BEFORE THE OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ΙN	THE	MATTER	OF	THE	APPEAL	OF,)		
J.	SMI	ГН,)	OTA NO.	22029629 220310040
	APPELLANT.				Γ.)	220310040		
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TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Cerritos, California

Thursday, March 16, 2023

Reported by: ERNALYN M. ALONZO HEARING REPORTER

1	BEFORE THE OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS						
2	STATE OF CALIFORNIA						
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5	IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL OF,)						
6)						
7	J. SMITH,) OTA NO. 22029629) 220310040						
8	APPELLANT.))						
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14	Transcript of Proceedings, taken at						
15	12900 Park Plaza Dr., Suite 300, Cerritos,						
16	California, 91401, commencing at 9:30 a.m.						
17	and concluding at 10:04 a.m. on Thursday,						
18	March 16, 2023, reported by Ernalyn M. Alonzo,						
19	Hearing Reporter, in and for the State of						
20	California.						
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1	APPEARANCES:	
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3	Panel Lead:	ALJ ASAF KLETTER
4	Panel Members:	ALJ SARA HOSEY
5	raner members.	ALJ KEITH LONG
6	For the Appellant:	RICHARD STACK
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8	For the Respondent:	STATE OF CALIFORNIA FRANCHISE TAX BOARD
9		JOEL SMITH JACKIE ZUMAETA
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5	(Appellant's Exhibits 1	-6 were received at page 8.)
6	(Department's Exhibits	A-G were received at page 7.)
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8	OP:	ENING STATEMENT
9		PAGE
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12	By Mr. Smith	17
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14	L CI	LOSING STATEMENT
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Cerritos, California; Thursday, March 16, 2023 9:30 a.m.

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JUDGE KLETTER: So this is the appeal of Smith.

It's OTA consolidated Case Numbers 22029629 and 220310040.

Today is Thursday, March 16th, 2023, and the time is approximately 9:30 a.m. We're -- my name is

Judge Kletter. With me are Administrative Law Judges Sara Hosey and Keith Long. While I'm the lead ALJ in conducting this hearing, all judges are co- equal decision makers.

Also present is our stenographer Ms. Alonzo who is reporting this hearing verbatim. To ensure we have an accurate record, we ask that everyone speaks one at a time and does not speak over each other. Please speak clearly and loudly. When needed, Ms. Alonzo will stop the hearing process and ask for clarification. And following the hearing, Ms. Alonzo will produce the official hearing transcript which will be available on the OTA website. The hearing transcript and the video recording are part of the public record.

Before we begin, some general rules to please keep in mind. Again, please say your name before you speak and try to speak directly into at the microphone.

As a reminder this proceeding is a live broadcast and any

information shared is -- will be publicly viewable. And if you have any questions during the process or any issue, please direct them to me, and just I ask that you please wait for me to acknowledge you before you -- then we can work through whatever issue it is.

And as a general reminder, the OTA -- the Office of Tax Appeals is not a court. We are an independent

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And as a general reminder, the OTA -- the Office of Tax Appeals is not a court. We are an independent appeals body. We are staffed by tax experts and independent of the State's tax agencies.

If I can have the parties, beginning with Appellant please each identify yourselves by stating your name for the record, it would be appreciated.

MR. STACK: Good morning, Judges. Richard Stack representing the Appellant Jonathan Smith in these appeals.

JUDGE KLETTER: Thank you.

MR. SMITH: Good morning. My name is Joel Smith with Respondent Franchise Tax Board.

MS. ZUMAETA: Good morning. This is Jackie Zumaeta with Respondent Franchise Tax Board.

JUDGE KLETTER: This is Judge Kletter with the Office of Tax Appeals. Thank you.

The issue for today is whether the statute of limitations bars Appellant's claim for refund for the 2012, 2013, and 2015 tax years. The 2014 year was

1 withdrawn. With respect to the evidentiary record, FTB has provided consolidated Exhibits A through G. 2 I just 3 want to confirm with FTB. Do you have any new exhibits that you'll be 4 providing today? 5 6 MR. SMITH: No. 7 JUDGE KLETTER: Thank you. And with respect to those exhibits, 8 9 Appellant's -- Appellant objected to exhibits as hearsay 10 and also as lacking in foundation. As a reminder the OTA 11 has more relaxed rules of evidence. So that objection is 12 overruled, and those exhibits are entered into the record. 13 (Department's Exhibits A-G were received in 14 evidence by the Administrative Law Judge.) 15 Please note that they will be given the due 16 weight that -- and due consideration. 17 Appellant has provided consolidated Exhibits 1 18 through 6, and I just want to confirm with Appellant. 19 Are there any new exhibits that you'll be 20 providing today? 21 MR. STACK: That is all we have. 22 JUDGE KLETTER: And this is Judge Kletter. Thank 23 you. 2.4 The Franchise Tax Board did not object to the 25 admissibility of those exhibits. So they are entered into the record.

(Appellant's Exhibits 1-6 were received in evidence by the Administrative Law Judge.)

And then as a reminder we have 25 minutes for Appellant's presentation, followed by 15 minutes for Franchise Tax Board's presentation, and then 5 minutes, Appellant, for your closing statement and rebuttal.

Mr. Stack, are you ready to begin your presentation?

MR. STACK: Yes, I am.

JUDGE KLETTER: Please begin.

MR. STACK: Thank you.

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PRESENTATION

MR. STACK: The issues in this case are largely legal. They are some factually issues, but they're generally not in dispute, except to the extent that there's an issue as to the significance of amended or original returns that were filed late by the taxpayer and whether that constitutes a federal adjustment. And also there's an issue as to the -- whether the -- whether there's reasonable cause for the failure to file timely, claims for refunds, if they are untimely filed under Supreme Court case of Boechler.

So I'll just start with the issues. So the main

three issues here are whether the taxpayer made deposits in the nature of cash bonds within the one-year period of limitations provided Revenue & Taxation Code Section 19306(a). The second issue concerns whether IRS adjustments are pending adjustments to taxpayer's 2012, 2013, and 2015 income tax accounts satisfies the two-year limitations period of R&T Code Section 19311.

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And then the third issue is whether based on the Supreme Court's decision last year in Boechler interpreting what we regard as an analogous statute of limitations. Reasonable cause exists for the taxpayer's possible untimely filing of his refund claims for the years at issue.

And so I'll just address the first issue. I should say sub-issues probably. The overarching issue is whether the statute of limitations allows for the refund claims. Again, in reviewing our brief, you'll see that we — the factual statements that we have largely track what the FTB has — has set forth. There are some differences, and I'll point those out. The theory of our case, really, is that due to the IRS audits of earlier tax years that involved years 2007, 2008, and 2010 that resulted in the filing of tax court cases.

There was an uncertainty of tax attributes and capitol loss carryovers of Mr. Smith for those years '07,

'08, and '10 and also subsequent years. And as a result he did not timely file his income tax returns for the years at issue here, with either the FTB or IRS. But shortly after those audits were concluded and the taxpayer's cases were concluded from June to September of 2021, Mr. Smith filed income tax returns for the subject years with both the FTB and the IRS. And that's where we get into the federal adjustment issue.

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The initial issue I'd like to discuss is the --whether the taxpayer made deposits in the nature of cash
bonds within the meaning of R&T Section 19306(a). It's
our position that any amounts the FTB received from the
taxpayer, before he filed his returns, were deposits in
the nature of the cash bonds that did not become payments
until after the taxpayer filed his return, which would
have fixed his liability. And accordingly, our argument
is that the one-year statute of limitations from payment
of R&T Section 19306(a) did not start to run until after
the taxpayer filed his forms 540NRs.

And as you know California incorporates federal law as relates to deposits that are made to suspend the running of the interest on potential underpayments. And that law is IRC Section 6603 which we've cited in our briefs. And for California purposes, a deposit is not considered a payment of tax for purposes of filing a

refund claim, converting an administrative claim into a traditional refund action, or filing a refund action, unless the taxpayer provides a written notification to the FTB stating that the deposit is a payment of tax, or a deposit was actually used to pay a final tax liability, and that's referenced as R&T Section 19041.5. And it's our contention that any substitute return that the FTB filed as to the taxpayer had no effect on the refund claim limitation period as to amounts it received from the taxpayer.

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The second issue has to do with IRS adjustments or pending adjustments to the taxpayer's 2012, '13 and '15 income tax accounts. R&T Sections 19311(a)(1) and (2) provide that if the IRS makes or allows a, quote, "change or correction," end of quote, to a tax return, the taxpayer may file a, quote, "claim for credit or refund resulting from the adjustment," end of quote, and FTB, in quote, "may allow," end of quote, such credit or refund within two years of the date of the final determination as defined by Sections 18622 or 18622.5 or within the limitation period provided in Section 19306, whichever period expires later.

And the case that we cited for that proposition is Sahadi versus Scheaffer, a court appeals decision from 2007. In turn subdivision (d) of R&T Code Section 18622

provides in part that the date -- quote, "the date of each final federal determination shall be the date on which each adjustment or resolution resulting from an Internal Revenue Service examination is assessed pursuant to Section 6203 of the Internal Revenue Code", end of quote.

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In this case, to the extent that the taxpayer filed Forms 1040 that the IRS did not process, if there is later a credit that results from a federal adjustment, it's our position the refund claim is timely since it was filed within two years from the date of a final federal determination under R&T Section 19311 subsection(a). And once the IRS processed the taxpayer's federal returns, it will have made federal adjustments which will affect the taxpayer's state income returns for the subject years. Consequently, the taxpayer filed his refund claims within the two-year refund claim statute of limitations provided by Section 19311(a).

The third issue I would like to address has to do with the Supreme Court's decision in Boechler that was decided last April, April of 2022. In that case the court unanimously held that the 30-day time limit to file a petition for review of a collection due process determination specified by IRC Section 6330(d)(1) is a non-jurisdictional deadline subject to equitable tolling.

And I'm not sure how familiar you are with the

CDP rules. Collection Due Process is what CDP stands for. It allows taxpayers to contest IRS levies before they are imposed, and IRS lien filings after the fact. And the statute states, quote, "The person may come within 30 days of a determination under the section, petition the tax court for review of such determination, and the tax court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such matter," end of quote.

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It is our contention that -- I know that the State in its briefing said that's not a federal statute of limitations. It is a federal statute of limitations that its Supreme Court determined is a claim processing rule. And in Boechler the Supreme Court parsed the language of Section 6330 of the Internal Revenue Code looking for a clear statement from Congress that it intended to make into a jurisdictional limit the 30-day deadline to file a tax court petition after a CDP Notice of Determination. It did not find any such clear statement.

And the Supreme Court in Boechler emphasized that there is a general applicability of equitable tolling. It indicated in a quote that is in our briefs that, quote, "Equitable tolling is a traditional feature of American jurisprudence and a background principle against which Congress drafts limitations periods." And that cites Lozano. And it goes on to say that "Because we do not

understand Congress to alter that backdrop lightly, non-jurisdictional limitations periods are presumptively subject to equitable tolling. And it cites Irwin versus Department of Veteran Affairs. It's a 1990 Supreme Court opinion.

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So the Boechler court went on to apply the general principle of equitable tolling to the CDP statute. And it found that it saw nothing to rebut the presumption of equitable tolling. The Section 6330(d)(1) did not expressly prohibit equitable tolling, and a short 30-day time limit is directed at the taxpayer, not the court. And so that's -- so it basically found that the deadline also appears in the section of the tax code that is, quote, "Unusually protective of taxpayers and a scheme in which laymen unassisted by trained lawyers often initiate the process," citing a case called Auber.

And it indicated that this context has nothing to rebut the presumption that non-jurisdictional deadlines can be equitably tolled. In Boechler the IRS argued that even if IRC Section 6330 didn't create a jurisdictional barrier, petitioner should nevertheless still not have the opportunity to come into tax court late, because equitable tolling should not apply in a tax case. And that's citing a 26-year-old Supreme Court case, U.S. versus Brockamp decided in 1997. And that held that equitable tolling is

inapplicable to IRC Sections 6511 deadline for taxpayers to file refund claims.

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And basically the Supreme Court in Boechler distinguished Brockamp on the following grounds. Brockamp rested on several distinctive features of the statutory deadline, and Congress wrote the time limit in 6511 of the Internal Revenue Codes in unusually emphatic form. And its detailed technical language could not easily be read as containing implicit exceptions. The court went on to say that the statute also reiterated the deadline several times, in several ways. And the statute explicitly listed numerous — actually six exceptions for the deadline.

And based on Boechler and Brockamp, it is evident here that the language of the California refund statutes here at issue, R&T Code Sections 19306(a) and 19311(a), are not sufficiently clear and emphatic to precludes applicability of equitable tolling. For example, R&T Code Section 19306 uses the word "shall" only once with reference to the allowance of credits or refunds. And that statute reads, "No credit or refund shall be allowed or made after the period ending four years from the date the return was filed," end of quote.

Similarly, R&T Code Sections 19311(a)(1) and (2) both use the word "may" with reference to the filing and allowance of claims for refund based on a final federal

determination. And the former subdivision, that be (a)(1) states in pertinent part, quote, "A claim for credit or refund resulting from the adjustment may be filed by the taxpayer within two years from the date of the final federal determination," end of quote.

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Further, R&T Code Section 19311(a)(2) states,
quote, "Within two years of the date of the final
determination, the Franchise Tax Board may allow a credit
or make a refund," end of quote. Here the taxpayer,
Mr. Smith, has ample basis for application of equitable
tolling. If this court were to determine that he untimely
filed his refund claims for the subject years, being '12,
'13 and '15, the facts here indicate that due to IRS
audits of earlier tax years 2007, '08, and '10 for which
Mr. Smith filed tax court cases and the uncertainty of his
tax attributes and capital loss carryovers for those years
and subsequent years, until the tax corp cases were
resolved that he did not timely file his returns for the
subject years, we submit that's reasonable cause for not
timely filing the claims.

Nonetheless, shortly after the audits were concluded and the tax court cases were over from June to September of 2021, Mr. Smith filed income tax returns for the subject years with both the FTB and the IRS. And we submit that he acted reasonably under the circumstances

and was unable to file accurate tax returns for the subject years until after his tax attributes and carryovers could be determined by the outcome of his tax court litigation for the earlier years.

With that, I believe that is our opening presentation. If Your Judges have any questions, I'm more than happy to address them.

JUDGE KLETTER: This is Judge Kletter. Thank you, Mr. Stack, for your presentation. We'll hold questions just to follow FTB's presentation.

Franchise Tax Board, are you ready to begin your presentation?

MR. SMITH: Yes.

JUDGE KLETTER: Please begin. Thank you.

MR. SMITH: Thank you.

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PRESENTATION

MR. SMITH: Good morning. My name is Joel Smith and with me is Jackie Zumaeta, and we are with Respondent Franchise Tax Board.

As mentioned during Appellant's case in chief, the loan issue in these consolidated appeals is did Appellant file timely claims for refund for the 2012, 2013, and 2015 tax years before the expiration of the statute of limitations. As mentioned, the facts are in

dispute with regard to when notices were issued, when payments were made, when claims were filed.

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So I'm not going to go into the details of the timeline for each tax year. Those are outlined in the Respondent's opening briefs. If the Panel has questions regarding the fact pattern and timeline, feel free to ask questions. I can address those, but I won't get into that to save all of us time.

There is, however, disagreement with regard to the application of the statute of limitations. And as I will explain in our briefing supports, Appellant did not file claims within an applicable statute of limitations. The applicable statute of limitations in the appeal is Revenue & Taxation Code Section 19306. Since Appellant did not file timely tax returns, the applicable statute time frames are four years from the date of the original due date for each year's tax return or one year from the date of payment, whichever is later.

With regard to each of Appellant's arguments,

I'll address all three of those and then -- individually
as part of my presentation. First, Appellant's payments
were not tax deposits. All payments at issue were made as
a result of Respondent's collection action taken after
assessments became final. Revenue & Taxation Code
Section 19041.5 allows taxpayers to make payments to pay

tax which have not been assessed at the time of the deposit.

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Quoting that section, a deposit shall not be considered a payment of tax for purposes of filing a claim for refund until the deposit is used to pay a final tax liability. Here, all payments at issue were made after Respondent issued Notices of Proposed Assessment after those NPAs went final, and after the Respondent initiated collection action. All payments were to pay final tax liabilities. They were not tax deposits under Section 19041.5.

With regard to the two-year federal action statute of limitations, Revenue & Taxation Code

Section 19311 does not apply because there were no federal changes giving rise to a claim for refund. Section 19311 only applies if the IRS makes a change or correction on Appellant's original or amended federal tax return, and the taxpayer files a claim for refund resulting from the adjustment.

If the IRS makes a change of correction, taxpayers have two years from the final federal determination date to file a claim for refund with California. The final federal determination date is defined in Section 18622. That's the date on which each adjustment resulting from an IRS examination is assessed.

So to summarize, for the two-year statute to apply, there needs to have been an IRS examination that gives rise to filing a California claim for refund resulting from an adjustment. The adjustment needs to be posted on the taxpayer's account transcript to determine when the final federal determination date is to calculate the two-year statute of limitations. Here, this series of events did not apply to any of the tax years at issue.

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For 2012 Appellant filed an original return in July of 2021. There's no change or correction made to the account as a result of an IRS examination as required under Section 18622. For 2015, Appellant did not file an original federal tax return until October 2021. Again, there was no change of correction. 2013 is a little bit different because the IRS prepared a substitute tax return. Healer v. Commissioner, a 2000 United States Tax Court case, follows a long line of tax court cases that holds a substitute tax return is not considered an original tax return filed by the taxpayer for purposes of the claim for refund statute of limitations. That's exactly what happened here.

So when Appellant filed his original 2013 federal tax return in August of 2021, the calculation or any change made to the account because of that original tax return is not -- does not give rise to the Section 19311

statute of limitations because of that substitute tax return as it's not a tax return filed or considered an original tax return under that code section.

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It appears, based on Appellant's account transcript, that an adjustment was made to significantly increase his federal tax liability for the 2013 tax year. There's nothing in the account transcript to indicate that a claim for refund with California would be proper given the adjustments that were made at the federal level. So for all three tax years, the IRS did not conduct an examination that led to a refund adjustment. Therefore, the statute of limitations under Section 19311 does not apply.

One quick note. Processing a return is not an IRS examination. And another note is, if there were to be any pending adjustments at the federal level, by definition those adjustments have not been made, have not been posted to the federal account. Filing a claim for refund on something that has not happened, there would be no reason -- or it would be impossible to process such a claim. If there is later action taken on an account, Appellant could file a tax return in accordance with later adjustments. But to file a claim for refund on adjustments that may happen into the future, that's not proper.

And then finally with regard to the third argument Appellant has offered today, Boechler is not relevant to this appeal. Boechler considered the jurisdictional requirements of the IRS's collection due process hearing under the Internal Revenue Code. As Appellant mentions, the Supreme Court of the United States expressly rejected the IRS's argument that no equitable tolling in statute of limitations cases should apply for collection in due process hearings.

The Boechler opinion expressly mention that it did -- was not overturning the longstanding precedent set in United States v. Brockamp, which held that the statute of limitations is a jurisdictional statute not subject to equitable tolling or reasonable cause. Boechler does not apply to the federal claim for refund statute of limitations. Boechler does not apply to the California claim for refund statute of limitations. Therefore, Boechler does not apply to this appeal.

In conclusion based on the evidence in the record and the California statute of limitations law, Respondent properly denied Appellant's 2012, 2013, and 2015 claims for refund. Respondent requests you sustain its position. I can answer any questions the Panel has at this time.

Thank you.

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JUDGE KLETTER: This is Judge Kletter. Thank you

1 for your presentation. 2 I'd like to turn it over to my Panel members 3 before we, you know, move to closing statements by Appellant. 4 5 I just wanted to ask, Judge Long, do you have any questions for the parties? 6 7 JUDGE LONG: I do have a couple of questions. wanted to start with Appellant. I just want to make clear 8 9 your position with respect to Boechler is that under 10 Boechler 19306 is not sufficiently specific enough to 11 allow Brockamp to be applicable in this case? 12 MR. STACK: Yes, that's our position. 13 JUDGE LONG: And that's even though Brockamp is 14 also specifically applicable to a time for credit or 15 refund statute of limitations? 16 MR. STACK: Yes. That's a different statute. 17 Brockamp is a different statute. It emphatically used the 18 word "shall" several times as the Supreme Court noted. 19 Whereas, the California statute does not use such clear 20 language, such emphatic language, which we argue allows 21 for equitable tolling in consideration with regard to that 22 statute. 23 JUDGE LONG: Okay. Thank you. 2.4 I also have a question for FTB. 25 With respect to the Appellant's argument as to

the pending IRS adjustments, I understand that your position is that the -- first that by definition, if there are pending adjustments, they have not actually happened because that's what the word pending means. And also that the statute of limitations would have already passed any way.

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But let's just, for the sake of this discussion, if Appellant were to prevail on the pending IRS adjustments argument, would the claim for refund in the returns that have already filed be sufficient? Or would FTB's position be that an additional claim for refund would have to be filed after the adjustments were made?

MR. SMITH: I think I understand all of the questions. I'm not saying that the -- I can't remember exactly what you said, but there was something in there that wasn't accurate as to what I wanted to convey to the Panel. I'm sorry. I can't remember exactly what that was. But with regard to your final question, there's nothing on these accounts to suggest that there's a pending action. But be that as it may, if there were to be something to happen at a later date, the Appellant would need to provide some documentation.

I mean, we could use -- right. Wouldn't need to file another tax return, per se, to start the time for refund. But there would need to be something filed to

1 connect the federal adjustment to the California return. 2 For all we know an adjustment may not be applicable to 3 California. So it wouldn't just be an automatic, you know, waiving of a wand and the claim happens. There 4 5 would need to be something filed, but it doesn't 6 necessarily have to be an exact, you know, form or 7 something to that effect. Does that answer the question? 8 9 JUDGE LONG: Yes, thank you. I have no further 10 questions. 11 JUDGE KLETTER: This is Judge Kletter. 12 want to turn it over to Judge Hosey. Do you have any questions for either of the parties? 13 14 JUDGE HOSEY: No questions. Thank you for your 15 presentations. 16 JUDGE KLETTER: 17 don't have any questions, but I would like to ask, 18 19 20 said? 2.1 like to say before the case is submitted?

So this is Judge Kletter. Mr. Stack, would you like to make a final statement or a rebuttal to anything that Franchise Tax Board or Mr. Smith Is there anything else that you prepared or would

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CLOSING STATEMENT

MR. STACK: Let me just respond briefly to what the FTB has mentioned, some of the points made by the FTB.

I just

I think the main thing I'd like to mention is that, you know, as far as the Boechler case, we believe it is relevant and -- for the reasons we stated. And we distinguished the language of the refund claim statute 6511 of the Internal Revenue Code and 19306 of the Revenue & Taxation Code and how the language used was different. And based on that and the facts of the case concerning the previous IRS audits and the uncertainty as to capital loss carryover and things of that nature, the taxpayer was not able to file accurate returns for these years at issue here until 2021.

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And so based on that, we think there is reasonable cause for the taxpayer to not have timely filed his refund claims and the Court should consider those circumstances the taxpayer has alerted the Panel to. And with that, I don't think I have anything further to add.

JUDGE KLETTER: This is Judge Kletter. I'd like to thank the parties again for their presentation. This concludes our hearing for today.

And the Judges will meet and decide the case based on the documentation and the arguments that were presented today. We'll issue our written decision no later than 100 days from today. The case is submitted and the record is now closed.

This concludes this hearing session, and we'll be

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returning at 1:00 p.m. for additional hearings.
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                Thank you.
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                (Proceedings adjourned at 10:04 a.m.)
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1 HEARING REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 2 I, Ernalyn M. Alonzo, Hearing Reporter in and for 3 the State of California, do hereby certify: 4 5 That the foregoing transcript of proceedings was 6 taken before me at the time and place set forth, that the 7 testimony and proceedings were reported stenographically 8 by me and later transcribed by computer-aided 9 transcription under my direction and supervision, that the 10 foregoing is a true record of the testimony and 11 proceedings taken at that time. 12 I further certify that I am in no way interested 13 in the outcome of said action. 14 I have hereunto subscribed my name this 21st day 15 of March, 2023. 16 17 18 19 ERNALYN M. ALONZO 20 HEARING REPORTER 21 2.2 23 2.4 25