BEFORE THE OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL OF,)
SQUARE, INC.,) OTA NO. 20025856
APPELLANT.))
)

TRANSCRIPT OF ELECTRONIC PROCEEDINGS

State of California

Thursday, March 24, 2023

Reported by: ERNALYN M. ALONZO HEARING REPORTER

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7	SQUARE, INC.,) OTA NO. 20025856)	
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14	Transcript of Electronic Proceedings,	
15	taken in the State of California, commencing	
16	at 1:44 p.m. and concluding at 3:37 p.m. on	
17	Friday, March 24, 2023, reported by	
18	Ernalyn M. Alonzo, Hearing Reporter, in and	
19	for the State of California.	
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1	APPEARANCES:	
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3	Panel Lead:	ALJ CHERYL AKIN
4	Panel Members:	ALJ JOSHUA ALDRICH
5	ranei Members:	ALJ ASAF KLETTER
6	For the Appellant:	AMY SILVERSTEIN
7		
8	For the Respondent:	STATE OF CALIFORNIA FRANCHISE TAX BOARD
9		MARGUERITE MOSNIER KATIE FRANK
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1		I N D E X	
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California; Friday, March 24, 2023

1:44 p.m.

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JUDGE AKIN: So we are opening the record in the Appeal of Square, Inc., OTA Case Number 20025856. This matter is being held electronically before the Office of Tax Appeals. Today's date is Friday, March 24th, 2023, and the time is approximately 2:06 p.m.

My name is Cheryl Akin. I am the lead

Administrative Law Judge for this appeal. With me today

are Administrative Law Judges Asaf Kletter and Josh

Aldrich. While I'm the lead Administrative Law Judge for

purpose of conducting this hearing, all three

Administrative Law Judges are coequal decision makers.

As a reminder, the Office of Tax Appeals is not a court. It is an independent appeals body. The office is staffed by tax experts and is independent of the State's taxing agencies, including the Franchise Tax Board.

Because the Office of Tax Appeals is a separate and independent agency, the only information we have and will consider is the argument and evidence that the parties have submitted in this appeal to the Office of Tax Appeals.

With that, let me please have the parties introduce themselves for the record, starting with

Appellants.

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MS. SILVERSTEIN: Good afternoon. My name is Amy Silverstein, and I'm representing Square today.

MR. MEDINA: Good afternoon. My name is Mark Medina. I'm here on behalf of Square today as well.

JUDGE AKIN: And Franchise Tax Board.

MS. MOSNIER: Good afternoon. Marguerite Mosnier for Respondent Franchise Tax Board.

MS. FRANK: Hello. Katie Frank also with Franchise Tax Board.

JUDGE AKIN: Okay. Thank you. Judge Akin speaking. As confirmed at the prehearing conference and in my minutes and orders following the prehearing conference, the issue to be decided in this severed appeal today is whether OTA has jurisdiction to hear and decide the substantive tax issue of whether Appellant was a financial corporation for California Franchise Tax purposes for the 2013 and 2014 tax year.

The substantive tax issue of whether Appellant was a financial corporation for these tax years has been severed from this jurisdictional issue and will be decided at a later time if OTA determines that it has jurisdiction to decide that issue. I just wanted to check with the parties and make sure that this is consistent with their understanding of the issue for today's hearing.

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Ms. Silverstein?

MS. SILVERSTEIN: Yes, that's correct.

JUDGE AKIN: Okay. And Ms. Mosnier?

MS. MOSNIER: Yes, that's correct.

JUDGE AKIN: Okay. Thank you.

With that, let's move onto the evidence in this appeal. I'd like to start with Appellant's exhibits.

Appellant has submitted 19 exhibits which have been labeled as Appellant's Exhibits 1 through 19. At the prehearing conference, Franchise Tax Board indicated that they do not have any objections to these exhibits, and Appellant's Exhibits 1 through 19 are now admitted into the evidentiary record without objection.

(Appellant's Exhibits 1-19 were received in evidence by the Administrative Law Judge.)

Franchise Tax Board has submitted four exhibits which it labeled FTB's Exhibits A through D. In my prehearing conference minutes and orders, Appellant was asked to review Franchise Tax Board's exhibits and indicate in writing whether Appellant had any objections to these exhibits. No written objections were received, but I did want to just quickly check in with Appellant to verify that there are not any objections to Franchise Tax Board's proposed Exhibits A through D.

Ms. Silverstein?

1 MS. SILVERSTEIN: We have no objections. 2 JUDGE AKIN: And I think I'm having a bit of 3 delay, but I think you said no objections? MS. SILVERSTEIN: Correct. No objections. 4 5 JUDGE AKIN: Okay. Thank you. Franchise Tax Board's Exhibits 1 through 4 [sic] are now admitted into 6 7 the evidentiary record without objection. (Department's Exhibits A-D were received in 8 9 evidence by the Administrative Law Judge.) 10 All right. Finally, before we get to the 11 parties' presentations, I'd like to quickly go over the 12 time estimates and the order of the proceeding today. It 13 is my understanding that neither party intends to present 14 any witness testimony. 15 Is that still correct, Ms. Silverstein? 16 MS. SILVERSTEIN: That's correct. 17 Okay. And Ms. Mosnier? JUDGE AKIN: 18 Yes, that's correct. And could I, MS. MOSNIER: 19 Judge Akin, just to bring up when you just admitted FTB's 20 exhibits into the record, you identified them as Exhibits 2.1 1 through 4 rather than Exhibits A through D. 22 that's just a technicality, but if you wanted to correct 23 it, I wanted to bring that to your attention. 2.4 JUDGE AKIN: Thank you. No. I do appreciate 25 that. So this is to clarify that Appellant -- excuse

me -- that Franchise Tax Board's Exhibits A through D are now admitted into the evidentiary record without objections. Thank you. I appreciate that.

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All right. So in my minutes and orders I indicated that Appellant would have 45 minutes for its presentation. Following Appellant's presentation, the Panel of Administrative Law Judges will give an opportunity to ask any questions they may have for Appellant. Following that, Franchise Tax Board will have 30 minutes for its presentation. I will again turn it over to my Panel to see if there's any questions for Franchise Tax Board.

After that, it will be turned back to Appellant for a closing or rebuttal statement, and 15 minutes has been allotted for that. Following that rebuttal or closing, I will again check with my Panel to see if there are any final questions for either party before concluding the hearing. Any questions before I turn it over to Appellants for their presentation? Seeing --

MS. SILVERSTEIN: I have none. No, I have none.

JUDGE AKIN: Seeing none, I will turn it over to
Appellant.

Ms. Silverstein, you may begin when you're ready, and you have 45 minutes for your presentation.

MS. SILVERSTEIN: Thank you.

PRESENTATION

MS. SILVERSTEIN: During the regular audit, the Franchise Tax Board changed Square's NOLs, and then the FTB bifurcated the financial corp issue, assigned it \$800, proceeded based on a refund claim, denied our refund claim, and we timely appealed to the OTA.

The threshold issue for today is whether the Franchise Tax Board had authority to do this, that is to assign the financial corporation issue \$800 and proceed based on a refund claim. If so, then we are here on a valid refund claim denial, and you don't need to reach the estoppel issue. But if not, then you do need to reach the estoppel issue.

The Franchise Tax Board says that the refund claim is null because even if it is where we're a financial corporation, it still would owe the \$800 minimum tax. However, we are not pursuing a refund of the \$800 minimum tax. Rather, as I said, the Franchise Tax Board assigned the financial corporation issue \$800 and therefore, if we win the financial corporation issue, Square gets a refund of that \$800. And so the proper question is whether FTB was permitted to assign the financial corporation the \$800 and proceed based on the refund claim.

While all of the Franchise Tax Board's staff

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acted like what they did was very routine when they did it, now they argue that it was invalid. But there's no authority confirming this. They haven't cited any statute, any regulation, any rule, any internal memo or manual. They simply assert it, and they want you to take their word.

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The OTA case is cited by the Franchise Tax Board shed no light on this question either. None of them involve the Franchise Tax Board setting up a refund claim procedure like this. In Appeal of C. Wright, the Franchise Tax Board denied a refund claim that didn't exist. So of course, that was a null act. In Cornerstone Compounding Pharmacy, the taxpayer filed a refund claim while it was suspended and later it was revived, and so the refund claim was deemed valid.

In MJK Real Estate Fund II, LLC, the taxpayer appeared to have filed the refund claim before they made payment. And that was perfected when they did make the payment effectively. So none of these involve the same facts as this situation, and none of them are on point. And finally, the documents and communications indicate that the FTB did have authority for what they did.

Multiple supervisors were involved. Over and over, they confirm that the proceeding was a refund claim. There wasn't any handwringing or concern. They didn't

debate whether they did or did not have authority to do

it. They just did it. It looked very routine, as I said.

And it certainly wasn't obvious to the Franchise Tax Board

Legal Division that there was a problem. We filed our

appeal or our brief in November of 2020, and it wasn't

until seven months later that they alerted all of us that

there might be a problem.

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So all signs point to the refund claim being valid. And in summary, the Franchise Tax Board properly bifurcated the financial corp issue. They had authority to assign it \$800. They denied Square's claim. We timely appealed, and the OTA has jurisdiction to decide the financial corporation issue. Now, only if you disagree with that and think the FTB did not have authority to do what they did, then you need to reach the estoppel issue.

And in that case, the Franchise Tax Board mislead and induced Square not to protest the NPACA. And so the FTB is estopped from arguing that Square is barred from OTA review because it didn't file that protest. There's no dispute that if they had filed the protest of the NPACA, then this case would properly be before the OTA.

The leading case on this is McKnight, and we briefed it pretty extensively in both of our briefs. It has virtually the same facts as this case. In both cases the Franchise Tax Board affirmatively induced the taxpayer

to skip a procedural step. It wasn't a mere instruction that the taxpayer read and said they relied on. It was an affirmative act by the Franchise Tax Board directed specifically at the taxpayer.

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So in McKnight the Franchise Tax Board proposed an early termination of McKnight's refund claim to expedite resolution in court. McKnight took the offer and was induced not to provide more information regarding its claim. So the court decided that the FTB was estopped from arguing that McKnight's suit was barred because he didn't provide that additional information. He was induced by the Franchise Tax Board not to provide it.

We cited many cases in our briefs involving procedural estoppel, and what this shows is that this is common. It's not specific to tax cases, and McKnight is not an outlier. There are four requirements for estoppel, and four of them are met here.

So first, the party be estopped must be apprised of the facts. The facts here are that the Franchise Tax Board -- if the Board were to -- if the court were to decide this, Franchise Tax Board didn't really bifurcate the financial corporation issue and assign it the \$800 because FTB didn't have the authority to do that. Now, not surprisingly the Franchise Tax Board hasn't contested this. The party is the FTB. So if it's true that they

didn't have authority to setup the refund structure, then they knew that. That's essentially what they're arguing here. So that requirement is satisfied.

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Second, the FTB must intend that its conduct would be acted on, or at least its actions had to have given Square the right to believe that that's what was intended. This can't reasonably be contested either. The FTB couldn't have been more clear about what they were doing and what they wanted Square to do. They wanted to complete the audit, to close it out, to proceed with a refund claim, and to give Square all of its rights of appeal. So it's very clear from the record that's what they intended, and they wanted Square to do just what Square did.

Third, the other part is that Square must have been ignorant of the true state of the facts. And again, that's why the FTB didn't actually setup this refund claim procedure, and it didn't have the authority to do it. And obviously Square didn't know that. It wouldn't have proceeded that way if it knew. And it couldn't have possible figured it out on its own because even FTB can't cite and hasn't cited any legal authority as to why this was barred. So the FTB -- Square clearly was ignorant of these facts, if they are fact.

And finally, the party asserting estoppel,

Square, must rely upon the conduct to its injury. And this is the detrimental reliance requirement. The record is very clear again that Square relied on the Franchise Tax Board. Square didn't protest the NPACA because the FTB said it would continue processing the financial corp issue as a claim. And it said the -- FTB said that Square would have all of its rights. And this is clearly in the documents that we presented with our brief.

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So they relied on the FTB and then the detriment or injury is that according to the FTB Square is barred from having its -- having the substantive issue heard by the OTA. We lost our appeal rights. That's the injury. So all four requirements for procedural estoppel are satisfied.

When estoppel is against the government, there's one last requirement. It's the policy prong. And as McKnight said, it is that the injustice, which would result from not applying estoppel, justifies any effect upon public interest or policy which would result from applying estoppel. So this is a balancing test. This is the requirement where you would consider the level of harm to Square, but only if there are countervailing public policy considerations. And the Franchise Tax Board has not identified a single one.

They haven't identified any reasons, other than

the technical ones, that the financial corp issue should not be heard now. So there's nothing to balance harm against. The balancing doesn't even come into play. And to illustrate this, there's two public policy interest that have been articulated as being potentially applicable in tax cases.

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One is protecting the fisc. And so that's like not giving a refund that's not due. We're not trying to get any refund that we're not due. We're just trying to have our day in court. We're just trying to get a hearing. So that consideration doesn't apply.

And then the other one is encouraging administrative resolution of disputes, and that's like if you proceed to court quickly and you don't go through the exhaustion process. But as we demonstrated here -- this is not disputed -- the Franchise Tax Board had ample opportunity and did audit the financial corp issue. They have all of the facts. And so, you know, if there was a possibility of administrative resolution, you know, we -- we provided that possibility here. So that public policy consideration doesn't come into play.

And last, I just want to submit that, actually, public policy favors the OTA hearing this now. So they — the legislature expressed its policy of having NOLs decided at this point in time in a case by the OTA by

setting up the statutory right to appeal an NPACA and then eventually get that to the OTA. So I would say that the policy actually favors having this hearing now and not making Square wait until there's a refund and going through a claim for refund process.

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And then the other reason that public policy favors having this hearing now is efficiency and accuracy. So this case dates back to 2013 and 2014. It's already 2023. The FTB wants us to wait until there's a refund claim and go through that process to come back. But it's better for all parties to have this substantive issue heard now, first, because it's already teed up. The FTB has gone through a full audit process. They have all of the facts.

We filed an extensive opening brief on this highly technical, highly factual issue. It's teed up perfectly, and it's going to be more — the result is going to be more accurate if it's heard now rather than waiting. It's already been ten years, waiting five years or more. It's better for OTA to have the full set of facts and to have them more quickly. So I would submit that public policy actually favors having the OTA hearing now.

I'm going to stop there and save my time for rebuttal.

1 JUDGE AKIN: Okay. Judge Akin speaking. I just 2 want to make sure everyone can hear me okay. All right. 3 Great. Thank you. And I'll note the extra time for your 4 rebuttal. And with that, let me turn to my Panel to see 5 6 if they have any questions for you. 7 Let me start with Judge Kletter. Any questions for the Appellant? 8 9 JUDGE KLETTER: This is Judge Kletter. I do have 10 some questions, but I'll ask it actually after other Panel 11 members. Thank you. 12 JUDGE AKIN: And Judge Aldrich, any questions for 13 Appellant? 14 JUDGE ALDRICH: I may have questions for 15 Appellant, but I prefer to reserve until after FTB has 16 presented, if possible. 17 JUDGE AKIN: Not a problem. I will circle back 18 to everyone after both presentations. 19 I do have some questions. So let me just 20 organize my notes for one second. Okay. My first 2.1 question is, I couldn't entirely tell from the briefing, 22 but was 2013 the first year that Square was claiming to 23 meet the requirements to be a financial corporation? 2.4 MS. SILVERSTEIN: Yes. At least officially it

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is.

JUDGE AKIN: Okay. I guess my follow up to that then is, if this was the first year that Square was claiming to meet the requirements to be a financial corporation, I'm wondering how there could be any impact to Appellant's net income or their net operating losses or credit carry over items for the 2013 and 2014 tax years.

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And to give you a little background on why I'm asking this is it's because of the requirement in Regulation Section 23183(b)(10), which requires that --well, basically states that a corporation cannot change its filing from a general corporation to a financial corporation, basically, until its third year. You would have to meet the requirements of the predominance test based on the current years of gross income, along with the preceding two years.

So if 2013 was the first year, I guess my question is, would 2015 then be the first year that Square could file as a financial corporation?

MS. SILVERSTEIN: Yeah. I guess I misunderstood your question. We're aware of that requirement. And so 2013 is the first year that their claiming that it effects their NOL. So I guess -- yeah. I think we're on the same page in terms of factually they were a financial corporation. Their business model hasn't changed, I guess is the way to put it. So, factually, they would have been

a financial corporation. 2013 would be the first year that their NOLs would be recomputed, if I think that's what you're asking.

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JUDGE AKIN: Yes. That is what I'm asking and thank you for that clarification. I guess if I could have you look at your Appellant's Exhibit Number 3, if you have that handy, because I had a question about that as well.

MS. SILVERSTEIN: Can you tell me what it is because I'm not sure.

JUDGE AKIN: Yeah. It is the October -- and might get the exact date incorrect. It wasn't -- the October letter where Square basically first asserts that there potentially -- October 27th, 2017. It's the letter where Square basically asserts for the first time that they are potentially a financial corporation.

MS. SILVERSTEIN: Okay. That might be helpful. Yeah.

I can ask it a different way if --

JUDGE AKIN: Okay. I guess my question is
looking at that document I see that Square explains that
99 and 98 percent of their gross receipts for 2013 and
2014 were the transaction-based revenues, which is what
Square contends were the financial, you know, qualifying
transactions. I guess I'm wondering if Square ever
provided Franchise Tax Board with information relating to

the two earlier? That would be the 2011 and 2012 tax years.

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MS. SILVERSTEIN: I don't have the full audit record in front of me. I'm going to guess that they did, but their business model hasn't changed. So those figures have remained consistent. I mean, I can't say going, you know, into the very present years. But throughout the relevant years, those numbers have all been consistent.

So I -- I mean, factually, the data is the same. Is that -- I don't know exactly what's in the record.

JUDGE AKIN: Okay. Understood. I think my next question is did Square ever provide FTB with revised computations of its net income for, you know, applying the net operating loss carry forward for the 2013 and 2014 tax years, you know, as they would be computed as a financial corporation?

MS. SILVERSTEIN: Yeah. I mean, they don't have income in these years, right. And so the issue is it's an NOL issue. But yes, I do believe they provided computations.

JUDGE AKIN: Okay. And just a follow up to that as well. Did they then provide revised computations of what the NOL carry forwards would be as of December 31st, 2014, if, you know, Square were allowed to file as a financial corporation for the 2013 and '14 tax years?

MS. SILVERSTEIN: Again, I believe so. I don't have the full audit record in front of me.

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JUDGE AKIN: Okay. And then last question for the time being. Thank you for your patience. I guess I just would like to know the status of the 2016 audit. You know, from Square's perspective, I will ask the same question of Franchise Tax Board in a bit. I'm specifically interested in the audit of Appellant's Form 100X, you know the netted tax return claim for refund for the 2016 tax year.

MS. SILVERSTEIN: Yeah. So the audit was completed, and there was a Notice of Proposed -- NPACA issued. We protested it timely, and it's in its beginning stages, the protest.

JUDGE AKIN: Okay. So it's in the beginning protest stages then?

MS. SILVERSTEIN: Yeah. It was assigned in January, and the first letter went out in February.

JUDGE AKIN: Okay. That's all of the questions I have for now. I know Judge Kletter had indicated that he may have some questions after my questions. So let me turn it to him to see if he has any questions at this point.

JUDGE KLETTER: Yes. This is Judge Kletter. I just have one question for Ms. Silverstein. Could you

please confirm whether Appellant filed the claim for refund for the 2013 and 2014 tax years? And if so, please direct me to which document in the record shows that refund claim.

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MS. SILVERSTEIN: The refund -- the refund claim arose because the Franchise Tax Board treated the proceeding as a refund claim. And all of the requirements for a refund claim were in effect satisfied because we made it clear, you know, what the basis for our position is, you know, that Square is a financial corporation. And that's rife throughout the record. FTB is on notice. Claims for refund are -- the requirement is noticed, essentially.

So there's not a document that says, you know, that's signed by Square that says, you know, we hereby request a refund on these grounds, but the FTB treated the proceedings as a refund claim. And there's a letter from the Franchise Tax Board confirming that's what they were doing. It's in the record. It was around June of 2018.

JUDGE KLETTER: So this is Judge Kletter. Thanks for clarifying that. So I just want to confirm. So for the 2013 and 2014 tax year, you know, there was an NOL issue but, you know, if they were treated as a financial corporation, how would they be entitled to any refund for the 2013 or 2014 tax years?

MS. SILVERSTEIN: Well, that was the basis of my opening statement. Essentially, that the Franchise Tax Board assigned the financial corporation issue \$800 and proceeded to -- and then wrote a letter to Square saying we are assigning this \$800 and treating the proceeding as a refund claim.

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When they audited it, they treated it as the audit of a refund claim, and then they denied the refund claim, and then we proceeded to appeal. Because they assigned the financial corporation \$800, it's our position that if we prevail on the financial corporation issue, we are entitled to \$800 back. That's not the \$800 minimum tax. It's necessarily this -- you know, it's a different -- it was recast by the Franchise Tax Board.

So we would be entitled to a refund because of the way the FTB set up the proceeding. And it's our position too that the Franchise Tax Board had authority to do this. They didn't, right. They didn't do it. They didn't -- you know, they seemed to have done as a matter of course. Every indication is that they had authority. And they can't point to anything specific saying that they were barred from doing this.

There doesn't seem to be any law any, you know, internal policy procedure, legal memorandum, or anything that says they're barred from doing this. From my

perspective they're just asserting that they couldn't do it. It seems -- it's -- you know, the fact that they did it and now can't say they don't have authority to do it indicates to me that they did have the authority to do it.

JUDGE KLETTER: This is Judge Kletter. Thank you, Ms. Silverstein. No further questions.

JUDGE AKIN: Okay. And checking one more time with Judge Aldrich. Nothing at this time? You can just give me a thumbs up if so.

Okay. Great. I think we are ready then to turn it over to Franchise Tax Board for its presentation.

Ms. Mosnier, you have 30 minutes and may begin when you are ready.

PRESENTATION

MS. MOSNIER: Good afternoon. Marguerite Mosnier and Katie Frank for Respondent Franchise Tax Board.

Before I go on, can you all hear me okay? Thank you.

You've heard some of the relevant facts. Let me perhaps fill in a little bit. We know that the Appellant filed timely 2013 and 2014 returns. There are abbreviated versions of them attached as FTB's Exhibits A and B. The Appellant filed as a general corporation and reported and paid the \$800 minimum franchise tax for both tax years.

FTB subsequently audited these tax years. And during the

audit, the Appellant asserted for the first time that it was properly classified as a financial rather than a general corporation for these tax years.

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The corporate classification issue was not decided in the audit. And near the conclusion of the audit, FTB issued an audit issue presentation sheet or the acronym AIPS. There's a copy enclosed as Exhibit D to FTB's -- well, FTB's briefing Exhibit D. And FTB set out what it believed were revised NOL and carry forward numbers for these tax years.

The Appellant signed and noted its agreement with revised numbers and returned the document to FTB. And FTB subsequently issued a decision document at the conclusion of audit titled "Notice of Proposed Adjust Carry Forward Amount" or an NPACA. It is a protestable document.

Appellant did not protest it. FTB separately and erroneously considered the corporate classification issue as a refund claim for these tax years. It assigned a \$1 value to the 2013 year and a \$799 value to the 2014 year. It considered the corporate classification issue, and on November 18, 2019, issued a claim denial for both years.

The appeal -- this appeal lies from that decision document, the claim denial letter. And OTA's jurisdiction over this appeal rests on that Notice of Action solely on the authority granted to hear the appeal based on that

document. As FTB will explain, that Notice of Action is erroneousness and is not a valid claim denial, and the OTA lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. And further, that the Appellant's equitable estoppel defense is unpersuasive.

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So turning first to the jurisdiction argument, the OTA is a tribunal with limited jurisdiction. As it noted in its 2019 precedential opinion Appeal of Liljestrand Irrevocable Trust, its jurisdiction is limited by statute and that pursuant to Board of Equalization's decision in Appeal of Schillace a 1995 decision, an agency cannot act in excess of jurisdictional limits that have been conferred on it.

In general, the OTA's rules for tax appeals

Section 30103 subdivision (a)(3) confer subject matter
jurisdiction on OTA over appeals from claimed denials.

However, a timely filed appeal from a self-styled claim
denial is not by itself sufficient to confer jurisdiction
on the OTA. The Appellant's reliance on OTA's
precedential opinion Appeal of Cornerstone Compounding
Pharmacy, Incorporated, for that proposition is misplaced.
As OTA discussed in that opinion with citations to other
precedential OTA opinions, a taxpayer must establish the
existence of an overpayment. Which FTB will explain is an
impossibility for these tax years.

We know from two precedential opinions,
Liljestrand and the more recent 2022 precedential opinion,
MJK Real Estate Fund II, LLC, that OTA jurisdiction over
refund claim denials requires both a valid refund claim
and a claim denial, either actual or deemed. And
specifically in Liljestrand, the OTA found that no refund
claim had been filed, that no claim of overpaid tax had
been asserted and held a no jurisdiction, and it dismissed
the appeal.

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The facts of MJK Real Estate are different, and they yielded a different result. In that case, the OTA found that the Appellant had filed a refund claim asserting a zero-dollar tax liability as opposed to the \$800 minimum tax that it had reported on its return and had paid. In that case, OTA determined that the requirements for denial had been satisfied and correctly exercised jurisdiction over that appeal.

So to consider the facts in this case against those in Liljestrand and in MJK Real Estate, we see that they line up perfectly with those of Liljestrand. No refund claim was filed in Liljestrand. We have just heard the Appellant acknowledge it did not file a refund claim. The requirements for a refund claim are set out in Section 19322. A refund claim requires affirmative action by a taxpayer.

The Appellant does not assert in response to

Judge Kletter's questions that it filed such document for
either tax year, and that somehow one was created by FTB's
consideration of an issue as a refund claim. That
argument finds no support in Section 19322. No claim was
filed. There is no claim evident in the record. That is
just like in Liljestrand. And no refund claim could be
filed because the Appellant reported and paid the minimum
tax owed.

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To clear up Appellant's confusion about FTB's authority and its mistake in having considered this issue as a refund claim, we turn to Section 19301 of the Code, which specifies first that Franchise Tax Board must determine that there has been an overpayment on a taxpayer's account for a tax year, and it proceeds to direct that an overpayment may be credited and/or applied as per the details in that statute.

So without the existence of an assertion of a liability that is less than the liability originally reported, there can be no overpayment, and there can be no refund. These are not the facts of MJK Real Estate where the OTA found that that Appellant had, in fact, asserted a claim of less than \$800 because it asserted that it revised its correct liability with zero dollars because it was not subject to taxation by California at all.

The Appellant here is not making that claim. It acknowledges that it is subject to taxation by California and simply ultimately disputes whether that taxation should be computed based on a classification as a financial or a general corporation. Under either classification for these tax years, the Appellant has an \$800 tax liability. So it cannot state a claim for refund for either year.

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So what we see is that the facts line up with Liljestrand and not MJK Real Estate. They require the Liljestrand analysis, and these facts require a determination in holding consistent with that in Liljestrand, which there is no jurisdiction. The appeal should be dismissed.

There is a more recent non-precedential opinion, Appeal of Wright, also issued in 2021, that has facts that are just like those before us. FTB issued a claim denial, although no claim had been filed. OTA said in that opinion that the Appellant did not file a claim for the relevant tax year, and consequently there was no refund claim for FTB to deny. The OTA specifically found that the claim denial letter was an error and had no force or effect.

The OTA held the evidence established error in FTB's issuance of the claim denial letter, and the

disposition of the appeal was that the claim denial letter is a nullity and should be of no force or effect. It's exactly what we have before us today. The facts here are the same as in Wright. They are the same as in Liljestrand. No refund claim has been filed. No overpayment of tax has been asserted. It is impossible under Section 19301 to determine an overpayment on those facts.

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The OTA should apply the analysis -- the analyses in Liljestrand and in Appeal of Wright and find first that no refund claim has been filed for either tax year.

Second, that the November 18, 2019, claim denial was issued in error, and the OTA should conclude that the claim denial letter is a nullity, and that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal and dismiss it.

To turn to the equitable estoppel argument raised by the Appellant, a defense of equitable estoppel is not applicable to this case. And it appears in Appellant's briefing and in its argument today that the equitable estoppel it is making, with respect to a decision document that's not before the OTA; it appears to be raising this defense to an argument it believed FTB would make that FTB has not made and is not making, that it had not exhausted its administrative remedies with respect to the NPACA.

In other words, the equitable estoppel argument is a defense to Square's failure to have protested and subsequently appealed the NPACA, but the NPACA is not before the OTA. It is the claimed denial letter, not the NPACA that is the subject of this appeal. And subject matter jurisdiction rises or falls on the authority conferred by that document alone. And the Appellant's argument in Footnote 7 of its first jurisdiction brief that OTA can consider the NOA that was filed in this appeal as a Notice of Action denying a protest of the NPACA is not supported by law.

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The case the Appellant cites, a 1975 Board of Equalization opinion Appeal of Peringer is factually distinguishable. In that case, Mr. Peringer filed a nonresident return for the year at issue, and he had calculated both a liability as a nonresident, a lower liability, and a higher liability as a California resident. And he remitted the higher amount along with his return and indicated the higher amount was paid under protest because he really was a nonresident that year.

FTB subsequently reviewed the return and erroneously determined that the lower rather than the higher liability had been paid and issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment for the difference, and that went through protest. And FTB then issued a Notice of Action

that Mr. Peringer appealed, and the Board of Equalization considered jurisdiction. FTB had withdrawn the Notice of Action affirming the proposed assessment and had instead offered one, denying the refund claim. And the Board of Equalization said not necessary. We have deemed denial jurisdiction over a refund claim.

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So there was a refund claim issued there. There has been a claimed denial. It implied that there had been a refund claim filed. It was noted with the return.

There is no refund claim filed here. You know, the Peringer case really supports FTB's position that a document issued in error as the Notice of Action affirming a proposed assessment in Peringer had been meaningless and does not confer jurisdiction over the Appellate Tribunal, then Board of Equalization and now the OTA.

It supports FTB's position, but no jurisdiction is conferred when the wrong Notice of Action or when a Notice of Action is issued in error. In the applicability of an equitable estoppel offense to the jurisdiction issue here today is illustrated by teasing out the Appellant's arguments. Even if the OTA agreed that equitable estoppel somehow conferred subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal, the relief the Appellant is seeking, a determination of corporate classification, does not flow from a refund claim that could be filed for either of

these tax years.

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There's no refund claim. There's no assertion of overpayment of tax, and there can't be because the minimum tax was reported and paid because the Appellant would owe the minimum tax regardless of classification, and there's just no legal theory under which the Appellant could argue that it owes less than \$800 for either tax year. It's not asserting, it's not subject to taxation by California, which would be the only way to assert a claim -- to assert a liability that would be less than \$800.

Nonetheless, FTB has complained in its briefing how the Appellant has not shown that it meets the criteria for this extraordinary equitable estoppel remedy with respect to the Notice of Action on appeal. And FTB would refer the OTA to its briefing — to its arguments and its briefing on that issue. And I'll wrap up with three general observations about equitable estoppel.

First, the California Supreme Court said in a 2010 decision, Steinhart versus County of Los Angeles that the law particularly disfavors estoppels where the party attempting to raise the estoppel is represented by an attorney. And if the OTA would consider Appellant's Exhibit 5, which includes notes from a May 23rd, 2018, meeting between the Franchise Tax Board and Appellant and its representatives, and they, among other things, were

discussing corporate classification. The notes reflect that Appellant was, in fact, represented by an attorney.

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Second, the McKnight Ranch, California Appellate Court decision is no help to Appellant here on a jurisdiction issue. It is factually distinguishable. In that case, FTB had audited McKnight Ranch, proposed an assessment, and McKnight Ranch protested it. It did not prevail at protest, and it subsequently paid the additional assessment and filed a refund claim. FTB commenced an audit of that claim but didn't go far in it.

The parties agreed that FTB could issue a claim denial so that McKnight Ranch could proceed with a suit -- a refund suit directly in state court, which in fact it did. FTB raised the issue that the taxpayer had not exhausted its administrative remedies because it didn't complete the audit. The taxpayer raised an equitable estoppel defense and argued that FTB was well apprised of every argument and fact in support of its position in the refund claim because it had all been discussed and evidence provided to FTB during the underlying audit that preceded the Notice of Proposed Assessment.

And so the question really was whether a notice -- whether adequate -- whether the standard was simply putting FTB on notice of the claim and not necessarily with the details in the suit or whether, as

FTB was arguing, the standard was notification in the pleading. And what the court said was actual notice is the standard and that FTB knew of the details of the claim precisely because they've all been presented during the original audit, and that satisfied the exhaustion of the administrative remedies requirement.

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So those are wholly different facts, a wholly different analysis, and really addressed the issue of what the standard of knowledge FTB needed to have shown in terms of establishing a valid refund claim were. That is what was really the crux of the McKnight Ranch decision. So that is no help to the Appellant.

And finally, third, as the Board of Equalization noted in its 1991 opinion Appeal of Smith, as a general rule, government action will not be estopped unless the facts establish that a grave injustice would otherwise result. And here, no injustice grave or otherwise will exist if the OTA determines that it lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. The corporate classification issue can be heard by this body, by the Office of Tax Appeals, and an appeal in a subsequent year where a difference in the classification matters so far as the tax liability reported.

In fact, Exhibit 19 -- Appellant's Exhibit 19 is a declaration of Phil Seabrease an employee of Appellant

who says in paragraph 14 that FTB was auditing the 2016 tax year. So it could, in fact, be that the Appellant could protest and appeal that tax year if it felt that it had an adverse outcome. And at that time, in that tax year, before this body, it could get a determination of the corporate classification issue.

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Remember that the right to protest an adjusted carry over amount, the right to protest it in a year where there's no tax consequence, 2013 and 2014 tax years, that's a relatively new addition to the Revenue & Taxation Code. It simply offered a taxpayer an early opportunity to challenge the reason for whatever the difference in the proposed carry over rounds were. And the default was always that the issue would be decided historically only in a later tax year where the consequence was felt -- tax consequence was felt.

So while absolutely Square could have protested the NPACA and didn't, which is irrelevant to the jurisdiction issue before you, it had agreed, in fact, with those proposed NOL revised calculations. But ultimately Appellant seems to be arguing that the grave injustice is the passage of time without a resolution on this issue, and that meanwhile has to file returns with local jurisdictions and pay tax that it would not have to pay if it were a financial corporation.

However, the Appellant acknowledged in the

December 21, 2022, opposition to FTB's request to file a

reply brief on jurisdiction, Appellant acknowledged that

it could raise the corporate classification issue directly

with the local jurisdictions. And it simply chose not to.

Obviously, the local jurisdiction then would be entitled

to reach a conclusion theoretically different from the

position FTB had taken. That remedy was available, has

been available, is available, and the Appellant has not

availed itself of that remedy.

So on those facts, it's difficult at best to

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So on those facts, it's difficult at best to conclude that any injustice occurs when a taxpayer concedes that it has an immediate remedy and fails to act on it.

Thank you. And that concludes FTB's presentation, and we will be happy to address your questions.

JUDGE AKIN: Okay. Thank you very much. Let me turn to my Panel to see if they have any questions.

Judge Kletter, any questions for Franchise Tax Board at this time?

JUDGE KLETTER: This is Judge Kletter. I have no questions. Thank you.

JUDGE AKIN: Judge Aldrich, any questions for Franchise Tax Board at this time?

JUDGE ALDRICH: Hi. This the Judge Aldrich. I do have a couple of questions for Franchise Tax Board. So in your opening presentation you had mentioned what the requirements were for filing a claim for refund. Is it FTB's position that a claim for refund must be filed on an FTB form?

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MS. MOSNIER: Thank you. No. Judge Aldrich, it isn't. Revenue & Taxation Code Section 19322 sets out three requirements for a valid refund claim. They are that a claim be in writing, signed by the taxpayer and/or authorized representative, and state with particularity the reasons or reasons the taxpayer believes it has overpaid its tax liability for the year in question. And that is what I would call, you know, the notice requirement to put FTB on notice of the reason or reasons why it believes it has overpaid its tax liability for the year in question.

JUDGE ALDRICH: And with respect to the writing component, could that -- is that necessarily one document or could there be an aggregation of documents or writings?

MS. MOSNIER: I don't know that FTB has addressed that question or that either the Board of Equalization or the Office of Tax Appeals has opined on that.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Okay.

MS. MOSNIER: So I don't know today that FTB

would be prepared to address that. But if you would like a response from FTB on that, if the OTA would grant -- if this Panel would grant FTB a short period of time, we would be happy to submit an additional brief on that issue.

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JUDGE ALDRICH: And so with respect to a theoretical dispute between a taxpayer and FTB regarding a general corp or a financial corp, could you walk me through what the appropriate -- or what FTB's view of the process would be like?

MS. MOSNIER: I'm happy to do that. This case, so it would be a perfect example. The NOL calculations for these tax years would be different based on Appellant's classification as a financial corporation or as a general corporation. And so in this case, since FTB issued an NPACA simply adjusting the NOLs and carry forward amounts just based on the general classification, in other words, it simply agree -- disagreed with the numbers Square had reported on its returns at that time.

One option is that Appellant could have protested the NPACA. It has protest and appeal rights just the way that Notice of Proposed Assessment does. That's one option. Another option is to take no action at that time on this change in carry over amounts, but wait until a later tax year when a tax difference arises to raise the

issue.

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For example -- and I don't know if this is the case -- in the 2017 tax year, perhaps Appellant claimed NOLs that by its numbers having qualified in its mind as a financial corporation for 2013 and '14, it would have available for use in 2017. And that FTB by its numbers, having considered Appellant as a general corporation for 2013 and '14, FTB's NOL calculations would be different. And if they were less, FTB would disallow claimed -- some or all of the claimed NOL and either could end up issuing an NPACA or, actually, an actual Notice of Proposed Assessment if that changed the amount of the tax liability that FTB calculated.

And then under either of those scenarios, either with an NPA or an NPACA for that tax year, the Appellant could exercise administrative remedies and argue and establish, if it does, that it is entitled -- was entitled to financial corporation classification for either or both of the 2013 and '14 tax years. Because that determination then would affect the NOL calculations from those years coming forward and would affect in my example what would be available for use in the later of this 2017 theoretical tax year.

Have I answered your question?

JUDGE ALDRICH: Yes. Thank you.

MS. MOSNIER: Thank you.

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JUDGE ALDRICH: No further questions for FTB at this moment. But I did have a brief question for Appellant.

So with respect to the 2013 and 2014 tax years and the equitable estoppel argument, how does that -- how do those years, if at all, relate to the 2016 tax year?

MS. SILVERSTEIN: I'm not sure I understand your question. I mean, they relate in the sense that as Judge Aldrich mentioned, taxpayer has to be a financial corp in the two years prior to the year that they're treated as a financial corp on the return. And so at least '14 and '15 are relevant to '16, if that's what you're asking.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Yeah. Thank you.

At this time, I'm going to refer it back to Judge Akin. And thank you for both of the parties for answering my questions.

JUDGE AKIN: Okay. Judge Akin speaking. I also have some questions for Franchise Tax Board. Let me organize my notes, and I'll be right with you.

Okay. This was somewhat covered by

Judge Aldrich, but I think I'm presenting it a little

differently. So I guess instead of for the 2013 and 2014,

you know, audit, those tax years, instead of giving the

bank or financial corporation issue a \$800 value and stated that it would -- it stating that it would be treated as a claim for refund. I guess I'm wondering what Franchise Tax Board asserts it should have done with respect to that issue for those tax years.

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MS. MOSNIER: Procedurally, I think it could not determine -- I think procedurally FTB could not have determined that a valid refund claim could have been filed for either of those tax years because a refund claim asserts a lesser tax liability than was previously determined or reported. And since the minimum amount was self-assessed and paid, and it wouldn't change based on the classification, there couldn't be a refund claim for that year.

However, FTB -- the Notice of Proposed Adjusted
Carry Over Amount, which simply revised the carry over
amounts based on being a general corporation, which is the
way that Square filed for that tax year. If Appellant had
wanted to dispute the NOL calculations based on its
corporate classification, then that's not a refund claim.
But its remedy then would have been to exercise
administrative remedies with that decision document.

Square would not have a valid refund claim based on the corporate classification issue until there were a tax year where as a general corporation -- if it had filed

as a general corporation and reported a tax liability that were higher than the tax liability it would report if it had filed as a financial corporation for that year. And as we said, that can't happen in 2013 and '14 because you can't file as a financial until the third year that you have qualified as a financial.

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So I don't know enough about the actual numbers that were reported on the return. So I can't tell you it would have been in, you know, this, you know, 2015, 2018. I don't know, but just generally speaking the refund claim could not be valid and could not state an overpayment until a tax year when Square could have filed and did file as a general and then come back and file an amended return as a financial that would result in a lower tax liability.

JUDGE AKIN: Okay. Thank you. Another question. So is there anything that you're aware of in statute that either expressly allows or expressly prohibits Franchise Tax Board from, you know, assigning a dollar value, you know. Just -- I don't want to use the word arbitrary but, you know, just assigning a dollar value that's not otherwise relevant, I guess, to an issue that would then allow the taxpayer to be entitled to a refund, you know, should they then prevail on that issue? I'm wondering if there's anything expressly that either allows or prohibits something like that.

MS. MOSNIER: I think the statutes that prohibit a gift of public funds would be the governing -- it would be the governing statute. Because pursuant to 19301, FTB is limited to refunding or crediting to handing -- you know, handing out money on behalf of the taxpayer or to the taxpayer unless it determines that an overpayment actually exists.

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And so that is really what would prohibit FTB from assigning a dollar value and saying well if you prevail on issue X, I'm going to hand this money back to you because handing money back has to occur only when an overpayment has been established. I would note too that --

JUDGE AKIN: Okay. Thank you.

MS. MOSNIER: Oh, excuse me. Marguerite Mosnier still speaking.

A refund claim is issue based. It is not dollar based. So to that extent, assigning a dollar value to any refund claim is -- is somewhat illusory. And that would be true more at the time when you are considering it if can be determined. You file a refund claim and you say oh, we had more NOLs. We could have reduced our liability. And maybe could have, but maybe your NOL calculation is off.

So maybe, actually, your liability has been

reduced. The FTB agrees to the revised NOL numbers.

Maybe you're going to get a higher refund or a lower refund than what you might have stated in your claim. Or maybe you didn't state a dollar claim. So refund claims are at issue, not dollar based just as a general proposition.

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JUDGE AKIN: Okay. Thank you. And I guess during the 2013, 2014 audit, did Square ever provide

Franchise Tax Board with, you know, revised computations that would, you know, revise its net operating loss carry forwards, you know, at December 31st, 2014? Or did they ever expressly assert that the financial impact -- excuse me -- that the financial corporation issue would impact those net operating loss carryovers?

MS. MOSNIER: This is Marguerite Mosnier. You know, I'll defer that question to Ms. Frank.

MS. FRANK: Yes. So during the course of the audit -- audited review to see what the computation of the income tax would be if Square was a financial during 2013 and 2014, and it actually would have increased their income, but then NOLs would have offset that. So it would have reduced their NOLs.

JUDGE AKIN: Okay. Thank you.

And then I ask this of Appellant, so I will -- and I said ask it of Franchise Tax Board also. I want to

1 check in regarding the status of the audit of the 2016 tax 2 I'm expressly interested in the Form 100X that 3 amended, you know, the original return for 2016 because I believe Appellant states in that that they were revising 4 5 their net operating loss carry forwards based on their 6 status as a financial corporation in addition to the, you 7 know, the adjustments that were made by the Franchise Tax Board during the 2013 and 2014 audit. 8 MS. FRANK: I'm sorry. Is this a question for 10 FTB? 11 JUDGE AKIN: I'm sorry for being unclear. 12 this is a question for Franchise Tax Board. 13 MS. FRANK: Yeah. So the amended return was 14 audited and a NPACA was issued for the 2016 year and 15 taxpayer timely protested. It is currently in protest. 16 JUDGE AKIN: Okay. That concludes my questions 17 for the time being. I just wanted to check how we are 18 Should we proceed with Appellant's rebuttal, or 19 would everyone like a maybe five-minute break? 20 I'm not seeing anyone in dire need of a 2.1 break, so let's go ahead and move forward. I will turn it 22 over to Ms. Silverstein for the closing or rebuttal. 23 You had 15 minutes, but you also had 2.4 approximately 32 minutes from your opening. So it could

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be up to 45 minutes.

Last call if anyone needs a break. Going once. Going twice. Okay.

So you may proceed. You can use up to 45 minutes.

MS. SILVERSTEIN: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

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CLOSING STATEMENT

MS. SILVERSTEIN: So I want to start out on the issue of the Franchise Tax Board assigning the financial corp the \$800 and setting up the proceeding as A refund claim. And I, you know, I think that the Franchise Tax Board didn't really respond to the point that we're mistaking, and didn't -- and seemed to almost ignore the fact that it was FTB that set it up this way.

We didn't choose to set it up this way. We aren't trying to buck the system and say the OTA should proceed even though we didn't file a refund claim. It's our position that there is a refund claim. FTB affirmatively setup the proceeding in that way. And I appreciate Judge Akin's questions because I think you're at least acknowledging that that's possible, right, that that's acknowledging that that's what our argument is and our position is.

The fact that FTB set it up that way makes it, in our view, a refund claim. So that begs the question, of

course, if FTB is going to disavow this, what is the authority that says they can't do it. And I appreciate Ms. Mosnier's response of the gift of public funds. We haven't briefed that. I don't think that it's necessary.

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But I do want to point out that one, that the FTB intentionally chose a nominal amount, \$800. So, you know, whether that could be a violation of gift of public funds. I kind of doubt it. It's not like they set it up at a million dollars or even a thousand dollars. But also, you know, there's -- the gift of public funds is, you know, is pliable.

It recognizes, you know, practical realities.

And just by way of example, you know, the Franchise Tax

Board and, you know, all government agencies are allowed

to compromise claims, you know, to make deals not based on

the merits but to return money even where it's not

absolutely determined that a refund is due.

So while, you know, I don't know all of the, you know, exceptions and all that may apply in this instance, I, you know, that's -- I think that's at best an incomplete result. There's no, you know, statute, reg, internal memo, you know, any -- any document or authority that the Franchise Tax Board can point to that specifically addresses assigning, you know, establishing a proceeding as a refund claim.

And, you know, that is what the FTB did here, and their presumed to have authority for what they do. So I think it's incumbent on FTB to point to something specific that said they didn't have authority to do that. But in a sense, you know, I -- we're going to get to the same result even if OTA decides that FTB didn't have authority to do that, and the reason is equitable estoppel. And I, you know, I think there again or similarly, the FTB's response is incomplete.

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Maybe they don't completely understand what our position is, but I think I want to frame it this way.

Does Square have a right to have the financial corp and NOL determination heard by OTA now? And, you know, FTB wants to say well, the NPACA is not before you. You shouldn't consider it. Just focus on the refund claim, but that's impossible. That's not right. That's not -- that doesn't do justice to these facts.

Because the facts are that Square was proceeding through this audit. The NPACA was coming. And what FTB did was to induce Square not to protest that NPACA to forego its procedural right and instead go down this other path. It's FTB's inducement that's what's relevant here and what makes the NPACA relevant here. It can't be ignored.

So, you know, FTB doesn't want to say this but,

you know, it's implicit in their position and answers to the judges questions that, you know, if we had appealed that, we would properly be before OTA. I don't -- that's not disputable. So then the question is, you know, does equitable estoppel come into play? Does that overcome the problem that we have, which is we didn't protest the NPACA? And yes, absolutely, equitable estoppel is relevant here.

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The FTB didn't go through the requirements. They want you to refer to the briefs, and I think that's telling. So, you know, I did go through, them, and they are all satisfied. I'm happy to answer the Judges' questions about the four requirements. Well, FTB's response to all of that is we haven't proved grave injustice. I explained in the brief that's not a requirement.

There's, you know, some of the cases -- and I think they are mostly BOE cases -- might use the word grave. There's a court case that uses the word grave; the Mansell case, I think it's called. But the important point that cannot be ignored, because it's clear in the case law, is that the injustice requirement arises in this extra requirement that applies only to public agencies.

It's the public policy requirement, and it's a balancing test. And it only requires us to prove

injustice if there are public policy concerns and, you know, public policy -- public policies will be, like, interfered with if OTA or a court, you know, allows an estoppel. The FTB hasn't identified any reason not -- to not let this go forward. They keep going back to the refund claim, but that's not the point.

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The point is that the legislature gave us the right to have these NOLs and by extension the financial corp issue decided at this stage. You know, FTB says oh, this is a new right. And, you know, really the norm is to wait for a refund claim, but it doesn't matter. It's in the statutes. We have this right. I think, you know, I would assert that the fact that it's a new right is even more important. The legislature just, you know, said it more recently. We have this right.

So FTB wants to deny us this right because we said -- we did what they told us to do. If we had done this right, we would -- if we had, you know, protested the NPA, even though they didn't want us -- the NAPCA, they didn't want us to. It's clear in the records. They didn't want us to do that. We would be properly here.

We don't need to prove grave injustice because they have no policy reason to say that we shouldn't be here. There's no public policy that's going to be interfered with or, you know, there's not any problem

that's going to be created for FTB or the fisc or anything like that.

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So the injustice is not letting us have our day in court when the legislature clearly wanted taxpayers to be able to do this. You know, I think Ms. Mosnier referred to it as an early opportunity. That's a right, not some kind of privilege or, you know, sometimes you get it or sometimes you don't. It's a right that we are asserting now. And I believe that estoppel is clearly applicable to allow that right.

I also wanted to just address a few other points.

Let's see. Just a small point about being represented by an attorney. I know it says that in the memo that

Ms. Mosnier is referring to. That was an accountant.

Maybe he's, you know, went through the law exam. I'm not sure, but he works for an accounting firm. He was not representing them as a lawyer. He would tell you that he can't do that. He can't practice law in that capacity.

But more importantly, the McKnight case that

Ms. Mosnier talked about absolutely is on point, and
there's a number of issues in that case. She was actually
referring to a different issue. That issue was what is
required for a claim for refund, but there's a separate
part of the case that addresses estoppel. And the issue
there was whether FTB was estopped from saying that the

taxpayer hadn't exhausted their administrative remedies because they didn't provide this extra information.

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They didn't go through the claim for refund process, but the taxpayer said, well, we were induced not to do that. And the court said, yeah, you were induced not to do that and now FTB can't stop you from having your day in court because they saw something they caused you to do. And that's exactly the facts here. So I want to go back to one of the first points I made, which is McKnight is the leading case on this issue. And McKnight is directly on point, and that the facts that are virtually identical to the facts here.

Oh, I guess the last point I wanted to make is I know Judge Akin has asked about what's in the record, what's not. And Ms. Frank said something about the NOLs and, you know, what had happened, I guess, in the 2013 and '14 audit. I don't know for sure. That was contrary to my understanding. But I think the more important point is that, you know, we're lawyers. We're not allowed to testify, and that's not in the records. So, you know, I would caution the Judges from taking what we say as testimony.

 $\label{eq:thm:local_thm} \mbox{That appears to be all of the points that I have.}$ I'm happy to answer questions.

JUDGE AKIN: Okay. Thank you, Ms. Silverstein.

1 Let me turn to my Panel to see if they have any 2 final questions for either party. 3 Judge Kletter? 4 JUDGE KLETTER: This is Judge Kletter. 5 have any questions at this time. Thank you. 6 JUDGE AKIN: Okay. And Judge Aldrich? 7 Hi. This is Judge Aldrich. JUDGE ALDRICH: No further questions. Thank you. 8 9 Okay. I just want to clarify one JUDGE AKIN: 10 thing. Ms. Silverstein, your point regarding testimony 11 versus argument, it is noted and understood. I just 12 wanted to check with you to see and verify that you don't 13 know for certain whether or not the net operating loss 14 would increase -- or excuse me -- the net operating loss 15 carry forwards would increase or decrease as a result of 16 the status as a financial corporation. I think that's 17 what you indicated? 18 I mean, what's contrary to my MS. SILVERSTEIN: 19 understanding is that they had income and then they would 20 have used their NOL. I think that's what she said. 21 contrary to my understanding. I think in -- well, I don't 22 want to testify anymore. But, yeah, I think that's all I

JUDGE AKIN: Understood. Understood. I just wanted to clarify and make sure I was understanding

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have to say.

correctly. I don't have any questions beyond that. Was there anything that either party would quickly like to add before we conclude? I will note that if Franchise Tax Board would like to add anything, I will turn it back to Appellant to respond before closing.

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Anything from either party before we conclude?

MS. MOSNIER: Judge Akin, if the amount of NOL carry forwards that you had asked about you think is relevant to the jurisdiction determination, if you would like to keep the record open and the parties could submit the evidence they have on that point, that would be fine. If you think it isn't, then ignore this comment. Thank you.

JUDGE AKIN: Okay. Thank you. I'm just checking with my panel to see if there --

Ms. Silverstein, how would you feel about that?
Would you want to keep the record open and provide
information regarding the impact the financial corporation
determination would have on the net operating loss carry
forwards as of the end of 2014. Would that be something
the parties would like to keep the record open to provide?

MS. SILVERSTEIN: Just I would object to anything that's going to delay the proceedings any further because we filed this appeal in November of 2020 and, you know, we really want to keep it moving. Furthermore, you know,

it's our position and FTB actually agrees with this that we had a right to appeal the NPACA, and that would have resulted in a hearing but, you know, a hearing on the substantive issues before OTA, and I think that's what's relevant. So, you know, we wouldn't have gone through all of this, you know, if it hadn't -- you know, if there wasn't a purpose to it. And that's what I'd like OTA to focus on.

JUDGE AKIN: Okay. Yeah. I think we are good with the evidence we have. So I appreciate, you know, both parties' responses to that. I do think we are going to close the record. All right. Any last items before we conclude for today?

All right.

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MS. SILVERSTEIN: I appreciate your thoughtful questions and your time today. Thank you.

JUDGE AKIN: Thank you.

Okay. So we are ready to conclude the hearing.

I would like to thank both parties for their presentations today. I know it's late on a Friday afternoon, so thank you everyone for being here and for your very well thoughtful, you know, organized presentations. It is much appreciated.

We will decide the case based upon the arguments and the evidence in the record, and we will issue a

written decision within 100 days from today. The case is now submitted and the record is now closed. This concludes the hearing for today, and it also concludes the hearing calendar for OTA for today. you again everyone. I do appreciate the presentations. (Proceedings adjourned at 3:37 p.m.)

1 HEARING REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 2 I, Ernalyn M. Alonzo, Hearing Reporter in and for 3 the State of California, do hereby certify: 4 5 That the foregoing transcript of proceedings was 6 taken before me at the time and place set forth, that the 7 testimony and proceedings were reported stenographically 8 by me and later transcribed by computer-aided 9 transcription under my direction and supervision, that the 10 foregoing is a true record of the testimony and 11 proceedings taken at that time. 12 I further certify that I am in no way interested 13 in the outcome of said action. 14 I have hereunto subscribed my name this 25th day 15 of April, 2023. 16 17 18 19 ERNALYN M. ALONZO 20 HEARING REPORTER 21 2.2 23 2.4 25