BEFORE THE OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL OF,)
KOENIG & BAUER,) OTA NO. 21037464
APPELLANT.)
)

TRANSCRIPT OF ELECTRONIC PROCEEDINGS

State of California

Friday, February 24, 2023

Reported by: ERNALYN M. ALONZO HEARING REPORTER

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14	Transcript of Electronic Proceedings,
15	taken in the State of California, commencing
16	at 1:00 p.m. and concluding at 1:40 p.m. on
17	Friday, February 24, 2023, reported by
18	Ernalyn M. Alonzo, Hearing Reporter, in and
19	for the State of California.
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1	APPEARANCES:	
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3	Panel Lead:	ALJ JOSHUA ALDRICH
4	Panel Members:	ALJ SUZANNE BROWN
5		ALJ KEITH LONG
6	For the Appellant:	RICK NAJJAR COLETTE SUTTON
7		COLLIE COTTON
8	For the Respondent:	STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TAX AND
9		FEE ADMINISTRATION
10		JARRETT NOBLE
11		CHAD BACCHUS JASON PARKER
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1	<u>I N D E X</u>
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3	<u>EXHIBITS</u>
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5	(Appellant's Exhibit 1 was previously received into
6	evidence.)
7	(Parties' Joint Exhibits A-K were previously received into evidence at the prehearing conference.)
8	
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California; Friday, February 24, 2023 1:00 p.m.

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JUDGE ALDRICH: This is Josh Aldrich. We're opening the record in the Appeal of Koenig and Bauer US Incorporated doing business as Planeta North America Incorporated before the Office of Tax Appeals or OTA; OTA Case Number 21037464. Today's date is Friday, February 24th, 2023, and it's approximately 1:00 p.m.

This hearing was noticed for a virtual hearing and is being heard by a panel of three Administrative Law Judges. My name is Judge Aldrich. I am the lead judge for purposes of conducting the hearing. I'm joined by Judges Suzanne Brown and Keith Long. During the hearing the Panel members may ask questions or otherwise participate to ensure that we have all the information needed to decide this appeal. After the conclusion of the hearing, we three will deliberate and decide the issues presented.

As a reminder, the Office of Tax Appeals is not a court. It's an independent appeals body. We do not engage in ex parte communications with either party, and our opinion will be based on the parties' arguments, admitted evidence, and the relevant law. And we have read the parties' submissions, and we're looking forward to

hearing your arguments today. 1 2 Who is present for Appellant? 3 MR. NAJJAR: Rick Najjar and Colette Sutton. JUDGE ALDRICH: Okay. And for the purposes of 4 5 presentation, are you going to be presenting, Mr. Najjar 6 or is Ms. Sutton, or are you dividing it? 7 I will be presenting. MR. NAJJAR: Thank you. 8 JUDGE ALDRICH: Okay. Thank you. 9 And who is present for the Department or CDTFA? 10 MR. NOBLE: Jarrett Noble with CDTFA. 11 MR. BACCHUS: Chad Bacchus also with CDTFA. 12 MR. PARKER: Jason Parker with CDTFA. 13 JUDGE ALDRICH: Great. Welcome everyone. 14 So the issue to be decided is whether any further 15 adjustments are warranted to the determined measure of 16 unreported taxable sales. And there are two sub-issues, 17 whether Appellant's transportation charges are subject to 18 tax, and whether the disputed measure include any other 19 nontaxable charges. 20 I'll start with Appellant's representative. Ιs 2.1 that your understanding of the issue? 22 MR. NAJJAR: Yes, it is. 23 JUDGE ALDRICH: And Department, is that your 2.4 understanding of the issue? 25 MR. NOBLE: Yes, it is.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Great. Moving on we'll address the exhibits. So both parties have identified the same exhibits, Exhibits A through K, as their exhibits in their respective exhibit indexes, which were submitted prior to the prehearing conference. Exhibits A through K were submitted with CDTFA's September 15th, 2021, opening brief. And pursuant to the agreement of the parties and to reduce duplicative exhibits, A through K will be referred to as a "Parties Joint Exhibits."

And in anticipation of the hearing, we admitted the exhibits into the record without objection from either

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And in anticipation of the hearing, we admitted the exhibits into the record without objection from either party. And Appellant also timely submitted an Exhibit 1, which was identified as a document defining the term "contemporaneous."

So for the Department, Mr. Noble, does this statement accurately reflect your understanding regarding the exhibits?

MR. NOBLE: Yes, sir. It does.

JUDGE ALDRICH: And Mr. Noble, do you have -- now have any objections to either Appellant's Exhibit 1 or the Joint Exhibits?

MR. NOBLE: We do not.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Great.

And so similar questions for Mr. Najjar. Does that previous statement accurately reflect your

1	understanding of these exhibit?
2	MR. NAJJAR: Yes, and we have no objections.
3	JUDGE ALDRICH: Thank you.
4	All right. So transitioning to the hearing
5	format, we plan for the hearing to proceed as follows.
6	Appellant's opening presentation will be approximately
7	20 minutes followed by CDTFA's combined opening and
8	closing statement of 20 minutes. Then the Panel may ask
9	questions for 5 to 10, and we'll afford Appellant the
10	opportunity to rebut or close, and we allotted 5 to 10
11	minutes there. So these are made for calendaring
12	purposes. If you need additional time, please ask me and
13	I will see if we can accommodate you.
14	And if there's nothing further, we'll switch over
15	to presentations.
16	Mr. Najjar, are you ready to proceed?
17	MR. NAJJAR: Yes, I am. Thank you.
18	JUDGE ALDRICH: Go ahead when ready.
19	MR. NAJJAR: Sure.
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21	PRESENTATION
22	MR. NAJJAR: This is Rick Najjar speaking. Thank
23	you, Judge Aldrich. And thank you to the OTA for hearing
24	our case today.

Overall there are three main issues in this case

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related to petitioner or taxpayer or Koenig & Bauer,
Bauer's contracts with three of its customers, Advance
Paper Company, Garvey, and Royal Paper Box. In
particular, the petitioner contends one, the charges for
transportation were separately stated in accordance with
Regulation 1628(a); two, the assembly charges are actually
nontaxable installation charges under Section 6011; and
three, the training charges are immediately incidental to
the nontaxable installation charges and therefore, they
themselves are nontaxable.

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Just to provide some background, petitioner's company is located in Dallas, Texas and is a member of the overall Koenig & Bauer Group, which is located in Germany. Petitioner sells high-tech printing presses to customers located all over the world, including in the U.S. and including in California. Petitioner's primary business is making these large custom high-tech printing presses that they sell via common carrier most of the time.

The sales contracts in question today all contain a lump sum purchase price for the printing presses, training, transportation, and installation. However, after the contracts are completed, including any modifying addendums thereto, the shipment of the actual printing press has occurred, invoices are issued to their customers that separately state charges for training, installation,

and transportation.

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So getting to our first issue regarding transportation charges, Respondent contends -- the CDTFA contends the invoices were not issued contemporaneously because they were not issued at the exact same time the contracts and the addendums were signed. Looking to California Law Regulation 1628(a) states the following: Transportation charges will be regarded as separately stated, only if they are separately set forth in the contract for sale or a document reflecting that contract issued contemporaneously with the sale, such as a retailer's invoice.

So what does contemporaneously actually mean in the context of Regulation 1628(a)? There's no California law or guidance on this issue. Therefore, we're left with trying to find the ordinary or popular meaning of the term. Respondent cites Webster's -- Merriam-Webster Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary which gives a simple definition of contemporaneous as meaning at the same time. In other words, contemporaneous is synonymous with simultaneous. But looking to a bigger dictionary, the Oxford English Dictionary unabridged, states there's actually a difference in the usage of simultaneous and contemporaneous.

Simultaneous is meant to mean at the exact moment

in time, while contemporaneous means in the same period of time. Petitioner contends that this definition better fits the context of Regulation 1628(a). Also, it should be noted dictionaries are a useful indication of what the ordinary and popular meaning would be of a term, but they are not a be-all end-all. As courts have stated before, dictionaries are not a talisman. So it's important to look at other indications.

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Looking further at California sales tax regulations, we see that the term "simultaneous" is used in Regulation 1502 instead of contemporaneous. So why doesn't 1628(a) use the term simultaneous if that's what the drafters of that regulation in 1962 actually intended? Thinking more abstractly about the matter, there is a notion of contemporaneous documentation that is ubiquitous in the tax law. For example, Section 178 -- 170(f)(8)(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides the following: No deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) for any contribution of \$250 or more, unless the taxpayer substantiates the contribution by a contemporaneous written acknowledgement of the contribution by the donee organization.

That meets the requirements of subparagraph (b). The statute goes on to provide that there's a one-year time frame, the same time as when the actual expense is

paid for the charitable contributions made. So it's a one-year time frame to submit the written acknowledgment.

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Furthermore, we would also like to point out that deference to CDTFA, Respondent, is inappropriate here, even though Respondent is entitled to deference usually when interpreting its own regulation, which is what 1628(a) is. Deference is not appropriate when there's no publish guidance or even a longstanding policy interpreting Regulation 1628(a), particularly with this matter with contemporaneous.

Next question would be, what is the relevant time frame and when does it begin? To assess what the time period would be, we define contemporaneous the way the petitioner contends. It's the petitioner's position that the relevant time frame would begin with shipment -- begin on the shipment date of the printing presses, which is actually considered the sale pursuant to Section 6006.

It's typical for a business, like petitioner's, to first have a contract then later have addendums to modifying the contract, then to ship the product and then to finally issue customer invoice. Given the large amounts of these sales, these are printing presses that run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars. This allows time for all the relevant pricing information to accrue to accurately issue a separately stated invoice

down the road.

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So let's just go over some relevant dates here with the contracts at issue.

Advance Paper, we have a shipment date of January 22nd, 2016, an invoice date of February 2nd, 2016. You can see Exhibit H and Exhibit E respectively for that.

The Garvey Group, a shipment date of January 12th, 2016, Exhibit H, and an invoice date of January 22nd, 2016, Exhibit F.

Royal Paper Box Company, a shipment date of December 22nd, 2015, Exhibit H, and invoice dates of 26 of -- February 16th, 2016, and February 19th, 2016, Exhibit G.

As you can see the time between the shipment date and the actual issuance of the customer invoice is nominal. Finally, the purpose of Regulation 1628 has been served here. The separate statement -- a separate statement rule Regulation 1628(a) is meant to ease the administrative burden for the taxing agency. Taxpayers often bear the evidentiary burden of demonstrating that a receipt is not taxable and requiring a separately stated charge provides a clear-cut way of meeting this burden.

Second and closely related to the first rationale

I just stated, the separate statement rule minimizes

disputes over the allocation of receipts to the taxable

and nontaxable components of the transaction. That's been met here. Circling back to 170 of the Internal Revenue Code, which I had mentioned about charitable contributions, the U.S. Tax Court has stated, the essential statutory purpose of the contemporaneous written acknowledgment required by Section 170(f)(8)(a) is to assist taxpayers in determining the deductible amounts of their charitable contributions and to assist the IRS in processing tax returns on which the charitable contributions deductions are claimed. Petitioner's timing of these invoices are contemporaneous, and they have not caused any administrative burden for the Respondent to separately figure out what should be taxable and what shouldn't be.

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Getting to the second issue related to installation, Respondent misclassifies this charge as a charge for taxable assembly instead of for a nontaxable installation. The value of the actual assembly is incorporated into the sales price, and the sales price alone for the printing press. Stated in another way, the printing press's retail sales price is unchanged from when it is shipped from Germany to the U.S. The installation charges do not increase the actual sales price of the printing press itself, nor does the installation change any substantive character of the printing press.

Exhibit 14 and Exhibit 16 in our original submission clearly outlined by affidavit and video evidence, the role of the erection engineers and the assembly that occurs in Germany, not in the United States. And the simple installation of just basically, in colloquial terms, hooking up the machine and getting it activated. The engineers just merely reassemble on-site.

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The last issue is related to training charges.

The training charges are merely incidental to petitioner's nontaxable installation charges as discussed previously.

KBA does not provide extensive training services regarding the operation of the machines. KBA's customers can obtain such training if they so opt. In other words, this isn't like a training course that they buy. It's more just to show users how to use the specific customized machine that was assembled in Germany. The training services are not, per say, required.

Overall, thank you for your consideration of this matter for the taxpayer.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Does that conclude your opening presentation?

MR. NAJJAR: That concludes it. Yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Great. So we're going to reserve
questions for after CDTFA presents. I do have some
questions for you and -- but --

So Mr. Noble, are you ready to begin with CDTFA's or Respondent's opening and closing?

MR. NOBLE: Yes, sir.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Okay. Go ahead.

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PRESENTATION

MR. NOBLE: On July 31st, 2018, Appellant was issued a Notice of Determination for the period

January 1st, 2014, through December 31st, 2016. The determination is based on a June 15th, 2018, audit report disclosing a taxable measure of around \$2.7 million.

Measure of tax for unreported sales determined by the audit is approximately \$2,050,000. And Appellant confirmed via email dated November 4th, 2020, that the measure in dispute is approximately \$1.6 million.

In addition, the Department subsequently performed a reaudit to remove installation charges of approximately \$41,000 from the taxable measure. The issues in this appeal are whether Appellant's charges for transportation of the printing presses are subject to tax and whether the measure includes any nontaxable charges such as installation or other services that were not part of its sales of the presses.

With respect to Appellant's transportation charges, Regulation 1628 subdivision (b)(2) provides that

when tangible personal property is sold for a delivered price, tax applies to the transportation charges unless three conditions are met. First, the transportation charges must be separately stated. Second, the charges must be for transportation from the retailer's place of business or other point from which shipment is made directly to the purchaser. And third, the transportation must occur after the sale of the property is made.

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The Department does not dispute that the charges were for transportation from the retailer's place of business. Subdivision (b)(1) states that property is sold for a delivered price when the price agreed upon in the contract for sale includes whatever cost or charge that may be -- that is made for transportation of the property directly to the purchaser.

There are three sales at issue to Advance,

Garvey, and Royal. The purchase agreements and other

sales documents for Advance and Garvey, which have been

provided as Exhibits D and E, show that the agreed upon

price of the printing presses includes the cost of

transportation. Appellant did not provide the purchase

agreement for its sale to Royal; however, Addendum A,

which has been provided as Exhibit F, shows that the

agreed price includes the cost of transportation.

Therefore, Appellant's sales of printing presses

were for a delivered price. As such, in order for its transportation charges to be excluded from tax, the charges must be separately stated and the transportation must have occurred after the sale of the property was made to the purchasers.

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As for separately stated charges, Regulation 1628 subdivision (a) states that the transportation charges will be regarded as separately stated only if they are separately set forth in the contract for sale or in a document reflecting that contract issued contemporaneously with the sale, such as the retailer invoice. The available sales documents, Exhibits D through F, though initial lump sum charges for the printing presses, which include delivery and installation. As such, Appellant's transportation charges were not separately stated in these documents.

Appellant also provided contract addendums for Advance and Royal. However, the addendums contained lump sum charges for transportation and assembly. Accordingly, the charges are not separately stated in the addendums. There are some invoices which appear to be requests for down payments for all three sales which have been provided as Exhibit G. These invoices do contain separately stated charges for transportation. However, based on the available shipping documents, which have been provided as

Exhibit H, it is unclear when possession of the printing presses was transferred to the purchasers.

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Specifically for Advance, the invoices dated February 2nd, 2016, that's Exhibit G, page 1, but the shipping documents list various dates of shipment in January of 2016. Appellant also provided an internal document, Exhibit I, indicating the delivery to Advance was completed on February 4th, 2016, but this is not the shipping receipt. And considering the other conflicting dates, this document alone does not establish that the invoice was issued contemporaneously with the sale.

Exhibit D, page 21, indicates that the payment identified in the invoice is due 30 days after the first salable commercial run of the printing press, whereas the invoice indicates that the payment is due immediately. Based on the 30-day terms of payment state in Addendum B and the invoice stating that the payment is due immediately, the only logical conclusion is that the invoice was issued sometime after the first commercial run of the printing press. Accordingly, the invoice was issued after the sale rather than contemporaneously with the sale.

For Royal, Exhibit G, page 2, is dated

February 16th, 2016, and Appellant has not provided any documents establishing when transfer of possession

occurred. For Garvey the invoice, which is Exhibit G, page 3, is dated January 22nd, 2016, but the available shipping documents list various dates in December of 2015. Accordingly, there's insufficient evidence to establish that these invoices were issued contemporaneously with the sale. And thus, Appellant has failed to establish that its transportation charges were separately stated.

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In addition to the charges being separately stated, the transportation must have occurred after the sale. The purchase agreements for Advance, provided as Exhibit D, page 6, and Garvey, provided as Exhibit E, page 6, are standard forms and state that the sales were made pursuant to a security agreement. The agreements grant Appellant a security interest in the property and give Appellant the right to repossess the property in the event of default.

Appellant did not provide the purchase agreements for Royal. However, given the standard nature of the available purchase agreements and statements in Appellant's briefs stating that they make these sales pursuant to perfected security agreements, it is more likely than not that the sale was also made pursuant to a security agreement.

Regulation 1628 subdivision (b)(3)(a) provides that when a sale is made pursuant to a security agreement

in which the retailer retains title as security for the payment of the price, the sale occurs when possession of the property is transferred by the retailer to the purchaser or other person at the purchaser's direction.

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Accordingly, the sales at issue occurred after transportation when possession of the printing presses was transferred to the purchasers. And thus, for this additional reason, Appellant has failed to establish that its transportation charges are not subject to tax.

As to whether the taxable measure includes nontaxable charges, such as installation labor or other services that were not part of its sales of the printing press, Section 6011 subdivisions (a), (a)(2), and (b)(1) provide that the sales price of tangible personal property means the total amount for which property is sold and specifically includes the cost of materials, labor, or service cost, and any services that a part of the sale.

Generally, whether service charges are subject to tax is a question of whether or not the charges are mandatory. In addition, Regulation 1546 subdivisions (a) and (b) provide that fabrication labor is subject to tax and include any operation which results in the creation or production of tangible personal property, or which is a step in a process or series of operations resulting in the creation or production of tangible personal property.

Lastly, annotations 435.0020 and 435.0120 provide the charges for assembling or engineering property prior to attachment to real property are subject to tax.

Appellant has not provided any documentation establishing that any of its service charges, such as training, erection, and assembly were optional to the purchaser. In fact, the available documentation indicates the charges were mandatory. For example, Exhibit A, page 20, under installation notes that the prices include the services of erection engineers with no indication that the purchaser had the option to refuse the service.

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In addition, considering the sales were made pursuant to a security agreement and that the presses came with a warranty and were, by Appellant's admission, large custom-made printing presses. The terms are consistent with Appellant's service charges being mandatory to ensure proper operation of the printing press. In the absence of evidence establishing that these service charges were optional, no adjustments are warranted.

With respect to the nontaxable installation charges, the Department has already removed \$41,000 from the taxable measure to account for installation based on invoices Appellant provided for Advance and for Garvey, which have been provided as Exhibit C. Appellant has not provided further documentation establishing that there

were other installation charges in excess of this amount and thus, no further adjustments are warranted.

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To the extent that Appellant argues that the printing presses were fully assembled at the factory, disassembled for shipment and then reassembled at the customer's location, annotation 435.0143 provides the charges for reassembling are not subject to tax if the charges are separately stated and the customer is not required to hire the seller for the reassembly. There's no evidence that the printing presses were assembled at its factory. But more importantly, there are no sales documents separately stating any reassembly charges and no evidence that the charges were optional.

To the extent that Appellant asserts that the training charges were incidental to its installation charges, there are no provisions in the sales and use tax law stating the training charges are not subject to tax. Regulation 1501 does provide a true object of the contract test for persons primarily engaged in the business of rendering services. The test is used to determine whether any tangible personal property transferred by a service provider is incidental to the service by examining whether the true object sought by the buyer is the service, per se, or the property produced by the service.

The test does not provide a distinction for

services for being incidental to other service charges and thus, Regulation 1501 is not applicable to this appeal.

Annotation 315.0335 provides that installation charges are subject to tax when the training is contractually or practically mandatory. There's no indication in the contracts that the charges for training were optional to the purchasers.

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Rather, the contract states that Appellant will furnish personnel to demonstrate the use of the presses, that the training occurs over the course of several weeks, and that there's optional auxiliary training available four weeks after the first commercial run, that the contracts note an optional auxiliary training but do not note that the initial training is optional is an indication that the charges were mandatory.

Furthermore, considering that the sales were made pursuant to security -- to security agreements and included warranties, it follows training the purchasers how to operate the presses is practically mandatory to ensure proper operation. Based on the foregoing, no further adjustments are warranted, and this appeal should be denied.

That concludes my presentation. Thank you.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Thank you, Mr. Noble.

At this time, we're going to switch to questions

from the Panel. So my first question is for Appellant's representative, Mr. Najjar.

So at times I've seen in the exhibits the KBA.

Is KBA synonymous with Koenig & Bauer U.S?

MR. NAJJAR: Yes.

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JUDGE ALDRICH: Okay. All right. And then I guess what's the relationship with Planeta? Is that just the doing business?

MR. NAJJAR: That's just a DBA registered in Texas.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Okay. Great. And the next -- I was curious. So in your presentation you had referenced Exhibits 14, 15, and 16 as part of your original submission. Are you talking about your submission to CDTFA or to the Office of Tax Appeals?

MR. NAJJAR: Our exhibits were submitted labeled as numbers to the Office of Tax Appeals.

JUDGE ALDRICH: So I guess you had referenced some declarations and a video, but we had requested that those be provided in our prehearing conference statement request and then also noted in our minutes and orders that we hadn't received a copy of those. So I'm just, like, wondering whether or not you're expecting that to be a part of the evidence or you're just incorporating that into the argument.

MR. NAJJAR: If we can still admit it into evidence, we would like to. But if not at this juncture, we understand.

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JUDGE ALDRICH: Okay. I guess part of the confusion is that in the opening brief -- briefs -- excuse me -- it was labeled as forthcoming. So meaning we were expecting to receive it in the future, and we never received a copy. And that's why I was putting you on notice with the prehearing conference statement request. But so your request would be to submit those three exhibits if possible?

MR. NAJJAR: Yes. So we request for admission, but we understand at this juncture if we can't get these admitted into the record.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Okay. And so let me turn to CDTFA to see what their position is regarding them.

MR. NOBLE: It was noted as forthcoming in their opening brief, and I believe in response briefs we noted it had not been provided yet. And again, in the prehearing conference statement, at the prehearing conference, and in your minutes and orders, you requested the exhibits. We would object to allowing more time for those exhibits at this point. However, in the event that you do accept them, we would request more time to respond post hearing.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Okay. So given the amount of notice that Appellant's representatives received, I'm not inclined to allow their late admission. So I guess we'll move on from there.

But so at this time, I wanted to see if Judge Long, did you have any questions?

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Judge Long I do not. I believe you addressed my questions. Thank you, Judge Aldrich.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Okay. And Judge Brown, turning to you?

JUDGE BROWN: I may have a question. I wanted to ask Appellant more about their position regarding the installation charges and assembly charges. I suppose I'll say I don't see where Appellant has addressed CDTFA's references to the annotations such as 435 -- one second. I have them in -- 43510143, for example, for regarding the reassembly charges. And I don't know perhaps that might be something that Appellant is going to address on rebuttal, but I wanted to say what is Appellant's position regarding those annotations? Do you agree? Are you arguing they're not applicable here, or are you arguing that -- that CDTFA, that they are wrong with -- yeah. So I will say I'll let Appellant respond.

MR. NAJJAR: This is Rick Najjar speaking. Our position is they're not applicable and that the record

speaks for itself, that there's a difference in those

particular annotations versus what we have here just given

the amount of assembly that's taken place in Germany. But

our position is that the record speaks for itself.

JUDGE BROWN: So you're saying that they -- the question about reassembly is not -- that the facts are different here?

MR. NAJJAR: Yes. I mean, I think that the reassembly that took place in those annotations was more extensive than what would take place in our case.

JUDGE BROWN: I think that's all I have right now. Thank you.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Okay. And we can circle back after Appellant's closing slash rebuttal to see if the Panel members have additional questions.

But so at this time I was going to see if the Appellant's representatives have -- would like to submit a rebuttal, a closing, if you need a second to gather your thoughts, let me know. That's fine.

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CLOSING STATEMENT

MR. NAJJAR: This is Rick Najjar speaking.

Before closing, we just want to say we think that there's substantial enough evidence that the preponderance of the evidence standards has been met when the shipment

in general took place. And these separately stated invoices were issued within a reasonable time frame to separately state these particular charges.

Furthermore, circling back to what Judge Brown brought up, we believe that the reassembly that took place on-site for U.S. customers is not anywhere near as substantial as it was, as what took place in Germany. And finally, we believe that the training is still merely incidental pursuant to Section 1501 to the installation charges.

Thank you.

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JUDGE ALDRICH: So just circling back with my panel members, I wanted to see if they had any additional questions. I saw a head shake no from Judge Long.

Did you have any questions Judge Long?

JUDGE LONG: No questions. Thank you.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Okay. And Judge Brown?

JUDGE BROWN: I don't think I have anything

further. Thank you.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Thank you.

So at this time I think we're ready to conclude the hearing. The record is now closed.

The Panel will meet and decide the case based off of the evidence and the arguments presented. We will send both parties our written decision no later than 100 days

from today. As I mentioned earlier, this is one of two hearings on the afternoon calendar, and the subsequent hearing should begin at approximately 2:10. Please go ahead and cut the live stream, and thank you everyone for your time. (Proceedings adjourned at 1:40 p.m.)

1 HEARING REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 2 I, Ernalyn M. Alonzo, Hearing Reporter in and for 3 the State of California, do hereby certify: 4 5 That the foregoing transcript of proceedings was 6 taken before me at the time and place set forth, that the 7 testimony and proceedings were reported stenographically 8 by me and later transcribed by computer-aided 9 transcription under my direction and supervision, that the 10 foregoing is a true record of the testimony and 11 proceedings taken at that time. 12 I further certify that I am in no way interested 13 in the outcome of said action. 14 I have hereunto subscribed my name this 10th day 15 of March, 2023. 16 17 18 19 ERNALYN M. ALONZO 20 HEARING REPORTER 21 2.2 23 2.4 25