Long, do you mind if I ask a 11 12 question of FTB? 13 ALIJ LONG: Yeah. 14 ALJ KWEE: Just -- I guess, FTB, did you want 15 to respond to that, or did you have a position on that? MR. WERKING: Yes. We do agree that this is a 16 limited waiver. It only extends the statute of 17 18 limitations for, you know, assessing additional tax that 19 results from a federal adjustment in this case. Our 20 position is that the 2002 assessment results from the 21 determination by the IRS that it's a -- the '99 22 transaction was a taxable transaction. 23 ALJ KWEE: Okay. Perfect. Thank you. 2.4 I will turn it back to Judge Long. 25 ALJ LONG: Thank you. This is a question for

FTB. Mr. Vesely mentioned earlier on about the -- the closing agreement, how it states in the recitals IRS's determination that this is not a neutral tax reorganization; whereas, in the determine -- or in the determination it mentions that it's an alleged gain.

Do you have a response or a position to how we should be considering these statements in the recital versus the determination portion of the closing agreement?

MR. WERKING: I think both are helpful. Same with looking at the explanation of items. It's helpful in understanding exactly why did the IRS agree to assess tax in 2002. We -- that's what you need to know. What is the federal determination? What did they determine to agree to this assessment of tax in 2002 when they believe the tax should be assessed in 1999?

And so looking at the recitals is helpful. And you can see that even in the terms and conditions of the actual closing agreement that -- that it does follow the same information that is contained in that analysis in the explanation of items that comparing, you know, the tax that would have been due had the taxpayer amended the return in 1999, but instead, because of the, you know, additional tax that -- that the IRS would collect determined or allowed or decided or agreed to tax the --

1	assess the tax in 2002 but with those limitations on
2	Appellants' ability to take deductions for a period of
3	time resulting from the 1999 transaction being a taxable
4	transaction but still allowing a portion of it as well
5	to continue, which I think is very important to to
6	look at to determine exactly why did the IRS assess tax
7	in 2002 and what would be the California tax effect of
8	that reason, that determination.
9	ALJ LONG: Thank you. We will all right.
10	The next portion of our hearing is for the rebuttal, but
11	looks like we're nearing the two-hour mark, so I think
12	now is a good time for a 15-minute break.
13	MR. VESELY: Okay.
14	ALJ LONG: So I guess we will come back around
15	3:05, if I did my math correctly.
16	(Break taken at 2:50 p.m.)
17	ALJ LONG: We are back on the record. We will
18	continue with Appellant's rebuttal, and you may begin
19	when you're ready.
20	MR. VESELY: Thank you, your Honor.
21	
22	REBUTTAL STATEMENT
23	BY MR. VESELY, Counsel for Appellant:
24	Since we have spent a lot of time on the
25	statute of limitations issue, I'll cut down on that part

of my thing. But I do want to repeat a few things that we need to keep in mind. Here. I believe I've said it a number of times here, 18622 and 19060 require the notification if the feds, the IRS makes an adjustment in a particular year on the taxpayer's federal return. The taxpayer is required to report that.

In this particular case, the final federal adjustment that was made is for the 2002 tax year. Counsel has talked about the BMF report and other things like that. He talked about 886-A. Those are all well and good. The 886-A is not the final. It's not a final determination. The BMF report has nothing to do with a final determination. It has to do with the date there. The BMF report in this case only talks in terms of a 2002 amount being assessed. 2002, not 1999.

So what do we have in this case? There's nothing that counsel can point to in the closing agreement that says that the 1999 tax year was adjusted under the closing agreement. They did not change the reporting of the merger as tax-free for 1999, no matter what counsel wants to say.

I think counsel kind of reversed himself a bit before the break, and he talked about the 2002 was resulting from the 1999 merger. Well, that's not the analysis. Was the 2002 adjustment -- what kind of an

assessment could FTB propose resulting from the 2002 adjustment. And, frankly, nothing in the agreement. Recitals are not the agreement. Recitals are just -- you know, they're -- they're not what parties agreed to. So that's something -- you know, Judge Long, you asked that question. That's not the agreement. The agreement is the body of what was done here, and nothing was done to the 1999 tax year. And that's crucial here because that's what 18622 and 19060 require.

So when we step back one more time, the treatment of the merger as tax-free on the taxpayer's 1999 return, by the way. It was not adjusted. And I'm talking about on the federal return. It was not adjusted. Nothing was changed. And all the other paragraphs that I mentioned that basically would go the other way if it was taxable and we've already referred to just to confirm that point.

Now, Judge Kwee actually made a comment that caught my attention and my colleague's attention is about a loophole. There's no loophole here for a taxpayer. To be honest with you, it's the other way around. If FTB is permitted to do this like that, that's creating a -- I'll call it a governmental loophole because this -- it's opening a Pandora's box. There's no limit to what year you would be applying a

final federal determination. That can't be the case.

I mentioned to you that the legislative history was very clear from 1964, 1967, and then post that with respect to the predecessor to 18622. And basically what -- what was said and what I think is real important here is actually the FTB's own -- own words in their manual.

And this is Exhibit 9, Appellant's Exhibit 9.

And it says -- it's the Manual of Audit Procedures. It says, "The tax effect of a Revenue Agent Report adjustment may apply to different years for California purposes than for federal purposes for such issues as net operating losses, tax credits and other carryover items."

It's not -- it's not a wide open thing. You've got some limits there and a reason -- there's a rationale for that. Because you may have an adjustment in a year that is adjusting income or deductions, whatever it might be, and it will affect the amount of the NOL in that year that you carry over into another year, or it might affect the credits that would be carried over into another year. That's the limited exception to saying if I adjust -- if the FTB or the IRS adjusts 2002, you know, the FTB can adjust 2002 because that's the nice and neat way it goes. That's what

Montgomery Ward is very clear about when you look at that opinion.

So I think that that's the problem. There's the loophole that we've got to be worried about here. And I think that's the part that we are, you know, very concerned about. This is -- this is not -- there's nothing here that supports their position that they should be adjusting 1999.

And as I said earlier, one of biggest issues that we've got and what FTB is really trying to do here is they don't like the conclusion of what IRS did. They don't like the fact that they didn't go full boar on that being taxable in 1999. And they're going to do it themselves.

So let's step back and think about that. They only can do 1999 under that limited waiver that we talked about, and that limited waiver is required resulting from the final federal determination. The only final federal determination related to anything remotely close to this is the 2002 final federal determination.

Now, that determination was done where it's not taxable, where the merger is not taxable. So to say that now that they can go into '99 and say, Well, you know what? We're going to go resulting from that

federal adjustment, which we are completely 180 degrees opposite. We want to get that assessment in 1999. Well, they're too late because it's not resulting from any final federal determination there; and therefore, that limited waiver does not save them. So I think that -- that itself is a major part of what we've got I think that -- the other part that I think was here. discussed a bit. Okay. What about the calculation of the -- of the settlement with the IRS? Well, that's all well and good, but that's not the final federal determination of how you calculated it. I mean, there's nothing in there that says that '99 was adjusted. that, I think, is -- is -- that's crucial in this whole matter. But let me -- let me go on and I want to address some of the statements made by counsel with respect to the merger issue.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

2.4

25

Now, counsel relies very heavily on Revenue Ruling 2000-5. The problem with that Revenue Ruling 2000-5 are manyfold. First of all, that was published in January 31st, 2000, for approximately seven months after the AFLMC merger. And the FTB is asking you folks here to apply that revenue ruling retroactively to the merger. Its position must be rejected for a number of reasons.

First of all, it is in direct conflict, the

conclusions in that revenue ruling, with the statute IRC 368(a)(1)(A) and the Treasury Regulation Section 1.368-2(b)(1) existing at that time. They can't -- they can't disagree. That's exactly what those documents -- they do not talk in terms of a liquidation requirement.

2.4

The liquidation requirement here -- and we talked about it being settled law, et cetera. The only thing that was settled law at that time -- and we're going to get into the Anderson factors here in a second -- was that you needed a statutory merger, since 1934. And we'll talk about it in a second. That was to put people on notice: What do you need? But it was also contemplated that the state's -- the state's -- the state's merger statutes were not identical. They were all over the place. It was understood there, and I'll point you to it where? Right in FTB's own exhibits, frankly.

So the liquidation requirement that they want to put in through the revenue ruling to go retroactive to 1999, how do they square that with the subsequent Treasury Reg changes in 2003 and '6? And if you notice counsel never mentioned effective dates. All he mentioned was, yeah, there's a liquidation requirement in those regulations. That's true, there is. But the liquidation requirement for the 2003 temporary regs was

prospective after January 24, 2003, and if you did a transaction before that date, you applied the former regulation.

2.4

God, I looked like heck for -- to find Revenue Ruling 2000-5 mentioned in these Treasury reg changes.

Not -- not even a semblance of it in there. Oh, by the way, there's nothing about 2000-5 somewhere in that closing agreement either. That's pretty interesting.

Where is it if it was so doggone important?

so when you look at the temporary regs in 2003 and then you look at the final regs in 2006, the effective dates in both of those are crucial in this case because what they're are asking you to do is to say that revenue ruling somehow trumps the regulations and say that that should be applied retroactively, where regulations say just the opposite. It says you apply the old regulation which had no liquidation requirement.

So how does that work? Let's just talk about that a little bit. Where in the pecking order are Treasury regs versus revenue rulings? Well, it's very clear what they are? 26 CFR Section 601.601(d)(2)(b)(v)(d). Sorry about that, all those. It basically says revenue rulings do not have the force and effect of Treasury regulations. That's the IRS's own words. A revenue ruling is merely an official

interpretation published by the IRS to provide information and guidance to taxpayers and IRS officials.

2.4

It doesn't take precedence over a Treasury regulation, but they're asking you to basically say that it does here for the purposes of applying this thing retroactively. I don't think that's a -- you know, rendering an opinion that says that's going to be a tough one, to be candid with you, like that.

But let's talk about this a little further. You know, putting aside the fact that a revenue ruling cannot trump the -- oh, sorry about that -- cannot take precedence over the -- over the Treasury regulations here, its liquidation requirement cannot be applied retroactively to the merger here. The revenue ruling merely set forth, as we said in our briefs, really a litigating position of the IRS at that time. That's all it did like that. it was inconsistent with the statute and the regs that existed at that time.

The other part of it that's interesting is that counsel did discuss the Anderson factors, but let's talk about those a little more in-depth here.

The first factor -- and this is a 1980 case, and it was cited in the briefs. The first factor is whether and to what extent a taxpayer justifiably relied upon settled prior law or policy and whether and to what

extent he punitively -- the punitively retroactive regulation or revenue ruling alters that.

2.4

So what happened here? Appellant justifiably relied on prior settled of law, policy which allowed law tax-free mergers without requiring liquidation of a target corporation. Until the IRS published Revenue Ruling 2000-5, there's nothing out there you can find that they say this.

Now, they talk about a lot of things, of how this was a dictionary definition and other things like that. That's not the law. The law here is what -- pursuant to a state merger statute, which is the Texas statute in this particular case which had been around for ten years. There's no question about that and they don't disagree with that.

The revenue ruling introduced a new liquidation requirement. So when you take that and then you add on the subsequent amendments to the Treasury regs, which I just referred to in the 2003 and 2006, yes, they introduced the liquidation requirement there, but they don't all of a sudden say, "Well, you know what? Four years prior to 2003, apply the revenue ruling." They don't say that. You apply the prior regulation. Very interesting. Why did they do that? There's not a specific mention on the revenue ruling here. So why did

the IRS instruct taxpayers to do so? Well, it certainly wasn't to give retroactive effect to the revenue.
Ruling, that's for sure.

Now, the interesting thing here, FTB's own Exhibit Q -- and this is the ABA tax section comments regarding the 2006 final Treasury regulations and the liquidation requirement that -- that came up at that point in time. But those comments are actually very helpful to our position in this thing.

Just a few excerpts. Page 11 of those comments. Quote, We can find no evidence that Congress intended in 1934 a target corporation must strictly cease its existence for all purposes in connection for a Type A reorganization.

Now, counsel seems to have said that, "Oh, this has always been known that you have to have that."

Well, that's interesting. It's not exactly what these guys are saying. And I think that they're, you know, not -- these aren't just comments out of the blue.

These are comments by well-respected group here.

The comments went on at page 12 to say, "In 1934 there was no uniformity regarding what was a merger in one State versus another in 1934." So we say that you could have a liquidation requirement in one and not in the other? I mean, it was all over the place.

But the one that really caught my attention is actually at page 16, Footnote 57. It says, "Therefore, we do not see why the current cessation or liquidation requirement should be considered well-established and deep-rooted principle for a Type A reorganization." Not quite exactly what FTB is arguing here.

Appellants clearly satisfy this first Anderson factor. They justifiably relied on settled law that said you look to see whether there was a state or United States or territory or District of Columbia statute that actually -- the merger statutes there. That's what -- that's what the regs say.

And this one is the one that really gets you, if you think about. Revenue Ruling 2005-5 changed settled law without any notice. So it came out -- unlike the subsequent amendments that we have to the Treasury regs in 2003 and '06, there was a whole body of comments and things like that in that with those regulations, lots of notice. That's why it took so long, frankly. It took until 2006 to get them finalized.

So I think that the fact of the matter is even without considering the subsequent amendments to the Treasury regs and really the precedence that they have over the revenue ruling here, this factor weighs

heavily, heavily in favor of invalidating the retroactive of application of the revenue ruling.

2.4

The second Anderson factor is "The extent, if any, to which the prior law or policy has been implicitly approved by Congress as by legislative reenactment of the pertinent Code provisions." Now, the Treasury through its regulations, has generally since at least 1955 interpreted a statutory merger or consolidation to mean a merger or consolidation affected pursuant to the corporation laws of the United States or a state or territory or the District of Columbia. Since '55. That's pretty settled law.

During the 65 years from 1934 to 2000, until the time when the revenue ruling came out, Congress had amended various provisions of Section 368 at least 17 times, but each time decided against changing the definition of a Type A reorganization overriding the Treasury's interpretation of a tape -- Type A reorganization at the time.

Again, let's look at a couple of FTB's exhibits. Provide -- which provide additional support regarding the 1934 amendments where Congress added the term "statutory" to the merger statutes.

Exhibit M, page 3, says, "The definition of a reorganization has been restricted so that the

definition of will conform more closely to the general requirements of corporate law." It goes to notice here. That's notice.

2.4

Exhibit P, page 2, "In determining the tax effects of a reorganization transaction, one has at the a very outset to go to the statutory definition and to ascertain whether the transaction is within the term as they are defined." Notice again.

Exhibit P, pages 2 and 3. Quote, A definition of this character must necessarily be specific in its term, otherwise, taxpayers cannot be advised in advance of the tax effects of their business transactions. And unless they are so advised, they will in numerous instances not go forward with adjustments, which are necessary for the successful conduct of their business.

All of these comments here in FTB's own exhibits go to providing prior notice. When you lay -- when you layer that on with the fact of failure of Congress to amend 368(a)(1)(A) and keep it in place from 34 on, that's implicit approval of the definition under the regs itself. And that implicit approval of the then-existing law supports rejecting, one more time, the retroactive application of the revenue ruling in this appeal. The Appellants satisfy the second factor.

With respect to the third factor, Anderson

factor, that is where the retroactivity would advance or frustrate the interest and equality of treatment among similarly situated taxpayers. Taxpayers who engaged in Type A reorganizations or statutory mergers after Revenue Ruling 2000-5 was issued were on notice of the new liquidation requirement set forth in that revenue ruling and thus were able to structure their transactions to meet that new requirement. However, since the merger in our case here occurred approximately seven months before the revenue ruling, Appellants were not able to restructure anything. They're being treated differently here. So the retroactive application of Revenue Ruling 2000-5 would lead to an unequal -unequal treatment between Appellants and other similarly situated taxpayers. This Anderson factor also weighs heavily against retroactive application.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

2.4

25

And, finally, the last factor, Anderson factor, whether according retroactive effect would produce an inordinately harsh result. There's no question about this one. Retroactive application of Revenue Ruling 2000-5 in this case produces an inordinately harsh result because taxpayers were not -- Appellants were not put on notice on the new liquidation requirement in the revenue ruling and was thus prevented from structuring the merger differently.

And again, putting aside the subsequent amendments of the Treasury regs, this is all with -- not even looking at what happened there, which you can't square the revenue ruling retroactive treatment with later changes to the Treasury regs. It would be an abuse of discretion to apply the new liquidation requirement retroactively without providing any prior notice. So similar to the other three Anderson factors, this factor weighs heavily in favor of not permitting the retroactive application of the revenue ruling.

2.4

Now, counsel all talked about deference as well. Well, first of all, you know, it really was nothing more -- and we had some articles that we attached to our opening brief. It was nothing more than a litigating position for the IRS. It was in conflict with the existing law, like I mentioned, in 1999. And it was directly contrary to the subsequent amendments to the Treasury reg. So this is -- now we're talking about deference. Okay? You're going to give deference to retroactive application of a revenue ruling where it's completely at odds with the later or the subsequent enactment of the -- or promulgation of the Treasury regs with their effective dates there. That doesn't make any sense to me.

And that last part, should it be given

deference? Well, you know, frankly, it has to yield to the Treasury regulations, as I indicated before. 26 CFR 601.601(d)(2)(b)(v)(d). It has to yield. It can't be given deference over the Treasury regs.

2.4

Okay. The final -- the final item that counsel brought up was the continuity of shareholder interest issue, and I would just point this -- your Honors to four of the exhibits that we had attached to our -- or four of our exhibits in this case, I'll put it that way.

The issue that counsel in their briefs had pointed to was whether or not there was an additional \$3 billion -- \$3 billion in additional consideration for the merger that -- that -- that really would cause this percentage. It's 11 percent that counsel is referring to here. There is no \$3 billion in additional consideration for the merger, and their assertions are really not -- not correct.

If you look at Appellants' Exhibit 24 -- and that's the articles of merger filed on June 30, 1999, with the Texas Secretary of State. If you read annex section labeled "Merger Consideration," you won't find that \$3 billion as being consideration for this merger. The same thing happens in Appellants' Exhibit 26, which is the sent Form 8-K filed July 15th, 1999. If you look at page 2, item 2, and as well as Exhibit 99.1, page 5,

all part of that exhibit, they all talk in terms of what's the merger consideration. You will not find that \$3 billion number in there.

If you look at Appellants' Exhibit 27, the Avis Rent-A-Car Form 8-K filed July 15th, 1999, and you look at page 2, Item 2., and if you look at the agreement and plan of merger, Exhibit 2.1, Section 1.3, under "Merger Consideration," nowhere is the \$3 billion mentioned as additional consideration.

And finally, Appellants' Exhibit 28, which is the Avis Rent-A-Car Form 10-Q filed August 16th, 1999.

Note 4 under acquisition, paragraphs 3 and 6 speak in terms of what was the consideration in this transaction. That \$3 billion is not in there. So when you take that out, that 11 percent changes, and that's not -- there's no -- there's no issue with continuity of shareholder interest in this case.

So in conclusion for the merger issue here, under the plain language of 368(a)(1)(A) of the IRC and the Treasury Regulation Section 1.368-2(b)(1), which were in effect on the date of the AFLMC merger, the merger qualified as a tax-free statutory merger under 368(a)(1)(A). The 2003 temporary regs and the 2006 final regs provide further support and compelling evidence that the merger qualified as a tax-free

statutory merger under 368(a)(1)(A).

2.4

In particular -- and I know you've heard it from me many times already -- the effective dates are everything here. The prospective application of the new liquidation requirement and the specific instructions to taxpayers that for transactions occurring before

January 24, 2003, you're to look to the Treasury regs in effect in our years, not look to Revenue Ruling 2000-5, there was no liquidation requirement under the prior regulations. That's why they made a change here. They had to make something specific. It was a change in the law. That is compelling evidence in favor of this being tax-free.

The 2003 temporary regs and the 2006 final regs take precedence over Revenue Ruling 2000-5. And if you applied that revenue ruling retroactively, like FTB would like to do, it would be directly contrary to the regs which takes precedence over them. So how does that work?

So the idea of applying the revenue ruling retroactively under the Anderson factors, it just doesn't fly. Everything about it points to not applying it retroactively, and in particular, again, being contrary to the Treasury regs.

So in all, the AFLMC merger was a tax-free

1 statutory merger under federal and California law, and 2 the FTB's position must be rejected on this basis as 3 well as because the NPAs are untimely. And the NPAs 4 must be reversed in their entirety. I welcome any 5 questions. 6 ALJ LONG: Thank you. I'm going to turn to my 7 panel members for any questions for either parties at this time. 8

Judge Johnson, do you have any questions?

ALJ JOHNSON: No questions. Thank you.

ALJ LONG: Judge Kwee?

ALJ KWEE: I don't have any questions. Thank

13 you.

9

10

11

12

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

2.4

25

ALJ LONG: I do have a question for FTB. Appellants spoke about the temporary Treasury regulations and the final regulations and how they perceive a conflict with the revenue ruling. What is FTB's position?

MR. LAISNE: Well, for one thing, it's important to keep in mind that regulations are by default prospective, revenue rulings are retroactive by default. And so when the regulations are referring back to following the old regulations, the revenue ruling was retroactively being applied for those regulations as well.

1	In addition, regarding the Skidmore factors and
2	in relation to this basically, you know, there isn't a
3	case where there has been guidance from an agency where
4	that guidance was picked up by a regulation and then
5	that guidance was overturned or not given deference
6	by by a Skidmore analysis. We had looked into that
7	and we also gave an IDR to Appellants for that as well,
8	and that type of case doesn't exist.
9	ALJ LONG: Thank you. I believe that concludes
10	the hearing for today. I don't believe we have any last
11	questions, do we?
12	I see no other questions. So thank you for
13	attending the hearing today. This will conclude the
14	hearing. The panel will meet and decide the appeal
15	based on the briefings, the arguments presented, and the
16	exhibits admitted as evidence. We will send both
17	parties our written opinion within 100 days from today.
18	Again, thank you for your participation. The
19	case is submitted and the record is closed. And this
20	concludes the Office of Tax Appeals, Friday,
21	December 16th, 2022, hearing calendar. Thank you.
22	MR. VESELY: Thank you.
23	(Conclusion of the proceedings at 3:40 p.m.)
24	00

1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE				
2	STATE OF CALIFORNIA)				
3	COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO) ss.				
4	I, MARIA ESQUIVEL-PARKINSON, do hereby certify				
5	that I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, and that at				
6	the times and places shown I recorded verbatim in				
7	shorthand writing all the proceedings in the following				
8	described action completely and correctly to the best of				
9	my ability:				
10	CASE: IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL OF MCGARVEY-CLARK REALTY, INC., 18083623				
11	AVIS BUDGET GROUP, INC., 18083632 DATE: Thursday, December 16, 2022				
12	LOCATION: OTA 400 R Street, Sacramento, CA 95811				
13	I further certify that my said shorthand notes				
14	have been transcribed into typewriting, and that the				
15	foregoing pages 1 through 92 constitute an accurate and				
16	complete transcript of all my shorthand writing for the				
17	dates and matter specified.				
18	I further certify that I have complied with CCP				
19	237(a)(2) in that all personal juror identifying				
20	information has been redacted if applicable.				
21	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have subscribed this				
22	certificate at Sacramento, California on this 10th day				
23	of January, 2023. Mairas Du				
24	Maria Esquivel-Parkinson CSR No. 10621, RPR				

i1 Index: \$1.5..2000-5

\$	41:24 78:3 89:20 1.368-2(b)(1)(ii)(63:17,24 64:8,18, 21 65:18 73:3	1998 12:17 26:16 28:24
	b) 23:7	74:9 75:4	1999 7:5,19,23,25
\$1.5 49:10	•	19 20:23 28:9	8:2,6,10,16,19,21
\$3 88:11,12,15,22 89:3,8,14	1.368-2(t)(b)(1)(ii)(b) 22:3	19036 25:2	9:5,9,22 12:1,2,7, 11,13 13:21,25
\$60 14:12 15:10	1.5 15:20	19057 9:14 17:12 19:5	14:8,17,20 15:13, 19 16:3 17:5,7,8,
48:8 63:12	10 15:17 16:15 25:5	19059 12:4,22	10,14,15,24
\$600 15:25 48:16	10-Q 89:11	16:9,16 18:6 69:24	18:16,17,18,19, 21,25 19:23
\$621 14:25 15:5	100 92:17	19059(a) 10:23	20:11,17,22 21:11,17 24:20,2
\$71.5 15:16	10621 2:20	19059(e) 12:25	26:15 27:7,9,13,
(11 20:5 25:5 43:1,	62:11	16 29:1,10,13,22 30:16,19,22 31:4,
	9 82:10 88:14 89:15	19059(e)(1) 12:23	9,12,16,20,24,25
(1) 13:4		19060 12:4 18:6	32:1,13 44:9,14 45:11,17,24,25
(a) 10:5,25 64:21	12 56:25 82:21	28:15 30:4,5,21	46:2,3,7,10,16,20
(b)(1)(v) 22:9,19	13 7:18 12:18	32:4 44:11 69:24	23 48:7,9,10,16,
23:11,21	49:18,25	73:3 74:9	23 49:9 51:5,7,10
(d) 27:20	15-minute 72:12	19060(b) 11:15	14 52:1,5,12 54:4 9,19 55:19 56:10
	15th 15:12,17	19067 9:20 28:19	57:1,23 58:13,21
-	17:15,16 88:24 89:5	1920 36:17	59:2,8,13,24 60:10 61:9,10
		1921 34:18,19,24	63:2,24 64:2 65:4
000 92:24	16 2:18 5:1,9 83:2	19311 62:24	71:16,23 72:3
0	168 17:1	1934 34:19,21,24	73:15,18,20,24
	169 17:1	36:24 37:2 39:3	74:8,12 76:8,13, 16 77:2 78:20
00 52:9	16th 89:11 92:21	41:8 42:16 78:11	87:16 88:19,24
01 52:9	17 29:14 84:15	82:12,22,23 84:13,22	89:5,11
02 44:14	170 17:1	1954 36:1 39:10	1:08 2:17 5:2,10
06 83:17	17001 25:5	1955 84:8	2
	17024.5(a) 19:21	1964 64:10 65:8	
1	17th 29:16,23	75:3	2 9:24 17:25 21:7 68:13,18 85:4,9
1 4:4 6:12,16,23	18 22:4 62:5	1967 64:9 65:19 75:3	88:25 89:6
12:19 15:3 41:16	180 77:1	1970 16:8	2.1 89:7
1.3 89:7	18083623 2:6 5:8	1980 80:22	20 17:18 23:5
1.368-1(e) 43:5	18083632 2:6 5:9	1984 36:1 37:7	2000 7:23 17:15 77:20 84:13
1.368-2(b) 37:18	18622 10:4,25	39:10	
1.368-2(b)(1)	11:19 12:4,11 17:7,10 18:24	1989 20:21	2000-5 26:20 32:24 33:1 34:10,
8:18,22 19:15,24 21:10,17 22:17,22 23:20 24:13,14	27:17 33:6 44:11 53:4,7 59:18	1990 31:16	11 35:13 36:3 37:19 40:14,19

Index: 2000-5's..96-SBE-012

41:1,9,19 42:6,21 19:6 27:10,16 **30th** 12:1 6 43:17 77:18,19 32:7,13,15 31st 27:16 32:13 79:5,7 81:7 86:5, **2014** 46:2,9 77:20 13,21 90:8,15 **6** 4:4,6 14:15 15:3 **2015** 28:8 **34** 85:20 45:21 47:1,2 2000-5's 42:2 54:21 58:8 78:21 2019 28:9,10 **355** 35:21 36:9,11 2001 14:25 51:22, 89:12 39:5,11,23 41:11 24 **2021** 28:11 60 6:19 63:21 **3570(c)** 44:8 **2001-1278** 13:13 2022 2:18 5:1,9 601.601(d)(2)(b)(92:21 **368** 84:15 **2002** 12:17 13:21 v)(d) 79:22 88:3 14:9,13 15:11,12, 20th 27:10 30:1 **368(a)(1)(a)** 6:10 6203 27:25 16 17:24 26:16,23 32:7,15 7:13 8:17,19 28:24 29:11 30:17 19:14,17 20:1 **65** 84:13 **21** 13:12 31:14,23 32:3 21:9,13,21 24:12 **67** 65:19 46:5,14,21 48:9 **23** 21:22 23:13,15, 26:9 33:20,23 51:3,5 52:17,20 18 36:8 55:2 78:2 53:20 54:2 59:5 85:19 89:19,23 7 **23001** 25:6 60:4 61:2,7 63:2, 90:1 13,16,21 64:1 23051.5(a)(1) 368(a)(1)(c) **7** 4:12 14:5,9,15, 65:4 66:18,19 19:21 34:21 18,23 15:10,13,17 70:20 71:13,15 **23051.5(d)** 20:9 47:1 49:8,22 50:4 72:1,7 73:8,15,23, **368(a)(2)(g)** 37:9 58:7 25 74:1 75:24 24 22:12,18 23:21 **3:05** 72:15 76:20 79:1 88:18 90:7 **71** 15:24 48:18 **3:40** 2:18 92:23 **2003** 15:12 21:22 **71.5** 15:25 **24451** 19:21 22:10,12,18,23 **7121** 13:6,9 24th 22:9,22 24:6 23:4,19,21 24:6, 4 15 78:21,25 79:1, **72** 4:20 **25** 4:13 20:23.25 10 81:19,22 83:17 32:10 **4** 29:4 30:25 36:17 **7737** 43:6 89:23 90:7,14 40:2,5 45:16,21 **25th** 28:8 58:17 89:12 2004 17:16 19:6 26 23:2 79:21 8 400 2:16 **2005** 31:16 35:2 88:2,23 46:7 **4549** 45:4 8 6:12.23 14:9 **27** 4:14 89:4 2005-5 83:14 8-K 88:24 89:5 **28** 4:4 6:16,23 5 **2006** 15:17 23:2, 45:8 89:10 **886** 62:15 13,15,18 24:15 **280** 64:10 **886-A** 26:17 43:10 29:14,16,23 31:18 **5** 14:5,23 58:17 45:1,15 47:14,17 46:12,25 79:11 88:25 **2:50** 72:16 81:19 82:6 83:20 51:1 54:24 57:11 **5.01** 21:1 89:23 90:14 58:1,4,9,19 62:8 3 73:10,11 **525** 15:23 **2007** 12:18 **55** 84:12 **2007-21** 28:1 **3** 29:6 40:2 64:10 9 68:3 84:24 85:9 **550** 48:16 **2008** 45:10 89:12 **57** 83:2 9 15:14 75:8 **2009** 30:1 30 20:16 21:11 5th 28:11 906 51:2 **2012** 32:10 88:19 96-SBE-012 300 45:9 **2013** 7:18 17:18 13:16

98 51:3 **99** 14:3 18:17,23 19:4.12.15 21:18 52:22 70:21 76:24 77:12 99.1 88:25 **9th** 28:10 Α **AA** 4:5 6:14,17 **ABA** 82:5 ability 30:18 67:21 72:2 **absorbs** 36:21 **abuse** 87:6 acceptable 41:7 55:9 accordance 21:6 29:14 33:6 account 28:4

29:11 30:17 31:23 32:3 65:21 accrued 15:11

achieving 35:21

acknowledged 16:14

acquired 35:5

acquisition 34:22 89:12

Act 34:19,24,25 36:24 37:2 39:3 41:8 42:16

action 69:3

actual 46:18 47:12,20 50:1 59:12 60:7 69:6. 12,13,16 71:19

add 21:24 35:10 55:16 61:22 65:14 81:17

added 84:22

adding 49:17,24

addition 22:5 25:4 35:15 37:8, 24 39:18 92:1

additional 9:9 14:7,11 24:20,24 27:15 29:10,16, 21,24 31:14,22 32:3 45:10,23,24 46:1,4,6,11,13,14 51:4,7,16,18 52:8 54:5 58:15 60:8 61:6 68:7 70:18 71:24 84:21 88:11,12,15 89:9

Additionally 34:4 36:23 42:5

address 9:10 29:8 32:18 59:10 69:15 77:15

addressed 36:1 58:9

addressing 58:12

adjust 13:25 52:12 66:18 75:23,24

adjusted 13:21, 22 48:22 73:18 74:12,14 77:12

adjusting 13:7 75:18 76:8

adjustment 8:4, 10 11:22 12:6 13:1 16:3,22 18:17,21 27:23 28:3,14 29:18 30:4,8 53:8 56:9 57:21,23 59:22 61:6 62:12 65:4, 12,16 66:1,13 67:6 69:25 70:19 73:4,8,25 74:2 75:11,17 77:1

adjustments 8:1, 2 11:7,11,12 12:3

16:13,17,24 17:5, 8 18:5,7 19:3 32:9 44:9,18,20 52:9 53:24 54:2 55:17, 18 56:15 57:13 59:13,14 64:14 66:16 67:1,4 69:4 70:6 85:14

adjusts 75:24

administer 63:3

administrative 13:3

admitted 4:4,5 6:13,14,16,17 92:16

adopt 37:18 42:1 adopted 28:8,9,

10,11

advance 38:17 40:3 85:11 86:1

advised 85:11,13

affect 51:5 66:14 75:19,21

affected 84:9 affirmatively 44:5

affirmed 28:5

AFLMC 7:11 8:8, 11,15 9:2 11:25 12:3,12,13 14:3, 21 15:2,7,18 16:4 17:2,9 18:21,22 19:12 20:16,19 21:6,11,19,23 24:10 26:7 27:13 29:1,9,22 30:22 31:4,5,7,8,13 34:1,6,14 36:14 45:11,17 46:3 54:19 77:21 89:21 90:25

afternoon 5:5 7:3 25:20

agency 92:3

agent 68:17 75:10

agent's 29:25

aggregate 51:8

agree 17:20 29:7 50:11,24 55:8 57:19 70:16 71:12,15

agreed 6:4 29:7, 10 44:19 45:20 71:25 74:4

agreeing 50:3

agreement 12:16, 22 13:5,9,11,19, 22,24 14:2,6,8,13, 15,17 15:9 16:1,2, 5 17:4 26:1,22 29:6,8,15 31:2,3, 11 42:23 46:18 47:4,19,21 48:5, 19,21 49:7,13,14 50:20 51:6,8 52:10,14,17 54:3, 8 55:11,15,17 56:22 57:16,18 58:5,7,11,21 59:12,15 60:14,18 62:2,4,5,6 63:14, 15 67:22 71:2,9, 19 73:18,19 74:2, 3,6 79:8 89:6

agreements 45:1 47:14 50:7,18 60:16

ahead 61:20

ALJ 5:4,5,17,21, 25 6:18,24 25:15 43:25 44:3,6,22 47:8 49:2,5,16,21, 24 50:17 54:13,16 57:8,11,15 59:10 60:12,24 61:14, 17,20,22 63:5,8, 11 67:13,19 68:11,17,21,24 69:6 70:10,13,14, 23,25 72:9,14,17 91:6,10,11,12,14 92:9

Index: alleged..attending

alleged 26:13 49:10,11,17,25 71:5 **allowed** 20:18

allowed 20:18 51:16 71:25 81:4

allowing 46:7 72:4

alters 38:14 81:2

amend 52:5 85:19

amended 14:17 21:23 29:13 31:12 49:9 71:22 84:15

amending 14:20 24:1

amendment

22:7,11 23:14 65:19

amendments

21:16,18 23:12 24:2,14 81:18 83:16,23 84:22 87:2.17

American 37:23

amortization

14:21 31:15,18,19 46:2,6,8,23 51:18 52:2,8 54:6,18 58:15,23

amount 14:25 15:6,11,23 52:18 55:7 63:17 64:14, 15 73:15 75:19

amounts 25:11

analysis 57:17 70:3 71:20 73:25 92:6

analyzed 64:17

Anderson 38:10 78:9 80:20 83:7 84:3 85:25 86:15, 17 87:8 90:21

Andrea 3:3 5:5

Andrew 3:4 5:22

annex 88:20

annual 53:13

anticipating 37:13 39:15

apologize 67:14

apparent 60:2

appeal 2:5 5:6,25 6:4 7:4,5 13:3,16 16:23 20:11 26:5 27:6 28:7,9,11 62:14 67:15 85:24 92:14

appeals 2:1 3:8 5:7 20:25 92:20

APPEARANCES

3:1

appearing 25:21

appears 36:13 43:12

Appellant 2:7 3:6 6:7,12 7:2 59:11 72:23 81:3

appellant's 4:4 7:17 72:18 75:8

appellants 5:17, 20 6:19 7:8,14,24 9:8,22 12:5,10,17 13:12 14:16,19 15:4,15 16:1 17:6, 9,20 18:25 24:19 26:16,22 27:9,14 29:7,12,17,20 31:3,11,13 32:14, 20,23,25 34:7 38:1,5,10 41:3 43:19 44:7,10,15, 18 46:5,8,15,22 47:9 51:17 58:16, 19,22 83:7 85:24 86:10,14,22 91:15 92:7

appellants' 6:7, 16 8:5 9:23 12:2, 12,18 13:21,25 17:2,5 18:22 22:3 28:23 29:11 31:17,23,25 32:3, 11 39:6 40:20,21 46:1 55:14 72:2 88:18,23 89:4,10

applicability 34:17

applicable 20:8 22:21 33:9,20 41:12

application 16:9 84:2 85:23 86:12, 16,20 87:10,20 90:4

applied 22:11 23:14 28:12 32:24 38:7 43:18 50:23 51:5 79:2,15 80:13 90:16 91:24

applies 17:12 19:5 26:11 36:15 43:14 69:13

apply 22:17 38:4 53:1,17 65:4 75:11 77:22 79:16 81:22,23 87:6

applying 74:25 80:5 90:20,22

approval 85:20, 21

approved 38:16 84:5

approving 37:13 39:15

approximately 14:12 15:20,24 77:20 86:9

April 28:9

area 10:23 23:3 40:23

arguing 48:11 83:6

argument 42:7 63:23

arguments 92:15

Article 21:1

articles 87:13 88:19

ascertain 85:7

aspects 68:11

assert 63:24

asserted 69:8

asserting 63:16

assertions 88:16

assess 27:15 29:10 32:11 45:10 46:21 54:8 67:22 71:12 72:1,6

assessed 7:14 14:11 25:7,13 27:24 29:15 30:7 31:23 32:3 45:25 59:5 60:4,8 61:13 71:16 73:15

assessing 46:4, 14,15 70:18

assessment 6:7 11:7,21 26:6 27:8, 9,12 28:3,17,22 29:21,25 30:3,6, 18 32:5,14 43:22 53:18,19 57:1 61:7,11 63:13,21 64:1 67:5 70:20 71:15 74:1 77:2

assessments 7:7 32:1 43:13

assets 14:24 15:1,6,8 35:6

assist 53:18

Association 37:23

assuming 8:13 19:10

Atkins 3:6 5:19

attached 87:14

8:88

attending 92:13

Index: attention..change

attention 74:19 43:8 44:11 46:12 **bound** 40:13 careful 62:3 83:1 55:8,18 92:15 box 74:24 carefully 49:14 attorney's 50:21 basically 54:2 62:2 break 72:12.16 74:15 75:4 79:23 attributable 73:23 carried 9:2 20:17 80:4 92:2 29:21 30:15 75:22 **Brian** 3:10 5:15 **basis** 15:1,2,8 audit 10:19 18:11 25:20 26:24 32:19 carries 66:11 24:25 38:6 47:5 25:25 26:17 51:21 52:3 54:6, **briefing** 38:2,11 carry 75:20 44:12,14,17 47:23 18 61:5 91:2 41:3 50:20 52:19 56:1 carryover 53:13, 65:11 66:7 67:8 begin 5:12 6:18, briefings 92:15 15 66:15 75:13 70:2 75:9 20 25:16 72:18 **briefs** 26:12 32:22 carryovers audited 26:15 beginning 31:18 47:10 64:7 66:9 66:12,14 46:25 80:15,23 88:10 auditor 18:12 case 2:6 5:8 10:4, behalf 25:21 70:2 **broken** 32:22 21 11:16,25 13:14,19 15:7 believed 39:19 August 28:8 brought 38:10 16:6,10,14 17:13, 89:11 88:6 benefit 59:6 17,20 21:5 22:7, authorities' Budget 2:6 5:7 25 23:9 24:19 benefits 54:18 41:14 25:10,23 26:3,12 55:12 burdens 32:21 28:23 30:16,17 authority 30:21 33:4 big 37:20 53:11 37:10 38:24 39:1, 33:10,11 42:12 **business** 35:15, 21 41:7,12,21 biggest 76:9 authority's 41:6 16 85:12,15 42:5 45:8 48:4,24 billion 15:20 52:24 59:16,22 automatically 60:2,4,25 61:4 49:10 88:12,15,22 35:5 C 62:15 67:4 69:20, 89:3,8,14 23,24 70:19 73:7, Avis 2:6 5:7 8:7 **bit** 9:25 40:16 calculated 15:1 14,16 75:1 79:13 89:4,11 44:25 73:22 77:8 77:11 80:22 81:13 86:9, avoidance 36:24 79:19 21 88:9 89:17 calculation 77:8 39:3 41:9 92:3,8,19 **Black's** 37:5 calendar 92:21 aware 7:5 **cases** 40:8 blacking 42:13 California 2:2.16. category 34:25 blue 82:19 21 5:1,11 7:21 В 9:5,12 12:21 16:6 caught 74:19 83:1 BMF 45:7 47:4 17:21 19:20 20:8 48:2,6,7,9,10 back 11:9 24:1 caveat 59:5 25:24 30:8,10 73:9,12,14 32:17 44:24 48:14 31:25 33:8,12 CDTFA 3:8 51:12 52:7,11 **boar** 76:12 43:16 60:9,21 54:16 65:7 70:24 cease 20:14 35:9 61:8 65:25 66:18, **Board** 5:16 6:6 72:14,17 74:10 82:13 22 70:7 72:7 13:15 25:22 28:6 76:15 91:22 75:11 91:1 Certified 2:20 44:25 60:13,19,21 **Baker** 38:4 call 74:23 cessation 83:3 **Board's** 70:2 balance 7:22 called 16:8 cetera 78:7 body 18:5 74:7 55:13,14 83:17 candid 80:8 CFR 79:21 88:2 **Bar** 37:23 **bottom** 18:9 captioned 29:4 chance 57:9 barred 7:19 8:14 68:14 care 56:7 change 10:11,12, based 9:22 39:6

Index: changed..constitutes

conditions 31:2 14,15 11:1,3,4,9, 8,15 31:2,3 42:23 compared 45:22 46:3 55:5 58:20 71:18 10,20,24 16:3 45:1 46:18 47:3, 24:4 27:18 28:15, 14,18,19,21 48:5, comparing 37:9 conduct 85:15 18 39:7,20,22 19,21 49:7 50:7, 71:21 52:13,20,23 61:6 18,20 51:1,3,6,8 conducting 6:1 73:19 90:10,11 52:10,14,17 54:2, comparison confirm 24:15 7 55:11,15,17 46:12 **changed** 10:8,9 74:17 56:22 57:16,18 12:14 17:3 18:23 compelling 21:19 58:5,7,11,21 confirmed 13:15 63:19 64:24,25 89:24 90:12 59:12,15 60:14 65:19 74:14 83:14 conflict 77:25 62:1,4,5 63:14,15 compensate 87:15 91:17 71:2,8,19 73:17, changing 84:16 29:11 19 79:8 conform 85:1 character 85:10 complete 42:18 co-counsel 26:24 62:6 conforms 19:20 **chase** 56:24 33:8 co-panelists 6:2 completed 34:12 checking 61:17 Congress 35:10, Code 10:5 13:6 completely 77:1 Chewning 28:10 20,24,25 36:8 19:22 20:10 33:21 87:21 37:12 38:16 39:5, 84:6 **Chief** 13:13 complex 40:23 9,14,19,23 41:11 Circuit 33:14 colleague's 82:11 84:5,14,22 compliance 74:19 85:19 cited 36:2 38:5 35:14 collect 71:24 41:12 80:23 Congress's complying 36:6 36:25 collected 25:7 citing 35:8 concede 7:10 45:23 connection claim 14:20 46:1, 19:11 70:8 82:13 collecting 63:12 8,22 52:7 62:23 conceding 8:13 Consent 18:3 63:1 **color** 21:2 19:10 claimed 38:1 consideration Columbia 9:1 concern 67:19 41:6 88:12,16,21, 20:4 34:4 83:10 clarifies 59:1 22 89:2,8,9,13 concerned 76:6 84:11 clear 12:9 13:20 considered 9:6 concerns 59:11 commencing 16:2 18:11 24:3 83:4 2:17 25:5,6 59:22 60:2 75:3 conclude 92:13 76:1 79:21 considers 42:11 comment 37:8 concluded 35:20 clients 56:6 74:18 consistency concludes 26:18 25:24 26:1 37:22 commentator close 51:2 76:20 65:15 92:9,20 41:17,22 42:9 37:3,21 42:17 **closed** 53:11,12 43:15 concluding 2:17 comments 82:5, 92:19 consistent 21:2 conclusion 14:4 8,11,19,20,21 **closely** 12:20 18:19 21:14 25:25 30:20,21 31:1,10 83:18 85:16 41:19,20 43:17 85:1 33:5 38:8 42:2,15 Commissioner 43:6 57:6 76:11 consolidated 5:6 closer 9:25 12:8 10:10 11:2,20 89:18 92:23 33:15 64:25 consolidation closes 51:7 conclusions 8:21 19:19 20:2 Committee 37:7 **closing** 12:16,22 26:17 78:1 22:1 37:11 84:9 39:12 13:4,9,11,19,22, conclusive 40:24 constitutes 6:8 23 14:2,6,8,13,15, common 50:7 47:15 17 15:9 16:1.2.5 concrete 59:13 Company 33:14 17:4 26:1,21 29:6,

contained 34:9 16:18,21 16:23 D 37:19 40:21 58:5. correctly 31:21 deficiency 9:15 20 71:20 39:8 72:15 11:6,21 25:8,9 date 10:13 11:13, contemplated 27:7,9,11 28:17, Cortland 35:8 23 15:12,13 21:10 35:24 51:14 78:13 22 32:1,5,14 22:7,15 23:12 cost 15:2 contemplating define 7:11 39:1 27:20,22,23 28:2, 51:15 costs 50:25 5,16 29:17,19 defined 34:18 30:2 32:7 45:6 contemplations 37:6 85:8 **counsel** 3:9,10 47:6 48:3,5 73:13 51:10 7:2 13:13 25:19 **defines** 33:24 79:2 89:21 27:5 48:11 49:6 contend 41:3 53:24 61:24 72:23 definition 21:25 dates 22:6 23:10 context 26:2 73:9,17,21,22 81:10 84:17,24 78:22 79:12 87:23 42:14 77:15,17 78:22 85:1,6,9,20 90:3 80:20 82:15 87:11 continue 72:5,18 definitions 39:1 days 92:17 88:5,10,14 continues 35:4 definitively 40:24 deal 18:7 42:3,14 couple 61:16,24 53:10.11 continuity 26:20 84:20 degrees 77:1 33:2 34:4 35:16 December 2:18 court 16:23 33:14 delinguent 7:13 42:22 43:7,20 5:1,9 27:16 32:13 36:18 39:19 40:8, 9:8 24:18 26:10 88:6 89:16 92:21 10 44:5 43:11 contrary 25:3 **decide** 92:14 courts 39:2 denying 28:6 87:17 90:17,24 decided 40:25 covered 59:15 depreciation control 42:13 71:25 84:16 14:20 31:15 46:1, covering 30:14 copy 9:24 13:12 6 51:17,18 52:2,8 deciding 48:4 17:25 20:5 23:5 **covers** 44:13 54:5 58:23 decision 16:22 corporate 35:3,6, **create** 67:21 **desire** 36:25 36:18 44:16 14,25 36:4,20,22 created 34:25 detail 27:1 53:16 deducting 31:15 85:2 64:6 creating 74:23 deduction 10:7 corporation 8:7, detailed 67:14 46:11 58:15 64:23 8,25 9:3 20:3,13, credit 8:5 53:15 65:23 17 21:3 34:2,22, 64:23 66:15 determination 23 35:5,9 36:6 6:4 8:2 9:23 10:2, deductions credits 75:13,21 81:6 82:12 84:10 14,20 11:4,6 12:6, 10:11 14:21 31:18 criticize 37:24 15,24,25 13:11,18 46:6,9,23 52:3,8 corporation's 14:2 17:23 18:15, 58:24 65:13 72:2 35:6 crucial 22:6 50:16 16,20 19:3 27:12, 75:18 74:8 77:13 79:12 corporations 20,22 28:2,5 29:2, deemed 54:20 35:9 36:19,20 17,22 30:22 32:2, crystal 13:20 6 33:7 45:5,7,11 deep-rooted 83:5 correct 6:24 33:7 **CSR** 2:20 47:6,7,15,16,18, 57:15 60:22 88:17 default 91:21,22 20,22 48:1,19 **curb** 39:3 corrected 10:9,10 52:15,17 53:2 defenses 43:14 current 35:1 66:2 55:24 56:13 57:2 correction 10:12, 83:3 deference 33:1, 58:3 59:2 61:9 14,16 11:1,3,5,9, 16 41:4 42:21 62:9,10,11,12 cut 56:24 72:25 10,20,24 16:3 43:18 87:11.19 67:8,9 70:21 71:3, 27:18 28:15,18 88:1,4 92:5 5,8,14 72:8 73:12, corrections 12:2 13 75:1 76:18,19, deficiencies

Index: determinations..exhibit

21,22 77:4,11 discussing 34:20 effected 8:24 equivalent 34:24 20:2 determinations discussion 33:19 erroneous 7:15 effecting 30:8 10:17,20 18:8 8:15 discussions 47:12 62:24 55:22 60:15 effective 22:6,7 **ESQ** 3:6 determine 57:19 23:10,12 33:25 **Disney** 33:14 Esquivel-58:2 71:4,14 72:6 78:22 79:12 87:23 parkinson 2:19 90:3 disposition determined 56:16 essence 49:1 24:22 28:25 31:8, effects 51:10,14 21 43:15 45:17 60:22 85:5,12 dispute 21:5 essentially 53:21 46:19 49:15 59:8 29:20 36:13 40:25 effectuated 34:2 **Estate** 28:10 60:10 71:25 43:12 Eleven 43:3 European 14:24 determining **District** 9:1 20:4 15:5 45:24 85:4 34:3 83:10 84:11 enacted 20:20 evidence 6:3 devoid 38:6 divisive 35:20,22 enactment 87:22 21:19 55:16 82:11 36:9 37:14 39:4, dictionaries 39:2 end 43:14 50:23 89:25 90:12 92:16 10,16,24 40:17 68:12 dictionary 37:5 41:12 evident 41:6 81:10 ended 51:23 document 45:20 examination difference 67:23 58:2 59:7 ends 47:24 27:24 28:25 60:5 differences documentation enforce 60:17 examine 41:23 30:12 68:3 engaged 86:3 examined 28:23 documents 40:7 differently 86:12, ensure 35:3,7 examining 39:18 45:1,4 56:1 78:4 enter 50:6 examples 38:24 direct 58:7 77:25 doggone 79:9 40:7 entered 12:16 directly 24:11 dollar 57:1 26:13,22 48:6,7,8 exception 66:17 87:17 90:17 **dollars** 15:21 75:23 enterprise 35:16 disagree 50:11 due 10:13 15:11. excerpts 82:10 78:4 81:15 entire 51:2 12,13 19:6 24:25 exclusive 35:21 disagreement 26:19 54:10 55:8 entirety 91:4 51:1 71:22 excuse 9:5 10:21 entities 20:22 13:18 17:10 24:22 disallow 55:2 26:14 34:8,13 Ε 65:13 **executed** 7:24.25 entitled 33:15 9:19,21,23 17:22 disallowing 55:1 34:6 41:4 42:21 earlier 38:7 41:17, 19:1 27:14 32:12 disallows 34:12 19 54:17,21 58:8 entity 35:3,18,24 executes 28:20 65:22 68:8 71:1 76:9 37:4,6 39:13 42:3, 20 exhibit 9:24 discretion 87:6 **early** 68:8 12:18,19 13:12 equal 6:2 42:25 **discuss** 26:25 17:25 18:2 20:5 **effect** 20:22 21:10 80:20 equality 38:17 22:18,22 23:20,23 22:4 23:5 26:18 40:4 86:2 29:4,6 30:24 30:11.15 38:19 discussed 38:7, 36:22 40:22 42:24 40:5 55:3 60:11 25 42:13 50:3 **Equalization** 61:8 65:24 66:4 43:10 45:8,16,21 77:8 13:15 28:6 72:7 75:10 79:24 46:18.19 47:1 discusses 34:17. 82:2 86:18 89:21 **equate** 11:10 49:22 54:21 57:16 18 90:8 64:10 68:3,13,18,

Index: exhibits..found

19 75:8 82:5 **extent** 38:1,11,13, 9 33:5,8,9,12,13 20 77:4,10 79:11 84:24 85:4,9 14,22 55:16 80:24 36:18 44:9,20 82:6 88:5 89:24 81:1 84:3 90:14 91:16 88:18,23,25 89:1, 45:5,7 47:6,7,15, 4,7,10 16,21 48:1 49:9 extra 59:6 final-final 47:24 52:15 53:2,6,19 exhibits 4:4,5 56:13,14,21 57:2, finalized 83:21 6:12,14,16,17,23 F 13,21 58:3 62:9, 20:23 78:16 84:21 **finally** 7:13 9:7 12,23 63:18,25 85:17 88:8,9 13:6 15:15 18:9 64:22 65:2,24 face 18:2 92:16 19:1 24:15 40:15 66:25 67:4,6,8,9 43:11,19 86:17 **fact** 13:24 17:19 exist 35:4,9 92:8 69:3,4,25 70:6,19 89:10 19:23 39:4,22 71:14 73:5,7 existed 80:18 42:24 56:19 64:7 74:13 75:1,12 Finance 66:10 65:22 76:12 80:10 76:18,19,20 77:1, existence 20:15 **find** 45:13 55:9 83:22 85:18 4,10 91:1 24:7 36:20,22 64:20 79:4 81:7 82:13 factor 38:21 39:9, federally 64:15, 82:11 88:21 89:2 18,25 40:11,15 **existing** 8:18 9:4 16 finding 50:2 41:5.13.16.17 24:13 78:3 87:16 feds 53:8 61:2 42:8,11 80:22,23 fine 56:8 65:12 66:17,22 exists 13:2 62:13 83:8,25 84:3 69:22 67:6 73:4 fleet 8:7 14:24 85:24,25 86:1,15, 15:5 17 87:9 fees 50:21 **expect** 37:25 floor 26:25 factors 38:10 fell 24:11 expenses 50:25 40:2 42:11 78:9 fly 90:22 file 14:16 31:11 expiration 32:10, 80:20 87:8 90:21 15 49:9 63:2 focused 41:10 92:1 filed 7:19,22,23 expired 28:21 folks 77:21 facts 27:1 30:6 9:17 11:14 17:14 36:16 **follow** 61:12 explain 57:12 63:1 88:19,24 failed 26:19 71:19 89:5,11 explained 58:19 Fonseca 28:11 failure 85:18 files 18:11 20:6 explains 34:19 35:2.19 45:15 fair 43:17 Footnote 16:15 filing 6:10 7:14 83:2 9:8 16:4 24:18 explanation 29:3 familiar 22:20 26:11 43:12 52:13 30:1,24 45:2 47:3 force 33:16 79:23 favor 39:20,25 54:24 57:12 60:1 **final** 8:1.4.10 9:23 forego 50:20,24 40:11 84:1 87:9 71:11,21 10:2,13,16,17,18, 90:12 foregoing 46:10 explicit 14:9 22:9 20 11:3,5 12:5,14, February 12:18 24,25 13:11,17 35:22 foremost 25:23 14:2 17:8,23 18:7, fed 63:21 67:24 **extend** 17:20 18:4 forget 70:4 14,16,20 19:3 27:14 federal 8:2 9:4,23 23:2,5,6,13,18 form 26:17 43:10 10:2,7,13,17 11:4, 24:17 27:20,21 extended 9:19 45:4 51:1 54:24 5 12:2,5,15,16,22, 28:1,4 29:16 69:10,19,20 88:24 extending 32:12 24 13:2,18,19,21, 37:17 41:24 45:5, 89:5,11 44:10 25 14:2 15:4,22 6 47:5,6,11,12,15, forward 46:25 16:13,18,22,24,25 16,18,21,24 48:1, extends 70:17 85:14 17:5,23 18:4,8,15, 19 52:15 53:1 extension 16:15 16,20 19:3 27:12, 55:24 58:2 62:8, found 26:17 39:20 20,21 28:2,5,14 10 67:8,9 73:7,11, extensive 69:17 40:10,20 47:1 29:3,17,18 30:3,8, 13 75:1 76:18,19, 9,10,12,22 32:2,6,

four-year 17:11 general 7:23 9:20 56:25 57:20 hook 50:13 19:5 44:20 51:17 59:16 **hoops** 57:4 **happen** 30:11 66:17 69:22 70:6 **fourth** 14:16 54:19 85:1 40:15 42:11 ı happened 81:3 generally 36:5 Franchise 5:16 87:3 38:3 52:3 84:7 6:6 25:22 44:25 i.e. 17:4 happy 43:23 60:13,19,20 70:2 **give** 39:19 42:12 48:25 64:5 idea 37:13 39:15 57:8 58:9 62:20 frankly 50:9 52:16 56:9 58:9 90:20 82:2 87:19 **harms** 42:8 53:22 57:7 62:22 identical 78:14 74:2 78:17 83:20 giving 50:8 54:17 harsh 38:20 40:6 88:1 86:19,21 IDR 40:21 92:7 goal 50:24 French 56:6 head 67:16 **IMF** 28:3 God 16:7 79:4 Friday 2:18 5:1,9 hear 44:4 68:6 immediately 43:2 good 5:5 7:3 92:20 16:11 25:20 48:12 heard 90:2 impact 51:6 64:1 frustrate 38:17 72:12 73:11 77:10 hearing 5:10 implicit 85:20,21 40:3 86:2 72:10 92:10,13, goodwill 46:2 implicitly 38:15 FTB 5:14 6:13 7:7 14,21 gosh 67:1 84:5 11:14,24 16:8,14 heavily 77:17 17:10 25:19 27:5 government 65:2 important 10:4, 84:1 86:16 87:9 44:14,17 48:24 15,21 16:20 17:19 governmental 50:13 52:16,19,24 heck 79:4 18:1 22:4 44:21 74:23 53:17 56:4 59:18 49:7.11 72:5 75:5 helpful 71:10,11, 60:17 61:1 63:19, governs 33:11 79:9 91:20 17 82:9 23 64:9 66:7 granting 39:25 importantly 14:1 67:24 69:8,19 higher 55:6 20:10 70:7,12,14 71:1 great 33:15 42:3, highly 33:9 74:1,22 75:23,24 14 64:6 imposed 6:11 76:10 77:21 83:6 historical 26:2 25:4,12 greater 27:1 90:16 91:14 36:16 42:14 46:13 imposition 9:7 FTB's 4:5 6:17 Historically 35:6 24:18,22 gross 8:5 10:7,11 8:3,11,14 9:7 64:23 65:20 history 26:2 improper 9:8 17:17 18:18 19:2 34:16 35:19 38:7, 24:19,23 21:7 25:15 47:22 group 2:65:8 24,25 40:7,16 68:19 75:6 78:16 82:20 in-depth 80:21 41:21 53:16 64:4 82:4 84:20 85:16 guess 48:14 51:8 75:2 **include** 33:24 91:2,18 55:21 60:12 63:3, 69:7 hit 66:6 full 76:12 14,19 64:2 69:9, including 10:7 14 70:14 72:14 hits 55:21 27:19 36:25 64:22 G quidance 26:3 holdings 8:6 income 8:5 10:7, 33:20 39:1 41:21 20:19 42:25 43:1 11 14:11 15:22 80:2 92:3,4,5 gain 14:25 15:5,19 honest 74:21 64:14,15,23 65:8, 29:12 31:4,7,12 guys 57:3 82:18 11,12,16,17,20 49:10 51:25 58:3 Honor 44:13 48:3 75:18 71:5 49:3,20 50:5 Н 55:21 61:15 64:18 inconsistent garner 58:1 72:20 33:17 34:9 80:17 gave 13:12 69:10 half 18:14 23:16 Honors 88:7

92:7

incorporating 69:9 80:1 84:18 71:2 79:24 50:17 54:13,16 23:3 57:8,11,15 59:10 interpreted 39:8 issuance 17:22 60:12,24 61:14, increased 52:2 84:8 issue 7:16.17 8:13 17,20,22 63:5 increasing 29:18 introduced 23:4 9:11,12 19:8,9 91:9,10 81:16,20 21:7 24:9,17 Joint 37:7 39:12 incurred 22:11 26:25 27:6 28:21 invalid 7:10 8:12 incurring 22:12 30:13 32:1,20,21 Judge 5:23,24 24:21 25:11 42:22 53:13,18 44:2 63:9,11 indication 39:19 70:11,24 74:5,18 invalidating 84:1 56:13 67:5 72:25 91:9,11 inform 59:18 77:16 88:7,10 involved 7:6 89:16,18 information 32:8 Judges 5:22 involves 7:5 issued 6:6 7:7,18, 58:3,5,25 59:21 judicial 13:3 61:5,7,11 71:20 **IRC** 6:9 7:12 8:17. 21 17:16,17 19:6 23:2 26:7 64:9,10 July 28:10 29:14, 80:2 19 19:13,17 20:12 86:5 16,23 88:24 89:5 21:8,12,21 24:11 informing 32:8 26:8 27:25 33:9, **issues** 6:5 7:6 jump 57:4 **Initial** 10:18 18,20,23 34:21 9:10 14:14 26:4 35:21 36:7,8,11 **June** 12:1 15:17 32:18,22 37:25 inordinately 37:8 39:5,11,23 20:16 21:11 88:19 51:3 75:12 76:9 38:20 40:6 86:19, 63:16 78:1 89:19 justifiably 38:12 issuing 9:13 10:1 irrelevant 48:3 80:24 81:3 83:8 17:12 inside 52:22 irrevocable 13:1 justified 38:21 Italian 56:5 instances 61:4 62:10,11,16 39:6 85:14 item 10:6 27:18 irrevocably 13:7 33:4 58:8 60:3,5 instruct 82:1 Κ **IRS** 8:4,10 10:19 64:21 88:5,25 instructed 23:19 89:6 11:4,14,19,24 **key** 10:9 11:8 12:1,14,16 13:20, instructing 24:5 items 29:3 30:1, 13:23 16:6 19:23 22.24 14:12 24 41:10,23 45:2 instructions 90:5 23:9 16:18,21 17:4 47:3 54:24 57:12 18:24 20:7 21:16, intended 36:8 kick 16:13 58:11 60:1 71:11, 23 23:1 24:2,5 82:12 21 75:14 kind 22:20 47:13 25:25 26:3,15,22 interest 15:10,15, 49:11 50:6,12,17, 27:24 28:14,23,25 24 25:4,12 26:21 20.21 53:2 55:11 J 29:2,7,10,11,15, 33:2 34:5 35:17 58:9 62:8 73:22, 22,25 30:7 31:8 38:17 40:3 42:23 25 33:15 36:17 38:25 **January** 21:22 43:4,7,9,20 46:11 40:11,24 41:21 22:9.12.18.22 knew 61:5 48:8,17 86:2 88:6 42:5,23 43:10,15 23:2,13,15,18,21 89:17 Kwee 3:4 5:22.23 45:10,15,22 46:19 24:6 77:20 79:1 63:9,11 67:13,19 49:15 50:1 52:4 interesting 48:2 90:7 68:11,17,21,24 53:8,11 54:23 61:25 64:19 79:8 jazz 64:20 69:6 70:10,14,23 55:18 59:3 60:10 80:19 81:24 82:4, 74:18 91:11,12 65:22 70:21 17 Jeff 56:5 71:12,24 72:6 Internal 10:10 **Jeffrey** 3:6 5:18 73:4 75:23 76:11 L 11:2,20 13:6 29:4 77:9 80:1,2,16 John 3:3 5:22 33:21 64:25 81:6 82:1 87:15 labeled 88:21 Johnson 3:3 5:22 interpretation **IRS's** 30:23 33:6 44:2,3,6,22 47:8 lack 43:7 28:4 40:23 67:20 45:11,17,19 46:12 49:2,5,16,21,24

Index: laid..merger

laid 23:10 32:21 legislative 26:2 13,24,25 72:9,14, making 24:2 44:17 50:1,2 53:8 38:24 40:7 41:20 47:18 17 74:5 83:20 64:3 75:2 84:5 91:6,11,14 92:9 Management 8:7 **Laisne** 3:9 4:13 lend 42:3 looked 52:21 5:15 25:19.20 manner 25:7 64:16,17 79:4 32:19 91:19 level 30:10 59:16 92:6 manual 66:7 75:7, Lambert 5:24 liability 13:2,8 loophole 67:21 language 10:16 14:7 26:23 43:16 74:20,24 76:4 manyfold 77:19 12:4 16:22 21:8 48:7,15,17 62:13 March 15:12 24:11 53:4 63:20 lose 36:21 limit 54:10 74:25 89:19 loss 31:4 65:10 **Maria** 2:19 limitation 16:12 larger 15:6 69:7,12 **losses** 75:13 mark 72:11 late 6:10 19:7 77:3 limitations 7:9, lot 14:4 51:25 53:1 materially 42:8 law 7:21 9:5,12 57:4 62:2 72:24 16,20,24 9:12,13, math 72:15 12:21 13:14 20:20 18,21 10:1,23 81:9 21:6 24:4 26:3,19 16:16 17:11,21 matter 2:5 6:1 lots 83:19 30:12 33:8,9,12, 18:4 26:5,25 27:8, 48:1 56:19 64:7 19 34:9 35:3,6 11,15 28:21 32:5, lower 51:25 73:20 77:14 83:22 37:5,12 38:12,14, 11,12 44:8,11 luck 67:25 matters 56:3 46:21 56:20 57:7, 15,22,23,24 39:1, 7,8,14,20,22 22 58:18 59:6 lump 51:4 Mcgarvey-clark 40:16 41:12,21 70:5,18 72:1,25 2:6 5:7 50:23 60:9 63:3 **limited** 7:25 8:1 M means 10:18 64:12 66:2 67:10 9:22 16:16 17:22 19:18 35:21 50:10 78:7,8 80:25 81:4, 18:13 19:2 30:6 62:16 made 8:4,10 13:5 11 83:8,15 84:4, 66:17 70:9,17 16:18,21 17:4 12 85:2,22 87:16 meant 36:5 39:23 75:22 76:16,17 18:21 19:4 24:3 90:12 91:1 77:5 measured 55:3 32:16 37:8 39:12 laws 8:25 9:3 47:10 55:18 limits 53:1 56:15 meet 26:20 86:8 20:3,18 26:14 60:16,20 64:14 75:16 92:14 34:2 84:10 65:12,20 69:20 liquidated 20:14 meets 33:22 73:8 74:18 77:15 lawyer 56:4 21:4 37:11 90:10 members 3:3 lay 85:17 liquidation 21:24 mail 28:17 30:2 44:1 91:7 layer 85:18 22:5,23 23:3,8,24 32:5 mention 81:25 24:3,8 35:23 **lead** 5:5,25 86:13 mailed 9:15 39:13 78:5,6,18, mentioned 39:9 11:12,22 27:7,9, leads 60:7 23,25 79:17 80:13 45:2 54:17 57:11 10 32:14 81:5,16,20 82:7, 71:1 74:15 75:2 leans 59:7 24 83:3 86:6,23 maintain 57:21 78:22.23 79:5 87:6 90:5,9 learn 29:24 87:16 89:8 major 77:6 litigating 80:16 Leasing 8:7 mentions 71:5 **make** 6:20,22 12:1 87:15 led 65:18 merged 35:8 44:18 52:17 59:6. litigation 50:21 12 66:13 87:23 legal 20:14 33:16 merger 6:8 7:11 90:11 located 45:7 64:9,10,11,12,16 8:6,9,11,15,16,20, 65:7,9,15 makes 18:6 59:14 21,24 9:2,4,6 **long** 3:3 5:4,5,17, 11:25 12:3,6,12, 73:4 21 6:18,24 25:15 legislation 66:8 13,15 14:3,21 43:25 63:8 70:11,

15:2,7,18 16:4,5 17:3,6,9 18:17,21, 22,23,25 19:4,9, 12,13,15,19 20:2, 11,16,19,20,21,22 21:6,11,12,19,20, 23,25 24:9,10,16, 24 25:10 26:8,9, 10,13,15,18 29:2 33:24 34:1,5,13 35:3,4,7,14,18,22, 25 36:4,6,9,11,12, 18 37:3,4,5,6,9,10 39:2,4,11 40:18 41:12 42:17,18, 19,20 48:10,15,23 51:15 52:1 54:9, 20 55:1,12 56:18 57:6 59:25 67:7 73:20,24 74:11 76:23 77:16,21,23 78:10,14 80:14 81:12 82:22 83:11 84:8,9,23 86:9,25 88:13,16,19,21,22 89:2,7,18,21,22, 25 90:1,25 91:1

mergers 34:12,25 35:1,12,20,23 37:14 39:13,16 40:8 81:5 86:4

merging 35:9

met 26:7 32:21

Metals 28:7

Meyer 13:16

Michael 3:9 5:15 25:20 27:2 32:18

middle 69:24

million 14:12,25 15:5,10,16,23,24, 25 48:8,16,18 56:25 63:13,21

mind 11:8 70:11 73:2 91:20

mine 56:6

minimum 43:4

minutes 6:20

Mm-hmm 68:10 69:5

Montgomery 16:8 76:1

months 10:13 11:3,5 27:19 29:19,23 77:20 86:10

moving 32:20 33:19 34:11

multiple 26:14 34:8,13

Ν

nail 50:22

names 5:13

nature 40:8

nearing 72:11

neat 75:25

necessarily 50:22 56:8 85:10

needed 78:10

net 45:22 65:9 75:13

neutral 31:9 71:3

nice 75:25

Nineteen 20:23

Ninth 33:14

nobody's 50:8

nods 44:5

NOL 66:14 75:20

NOLS 65:24

normal 69:21

NOS 2:6

notably 15:18

note 10:15 33:4 49:16 68:5 89:12 **noted** 12:23 17:19 33:13 37:3 38:4 43:6

notes 41:18

notice 6:6 7:6 9:15 11:6,14,21 20:24 26:6 52:10 59:18 60:6 62:19, 21 78:12,21 83:15,19 85:2,3,8, 17 86:5,23 87:8

noticed 69:2

notification 11:17 28:16 73:4

notifies 11:24

noting 36:16

Notwithstanding 25:3

November 17:18 27:10 28:11 32:15

NPA 7:21 9:13 10:2 17:12,15,17, 23 18:18 25:10 56:13

NPAS 7:7,9,10,17 8:3,11,14,15 18:19 19:2,5,12 24:20,21 25:11 91:3

number 5:8 10:3 15:10 19:8,9 47:1 50:3 56:7,8 68:14 73:3 77:23 89:3

numerous 85:13

0

objection 6:13,15 objections 5:23 occurred 8:16 11:25 19:15 20:12.16 29:1.9

20:12,16 29:1,9 30:15,20 31:23 86:9 occurring 23:15, 17 24:6 90:6

October 17:15,16 30:1 32:7

odds 87:21

offering 55:6

Office 2:1 3:8 20:24 92:20

official 20:24 79:25

officials 80:2

online 68:6

open 26:6 27:8,10 53:10 57:22 66:5 75:15

opening 21:7 48:14 62:1 74:24 87:14

operated 35:7

operating 65:9 75:13

operation 37:11 39:14

opinion 28:6 36:17 76:2 80:7 92:17

opportunity 7:4

opposite 77:2 79:16

option 55:10

order 8:3 19:25 79:19

organization 6:9 original 15:1

OTA 2:6 5:8 28:8

outlined 26:12

outset 85:6

overarching 26:4 overlay 62:8

overriding 84:17

overturned 92:5 owe 9:9 24:19

Р

p.m. 2:17,18 5:2, 10 72:16 92:23

pages 14:15 17:1 45:21 85:9

paid 15:15 16:1 52:18 55:8

Pandora's 74:24

panel 3:3 5:21 44:1 67:15 91:7 92:14

paragraph 14:9, 18,23 15:3,14,17 47:2 49:8,18,25 50:4,9 55:5 58:8 62:4,5

paragraphs

13:23 14:4 54:22 58:17 74:15 89:12

parenthetical 34:24

parse 48:21 49:13

part 9:14 10:6,24 23:9 25:5,6 44:21 47:9,11 49:12,25 53:23 59:10 72:25 76:5 77:6,7 80:19 87:25 89:1

Partial 57:14

Partially 57:15

participants 6:2

participation 92:18

parties 5:12,23 6:4 20:20 44:24 50:24 56:3 60:17 62:6 68:6 74:4 91:7 92:17

parties' 31:10

partner 37:20

party 60:14 63:10

party's 6:19

passing 37:2 42:16

path 36:9 39:4,10, 23 41:11

pay 15:4 31:13 51:23

payment 46:11, 12

pecking 79:19

penalties 6:10 7:14 25:12

penalty 8:5 9:8 10:8 24:17,18,23 25:4 26:11 43:12, 13 64:23

people 78:12

perceive 91:17

percent 43:1,3,9 88:14 89:15

percentage 88:14

Perfect 70:23

period 11:18 27:22 28:13,22 31:19 72:2

permitted 20:22 40:9,17 74:22

permitting 87:9

perspective 33:13

persuade 42:12

persuasive 33:10,11 42:3

pertinent 9:14 10:6,24 84:6

petition 28:6

PHH 8:6 20:19 42:24

phonetic 40:10 42:13

pick 65:25

picked 92:4

piece 47:5 48:13 62:18

Pillsbury 5:19

Pittman 5:19

place 5:10 21:23 36:19 78:15 82:25 85:19

plain 12:4 21:8 24:11 89:19

plan 89:7

Plymouth 40:10

point 47:11 54:16 73:17 74:17 78:16 82:8 88:7

pointed 54:21 88:11

points 39:7 61:23 90:22

policy 38:13,15 80:25 81:4 84:4

portion 71:8 72:4,

position 7:17 13:10 16:4 29:5 30:23 45:17 49:1 52:13 55:14 57:5 59:4 64:2 66:24 67:7 70:15,20 71:6 76:7 77:23 80:16 82:9 87:15 91:2,18

positions 10:19

possibility 60:25

post 75:3

posted 30:16

potential 45:23

potentially 51:9 67:20,24

power 42:12,13 practicing 16:7

practitioners 39:2

praise 37:21

precedence 80:3, 12 83:24 90:15,18

precedent 33:17

Precious 28:7

precisely 29:8 33:10

precluded 31:14 46:5

predecessor 16:9,16 34:21 35:1 64:8 65:18 75:4

preliminary 47:23

present 7:4 36:24 40:19 45:22

presentation4:10 6:19,20 7:1
25:16,18 27:4
68:9

presented 41:7 92:15

presumed 33:7

pretty 12:19 69:16 79:8 84:12

prevent 36:25 41:9

prevented 86:24

previous 26:2 42:9

previously 17:19 41:15

primary 58:2 principle 83:5

prior 20:21 38:12, 15,22 43:2 80:25 81:4,22,23 84:4

Index: problem..regard

85:17 87:7 90:9 91:21 19:12 21:11,20 65:23 72:8 75:16 89:22,25 reasonable 43:17 problem 48:20,23 provide 21:19 qualifies 6:9 50:14 52:16 28:1 80:1 84:21 reasonableness 56:17,20,23 57:5, 89:24 qualify 8:23 19:25 40.19 6 76:3 77:18 provided 19:17, 33:21 36:12 45:18 reasoning 38:8 problems 66:24 24 22:10 23:14 question 44:6 41:14,16 45:19 29:3 30:23 45:21 Procedure 43:6 45:14 47:13 54:13 60:13 67:13 61:18 67:11 68:7, Procedures 66:8 reasons 35:13 providing 85:17 22,25 70:8,12,25 75:9 36:10 41:1,14 87:7 74:6 81:14 86:19 42:6,20 43:21 proceedings 91:14 provision 25:3 77:24 2:15 6:1 92:23 questions 6:3 34:19 40:18 rebuttal 4:18 produce 38:19 43:24 44:1,23 provisions 19:17 25:14 53:3 56:19 57:9 63:6,9 91:5, 40:6 86:18 33:18 84:6,15 72:10,18,22 7,9,10,12 92:11, produces 86:21 published 77:19 12 received 29:25 prohibited 14:19 80:1 81:6 32:8 42:6,25 quote 19:18,25 52:7 punitively 81:1 82:11 85:9 recital 49:12 71:7 prominent 37:2 quoting 36:18 recitals 29:5 31:1 purported 36:10 46:17 47:19.20 promulgated purpose 35:15 71:2,17 74:3 20:8 39:3 50:19 R promulgation recognition 67:3 purposes 17:21 87:22 raised 43:14 recognized 18:12 18:15 20:8,11,15 59:11 24:16 25:24 36:23 pronouncement record 5:4.13 41:8 43:5 48:4 **s** 41:18,20,22 42:1, RAR 18:10 32:8 45:3 72:17 92:19 53:20 56:15 63:22 10 45:2 62:15 68:15 64:2 65:24 75:12 reenactment **proper** 53:14 **RARS** 47:11 80:5 82:13 84:6 properly 6:11 rational 38:6 pursuant 8:25 9:2 refer 69:23 31:24 41:10 20:3,17 28:19 rationale 75:17 referenced 51:23 30:4 32:4 34:2,12 properties 34:23 reaching 6:3 36:13 81:12 84:10 references 18:6 35:11 **read** 11:1 16:10, **pursue** 54:25 referred 53:24 propose 30:18 11 50:9 62:1 65:8 68:12 74:16 74:1 pursued 42:5 64:12,20 66:10 81:19 **proposed** 6:6 7:7 88:20 **put** 50:19 52:14 referring 47:4 9:15 11:6,21 55:11 59:17 61:2 reading 65:5 49:6 68:4 69:3 25:13 26:6 27:7,9, 64:6 78:12,19 88:14 91:22 11 28:17,21 30:3 ready 6:18,21 86:23 88:9 32:1,5,14 37:16 25:16 72:19 refers 16:23 puts 60:6 41:23 real 48:2 62:3 reflected 52:19 putting 80:10 proposing 30:6 64:19 75:5 87:1 refund 62:23 63:1 proprietary 43:4, realize 46:13 reg 19:24 22:10 **Realty** 2:6 5:7 Q 78:21 79:5 87:18 prospective reason 40:20 47:9 22:12,13 23:15 regard 14:10 qualified 7:12 53:9 58:4 64:11 24:2 79:1 90:4

Index: regs..retroactively

regs 20:13 21:24 22:14,16,19 23:4, 8,13 24:2 78:25 79:10,11,20 80:18 81:18 83:12,17,24 85:21 87:2,5,22 88:4 89:23,24 90:7,14,18,24

regulation 8:22 12:22 19:14 21:9, 17 22:2,17 23:7, 20 24:12 37:18 38:14,23 43:5 62:11 78:2 79:3, 17 80:4 81:2,23 89:20 92:4

regulations 8:18 20:7 21:15,18 22:8,13,22 23:3,5, 18,19,23 24:7,14 27:25 33:25 37:16,17,25 41:24 47:22 62:10 78:24 79:14,16,24 80:12 82:6 83:19 84:7 88:2 90:10 91:16, 20,22,23,24

rehearing 28:7

rejected 77:23 91:2

rejecting 85:22

related 8:6,10 12:2,6,12,15 14:14 17:6,8 18:17,21,25 19:4 27:1 48:9 76:19

relation 92:2

release 37:20

released 41:25

relevant 11:16 34:17 41:23

reliance 38:22 39:6

relied 38:12 80:24 81:4 83:8

relies 77:17

rely 58:1

relying 56:12

remainder 31:19

remaining 46:8

remember 68:13

remotely 76:20

rendering 80:7

Rent-a-car 89:5,

reorganization

7:12 8:23 19:18 20:1 31:9 33:21, 24,25 34:18 39:24 40:17 45:18 55:2 71:4 82:14 83:5 84:17,19,25 85:5

reorganizations 34:20 37:1 86:4

repeat 73:1

reply 38:5

report 10:12 11:1, 2 12:5 17:10 18:25 27:17 28:14 29:18,21 30:1 31:12 47:23 48:6, 7,9,10 49:10 60:11 62:18,19 63:19 64:13 65:17 66:1,10 67:8 68:17 73:6,9,12, 14 75:10

reported 2:19 10:18 18:5 28:3 29:12 31:4,6,24 54:11 63:17

Reporter 2:21 44:5

reporting 12:9,10 17:7 73:20

reports 11:4,19 28:15 36:2 48:3 70:3

represent 5:13 45:5 **require** 36:5 73:3 74:9

required 8:20 10:6,17,24 11:19 12:5 14:16 15:4 17:15 27:18 28:13 29:17 31:13 34:5 43:3 49:8 52:4 59:17 64:13,22 73:6 76:17

requirement

12:9,11 17:7 20:12 21:3,24 22:5,24 23:4,8,24 24:3,8 33:3 35:11, 17,23 37:18,24 41:10 43:20 78:5, 6,18,23,25 79:17 80:13 81:17,20 82:7,24 83:4 86:6, 8,23 87:7 90:5,9

requirements

8:17 9:4 19:16 26:8,21 33:22 35:17 59:18 85:2

requires 27:17

requiring 31:11 81:5

reserve 25:14

resolution 27:23 55:9

resolve 40:25

respect 12:7,11 13:10 16:13 24:9 30:13 54:10 75:4 77:16 85:25

respond 61:15 70:15

Respondent 5:16 25:21 27:7 28:16, 21 29:19,24 30:2, 5 31:21 32:7,8 33:5 41:18 54:20 57:8

Respondent's 26:18 29:4,6 30:18,24 36:22 42:24 43:10,13,21 45:8,16 46:18,19 47:1

response 40:21 71:6

rest 25:14

restricted 57:17 84:25

restrictions 40:14 46:15

restructure 86:11

result 16:17 24:15 30:20 32:2 38:20 40:6 50:24 56:16, 22 86:19,22

resulted 14:25 27:12 34:8 39:13 51:7,10 60:4

resulting 8:1 10:2 11:7,8,12,22 16:21,23 17:23 18:14 25:25 26:14 27:24 28:17 30:3 31:19 32:6 34:13 46:1,23 51:4 53:24 54:1 56:14, 21 58:14 60:11 66:25 67:4,6 69:25 70:5 72:3 73:24 74:1 76:18, 25 77:3

results 10:11 16:20 54:8 60:3 70:19,20

retained 43:4 retains 36:20

retention 43:8

retroactive 22:13 38:13,19,23 40:1, 5 41:2 78:19 81:1 82:2 84:2 85:23 86:12,16,18,20 87:4,10,20 91:21

retroactively 32:24 38:4 43:18 77:22 79:15 80:6,

Index: retroactivity..specific

specific 30:13

90:5,11

51:3 81:25 85:10

RTC 33:6 14 87:7 90:16,21, 21,24 20:1 21:1,8, **showed** 32:23 23 91:24 9,12,21 22:2,17, rule 64:10 66:17 **shown** 10:6 27:18 19 23:7,20 24:11, retroactivity 32:25 43:19 63:18 rules 40:22 66:19 12,14 25:2,5,6 38:3.16 40:3 64:22 26:9 27:17,25 41:15 42:7 86:1 ruling 13:13 26:1, 28:15,19 30:4,5, **shows** 37:12 20 28:1 32:23,25 return 7:22 9:16 21 32:4 33:6,20, 39:14 57:21 33:10 34:9,11,16 10:7 12:2 13:21, 23 34:21 35:21 sic 6:12 31:16 35:2,8,13,19 36:2, 25 14:17,20 36:7,8,11 37:8,18 3,14 37:19,20,21 39:5,11,23 41:11, side 53:6 15:12,13 16:19, 38:1,6,8 39:7,25 24 43:5 63:16 24,25 17:5,6,14 40:14,19 41:1,4,9, **sided** 57:22 18:23 27:19 29:13 78:2 79:21 82:5 19 42:1,2,15,21 84:15 88:21 89:7, 31:12.25 49:9 **sign** 44:10 43:16 64:9,11,12, 20 52:5 63:18 64:22 16 65:7,9,15 **signed** 12:17 71:23 73:5 74:12, 77:18,22 78:1,19 Sections 18:6 13 significantly 79:5,14,25 80:10, semblance 79:6 15:6 returns 7:19,23 14 81:2,7,16,22, Senate 36:2 37:7 12:14 28:24 65:2 25 82:3 83:14,25 similar 40:4 87:8 39:11 66:10 84:2,14 85:23 **revenue** 10:5,10 similarly 28:12 86:5,7,10,13,20, 11:2,21 13:6 **send** 92:16 38:18 64:4 86:3, 24 87:4,10,20 19:22 20:10 26:1, 90:8,15,16,20 sense 87:24 19 28:1 29:5,25 91:17,23 **Simple** 67:10 separate 20:14 32:23.25 33:10. 15,21 34:9,11,16, rulings 33:9,15 **simply** 8:22 18:13 September 32:10 18 35:2,13 36:3, 38:4 79:20,23 36:6 14,24 37:19,20 91:21 Services' 29:5 situated 38:18 38:3,6,8 39:7 set 80:15 86:6 40:4 86:3,15 40:14,19 41:1,4,8, S 9,18,25 42:1,15, sets 23:7 situation 69:11 16,21 43:6,16 settle 56:3 Sacramento 2:16 **six-month** 11:17, 65:1 68:17 75:10 5:1,10 18 27:22 28:13 77:17,18,22 78:1, **settled** 38:12.22 19 79:4,14,20,23, 78:7,8 80:25 81:4 sale 14:24 15:5 Sixth 14:24 25 80:10,14 81:2, 83:8,15 84:12 27:13 29:2,23 **Skidmore** 41:5.15 6.16.22.25 82:2 30:23 31:6,9,13, settlement 14:14 42:8 92:1,6 83:14,25 84:2,14 17,20 30:14 40:20,25 85:23 86:5,6,10, sole 39:23 41:11 sales 36:25 42:6 45:20 77:9 13.20.24 87:4.10. solicitor 36:17 20 90:8,15,16,20 settling 13:7 **satisfied** 9:4 33:3 91:17,21,23 43:21 **sort** 55:13 57:17 Seventh 15:10 59:15 64:3 reversed 25:13 **satisfy** 8:16 36:7, shareholder 73:22 91:4 11 83:7 85:24 **sound** 22:20 26:21 33:2 34:4 review 13:23 60:3 35:17 42:23 43:7, save 19:2 77:5 **source** 36:19 68:3 20 88:6 89:16 Secretary 88:20 **speak** 89:12 reviewed 59:23 **Shaw** 5:19 **section** 6:9 7:12 speaking 52:4 reviewing 6:3 Shorthand 2:20 8:17,18,19,22 Specialty 35:8 9:14,20 10:25 roughly 15:23 shortly 12:20

show 51:9 59:7,8

66:6

11:19 12:4 13:6

19:5,13,14,17,20,

17:7,12 18:24

RPR 2:20

specifically **stating** 5:12 35:20 stretched 67:2 survival 20:18 12:23 13:13 22:10 37:10 42:2 strictly 82:12 23:13 24:5 37:3 **statues** 16:12 survive 20:23 42:17 51:19 58:6 strongly 16:11 35:18.24 statute 7:8,16,20, specificities structure 86:7 24 9:11,13,18,21 survived 37:4 50:22 10:1,22,23 11:15 structured 50:19 survives 35:10 specificity 59:17 16:15 17:11,21 68:1 18:4 19:5 20:9 surviving 26:15 specifies 27:21 structuring 86:24 21:15 26:5,25 34:8,14 35:4 36:5 speculate 61:3 27:8,11,15,21 stuff 50:21 62:24 37:6 42:20 28:20 32:4,11,12 spent 72:24 sustained 43:13, subdivision 10:5, 34:7 36:7 42:18 25 13:4 22:8 22 44:7,10 56:20 **split** 34:20 23:11 27:20 57:7,22 62:23 **spoke** 91:15 65:5,6 66:21 70:5, Т **submits** 6:12,14 17 72:25 78:1 square 78:20 87:4 submitted 92:19 80:17 81:12,13 table 60:15 **staff** 65:11 83:10 subsequent takes 36:19 90:18 **stage** 56:1 21:17,18 24:13 statutes 10:3 42:9 78:20 81:18 taking 5:10 46:5 11:10 12:10 18:7 standard 9:13 83:16,23 87:1,17, 58:21 20:25 34:13,17 17:11 69:19 21 35:3,7,14,25 36:4 talk 48:25 56:5,6, start 5:14 44:2,25 69:23 78:14 83:11 substance 45:9 18 62:17 65:3 84:23 started 16:7 78:5,11 79:18 substantially 80:9,20 81:9 89:1 **statutory** 6:8 8:20 **starts** 10:22 34:22 35:11 17:3 18:23 19:13, talked 70:4 73:9, **state** 2:2,21 9:1,3 substantively 19 21:12,20,25 10,23 76:17 78:7 69:12 20:4.18 28:20 24:10 26:8,10,13 87:11 30:12 34:3,13 33:24 34:12,25 substituting 5:24 35:14,25 36:4,6, talking 8:9 9:24 35:23 36:10 37:3, 10 42:18 57:22 successful 42:19 54:1 62:7,25 68:9 10,14 39:16 40:8, 64:1 67:24 81:12 85:15 74:13 87:18 18 42:17,19 78:10 82:23 83:9 84:11 84:8,23 85:6 86:4 **sudden** 56:11 **talks** 11:17 16:9 88:20 89:22 90:1 91:1 62:8 81:21 53:7 66:11 73:14 state's 78:13,14 **step** 11:9 51:12 suggest 55:17 tape 84:18 52:10 74:10 76:15 **stated** 8:22 26:19 sum 51:4 target 20:13 21:3 34:1 35:7 36:17 **step-up** 54:17 35:5 81:6 82:12 39:5,10 40:22 summary 24:9 stepped-up 15:2, 41:14 42:7,24 36:3 tax 2:1 3:8,9,10 8 51:21 52:3 54:6 43:9 5:16 6:6 7:5,19 support 84:21 8:5,6 9:9 10:7,8 stepping 24:1 statement 4:18 89:24 12:7,11,14,17 39:12 50:1 72:22 **stock** 42:25 43:1 supported 21:16 13:2,7,20,21,25 statements 50:18 24:4 14:7,8,11,13 15:4, stop 55:12 64:24 57:19,20 71:7 11,15,16,22 16:3 supports 76:7 straightforward 77:15 20:10,24 24:20, 85:22 21:14 24,25 25:4,9,12, **states** 8:25 13:14 supposed 56:10 22.24 26:16 strained 67:3 20:3 34:3 35:15 27:15,16,19 40:13 71:2 83:10 supposedly **Street** 2:16 28:23,24 29:10, 84:10 56:12

Index: tax-free..treating

11,16,18,21,24 30:7,8,9,10,11,13, 15,16,17,19 31:8, 14,22,23 32:2,3 36:24 39:3 41:9 43:16 44:9,25 45:10,23,24 46:5, 11,13,14,15,21 48:17 49:9 50:23 51:4,5,7,10,13,24 52:19 55:3,7 57:23 59:4,13 60:3,8,11,13,19, 20,21 61:6,8,12 62:13 63:24 64:22,23 65:2 66:4,6 70:2,18 71:3,13,15,16,22, 24,25 72:1,6,7 73:8,18 74:8 75:10,13 82:5 85:4,12 92:20

tax-free 6:9 7:12 8:16,23 9:6 12:13 14:3,5 15:8,19 16:4 17:3 18:22 19:10,13 21:12,20 24:10,16,24 25:11 26:8,13 29:2 33:22 34:5,6,12 35:22 36:9,12 37:1 39:4 42:19 52:13 54:20 55:13 56:17 57:6 59:25 73:20 74:11 81:5 89:22,25 90:13,25

taxability 29:9

taxable 14:22 15:3 27:13 28:24 29:1,23 30:14,23 31:7,17,20 36:14, 25 45:12,25 46:4, 7,10,20,24,25 48:15 51:15 52:1 54:4,9 56:11 58:12,13,22 59:3, 9,24 60:9 61:9 64:14,15 65:8,10, 12,16,17,19,24 67:7 70:22 72:3 74:16 76:13,23 **taxation** 10:5 19:22 40:23

taxpayer 9:16,19, 20 10:8,12,24 11:13,14,19,23 16:25 22:16 28:14,19 38:12 40:24 49:8 51:16 54:11 59:17 60:19 62:17 64:13,24 65:10,17 66:1 71:22 73:6 74:21 80:24

taxpayer's 13:1,7 16:18,24 55:9 62:12 63:23 73:5 74:11

taxpayers 23:19 24:5 27:17 38:18 39:21 40:4,12,13 52:14 55:6 60:6, 18 62:21 80:2 82:1 85:11 86:3, 15.22 90:6

technical 37:4 42:18

temporary 22:2, 10,14,19 23:4,19 37:16 41:23 78:25 79:10 89:23 90:14 91:15

ten 20:21 81:14

term 19:18 21:25 51:18 64:17 67:2 84:23 85:7,11

termination 13:1

terms 18:10 29:14 30:5 31:2 38:21 58:20 64:15 71:18 73:14 78:5 89:1, 13

territory 9:1 20:4 34:3 83:10 84:11

Texas 9:3 20:18, 20,25 21:6 26:14 34:7 81:12 88:20

text 69:6,13,16

then-existing 85:22

thing 13:17 18:1 49:3 50:12 51:24 52:21 53:14 61:1 73:1 75:15 78:8 80:5 82:4,9 88:23 91:19

things 13:17 18:2 54:3 61:16,24 62:2,17 73:1,9 81:9,10 83:18

thoroughness 41:5,7

thought 6:23

thoughts 63:12

threshold 43:4

tied 44:20 52:1 56:10 62:24 65:1

time 8:14,18,21 24:8,13 25:14 26:6 34:1 37:2,6, 19 41:25 42:15 44:13,15 64:13 72:3,12,24 74:10 78:3,8 80:16,18 82:8 84:14,16,19 85:22 91:8

time-barred 7:8

timely 6:6 7:9 8:3 19:12 24:22 27:10,14 32:16

times 30:10 64:20 73:3 84:16 90:3

timing 50:13

title 18:3 69:2,10

titled 68:15

today 5:6,22 6:5 7:4 23:9 92:10,13, 17

Todd 3:10 5:16 25:21

top 18:3 69:2

total 15:24 43:1

totaling 15:16

tough 80:8

transaction 6:8 8:20,24 15:3,19, 20 20:2 23:17 24:24 26:7 27:13 29:1,9,22 30:15. 19,22 31:5,6,7,8, 17,20,22 34:1,6,8, 14,15 36:14,15 43:2,8 45:9,12,18, 24 46:3,4,10,20, 24 49:17 51:22 54:19 56:11 58:13,21,22 59:2, 3,8,9,23,24,25 60:7,10 61:9 70:22 72:3,4 79:2 85:5,7 89:13

transactions

22:11,15 23:14,17 24:6 37:14 39:16 85:12 86:8 90:6

transcript 2:15 28:4

transporter 37:11

Treasury 8:17,22 19:14,24 20:7,13 21:9,16,18,24 22:2,8,17,21 23:6, 20 24:1,7,12,14 33:25 37:17 40:7 41:24 43:5 78:2, 21 79:5,20,24 80:3,12 81:18 82:6 83:17,24 84:7 87:2,5,18,22 88:2,4 89:20 90:7,

Treasury's 84:18

24 91:15

treated 31:5 37:1 86:11

treating 46:3 58:12

treatment 12:12 17:2 18:22 33:22 34:7 36:12 38:18 40:1,4,12 41:2 74:11 86:2,14 87:4

triggered 59:19

triggers 27:22

true 78:24

trump 80:11

trumps 79:14

turn 32:17 43:25 70:24 91:6

two-hour 72:11

type 8:23 26:9 33:11 34:5 35:1, 11 36:12 37:9 39:12 82:14 83:5 84:17,18 86:4 92:8

U

U.S. 38:5

underlying 27:25 31:22

underscores

13:24

understanding 44:16 63:22 71:12

understood

78:15

unequal 40:12 86:13,14

unexpected 38:9

Unified 28:7

uniformity 82:22

United 8:25 20:3 34:3 40:13 83:9 84:10

unlike 83:16

unreasonable

33:17

untimely 8:11 18:20 24:20 25:10 91:3

urge 16:11

٧

valid 41:16 validity 41:13

variety 14:14

version 23:22,25

versus 71:8 79:20 82:23

Vesely 3:6 4:12, 20 5:18 6:22,25 7:2 44:12 47:16 49:3,6,20,23 50:5 51:12 54:15 55:20 57:10 61:15,19, 21,24 63:7 64:5 67:18 68:10,16, 18,23 69:5,18

W

71:1 72:13,20,23

92:22

waiver 7:23,25 8:1 9:19,21,22,24 17:22,25 18:5,9, 10,13,18 19:1,2 27:14 28:20,22 32:12,15 44:7,8, 10,13,19,21 50:15 56:14 68:9,20 69:7,16,19,21,22 70:1,6,9,17 76:16, 17 77:5

Walt 33:14

wanted 39:20 41:11 69:15

Ward 76:1

Wards 16:8

Watkins 3:10

5:16 25:21

weighs 83:25 86:15 87:9

weight 42:4

well-established 83:4

well-respected 82:20

Werking 3:10 4:14 5:15 25:20 26:24 27:2,5 45:6 49:22 57:14,24 59:20 60:23 61:3 70:16 71:10

west 66:5

whatsoever 19:11

wide 14:14 66:5 75:15

wild 66:5

willy-nilly 53:21

Winthrop 5:19

wondering 63:15 64:3

word 10:16 49:11

words 10:9 11:8 21:15 75:6 79:25

work 79:18 90:19

worried 76:4

worth 36:16

Wow 53:25

wrap 67:16

written 29:8 92:17

Υ

Yazdinian 28:9

year 7:5,19 8:6 9:9 10:8 12:7,12 13:20 14:8,13 15:11,16 24:25 27:16 28:24 30:7, 9,11,16,17,19 31:14,23 32:2 44:9 45:25 49:10 51:2,5 52:18 53:4, 5,8,9,11,12,17,18, 21 56:11,13 57:23 59:13,14 61:12 63:13,20,24 64:17,24 65:1,22 66:2,6,14,20,21 67:22,23 73:5,8, 18 74:8,25 75:18, 20,21,22

years 7:18,22 9:16 11:13,23 12:17 17:16,18 19:7 20:21 21:22 22:21 23:1,16,17, 23 26:16 28:16,24 30:2,14 32:7 46:7, 25 53:14 62:25 63:18 65:3 66:4, 15,16 75:11 81:14,22 84:13 90:8

yield 88:1,3

Ζ

Zach 5:18 ZACHARY 3:6