BEFORE THE OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ΙN	THE MATTE	R OF	THE APPEAL OF,)		
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S.	MATHER and	d N.	MATHER,)	OTA NO.	18093787
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			APPELLANT.)		
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TRANSCRIPT OF ELECTRONIC PROCEEDINGS

State of California

Wednesday, September 20, 2023

Reported by: ERNALYN M. ALONZO HEARING REPORTER

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14	Transcript of Electronic Proceedings,			
15	taken in the State of California, commencing			
16	at 1:34 p.m. and concluding at 4:07 p.m. on			
17	Wednesday, September 20, 2023, reported by			
18	Ernalyn M. Alonzo, Hearing Reporter, in and			
19	for the State of California.			
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1	APPEARANCES:	
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3	Panel Lead:	ALJ KENNY GAST
4	Panel Members:	ALJ OVSEP AKOPCHIKYAN
5		ALJ CHERYL AKIN
6	For the Appellant:	JON SPERRING DERRICK BRANNAN
7		MICHAEL ZARGARI GLENN NEWMAN
8		CHEMIN MEMILIAM
9	For the Respondent:	STATE OF CALIFORNIA FRANCHISE TAX BOARD
10		DESIREE MACEDO
11		NATHAN HALL
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1	<u>I N D E X</u>				
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3	<u>EXHIBITS</u>				
4					
5	(Appellant's Exhibits 1-42 were received at page 6.)				
6	(Department's Exhibits A-I were received at page 6.)				
7					
8	PRESENTATION				
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11	By Mr. Sperring (further)		32	7 2	
12	By Mr. Brannan (further)			9	
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14	Mr. Hall		2,	4	
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17	WITNESSES:	DIRECT	CROSS	REDIRECT	RECROSS
18	Mr. G. Newman (further)	17		52 86	
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21			PAG	<u>GE</u>	
22	By Mr. Brannan		8.	7	
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1	California; Wednesday, September 20, 2023
2	1:34 p.m.
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4	JUDGE GAST: We are on the record.
5	This is Appeal of Mather, OTA Case No. 18093787.
6	Today is Wednesday, September 20th, 2023, and the time is
7	approximately 1:34 p.m. We're holding this hearing
8	electronically with the agreement of all the parties.
9	My name is Kenny Gast, and I am the lead
10	Administrative Law Judge for this appeal. With me today
11	are Administrative Law Judges Ovsep Akopchikyan and Cheryl
12	Akin.
13	At this time, I'd like to please ask the parties
14	to identify yourselves by stating your full name, first
15	and last, for the record, beginning with Appellants.
16	MR. SPERRING: Jon Sperring.
17	MR. BRANNAN: Derrick Brannan.
18	MR. ZARGARI: Michael Zargari.
19	MR. NEWMAN: Glenn Newman.
20	JUDGE GAST: And Franchise Tax Board.
21	MR. HALL: I'm Nathan Hall on half of Respondent.
22	MS. MACEDO: Desiree Macedo on behalf of
23	Respondent.
24	JUDGE GAST: Thank you.
25	So the issue in this case is whether Appellants

are entitled to other state tax credit for amounts paid for the New York City Unincorporated Business Tax and the Metropolitan Commuter Transportation Mobility Tax.

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Both parties submitted exhibits for the record -evidentiary record. Appellants have provided Exhibits 1
through 42, and FTB did not object to the admissibility of
these exhibits. Therefore, these exhibits are entered
into the record.

(Appellant's Exhibits 1-42 were received in evidence by the Administrative Law Judge.)

JUDGE GAST: FTB provided has provided Exhibits A through I, A as and apple, I as in I am. Appellants have not objected to the admissibility of these exhibits.

Therefore, these exhibits are entered into the record as well.

(Department's Exhibits A-I were received in evidence by the Administrative Law Judge.)

JUDGE GAST: One point of clarification, though, is that some of the exhibits contain copies of tax statutes, the state tax opinion, tax forms, publications, and instructions to tax forms. Those will be considered as legal arguments and not evidence.

Okay. Moving along here. Appellants will have 90 minutes to present. That will include questions or testimony from their expert witness. That will also

include questions from FTB, if FTB has any questions of the witness. Appellants will be redirect the witness, and the ALJ panel will then have an opportunity to ask questions of Appellants and their witness. And then we'll move to -- we'll probably take a 10-minute break then, maybe earlier, depending on how things go. And then FTB will 90 minutes as well for their presentation. We'll probably take a 10-minute break after that, and then I'll turn it over to the panel for questions. And then Appellants will have the final say. They will have

So with that, unless there are any questions from the parties, Appellants can begin. They will have 90 minutes.

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PRESENTATION

MR. SPERRING: Good afternoon, Judge Gast,
Judge Akin, and Judge Akopchikyan. Thank you for your
time today.

For the record, my name is Jon Sperring, and I'm with PricewaterhouseCoopers. I'll be discussing the net income portion of today's presentation.

My colleague, Derrick Brannan, will review the framework for consideration for both the New York City Unincorporated Business Tax and the Metropolitan Commuter

1 Transportation Mobility Tax for the purposes of the other state credit and address issues raised by Respondent. 2 3 We also have Michael Zargari from PricewaterhouseCoopers' New York office who has extensive 4 5 knowledge of the New York City Unincorporated Business Tax and the Metropolitan Commuter Transportation Mobility Tax. 6 7 Our expert witness is today Glenn Newman, a 8 former president of the New York City Tax Commission and 9 Tax Appeals Tribunal. Mr. Newman is an expert with regard 10 to the background operation and implementation of New York 11 tax laws. 12 Before I turn the presentation over to 13 Mr. Brannan, I'd like to confirm that you have in each of 14

your position Appellant's slide deck, which we will reference throughout the presentation.

Thank you.

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JUDGE GAST: This is Judge Gast. We have the presentation. Thank you.

This is Judge Gast. Mr. Brannan, we cannot hear you. You might be muted.

MR. BRANNAN: I'm mute.

JUDGE GAST: There you go.

MR. BRANNAN: That's crazy. Thank you very much. My apologies. Technology has never been my strong point, but I think this is far more convenient given the number

of people that are presenting here today.

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PRESENTATION

MR. BRANNAN: Again, thank you all for your time.

You know what we'll do is walk through the

slides, and what I'd like to do is give a short overview

of the California law. And then what I'll do is ask

Mr. Newman to kind of give some of his background and

also, kind of walk through the overview of the two

New York taxes that we're discussing here today. And then

I think we'll get to, you know, some of the points that

are raised in the briefs. And that will complete kind of

the initial portion of our presentation.

Walking through the slides, you know, we'll just jump in. Slide 2 is really just a restatement of the issue that you read, Judge Gast.

I embellished a bit. There are a couple of abbreviations that I've placed in there. And just, for the record, you know, I have habitually called it the MCTMT. New York smart people will call it the Mobility Tax. So my apologies at the beginning as we move back and forth between those two -- those two references to the Mobility Tax.

What I'd like to do is, I think the kind of underlying facts are very straightforward. And on Slide 3

you'll see them lifted out -- or listed out. Appellants in this case were California residents during the years at issue. Appellant Scott Mather -- Mr. Mather was a partner in both Pacific Investment Management Company, LLC, PIMCO, LLC, and PIMCO Partners, LLC. PIMCO Partners, but collectively just refer to them as PIMCO. Both PIMCO entities are partnerships for California tax purposes.

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PIMCO is headquartered in Newport Beach,

California and has offices throughout the world, including

New York. PIMCO and Mr. Mather, as a PIMCO partner, were

subject to and paid New York State taxes, the UBT or

Unincorporated Business Tax and the MCTMT, based on

Mr. Mather's distributive share of PIMCO earnings. That's

it from a factual standpoint. The rest of this is about

the law and what those laws mean and how they are applied

for purposes of the Mathers and the other state tax credit

here of California.

One last point that is listed on the slide, there's, you know, a certain number of, you know, documentary questions that have arisen before the hearing. And the amount, calculation, and payment of these taxes are subject to proof, which will be provided in accordance for the prehearing order after the hearing. So we're not going to spend a lot of time today going through the numbers.

If there are questions, we can certainly do our best to respond. Hopefully that's consistent. Probably should have brought that up before the hearing, but I wanted to bring that up early with regard to the facts, Judge Gast.

JUDGE GAST: This is Judge Gast. Yes, that is consistent. And as I mentioned prior to this hearing, we will keep the record open for submissions, and I will mention that briefly at the end.

MR. BRANNAN: Perfect. Thank you very much. I didn't mean to stall out there, but I did want to make that -- you know, put that on the record for everybody's benefit.

So at the end of the day the case is about the California other state tax credit. In California -- basically Slide 5 has a couple of legal highlights.

California taxes its residence on their world-wide income from all sources. Other states may tax income earned in resource to that state regardless of residence. Unless absent some relief mechanism, the California residents may owe tax in California and in another jurisdiction based on the same income. And we don't like that.

California mitigates that, the impact of this potential for double tax by providing this other state tax credit. And it's that guiding principle that really

should, you know, kind of help us construe and interpret every one of the provisions that we talk about here as this presentation goes on.

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So simply put, you know, Slide 6, the OSTC, you know the basic framework for it is set forth in Revenue & Taxation Code Section 18001. In accordance with that section, residents shall be allowed a credit for net income taxes imposed by and paid to another state. It's a very simple statement of the rule. For our reference purposes, in 18006 it makes clear that a member of a partnership is allowed to treat the pro rata share of net income taxes paid to another state by the partnership as if those taxes had been paid directly by the partner. Unless there's a question with respect to who gets benefit for the payment, we're probably not going to bring that up again. I think it's pretty straightforward.

So when we talk about the other state tax credit, it's, you know, as with many things under the law, the statement itself is simple. But the limits and exclusions end up taking more time to talk about than the actual rule or the benefit provision of the credit itself. So first of all, we have to hit some of those limitations and talk about how they could apply.

Under Rev & Tax Code Section 18001(a)(1), the credit shall be allowed only from taxes paid to the other

state on income derived from sources within that state,
which is taxable under its laws irrespective of the
residence or domicile of the receipt. In other words,
income based on source, rather than residency in the other
state, and the source of income shall be determined using
California nonresident sourcing rules.

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Slide 8 further limitations in connection with USTC under 1800183, the maximum credit is limited to the amount of tax that would have been paid on the same income in California. There's a couple of case cites there that ended up kind of clarifying what that -- that mechanism and how it works. Additional limitations, the tax is paid under 18001 do not include any preference, alternative, or minimum tax comparable to the tax imposed by Section 17062. And also, the credit shall be not be allowed. If the other state allows residents of the state of credit against the taxes imposed by the other state. In other words, there's no double credit. And all these things make sense from a very practical standpoint. But, nonetheless, they do kind of factor into the consideration and eligibility for the credit.

So what happens is we put all these things together, and we move to Slide 9. And what we -- the way we view this whole issue is kind of there's a framework for how we have to look at. And it's, you know, just kind

of walking through the statutory authorities again. But they are all on one page here. It's the only advantage of Slide 9. And it's income from sources within the other state. It's determined based on California law. Tax must be imposed by the other state. The big issue here is it imposed by the state or by a locality of some sort. Tax must be paid to the other state, and tax must be imposed on that income. Kind of the big three, there. Those are the ones that are specifically mentioned in 18001. And then it's not limited by some other mechanism.

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So what we're going to do is try and address those points as we walk through, you know, both with regard to, you know, what happens in California, but most notably for what happens in New York. And that's why we're very happy to have Mr. Glenn Newman with us here today.

And on Slide 10 you see kind of just identifying Mr. Newman. What I'd like to do is to introduce him as an expert witness, you know.

With that, Mr. Newman, if you would give us a little bit of background about yourself, your education. And I think everybody is comfortable with your qualifications. So we can probably move through that quickly.

JUDGE GAST: This is Judge Gast. Before you do

1 that, I'd like to swear him in. 2 MR. BRANNAN: Sure. Perfect. Thank you very 3 much. JUDGE GAST: Okay. Mr. Newman, will you please 4 5 raise your right hand. 6 7 G. NEWMAN, produced as a witness, and having been first duly sworn by 8 9 the Administrative Law Judge, was examined, and testified 10 as follows: 11 12 I'm sorry. Mr. Newman, it's kind of JUDGE GAST: 13 hard to hear you. 14 Is that better? MR. NEWMAN: 15 JUDGE GAST: Yes. Thank you. 16 I'll speak up. MR. NEWMAN: 17 I received my Bachelor of Arts Degree from the 18 State University of New York in Albany and then attended 19 Borden University School of Law where I received the JD 20 Degree. I was part of the honors program and was hired by 2.1 the New York City Office of the Corporation Council under 22 the honors program where I was a staff attorney, initially 23 handling matters of the New York City taxation, drafting

the courts of New York up to the US Supreme Court and

legislation, drafting regulations, litigating tax cases in

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advising the Taxing Authorities, Property Finance in New York City.

From there, I -- I was appointed Mayor Koch as a Deputy Commissioner for the Department of Finance. I was Deputy Commissioner for Audit and Enforcement, which involved handling, supervising, and managing the audit program for the City of the New York. After six years there, I moved to law firm Roberts and Holland, a boutique tax law firm where I was a partner there for eight years. And then after the election of Michael Bloomberg, I was appointed to the be the president of the New York City Tax Commission and Tax Appeals Tribunal.

The Tax Commission hears property tax appeals, not a concern here. The Tax Appeals Tribunal heard litigation arising from the various tax laws. And those issues range from apportionment and the imposition of taxes, constitutionality of the taxes. And I was in those positions for just over 12 years. After that, in 2015 when I left the City of New York, I started working at Greenberg Traurig as an attorney advising people on state and local tax issues primarily in New York and Northeast. And here I am now.

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DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. BRANNAN:

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Q Perfect. Thank you very much, Mr. Newman. I kind of maybe stating the obvious, but I'll ask nonetheless. During those many years in the various positions you've had, assuming, you know, rather constant exposure to New York State taxes, New York City taxes, and the Mobility Tax as well?

A Yes. I dealt and advised on the New York City Unincorporated Business Tax and on the Mobility Tax and continue to do that at Greenberg Traurig.

MR. BRANNAN: With that background, you know, I don't want to get too caught up in the formalities recognizing this is, you know, an administrative forum, but I would offer Mr. Newman as an expert on New York state tax, the New York City Unincorporated Business Tax and the MCTMT as well. We'll continue absent any questions. At that point with regard to Mr. Newman's qualifications, we'll move on then.

BY MR. BRANNAN:

Q Mr. Newman, what I'm going to do is kind of walk through -- and we've chatted a couple of times before here. That's not a secret. What I'm going to do is kind of walk-through kind of the big picture structure, New York state taxes, and then walk through some the, you

know, kind of the framework questions, if you will, in connection with the MCTMT or the Mobility Tax and also the UBT.

So let's start. We move into -- it's Slide 11 or Slide 12, excuse me.

And, Mr. Newman, you do have those slides in front of you, I'm hoping.

A I do not --

Q Okay.

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A -- have the slides in front of me.

Q Well, I don't know if you have them there. If not, I think we'll be fine anyway. Let's -- I don't think -- I don't think it's critical from your perspective. You know all this stuff anyway. So Slide 11 has two provisions of the New York State Constitution, and I'm just going to read excepts from it. But the first provision is that the legislature shall enact and may amend statute of local governments granting to local government power, local legislation, and administration.

And essentially what that constitutional provision does is it gives -- and you can stop me if I'm wrong. But I mean, it basically gives authority -- it places authority in the State to govern the actions of the subdivisions within the State. Is that --

A That is correct. And the State is sovereign and

it sets the rules. It's the State of New York that sets the rules and particular on taxation.

Q Perfect. The second provision that's up on the slide is, you know, it goes specifically to taxation.

It's Article 16, Section 1, the power of taxation shall never be surrendered, suspended, or contracted away except as to securities issues for public purposes pursuant to the law. Short question, hopefully, clear from the, you know, the tenor of the language of the constitution. I mean, that reserves the power to tax in the State; correct?

A Well, the State is sovereign and sovereign is the one that has the authority and the power to impose tax.

Q Thank you.

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MR. HALL: Sorry to interpret, Judge. Respondent is noting -- I don't know if this matters to the tribunal, but these questions are all leading questions. So, you know, to the extent that opposing Counsel cannot lead the witness, you know, we would note that in the record.

JUDGE GAST: Thank you, Mr. Hall. I'm going to allow Mr. Brannan to continue to ask questions. The panel will ultimately decide, you know, what weight to give to the witness testimony. So I will let Mr. Brannan continue with the questions. But thank you for that clarification.

You may proceed, Mr. Brannan.

MR. BRANNAN: Thank you, Judge Gast.

And point taken, Mr. Hall. I'm really just trying to move things through, especially, with my witness who can't see the slides at the moment.

BY MR. BRANNAN:

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Q So, anyway, well, you know, just a couple of questions with respect to the New York Authority based on those provisions we just referenced, Mr. Newman. And keep in mind that the years we're talking about here -- I don't the it matters much -- are the 2012, '13, and '14 years. But is there -- you know, when it comes to the power to tax, either the UBT or MCTMT, does the State make those decisions, or do the localities? Does the City or the, you know, the MTA, the Transit Authority make those decisions?

A The state legislature, along with the governor approving the legislation or vetoing it and having that veto overridden. It's the state legislature that sets all of the details of the taxes that are enabled throughout the State of New York. It's the State that determines the -- how the taxes are to be imposed, how they are to work in terms of apportionment and imposition in what is taxed. And, by the way, it's -- you need the general law of the State of New York to have any exemptions. So any exemptions that are provided in the statute are -- must be

done through state law.

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Q And this -- this is kind of my word, plenary authority over these functions. It applies to both the UBT and the MCTMT?

A That's correct.

Q So there's no scenario under which, you know, either the Transit Authority or New York City could raise or alter the rates, for example, in connection with either of those taxes?

A That's correct. The state legislation sets the tax rate, sets the exemptions, and the procedures for appeal, and all of the details of the tax law.

Q Okay. Thank you. We're going to move on to the, you know, kind of an individual tax and I'm going to apply. You heard us setup the framework for California, and we're going to kind of walk through some of those questions, specifically, with regard to first, the Mobility Tax, and then in connection with the Unincorporated Business Tax.

So if we get into Slide 14 at this point, you know, Mr. Newman, we're going to focus now on the Mobility Tax. And would you describe kind of the general parameters of the Mobility Tax as they would be applied to Mr. Mather, a partner at PEMCO during these years?

A All right. The Mobility Tax applies, is imposed

upon self-employment, and that includes partnerships and limited liability companies as well as sole proprietorships. So the tax is imposed on the net income from the operation -- the business operations of the entity within the designated area, New York City and the 12 counties surrounding it to fund transportation.

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Q Two, kind of, one-off questions. I mean, out here in California we don't have anything that looks like the Transit Authority or the Transit District. Can you just talk -- I mean, how big is it? It's not just the City; right?

A That's correct. The Metropolitan Transit

Authority covers New York City, Nassau County, Suffolk

County, and several counties north of the New York,

including Westchester, Rockland, Dutchess that are

serviced by Metro-North, which is one division of the

Metropolitan Transit Authority. There's the Long Island

Railroad that services Suffolk and Nassau, and this

Mobility Tax raises revenue for those operations.

Q So thank you very much. The background is helpful because I remember the first time I heard it. It was just like, wow, that's big. You know, that is kind of is an understatement for sure. The other point of confusion that has come up during the briefing of this, there are two Mobility Taxes. And the one that you've

already described, the net earnings applies to us. What's the other one, and why doesn't that apply to what we're talking about here today?

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A The corporate taxpayers. Corporations pay on a tax based on the wages paid to employees, and that's entirely different, separate from the Mobility Tax and position on self-employment, which is based on net income.

Q So, again, I think this is a repeat, but the -like the mobile -- the Metropolitan Transportation

Authority, the MTA, they don't have an authority over this
because it's all implemented by the State?

A That's correct. And the MTA a is feature of the State created for the State to provide transportation in the district that it covers.

Q Great. So when folks pay this tax, who do they send the check to?

A The State of New York Department of Taxation and Finance.

Q And it could be paid either, in this case, from Mr. Mather or PIMCO. Either one of them could be paying this tax, even on behalf of Mr. Mather as an individual through, you know, say a composite return situation?

A Well, that is correct. You can pay individually. Each particular partner can pay on their own. Or more frequently, there's a composite return where the

1 partnership will report and pay the tax on behalf of the 2 department. 3 Okay. Let's -- and moving on to Slide 15. Let's talk -- focus a little bit more on the tax base. Would 4 5 you describe the tax base for the tax and net earnings on 6 self-employment for us, please? 7 Yes. It starts with federal taxable income. There are certain modifications, but it's net income that 8 9 is then apportioned based on the activities within the 10 district. And how is the net income, you know, how do you 11 12 determine what net income is sourced to the district? If you look at -- well, there's a three-factor 13 14 formula for certain years. The -- with rating -- with 15 property payroll and receipts. Subsequently, it's a 16 three-factor payroll with different ratings. 17 So for these years, for '12 through '14, they 18 were still using the evenly weighted three-factor? 19 That's correct, the evenly weighted three-factor 20 formula. And then later years moved to more and more of 2.1 the receipts factor as California did. 22 Correct. Correct. So does the Mobility Tax 23 allow a credit for California taxes paid? No. The Mobility Tax does not allow a credit 2.4 25 because the income is apportioned and only that portion of the income that represents activity within the district is subject to tax. So there's no need for a credit.

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Q Different question but maybe a little obscure as well. But does the Mobility Tax include any preference, alternative, or minimum tax item?

A No. There is no preference or an alternative tax or minimum tax in the Mobility Tax.

Q Okay. Thank you very much. I think that's all I have on the Mobility Tax. So, you know, very -- drawing a line here. I'm trying to move on to the same series of questions, really, in connection with the Unincorporated Business Tax, New York City Unincorporated Business Tax. So when this -- this tax was first adopted in 1966; is that correct?

A That's correct. Chapter 772 in the laws in 1966.

Q Okay. Thank you. 1966. So can you describe, you know, like you did with the Mobility Tax, the general parameters of UBT as they would be applied to PIMCO and Mr. Mather as a partner with PIMCO during the years that are under consideration?

A So the Unincorporated Business Tax is a tax that supplements the General Corporation Tax at time and now.

The -- there is a corporate tax on those who are engaged in business in New York City in corporate form. And the Unincorporated Business Tax is also a tax on that income

based -- that is imposed on sole proprietorships,
unincorporated businesses, including partnerships and
limited liability company.

Q And as with the Mobility Tax, does the City have any authority to change, you know, aspects of the UBT without legislative approval?

A No. The State of New York set a model local law as well as the Enabling Act and the City has no authority to deviate from those. In fact, the rate is set by the State of New York and the state legislation, and any exemptions are provided under the state law. The City has no authority to grant additional exemption or to change the rate.

Q And a little different from the Mobility Tax we talk about, it is applied to the partnership, PIMCO, not to the individual partner; is that correct?

A That's correct.

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Q But when PIMCO pays the tax, those amounts are attributable to Mr. Mather, you know, probably based on his partnership interest?

A That's in the K-1 that Mr. Mather would have received from the partnership which show that payment, and it would be related to his partnership interest on the percentage of his interest in the entity.

Q And who is the UBT paid to in New York?

2 11101 1110 10 0110 0

A So the Unincorporated Business Tax is paid to the Commissioner of Finance of the City of New York. And the City of New York collects taxes on behalf of the State and transfer tax in other areas.

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Q And that process is, again, that's subject to discretion, if you will, with the State of New York, just like every other component of this tax; correct?

A Well, the state legislature, the legislation of law imposing the unincorporated business tax provides that it's to be paid to the Commissioner of Finance. As an officer of the Municipal Corporation of the City of New York, that is a feature of the State of New York, subdivision of the State of New York that's provided in the unincorporated business tax law.

Q Perfect. So let me end with Slide 18. Would you describe kind of a tax base for the unincorporated business tax?

A So once again it starts with the federal Form 1065. The net income is reported on a federal return. There are particular modifications that are made to that number, for example, you have to add back interest income from other states' bonds. That's a typical add back across many jurisdictions and New York City as well. And then -- excuse me. Then that net income gets apportioned to New York City initially on the three-factor

formula of property, payroll, and receipts. And again, over the years they moved to more emphasis on receipts.

Q Great. Thank you. In a similar to that Mobility Tax, again, does the UBT allow credit for California taxes paid?

A No. There is no credit for taxes paid because, again, the income is apportioned. So there's no need for credit. It's only New York's source income that is subject to the tax. So there is no credit.

Q And same question again. Does UBT include preference, alternative, or minimum tax items?

A No. There's no alternative, minimum tax, or preference.

Q Super.

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MR. BRANNAN: Okay. That's -- those are my questions for Mr. Newman.

Judge Gast, I'm not sure if now is the right time to open him up for questions, or if we should finish our presentation as we walk through some of the issues that were raised in -- during the briefing in this matter.

I'll defer to your questions and, certainly, we can have questions now and questions later too. Mr. Newman is here for the whole afternoon.

JUDGE GAST: This is Judge Gast. I want to be sensitive to Mr. Newman's time. I'm not sure if he is

1 anticipating staying the entire hearing. But given that, if you're done with your questions with him, I'd like to 2 turn it over to the Franchise Tax Board. And then once 3 they're done with their questions and if the panel has any 4 5 questions, then I'll turn it back to you, Mr. Brannan, to 6 finish your presentation. 7 MR. BRANNAN: Great. Thank you very much. JUDGE GAST: Yeah. So Mr. Hall, if you have any 8 9 questions for the witness, feel free to ask your 10 questions. 11 MR. HALL: We have no questions for the witness. 12 JUDGE GAST: Okay. Thank you very much. All right, Mr. Brannan -- oh, actually, let me ask my panel 13 14 first. Judge Akopchikyan, do you have any questions for 15 the witness? 16 JUDGE AKOPCHIKYAN: I don't have any questions. 17 Thank you. 18 JUDGE GAST: Okay. Thank you. 19 And Judge Akin? 20 JUDGE AKIN: Judge Akin speaking. No questions 2.1 at this time. And thank you for your testimony, 22 Mr. Newman. 23 JUDGE GAST: This is Judge Gast. I have one 2.4 question for Mr. Newman. 25 MR. NEWMAN: Can you speak up a little?

1 JUDGE AKIN: We can't hear you. I'm sorry. Can you hear me? 2 JUDGE GAST: 3 MR. NEWMAN: Barely. 4 JUDGE GAST: Okay. I have one question for 5 Mr. Newman on the UBT. Is New York City required to 6 impose -- or is any city required to impose a UBT, or is 7 that optional? 8 The state authorized the imposition MR. NEWMAN: 9 under the model local law and the Enabling Act. The State 10 will frequently -- how do I say this diplomatically? --11 to lessen the objections of their constituents, they will 12 provide an enable authorization for the local legislature to impose a tax. And, again, just share the blame for any 13 14 taxation with the local legislators as well as the state 15 legislators in that context. 16 This is Judge Gast. Thank you, JUDGE GAST: I'll turn it over back to Mr. Brannan for the 17 Mr. Newman. 18 rest of his presentation. 19 MR. BRANNAN: I guess in light of your question, 20 Judge Gast, Mr. Newman, I might have one or two follow 2.1 ups. 22 BY MR. BRANNAN: 23 You know, somewhat repetitive, but when we talk 2.4 about, you know, does the locality have a choice, the real 25 question is they don't -- does the locality in this case,

the New York -- does New York have a choice as to how to implement this tax?

A Well, no. If the local legislature, the City
Counsel, and in the end New York City, wants to impose the
tax, they are have to strictly follow the model local law
and the enabling -- you know, the enabling legislation.
So all the city council can do is say yes or no. They
can't tinker with it. They can't change the rate. They
can't change the apportionment without state legislation.

And over the years with the unincorporated business tax, every time there's been a change, it's gone to the state legislature to make that change. So there was a major change in 1995, I believe, '94 or '95 that had to do with state legislation and every subsequent amendment to the City, unincorporated business tax was passed through the state legislature.

- Q So through the legislature and then approved by the governor at the end of the day; correct?
 - A That's correct.

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- Q And so the State does nothing -- excuse me. The City does nothing without approval of the legislature; correct?
 - A That's correct.

MR. BRANNAN: Okay. So with that I guess we'll kind of move on to the issues that are asserted by

Respondent during the course of the briefing, and these are listed on Slide 20. And the -- you know, the -- what we're trying to do is to summarize and kind of by listing it we make it efficient. If any member of the panel sees any issues that are not the list, we're not trying to ignore them by any stretch. We're certainly happy to respond to them.

But, you know, as we see it, one of the issues raised or the issues raised during the course of the briefing is, you know, whether or not the tax is imposed on that income; whether it's imposed by the State; whether taxes are not paid to the state. No proof that PIMCO -- you know, proof that PIMCO is not an investment partnership. And then there's a couple additional, like the mismatch of apportionment rules is problematic for, you know, for the FTB at one time; definition of fees or general taxes under the California constitution. And then, ultimately, whether Appellant has carried its burden of proof or not. We'll kind of ignore last one for now. Again, given the submissions post-hearing.

With respect to the discussion on net income, I'll turn that over to Mr. Sperring at this point.

MR. SPERRING: Thank you, Mr. Brannan.

PRESENTATION

MR. SPERRING: As Mr. Brannan mentioned, one of the requirements to claim the other state credit, under Revenue & Taxation Code Section 18001 subdivision (a) and 18006 subdivision (a), with respect to partners in a partnership, this is a credit that's only available for taxes paid on net income. Therefore, I thought it would be helpful to walk the panel through what constitutes a net income tax.

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Please turn to Slide 22. As seen in the illustration, at the top the page is the broadest level of taxes, which are known as gross receipts taxes. Ohio's Commercial Activity Tax and Washington's Business and Occupation Taxes are classic examples of a gross receipts tax. Gross receipts taxes are applied to the gross receipts from the business total sales. Unlike taxes imposed on gross net income, these taxes apply to the business sales without deduction for business cost. They apply to all transactions a business makes.

In other words, they apply to every dollar that the business generates. In the middle of the page you have gross income taxes, which include the total revenue derived from the sales and goods of services. Gross income is total revenue less cost of goods sold. The cost of goods sold represent all direct costs associated with making a product. This definition of gross income was

adopted by the California Court of Appeal in the Robinson Decision.

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As you can see, taxes on gross income have a smaller base than taxes on gross receipts since they subtract the cost of goods sold. The dollar at the bottom of the page represents net income tax. Net income is the profit left after the cost of goods sold are removed and after further deducting ordinary trade or business expenses from gross income.

Please note, the business expense deduction are reflected in blue lettering at the bottom of Slide 22. It is the deduction if the cost of goods sold and ordinary trade or business expenses that is the hallmark of net income tax. Applying these principles to the MCTMT, it is clear that the tax is on net income. As indicated by Mr. Newman, individuals who have net earnings in excess of \$50,000 from self-employment within the MCTD are subject to the MCTMT. For those individuals, the MCTMT is based on net income.

Please turn to Slide 23. This is because under Section 800(e) of New York tax law, the MCTMT net earnings from self-employment is defined as a net earnings from the self-employment under Section 1402(a) of the Internal Revenue Code without the annual limitation of 1402(b)(1). For a more robust discussion, please see Slide 24, which

is an excerpt from the 2015 version of the New York State
Department of Taxation and Finance Publication 420, titled
"Guide to the Metropolitan Commuter Transportation
Mobility Tax." As you can see, the publication confirms
that the New York state legislature expressly tied the tax
base to the MCTMT for individual business owners to the
federal self-employment tax base.

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Now, let's review IRC Section 1402(a) on Slide

25. As you can see the net earnings from self-employment
is gross income minus deductions, which are attributable
to trade or business. Bingo. That is the very definition
of net income. Please see Slide 26. I would also add IRC
Section 1402 is consistent with the federal income tax
definition of net income since the Schedule SE Form 1040,
Line 2, request the net profit from the sole
proprietorship or, in the case partnership, appearing on
Schedule C, or in the case of partnerships, Schedule K-1
from the federal individual income tax return.

Respondent has not articulated why the MCTMT imposed on self-employed individuals is not a net income tax under California law. In fact, Respondent's only objection is that California does not incorporate

Section 1402 and, therefore, cannot be reconciled, quote, end quote, to determine the California net income. This position is specious because there's no evidence of any

deviation between the definition of net income found in the federal self-employment tax and California's definition of net income.

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Moreover, the BOE in Robertson acknowledged in an off quoted passage that a precisely and universally acceptable definition of net income may not be possible. As such, there is no reconciliation requirement that the other state's net income tax calculation needs to exactly match California's calculation of net income and the California Revenue & Taxation Code.

In fact, FTB's own legal ruling 2017-1

contradicts the existence of such a requirement by stating and I, quote, "A tax is analyzed by applying general law, including applicable federal and California authorities."

Okay. So, again, general law and applicable federal and California authorities determine whether a tax is net income or not. New York's legislators' decision to adopt IRC Section 1402 as the tax base prior to modifications for the MCTMT was likely made because it is the federal definition of net income. FTB, on the other hand, is demanding that the New York legislature reinvent the wheel by listing out in the statute all the subtractions necessary to come up with a net income tax base. This is silly. For the above reasons, it is clear that the MCTMT imposed on individual business owners is a net income tax

for purposes of Revenue & Taxation Code Section 18001 sub (a) and 18006 sub (a).

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Now, let's turn to the New York City

Unincorporated Business Tax or UBT. Unlike the MCTMT, in

the case of the UBT, the instructions don't tie the tax

base directly to the federal definition of net income. So

instead we must look at the actual UBT statutes. As you

will know on Slide 27, UBT taxable income shall be the

excess of UBT gross income over UBT business deductions.

And on Slide 28 we see that Section 11056(a) of the UBT

code states that UBT gross income is the same as gross

income for federal purposes. And in Section 115047, the

UBT business deductions are same as those allowable for

federal income tax purposes.

When we look at the UBT return, we see that it comports with those statutes. Please turn to Slide 29 which contain the first two pages of the 2014 UBT return. When we turn to Slide 30, with see Schedule B, which provides for the computation of total income, which is the tax base prior to specific modifications to get to taxable income. When you examine Section B of the UBT return, you will note that it lists all the items of income found on federal Form 1065. In other words, the UBT mirrors the federal partnership income tax return.

In fact, Line 1 of Section B of the UBT return is

ordinary income, which allows a full deduction for expenses, including the cost of goods sold and other trade or business expenses since it is taken from Line 22 of Form 1065. Please see Slide 31, which contains federal Form 1065. You will note Line 1 starts with gross receipts. As you can see, Line 2 subtracts the cost of goods sold. And Line 9 through 20 provides for the subtraction of all other trade or business expenses. Again, bingo. We have a net income tax. Gross receipts minus cost of goods sold and all other trade or business expenses equal net income.

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You will also note that Line 9 of Form 1065 states salary and wages to partners are not to be subtracted as wages. All right. That's right on Line 9 of 1065, and, ironically, it's the inclusion of partner distributions in the UBT that the FTB is raising as the sole reason why the UBT is not a tax on net income. To quote Respondent, "The UBT law provides no deduction shall be allowed for amounts paid or incurred to a proprietor or partner for the services or for the use of capital."

Respondent's opening brief, page 2, lines 12 through 13.

And, therefore, UBT is not net income taxed under California law. Respondent's opening brief at page 6, lines 12 through 13.

The obvious problem with this argument is that

under both federal and California law, payments to partners are not wages, and no wage deduction is available. Therefore, it is entirely consistent with California law and federal law to include payments to owners in the UBT tax base. Again, please see line 9 of Form 1065, which disallows any payments to partners as wages. After all, if payment to owners were not included in the tax base, then in most cases there would be no profit to tax.

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For example, an individual operating a business as a sole proprietorship is not allowed a deduction for wages paid to him or herself. Similarly, in the partnership context, payments to owners are not wages since in general partners only have net taxable income to the extent of net earnings of the partnership that flow through to each partner. In case there's any doubt that payments to partners represent their share of profits are not wages, please see Revenue Ruling 69-184.

Finally, I would be remiss not to mention that the FTB and the Board of Equalization considered the New York State UBT with respect to tax years 1962 through 1964. In that instance, both the FTB and the Board of Equalization clearly agree that the UBT reflected a separate income tax that was in effect, the tax measured by net income for California purposes. The structure of

the taxing scheme was the very same structure that the New York City UBT was modeled after in which this is also clearly a net income tax. Please see Appeal of William A. Salant and Dorothy Salant 1967.

I now turn the presentation back to Mr. Brannan.

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PRESENTATION

MR. BRANNAN: There we go. Focusing on the next of the asserted issues from the briefing process, it's whether tax is imposed and paid to the State. And we have an awkward situation here. I say awkward for some but really not a problem from our standpoint is that the UBT is paid to the City. Mr. Newman spoke to that. And the Mobility Tax is paid to the state. What the position is on that is that it really doesn't matter who the recipient of the tax is for purposes of the language in Section 18001, and here's why.

So we'll start with our discussion in the appeal of Bartz decided by the Board of Equalization in 1994.

And while it's out to start with a case that all of us would admit has been overruled, but we need to go through the facts and the arguments in that case to get context for what happened later in the Callister case. And so the facts here are important. They're kind of reoccurring characters. We're going to talk about three different

cases. They talk about the same Maryland tax.

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And so the Maryland tax included a 5 percent state income tax and a local surcharge that was equal to between 20 and 50 percent of the tax. The State required collection of 20 percent of that tax that allowed local discretion as to any amount between 20 and 50 percent of the tax. And the surcharge was paid to the State, but it was used for the local benefit. So the FTB argued and the SPE agreed that the local surcharge was not imposed by the State because the Maryland statute enabled counties to impose a surcharge and use the proceeds for the benefit of the locality.

Bartz does not distinguish between the mandatory and discretionary aspects of the tax that is already in place. Further, the local surcharge was not paid to the State based on the analysis in Bartz because, although, the taxpayer paid the State directly, the State turned the funds over to the county such that the State was merely acting as an agent for the county or the locality in this case. So we have those two holdings in Bartz. And, again, if you look at it as two different requirements imposed by and paid to, both of them were found in favor of the FTB in that case.

So a few years later we have the Appeal of Callister, and that's in Slide 34. And it was decided in

1999. Importantly, Callister overturned Bartz in reliance in the Meyer case out of Minnesota. It's the same Meyer case that the FTB has provided as Exhibit I, you know, as part of their submission. And the language in Callister is critical here. We've reviewed the decision of the Minnesota Tax Court in Meyer and accepted its conclusion.

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Accordingly, we will no longer file our previous holding in the Appeal of Bartz completely. Instead, we find that a tax credit may be allowed under Rev & Tax Code Section 18002. And that's for nonresident credits, but the framework for whether the credit is appropriate or not is the same. But we'll allow it -- will be allowed under Revenue & Taxation Code 18002 for county surcharge taxes paid to Maryland in an amount not to exceed the surcharge mandated by the State.

So in Callister they acknowledge that if the State has control over the amount of the tax, then that tax will be amendable or eligible for the other state tax credit. And here's what's important. By overruling Bartz, Callister holds that just because a tax is used for local purposes does not mean it's a local tax. And that's one of the arguments the FTB beats -- you know, beats the heck out of in their briefing. Overruled. If the State collects the tax, the State is not the agent collecting on behalf of the locality, and that collection activity does

not make it a local tax. Same thing. FTB makes the agency theory both in their briefs and also in their recently -- well, recent, 2017-01.

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In other words, the identity of the agency that collects the tax is not determinative of whether the tax is paid to the State or not for purposes of the OSTC.

What's important is who is imposing the tax. So we get to Meyer, and that's Slide 35. You know, Meyer is more explicit with regard to how they treat who the tax is paid to. And, again, we adopt the reasoning in Meyer. That's what's in Callister. That's the California Authority. So Meyer consider the same Maryland tax. Again, in my other taxpayer argued in part that the entire Maryland tax was a state tax because payment was literally made to the Comptroller of the Treasury of the State of Maryland.

And the Meyer court said wait, we're not worried about that. We are not going to construe the word "paid", literally, on the basis that the central issues is the identity of the taxing authority, as it is for the both the Mobility Tax and the NYC UBT. The taxing authority, the person who approves, the entity that approves every aspect of the tax is the State. The Meyer court concludes ultimately that if the tax is State imposed, it is entitled to credit under the credit provision. So those arguments that the FTB has made have already been

considered by the SPE and rejected. And that's what Callister tells us.

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So moving into Slide 36, the Mobility Tax and the UBT are, in fact, imposed by the State. Both are imposed by the State because only the State of New York has that taxing authority that it may delegate under certain circumstances, but it takes control over every aspect of that tax. Neither the City nor the district have discretion as to the terms or computation of the tax. The UBT, for example, has been in place since 1966. Once in place, there's absolutely nothing that the City can do to change the terms. That's required by state law.

You know, there's a provision here in Slide 36.

Under New York law, the City can't even raise dog

licensing fees without State approval. And that line is

noteworthy because it shows how extreme the authority is

placed within the State of New York. But more

importantly, it's actually from a part of Respondent's

Exhibit E that they submitted. Respondent submitted a

portion of a law review article, that sentence from the

portion of the article that was not included with

Respondent's submission. But it does illustrate what

we're talking about. The State controls everything, down

to the dog license fees in the cities.

So -- and I'll speak quickly about the article

itself as long as I brought it up. The article itself, it speaks to home-rule, and the idea that if it's home-rule there should be some sort of implicit taxing authority. Ignoring, you know, the virtues of that policy, it doesn't really change what the facts are for the two taxes that we're talking about here today. Simply put, the labels don't matter. You know, the Wynne versus Maryland, United Supreme Court made that very clear. It doesn't matter what we call it. It's who is the authority for imposing the tax. And in this case, it's the State of New York.

So let's go to Slide 37. The Mobility Tax and the Unincorporated Business Tax are paid to the State, again, based on Bartz, Callister, and Meyer. We're not going to get -- we shouldn't get caught up in the word "paid", because that's what Meyer tells us not to do, and Callister adopts Meyer. That's the law of the State. The State is not the agent for the locality such the tax is paid to the locality. And, you know, it's simply not the law and it ignores precedent. And that's what a little frustrating by both the FTB legal ruling and also the way they brief this case. They don't mention these arguments that have been rejected or overruled by Callister.

And I think most importantly, at the end of the day, who pay -- who the taxes are paid to is not important for purposes of determining whether it's a state tax or

not. You know, Mr. Newman referenced the sovereign. The sovereign creates. The sovereign, you know, creates the entities, and the sovereign determines how those entities can tax, and that's what it does. Who the payment goes to doesn't change. It doesn't change anything. And it doesn't impact, again, the policy considerations behind the intent to avoid a double tax.

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So we go to Slide 38 and here's -- you know, it's just statutory construction. To the extent, you know, we think the law is clear that who the taxes are paid to really doesn't impact the outcome as long as we're construing everything to avoid a double tax, and that's really what the statutory construction language from the Eel River case in Slide 38 says. You know, it's -- the idea is you can't let an administrative detail undermine or disrupt what the statutory framework. Not just 18001, but all of the statutes around it, and all the regulations around it, you can't take a detail and let it overrule the entire point of the statute. And that's what would happen here if we ended up focusing on a decision based on who the recipient of the tax was because the goal is to avoid a double tax. And that's what should be happening here and the credit should be approved.

So Slide 39, you know, to be clear -- and I'm going to touch on this very quickly. You know, we labeled

some of the slides as limitations on the other state tax credit. Also, you'll note from the briefs that there is constitutional argument that is raised, and the idea is pretty simple. Because of the limitation based on, you know, the potential limitation on the credit base on the use of disparate apportionment factors, what's happened is a result of Prop 39.

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And then the, you know, the subsequent adoption of those rules for purposes of the credit under 17 -- I had it written down anyway. But it's the sourcing rules for the individuals. What happens there is that you have a very arbitrary change in the law, and prop 39 is very specific. They wanted to change the apportionment mechanism for corporations. And, in fact, the ballot pamphlet says very specifically that Proposition 39 does not increase taxes on California families by even a penny. And that's what went to the voters.

And, at the end of the day, if a new apportionment formula reduces the amount of credit, it has the effect of increasing the tax that the Mathers are required to pay under the statute, and that's wrong. That was never what was intended. Secondly, from a pure constitutional or commerce clause standpoint, to the extent that an individual who earns the same money in

state pays less tax than somebody who earns the money both in state and out of state. That is a burden on interstate commerce. That's exactly what was being talked about in Wynne when the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Maryland tax credit scheme.

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So the idea of a disparate impact based on the credits is an anathema to the commerce clause. And we need to consider that at some point because the client is not being treated fairly if, in fact, the different apportionment schemes result in a lower -- or excuse me -- a higher tax in California than somebody who is solely in California would end up paying under California law.

So, lastly, a few quick arguments we hope. Slide 40, Respondent's additional arguments. There's a few arguments that we think, candidly, we see grasping at straws from Respondent. And the first one is this idea that while we can't look to, either the Mobility Tax or the Unincorporated Business Tax because the -- I think the wording from the brief are, "Because the apportionments schemes are not in harmony."

Okay. With regard to the disharmonious -- I

don't know what the word is -- apportionment schemes,

that's not required by any single statute or case

authority. It's just something formulated out of whole

cloth for the FTB. There's no requirement in that. And,

in fact, it can't. Because I will guarantee you that not every state has exactly the same apportionment scheme as California does. No. The idea is simply to look to income to see if it's being taxed twice. And if it is, tax rate gets a credit.

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The FTB also suggest that we have not proven that PIMCO is not an investment partnership. Look, the FTB has no basis for making that statement whatsoever. Everything that is on file with the FTB says that PIMCO is not an investment partnership. An investment partnership, for example, has to generate no less than 90 percent of their gross income from interest or dividends or gains from the exchange of investment securities. This is the investor part. That's not what PIMCO does. PIMCO advises investment partnerships, but PIMCO itself is not an investment partnership. PIMCO manages assets for others and it's a huge difference, and that's why it's not an investment partnership.

Last point, the FTB looks to certain

constitutional provisions here in California that go to

whether something is a fee or a tax. And that distinction

matters with respect to what the voting threshold is.

Similar reference in connection with what is a general

tax, or what is not a general tax; again, voting

preferences, specifically in the constitution. Those

1 provision are important for the California Constitution 2 and the voting threshold, but those provisions have 3 absolutely nothing to do with the net income tax and the payment of tax to other states, the availability of the 4 5 credit under 18001. Skew lines, they have nothing to do 6 with each other. Those arguments are irrelevant. 7 So with that, I think we'll close it out very quickly. The Mathers are entitled to a credit for the 8 9 taxes imposed by and paid to the State of New York 10 understand all of the case authorities. Those taxes are 11 paid based on net income, as Mr. Sperring walked through. 12 And each dollar of that credit -- subject to proof 13 again -- is amenable or eligible for the credit. 14 So that will conclude the presentation at this 15 point. 16 MR. HALL: Judge, excuse --17 This is Judge Gast. Go ahead, JUDGE GAST: 18 Mr. Hall. 19 MR. HALL: If the panel would allow, I just 20 wanted to clarify something that Mr. Newman said earlier, 2.1 if that's okay, if we have a moment to do that? 22 JUDGE GAST: Sure. Go ahead. 23 MR. HALL: Thank you. 2.4 Mr. Newman, I just want to clarify. You had

mentioned earlier that the City has the right to approve

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or not the UBT. Can you -- can you restate what you said earlier or --

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MR. NEWMAN: And that's not exactly -- the City was authorized by the State of New York to impose the tax. The City Council then passed legislation and the administrative code to have the Unincorporated Business Tax apply within the boarders the City of the New York. As I mentioned in prior testimony, in some ways that's a political decision by the State of New York to say -- the state legislature to say we only authorize this. It's your own local legislative body that, you know, that put it into effect. But again, the City of New York is a municipal corporation and a creature of the State of New York. So to -- I think there isn't a real difference in that kind.

MR. HALL: Sure. But thank you. Thank you. But to be clear then, the City Council could potentially say, although, we're authorized by the State to impose this tax, we don't -- we're not forced to. We -- we could reject whatever proposal is -- is being made; correct?

MR. NEWMAN: The City -- yeah. The state law delegates to the City legislative body the authority to actually do -- implement the tax.

MR. HALL: Thank you.

JUDGE GAST: This is Judge Gast. Thank you,

Mr. Hall.

At this point I'm going to ask the panel if they have questions for Appellants, and then I'd like to take a 10-minute break if that's okay with everyone.

MR. BRANNAN: Judge Gast, before we break, I might ask for an opportunity to redirect Mr. Newman with a few questions.

JUDGE GAST: Okay. Sure. Go ahead.

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REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. BRANNAN:

Q Yeah. Mr. Newman, have you ever known the City of New York not to adopt a tax that was granted the permission, which was granted to them by the State?

A No, as a matter of fact, frequently, the state legislature -- the City would only go forward with the proposal.

Q What would happen to the City if they didn't adopt a tax, Mr. Newman?

A They would have to raise some other tax. So the State would --

Q And how would they do that, Mr. Newman?

A The state would end up having to fund the City for that difference between what their -- what the revenues are and what they came in at.

1 So if they took the route of adopting no taxes, 2 the city would cease to function perhaps? 3 Well, it's hundreds -- it's billions of dollars. In the course of years, it's many billions of dollars and 4 5 the city would -- the city has never gone and not approved 6 a -- not imposed a tax that the state has authorized. 7 MR. BRANNAN: Great. Thanks very much. 8 JUDGE GAST: Okay. Thank you. 9 This is Judge Gast again. I'm going to turn it 10 over to my panel, and then we will take a 10-minute break. 11 I'm going to start with Judge Akopchikyan, if you 12 have any questions. 13 JUDGE AKOPCHIKYAN: Judge Gast, no questions at 14 this time. Thank you. 15 JUDGE GAST: Thank you. 16 And Judge Akin? 17 JUDGE AKIN: Judge Akin speaking. I do have 18 questions, but I think I want to ask them of both parties. 19 So I'll reserve them until after Franchise Tax Board's 20 presentation. 21 JUDGE GAST: Okay. Great. Thank you. 22 And I will as well. So why don't we take a 23 10-minute break. Let's come back at 2:50. 2.4 Please turn off your camera and microphone but do not leave WebEx. Thank you. 25

1 (There is a pause in the proceedings.) 2 JUDGE GAST: So Ms. Alonzo, we'll go back on the 3 record. And I will now turn it over to Mr. Hall for his 4 5 presentation. 6 You will have 90 minutes. Please begin whenever 7 you're ready. MR. HALL: Thank you. One moment. 8 9 10 PRESENTATION 11 MR. HALL: Thank you, panel. 12 This is Nathan Hall on behalf of the Franchise 13 Tax Board. 14 The issue in this case, as you've heard, is 15 whether Appellants have satisfied their burden to 16 demonstrate that they are entitled to claim the other 17 state tax credit with respect to the New York City 18 Unincorporated Business Tax, referred to as a UBT, and the 19 Metropolitan Commuter Transportation Mobility Tax, 20 referred to as the MCTMT tax. This appeal begins and ends 2.1 as a matter of statutory interpretation. 22 At the outset, Respondent reminds the panel that 23 tax credits are matter of legislative grace, and taxpayers 2.4 bear the burden of proving they are entitled to any

claimed credits. Furthermore, statutes granting tax

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credits must be strictly construed against the taxpayer with any doubts resolved in Respondent's favor. To be eligible for the other state tax credit, several requirements and conditions must be satisfied. If any single requirement or condition is not satisfied, the taxpayer is ineligible to claim the credit.

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Generally, Revenue & Taxation Code Section 18001 provides for a credit of, quote, "Net income taxes imposed by and paid to another state," unquote. The statute's use of the word "and" means that imposed by and paid to are separate and distinct requirements. An eligible tax is, therefore, a net tax, which is both imposed by another state and paid to another state. Here, Appellants have failed to demonstrate that the UBT and the MCTMT are such eligible taxes.

Rather, the UBT is a New York City income tax applicable to unincorporated businesses earning revenue within the city limits of New York, and the MCTMT is a tax imposed by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority on certain employers and self-employed individuals engaged in business solely within the Metropolitan Commuter Transportation District.

First, I will address Appellants' argument that the UBT and MCTMT are taxes imposed by and paid to the State of New York by virtue of the State's constitutional

powers of taxation. Second, I will discuss why the UBT and MCTMT are paid to the respective entities and not to the State. Third, I will discuss why these taxes are, in fact, imposed by the City of New York and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority respectively.

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Appellants allege that the UBT and MCTMT are taxes both imposed by and paid to the State by virtue of New York State's Constitutional Powers of Taxation.

Respondent disagrees. In support of their position,

Appellants claimed that New York's home-rule provisions mandate a finding in their favor. The terms home-rule or home-rule provisions are used to describe legislation enacted by states granting local government's lawmaking authority over local affairs. It is noted that without home-rule provisions most local government activity would require the expressed authorization of state government.

The specific powers conferred by home-rule provisions generally fall into four categories, including structural, personnel, functional, and fiscal, with taxes falling into the fiscal category. Appellants point out that the New York state constitution allows the legislature to delegate certain authority to local governments. However, under Article 16 of its constitution, the State retains all powers of taxation. However, most states retain fiscal control at the state

level.

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As stated in a 2016 New York University Law
Review article, quote, "Only 12 states have laws that give
local governments any fiscal control," unquote. This is
described on page 4 of Respondent's Exhibit E. Appellants
argue that because the State of New York retains fiscal
authority to levy taxes, the UBT and MCTMT are
characterized as taxes imposed by and paid to the State of
New York for purposes of Revenue & Taxation Code 18001.
This is a mischaracterization.

Respondent does not dispute that the New York

State legislature reserves the power to enact or amend the statutes concerning the UBT or MCTMT. However, statutes must be read to avoid absurd results. Under Appellants' logic, if the UBT and MCTMT are imposed by and paid to the State of New York by virtue of its authority to tax, it follows that all net income taxes levied within a state's borders, including all local income taxes, would qualify for the other state tax credit.

Furthermore, given that all but 12 states appear to retain fiscal control at the state level, interpreting California's statute so broadly would call into question potentially several dozens of local taxes from other states as qualifying for the California other state tax credit. Nothing in the statutory language or case law

involving the California other state tax credit supports such an expansive interpretation. Certainly, the California legislature could have stated that where another state reserved its constitutional taxing authority, all net income taxes levied within that state's borders are consider qualifying for the other state tax credit. However, it chose to use much more narrow and specific language.

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Appellants have pointed to no authority suggesting a broad -- such a broad interpretation of the term imposed by and paid to. As will be discussed later, the Board's decision in Callister, as well as the Minnesota Tax Court opinion in Meyers versus Commissioner does not support Appellants' position. Under the mandate that statutes granting tax credits be construed narrowly, Appellants have failed to satisfy the burden that these taxes are imposed by and paid to the State of New York by virtue of the State's home-rule provisions.

As discussed, the specific requirements of the other state tax credit are not disposed of by Appellants' home-rule argument. Rather, Appellants must demonstrate that the UBT and MCTMT are both imposed by and paid to the State under a plain reading of the statute. Respondent will now address why the UBT and MCTMT are not paid to the state for purposes of Revenue & Taxation Code

Section 18001. According to applicable California law, the object of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent by giving meaning to every word and every phrase in the statute to accomplish a result consistent with legislative purpose.

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Additionally, the plain meaning of statutory language is ordinarily conclusive. To give meaning to the phrase, "Paid to another state," the tax must be, in fact, paid to the other state. Here, the UBT is paid directly to the City of New York, not New York State. There's ample uncontroverted evidence supporting this fact. For example, UBT payments are remitted directly to the New York City Department of Finance for use by the City of New York. This is shown at the bottom of page 5 of Respondent's Exhibit C and page 6 of Respondent's Exhibit D in the instructions for line 31.

The UBT is never collected by, accessed by, controlled by, or used by the State of New York in any manner whatsoever. It's paid to the City. Appellants have set forth no evidence that the terms other state or another state, for purposes of Revenue & Taxation Code Section 188001, should be expanded to include taxes paid to cities, counties, municipalities, or corporate entities. Statutes granting tax credits are to be narrowly construed. Regulation Section 18001-1 provides

that the term "state" includes, quote, "States of the United States, the District of Colombia, and possessions of the United States, but does not include the United States or foreign countries."

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This is an exclusive list that must be strictly construed and excludes cities or other entities separate from the State. As described earlier, Appellants' position is that the UBT is paid to the State by virtue of it being paid under State authority. However, this argument conflates the distinct requirements that the tax be both imposed by the other state and paid to the other state.

There are many instances in which an amount can be paid under authority of one party yet, paid to a different party. For example, a trust can grant the trustee of the authority to determine the timing and amount of Appellants of trust funds to a beneficiary. In that instance, payment may be made pursuant to the trustee's authority but paid to another party. Accepting that the terms imposed by and paid to are separate and distinct, one cannot be the substitute for the other.

A close reading of Appellants' briefing reveals this logical fallacy. Appellants' position that the many requirements of the other state's tax credit are at once disposed of by the fact that the state retains its

constitutional powers of taxation is incorrect, or the terms of a statute are unambiguous is presumed that the legislature meant what it said and the plain meaning of the language governs. Here, the UBT is not paid to the state.

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Moreover, if Appellants' position is adopted and the tax is considered paid to a state by virtue of it being paid under a state's taxing authority, there would be no instance in which a tax can be paid under state authority and not be considered paid to a state. If that were the case, there would be no need for the statute to specifically require that the tax be paid to the state. Such a reading would effectively element the meaning of the words paid to under the statute and violate the canon of statutory interpretation that courts are to give meaning to every word of the statute.

With respect to the UBT, this closes the inquiry. The UBT is not paid to the State and is, therefore, ineligible for the California other state tax credit. The MCTMT is also not paid to the State for purposes of Revenue & Taxation Code 18001. The MCTMT is undisputedly paid to the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, also referred to as the MTA. Pursuant to New York consolidated laws, Article 23, Section 805(a), MCTMT payments are held in accounts designated by the state comptroller, quote,

"In trust for the Metropolitan Transportation Authority," end quote. A copy of the statute was included as Respondent's Exhibit G for the panel's convenience.

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The statute provides that MCTMT deposits must be kept separate and apart from all other money in possession of the comptroller. The statute further authorizes the Commissioner to deduct a reasonable amount for necessary expenses to reimburse the Department for the cost incurred to administer, collect, and distribute the taxes collected on behalf of the MTA. In sum, MCTMT payments are held in trust by the state but not paid to the state. They're held temporarily for a matter of weeks before being paid to the rightful owner, the MTA. The funds are collected by the state on behalf of the MTA, but they belong to the MTA as a matter of law.

As just described, the statute unambiguously calls for MCTMT to be paid to the Metropolitan

Transportation Authority, not the State of New York.

Furthermore, Appellants have failed to meet the burden to allege or establish that the MTA should be otherwise considered the state itself for purposes of the statute.

In fact, the evidence demonstrates otherwise. The MTA is not an agency or department of state government, similar to the Department of Agriculture or the Department of Financial Services among others.

As reflected in MTA's governance documents contained in Respondent's Exhibit H, the MTA is, quote, "A corporate entity separate and apart from the State of New York," end quote. If the funds are, in fact, paid to the state as Appellants claim, Appellants have failed to explain why the funds must be kept separate and apart from all other funds held by comptroller, why the legislature would require the funds to be held in trust, and why the MTA would be required to reimburse the State for cost incurred to administer, collect, and distribute the taxes imposed. Here, it's evident the State's only role is merely as a collection agent on behalf of the MTA.

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Based on the foregoing, the MCTMT is not paid to the State for purposes of Revenue & Taxation Code 18001. The statute must be construed narrowly. While MCTMT funds are briefly held in trust by the State comptroller, they are, in fact, paid to the MTA. The state has no discretion as to what to do with the MCTMT funds as they belong to the MTA. These funds pass through the state as a matter of administrative convenience and nothing more. Appellants have failed to satisfy their burden to demonstrate that the MCTMT is paid to the State of New York.

Appellants claim that Callister supports their position, that it doesn't matter who the tax is actually

paid to. The language in Meyer upon which Callister is based actually does not support Appellant's position. In Meyer, the Minnesota Tax Board analyzed its analog to the California other state tax credit. In that case, the taxpayer argued that because the payment was literally made to the State of Maryland, it was paid to the state. However, that argument was rejected as the Minnesota Tax Court held in Meyer that quote, "We do not interpret the word paid literally and, therefore, disagree with Ms. Meyer's first argument," end quote.

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So actually, in Meyer the Court said it disagreed with the taxpayer's interpretation of the paid to requirement as being literal interpretation and considers it relevant who the tax was paid to in substance. Now, because the case involving the Maryland statute are not binding as to present appeal, the Minnesota Tax Court's reasoning as to why it ultimately allowed a portion of the surcharge to qualify for its credit in spite of language to the contrary, or the FTB's subsequent acquiescence to the Minnesota opinion need the subject of speculation.

Rather, the panel must only decide here whether the paid to requirement is to be read expansively as Appellants insist or narrowly as required by law.

I will now discuss whether the UBT and MCTMT are imposed by the State. With respect to the requirement

that the tax be imposed by the state, neither the UBT or the MCTMT are imposed by the State. Appellants substitute the term "imposed by" with the term "authorized by." This substitution of terminology, while seemingly innocuous, alters its meaning and unduly expands the scope of the statute in a more narrow or strict sense of the word.

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The UBT and the MCTMT are imposed by the City of New York and the MTA respectively. As to the UBT, the UBT is set forth in the New York City Administrative Code and is therefore imposed by the City under a plain reading of the statute. This fact is undisputed. Appellants respond to this fact to point out -- excuse me. Appellants' response to this fact is to point out New York's home-rule provisions and constitutional powers of taxation. However, accepting this argument would lead to absurd results as explained earlier.

Further, as we heard from Mr. Newman, the State authorize the UBT. However, whether the tax is, in fact, imposed is a different matter. And whether the tax is imposed is a matter that's up to the City. As we heard from Mr. Newman, the City can approve or withhold approval for the UBT. The City's ability to withhold approval for the UBT is further evidence that it's, in fact, imposed by the City. The fact that the City has never actually, as far as we know, refused to impose the UBT is irrelevant to

determining whether the tax is, in fact, imposed by the City.

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The fact that the City has never rejected or refused to impose the UBT is merely evidence that the City needs to raise money. Although, the MCTMT is found in the State's statute, it's also not imposed at the state level and exists for the sole purpose of generating revenue for the MTA. For these reasons, under a reasonable reading of the statute, the MCTMT is imposed by the MTA.

Respondent's position is further supported by the Board of Equalization decision in the Appeal of Callister as well as Meyer versus Commissioner, a Minnesota Tax Court opinion that Callister is based on. Reading these cases carefully, it's evident that even where authority to tax is held by the state, the tax will not be considered imposed by the state unless such tax is imposed at the state level.

Appeal of Callister involve the Maryland County tax that was first analyzed by the Board in the Appeal of Bartz. In Bartz, the Board held that the entire Maryland tax was a local tax. Of course, as was discussed and we know, the Board later partially reversed its decision in Bartz and Appeal of Callister as a result of a Minnesota Tax Court opinion in Meyer versus Commissioner. A copy of the Minnesota Tax Court opinion in Meyer is attached for

the panel's convenience as Respondent's Exhibit I.

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In Meyer, the Minnesota Tax Court reviewed the Maryland statute, which imposed what was described as county income tax. The statute provided that the tax shall, quote, "Not be less than 20 percent nor more than 50 percent of the state income tax liability of such resident," end quote.

In Meyer, the Court noted that, quote, "The county tax across the state was 20 percent. However, each county could elect to tax an additional 30 percent if it chose to do so." Notably in Meyer, the Minnesota Tax Court held that only the portion of the tax equal to 20 percent, which was levied as to all counties, was determined to be a tax imposed by the State. And any amount in excess of the statewide 20 percent was deemed imposed by the county and was not entitled to a credit under the Minnesota Credit Provision.

The Court distinguished the creditable portions and non-creditable portions of the tax, despite the fact that the county's authority to impose any additional tax was derived under the same state statute. In Callister, the Board of Equalization followed the Franchise Tax Board's acquiescence to the Tax Court opinion in Meyer finding that only 20 percent of the tax as applied across all counties was considered imposed by the State. Thus,

the holdings in Meyer and Callister made clear that even where the authority for an individual county to increase its rate is derived from the State, it will not be considered imposed by the state to the extent it is not imposed at the state level.

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Here, the UBT and MCTMT are similar to the non-creditable portions of the Maryland county tax because they are imposed as to only specific localities and not at the state level. These taxes are distinguishable from the taxes that are levied on a statewide basis, but perhaps ultimately paid to a locality for a specific purpose from the state's general fund. As a thought exercise, let's assume for a moment that the MTA, through its board of directors, determines that it needed to raise revenue. One way of accomplishing this might be by increasing or amending the MCTMT rate. However, in order to do that, of course, the MTA would need to seek permission from the state legislature.

To that end, the MTA might, for example, hire a lobbyist to lobby a state congressperson to introduce legislation increasing the MCTMT rate. It might take further measures to ensure that a bill, if introduced, were passed. The same holds true for the UBT where the City acts through its mayor or other New York City municipal functions. In order to raise tax revenue, the

MTA must proactively seek permission from the state legislature to increase the MCTMT. Although, it's reasonable to conclude that although the state maintains the authority to levy taxes, when it does so on behalf of the MTA for the sole benefit of the MTA, such tax may be consider imposed by the MTA.

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It is also helpful to bear in mind that because the MCTMT and UBT are levied only with respect to specific localities, they are not taxes of New York State and do not represent revenue of the state. Thus, if the New York state legislature determined that it wanted to raise revenue for the State, it would not do so by amending the UBT or MCTMT. Instead, it would amend or increase the State's income taxes. This is distinguishable from a scenario in which the State collects its own revenue and then determines how to spend that revenue. In those cases, using state revenue to benefit a locality does not change the nature of the tax as a state tax.

Applying this example in the context of the local portions of the Maryland tax at issue in Meyer and Callister shows that there is no difference as to the authority to tax, only as to timing. So say a particular county in Maryland was to raise revenue similar to the MTA in the previous example. Because of the way the Maryland statute was written, the counties had standard permission

from the state to increase the surcharge in their county to 30, 40, or even 50 percent without seeking further legislative approval.

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Here, the only difference between the non-credible portions of the Maryland County tax and the MCTMT is that the legislature's approval to increase the Maryland tax was given in advance. But in both cases, the authority for the tax was derived at the state level and specifically provided for in the state's statute. Given this fact, there must be some other distinction that resulted in portions of the Maryland County tax to be found not imposed by the state.

As stated earlier, it is evident from analyzing those opinions that the distinction is this, to the extent the taxes not imposed on a statewide basis but imposed as to a locality, it is not considered imposed by the state. Practically speaking how else would one distinguish a local tax from a state's tax if not on the basis that a local tax is levied as to a specific geographic region and a state tax is levied on a statewide basis. This is an important distinction that Appellants' analysis simply ignores.

Furthermore, there is also no evidence that the Maryland state legislature couldn't have amended its statute to preclude counties from increasing the

surcharge. The state had absolute discretion to amend its state law in that case. This is additional evidence that the authority of the state to impose a tax was not the deciding factor in Meyer. While the Minnesota Tax Court differentiated the non-creditable portion of the Maryland tax in terms of county discretion, it could just as easily be said tax that the extent to which the levy was considered a tax imposed by the state depended on the extent to which the surcharge was applied at the state level.

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Finally, the Maryland County tax was found to be imposed by the state on grounds that differ from the taxes in this case. The United States Supreme Court case Comptroller v. Treasury -- Comptroller of the Treasury versus Wynne, spelled W-y-n-n-e, has been raised in support of the proposition that the Maryland County tax was, in fact, a state tax in spite of its label. Wynne involved the question of whether a Maryland tax violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. However, with respect to whether the county tax was, in fact, a state tax, the court relied on a Maryland Court of Appeals Opinion in Frey versus Comptroller of the Treasury.

In Frey, the Court of Appeals referenced its decision in Stern v. Comptroller of the Treasury.

Specifically, Fray stated, quote, "We held in Stern that

the credit applies to all taxes, including the county income tax, appearing in the state's income tax subtitle. In reaching this conclusion we rejected the argument that the local political subdivisions, rather than the state, impose the county tax. That's precluding the application of the credit in question. We did so in part because the county income taxes were adopted, mandated, and collected by the state. In other words, because the county income tax was prescribed in the income tax subtitle and was administered by the state, that tax was just as susceptible to the credit as other state imposed income taxes," end quote.

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Thus, in the cases -- in the line of cases analyzing whether the Maryland County tax was a state tax, the courts found relevant that the so-called county tax was found in the State's income tax subtitle. However, the UBT and MCTMT are distinguishable from the Maryland tax in this manner. As pointed out, the UBT is found in the City administrative code, not the consolidated laws of New York or the New York State personal income tax article. Additionally, the MCTMT is found in Article 3 of chapter 60 of the consolidated laws of New York. Whereas, New York State's personal income tax provisions are set forth in an entirely different article, Article 22.

Thus, the rationale is as to the Maryland tax, at

least in part, is not helpful for determining whether the UBT and MCTMT are imposed by the state in the present appeal. As shown, the MCTMT is more analogous to the non-creditable portion for the Maryland tax found in Meyer and Callister to be imposed by the county. And it is distinguishable from the portion of the tax found in those cases to be a state tax.

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Now, briefly to address Appellants' constitutional arguments, Appellants raised a constitutional issue they feel is implicated in this appeal. First and for most, whether there's a constitutional right for a taxpayer to receive a credit for the UBT and MCTMT, and conversely whether or not credit for these taxes would, therefore, be unconstitutional is a question that this panel lacks jurisdiction to determine. Under OTA Regulation 30401 subsection (a), the OTA lacks jurisdiction to determine whether a California statute is invalid or unenforceable under the United States Constitution. If the tax imposes a burden on interstate commerce, it is potentially an issue for the New York courts and whether the UBT violates the Commerce Clause, but that's not to be decided here today.

As you heard earlier Appellants' counsel, stated quote, "Who the tax is paid to doesn't dictate the

outcome." They refer to it as an administrative detail. It's not a detail, however. It's not elective. It's a requirement in the statute. Similarly, the mandate to interpret Revenue & Taxation Code Section 18001 strictly and narrowly is mandatory, not elective. While the purpose of the California other state tax credit is to help alleviate double taxation, it is not panacea for all double taxation.

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As observed in a recent Office of Tax Appeals decision in Appeal of Buehler, quote, "Section 18001 is narrowly drawn, applying to only cases which include the required elements," end quote. Here, the required elements have not been satisfied. The panel heard from the taxpayer's expert, Mr. Newman, as to how these taxes operate. However, Mr. Newman's testimony does not alter the points made by Respondent, namely, that the statute requires the tax to be actually imposed by and paid to the It does not change the fact that the UBT is paid State. directly to the City, nor the fact the MCTMT is paid to the MTA. The expert's testimony doesn't change the fact that under Meyer and Callister the tax must be imposed at the state level to be considered imposed by the State. Mr. Newman's testimony doesn't change the fact that local taxes are not considered state taxes for purposes of Revenue & Taxation Code 18001.

And finally, Mr. Newman's testimony does not change the requirement that the statute be read narrowly. On balance, it's more reasonable to find that the UBT is imposed by the City of New York and paid to New York City. On balance, it's more reasonable to find that the MCTMT is imposed by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority and paid to the Metropolitan Transportation Authority.

Appellants' application of the other state tax credit to these taxes is based on its overly broad and incorrect interpretation of the statute, which, if accepted by this panel, will have potentially harmful consequences, not only as to California other state tax credit, but to other states with similar statutes that will be unbearably affected by an overly expansive analysis.

Thank you.

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JUDGE GAST: This is Judge Gast. Thank you, Mr. Hall.

At this point, I'm going to turn it over to -actually, I'm going to ask a few questions first to
clarifying as to FTB's position on certain issues,
Mr. Hall, you didn't touch on.

Do you still believe the UBT and MCTMT are not net income taxes?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ HALL: We are not disputing that at this time. To the extent that I did not address any arguments

on brief, you know, we stand on our briefing, but we're 1 2 not disputing any issues that I have not discussed today. 3 JUDGE GAST: Okay. And that goes with the tax versus fee distinction? 4 5 MR. HALL: Correct. JUDGE GAST: So just to clarify, FTB's position 6 7 at this hearing is that it is a tax and not a fee? MR. HALL: Well, our position is not -- we're not 8 9 conceding that point. 10 JUDGE GAST: Okay. 11 MR. HALL: If the OTA determines that it is a 12 fee, we don't object. However, you know, we rest on our brief for -- as to those issues. 13 14 JUDGE GAST: Okay. So the same with the --15 whether these taxes are net income taxes, you're not 16 conceding that they are net income taxes. You're just not 17 addressing them here, and you decide to rest on the brief 18 for those issues? 19 MR. HALL: That's accurate. 20 JUDGE GAST: Okay. Thank you. 21 With that, I'm going to ask Judge Akopchikyan if 22 he has any questions at this point for either party. 23 JUDGE AKOPCHIKYAN: I don't have any questions at 2.4 this point. Thank you. 25 JUDGE GAST: Thank you.

And Judge Akin?

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JUDGE AKIN: Yes, I do. Give me just one moment to look at my notes. Okay. The first question I would just like to better understand what Franchise Tax Board believes the test or standard is for determining whether a tax is a net income tax imposed by a state for other state tax credit purposes.

MR. HALL: Just to clarify, Judge, are you asking about the net income portion of it, or the imposed by it portion?

JUDGE AKIN: Thank you. I'm asking about the imposed by requirement, not the net income requirement. I'm just wondering if there's a succinct summary you can provide as to FTB's position about what's required for a tax to be imposed by another state for other state tax credit purposes.

MR. HALL: You know, I'll be honest with you. I think your question sort of gets at the heart of why this appeal is little bit tricky. Because when we're talking about whether a tax is imposed by the State, we're talking about 49 other jurisdictions and their taxing schemes and whether -- you know, I don't know that I can come up with a universal definition of impose by. But when we look at these taxes, as stated in my argument -- and hopefully when you guys get the transcripts, you'll be able to

relook at that and re-review what we stated.

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But in these cases, we don't see that these taxes are imposed by the State. And, you know, a simple example would be for the UBT. You know, it's not even in the state statute. It's in the City Administrative Code. And as you heard from the taxpayer's expert, the city decides whether that gets imposed or not. Whether or not the city decides that it ultimately is going to impose that tax really is irrelevant. The fact is they have the, ability, the power to do that.

As with the MCTMT, I believe as we explained that the cases of Meyer and Callister support finding that, hey, certain taxes if they're not imposed on a statewide basis, if they are local taxes, these are not taxes that should be considered imposed by the State under the statute. And Callister is, again, a California opinion that addresses -- at least to the extent it references

Meyer -- addresses that issue. But I can't give you a universal definition because we'd have to find something that fits for, you know, potentially 50 states' different taxes.

JUDGE AKIN: Fair enough. Understood.

I do want to, you know, provide Appellant the opportunity to answer the same question. If you would like me to repeat it, please let me know, or respond to

what FTB just said.

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MR. BRANNAN: Well, I think I understand. The question is, you know, how do we construe when or when it is not imposed by the State. I mean, you know, I don't mean to restate or re-characterize the question. That's not what's intended, Judge Akin. But I think the case law makes it pretty clear.

If -- if -- it's where the discretion over the tax lays. And we would say semantics aside, that if the authorities with the State, and the city can't do anything without state approval, then that discretion lies with the state. And, you know, I think it's when we get into the difference between the word authority or, you know, discretion, or power, or anything else, I mean, it's just really simple. It's like where's the taxing authority? And the taxing authority in both cases is it stems from the State. The Constitution keeps it with the state until they say it's okay.

So I hope that's responsive to the question. If not, I'm certainly willing to, you know, to try again.

JUDGE AKIN: No. That's responsive. Thank you.

I did have one follow-up question, and I will pose it to both parties, but I'll start with Franchise Tax Board.

And, Mr. Hall, I do think you touched on this in

your argument, but I just wanted to clearly ask it of both parties. In order for a tax to be imposed by a state, does it need to be a statewide tax? Or can it be taxed on, you know, on taxpayer's and just a specific locality within the state?

MR. HALL: Thank you, Judge Akin.

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I think that I'm not going say, you, know as to taxes we don't know about or not aware of or aren't at issue in this case. I know that I can answer that, but as far as these taxes are concerned, again, the holding in Meyer suggests strongly that "imposed by" means, you know, on a statewide bases and not as to not a specific locality, and that's our position as to these specific taxes. We believe that definition doesn't -- that these taxes don't fit the definition of imposed by the state for that very reason. And also because, you know, the taxes are, again, here in this case for the sole benefit of the MTA. They're not state taxes. So thank you.

JUDGE AKIN: Okay. Thank you. Understood.

And I will again pose the same question to

Appellants. Would you like me to restate the question?

MR. BRANNAN: Again, I think I have it. If for some reason I miss the cue, I'll just apologize in advance.

No. I think that the idea that it must be a

statewide tax is simply incorrect. And the research for that is really Wynne versus Maryland or Wynne versus Comptroller Maryland when they say it's clearly a local tax collected from a specific locality within the state. And, you know, candidly, I'm not -- I'm not a fan of the parade of horribles that's being suggested that says, well, it's really complicated and there's a lot of states and there's a lot of counties, and boy, this could be really hard work and, you know, lots of tax.

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It doesn't matter to me, the policy side of it.

And I don't think it really matters to the panel. At the end of the day, the idea is the net income piece -- which has essentially been agreed to here -- that's what levels the playing field across the country and across multiple jurisdictions. If it's all on net income, which it is, then if we can determine, well, what is the subject of that net income tax. What's the income? And if it's tax twice, the purpose of the credit is to avoid that double tax. But the net income base is what levels it out. It doesn't matter how many different jurisdictions we look at. That's the leveling influence.

So I don't think there's a requirement that it be statewide. The requirement is that the state has authority over it. And contrary to what's been suggested, I don't think it's this -- you know, I don't think the

world is coming to an end because a lot of people have a net income tax. But California, for example, reserves the power to impose a net income tax for the state itself. No other local subdivision can impose a net income tax in California, and other states have similar rules. This one is just different.

 $\,$ JUDGE AKIN: Understood and was responsive to what I was asking, so thank you. And I think --

JUDGE GAST: Judge Akin, can I ask a follow up if that's okay? Sorry.

JUDGE AKIN: Absolutely.

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on this, I think Appellants' position is that it doesn't have to be a statewide tax. Just to clarify, I think this is my last question here. And I don't want to be hypothetical here, but I know we're kind of dealing with it with hypos. But if we have a situation where, just assume, a state requires a tax to be imposed and paid to the state -- let's just assume that -- but they limit that tax to a certain geographical region in the state. Does that, under 18001(a), does that make it potentially credible, assuming all the other requirements are met? Or is your position because it's limited to a certain geographical area, it can never be credible under 18001(a), even though it's imposed and paid to the state,

just under those hypothetical facts? Sorry if that was convoluted.

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MR. HALL: Yeah. I think the question kind of -you know, our position is that in these cases, if you look
at Meyer and Callister, the non-credible portions of the
Maryland tax were those which were imposed by the county.
And they were considered imposed by the county because
they were imposed at the county level. And so taking that
rationale, we believe the position supported that to the
extent the tax is not imposed on a statewide level. It
would not be imposed by the state.

So I guess your question assumes that imposed by is already satisfied. And I think our position is that here we don't have -- the impose by requirement is not satisfied by virtue of the fact that these taxes are not imposed by the state. In fact, impose by in a plain -- you know, in a plain meaning of the term, imposed by the MTA.

JUDGE GAST: Okay. Thank you very much,
Mr. Hall. Sorry for that convoluted question there.

I'll turn it over to Judge Akin. I think you have a few more questions.

JUDGE AKIN: I had just one other question moving onto a slightly different topic. So I just wanted to ask, you know, for the paid to requirement. If I'm

understanding your position -- Franchise Tax Board's position correctly with respect to the MCTMT, it's that it's not paid to the state because it's essentially held in trust for the, you know, Transit Authority as opposed to -- is that correct? I just wanted to make sure I understand. Because in the sense of whose -- you know, who you are writing the check to or making the electronic payment to, it's being --

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MR. HALL: Yeah. That's what we believe was addressed in the Meyer. And our position is we have to look at paid to sort of substantively, not -- not literally. And so as pointed out in Meyer, the taxpayer made an argument that, hey, we literally paid our check to the State of Maryland, and so it's paid to the State of Maryland under the statute. And the Court actually says they disagree with this analysis. They say we don't view this as a literal -- you know, we don't interpret the word paid to literally. And so, therefore, taxpayer, we disagree with you.

Now, as I mentioned, it's not our place to question why the Meyer Court ultimately allowed a portion of the credit or have a portion of the tax to qualify for their credit. But the language is there suggesting that. And I believe, you know, in a world where we interpret the statute in a sensible way, we're looking at the MCTMT and

1 saying, the statute under 805, the New York statute 2 requires the taxes be held in trust by the comptroller and 3 paid to the MTA. These are the MTA's funds by law and so, therefore, they are paid to in substance the MTA. And for 4 5 purposes of 18001, they are paid to the MTA. JUDGE AKIN: Understood. I just wanted to make 6 7 sure I was understanding fully. 8 MR. HALL: Thank you. 9 JUDGE AKIN: Thank you. That's all the questions 10 I had at this time. 11 JUDGE GAST: This is Judge Gast. Thank you, 12 Judge Akin. 13 At this point, I'm going to turn it over to 14 Appellants for their rebuttal for 30 minutes, if you're 15 ready. 16 Yeah. I might ask for a 10-minute MR. BRANNAN: 17 break, not to necessarily stretch this out, but I think it 18 might help smooth out the rebuttal as opposed my random 19 notes here. If you just give me that courtesy, I would 20 really appreciate it. 2.1 JUDGE GAST: Okay. So why don't we come back at 22 3:50. So again, mute your microphones, turn off your 23 cameras, but don't leave Webex. Thank you. 2.4 (There is a pause in the proceedings.) 25 JUDGE GAST: All right. I think we have everyone

1 back. So why don't we go back on the record, Ms. Alonzo. 2 And I'll turn it over to Mr. Brannan for 3 Appellants' rebuttal, and you will have 30 minutes. please begin whenever you're ready. 4 5 MR. BRANNAN: Thank you very much, Judge Gast. 6 I guess I'd like to begin by asking Mr. Newman a 7 couple of questions to clarify some facts that just really need to be pinned down at this point. 8 9 10 FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. BRANNAN: 11 12 First, with regard to the Mobility Tax, Mr. Newman, who is the tax paid to when somebody writes a 13 14 check for the tax? 15 It would be the State of New York Department of 16 Taxation and Finance, the Commissioner of the State 17 Department of Taxation and Finance. 18 So it is not paid to the MTA or any other Transit 19 Authority? 20 That's correct. 2.1 Second question, Mr. Newman. Does the MTA have 22 any independent authority to reject a decision by the 23 State to impose the Mobility Tax? 2.4 No. The Mobility Tax was imposed by state law 25 and became effective immediately on that. The MTA had no

discretion to choose not to.

Q So that makes it a little different than the way you have described the UBT; correct?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. Thank you. Last question for you,
Mr. Newman. I believe that Respondent has suggested that
the UBT is not part of the state tax code. Could you
please respond to that -- the state laws, excuse me.

A The Unincorporated Business Tax is in the unconsolidated laws of the general -- I'm sorry. I'm giving general city law -- the model law and it's Chapter 772 of the laws in 1966. It's been updated, and it is included in the state acts. I mean, in the body of state laws. It's in an unconsolidated law.

MR. BRANNAN: Great. Thank you very much. And no further questions for Mr. Newman.

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CLOSING STATEMENT

MR. BRANNAN: And I'll do my best here to kind of unpack a number of things that we heard. And I think I'll start with the Mobility Tax because it does illustrate, I think, a number of flaws in Respondent's position.

First, you know, factually as indicated by

Mr. Newman, it's indeed paid to the State. And so we can

reach to this dichotomy of imposed by and paid to, you

know, and that's fine. We start with the impose by branch of this, and I think it's very much kind of a semantic exercise. I appreciate that it says impose by and in the state -- or in the statute. I understand that. But I think that you, you know, if you were to draw a Venn diagram, which is one of my favorite things to do, you can't impose if you don't have the authority.

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And so if you have the authority, then that really drives who is the one imposing the tax. Either I let you do it, or I don't let you do it. And if I let you do it, there you have it. Now, if I give you a choice as to how to do it, then that's the discretionary part.

That's the 20 to 50 percent that we're talking about in the Maryland surcharge. If I give you choices as to how you can do it, then that's -- you know, that's different. But if I tell you how to do it and I don't give you any choice at all as to what the terms are, then that's -- you know, that's the authority. That's the power to tax, you know.

Now, very quickly, it's convenient, if nothing else, but refer to the -- you know, at the top of -- you know, it's page 1 of Exhibit H offered by Respondent in that very first opening paragraph. It talks about the Transit Authority as a corporate entity separate and apart from the State of New York. Okay. Well, I think we're

all in agreement there. Without any power of taxation, so there's a different word. Power of tax. Power or authority, it doesn't matter. But for the Mobility Tax, at least, that's very clearly and without question imposed by the State.

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So let's talk about the impose by and paid to.

So what's troubling here is I've heard a few times that

Meyers is not binding on California. Well, you know,

that's great. And I appreciate that a Tax Court decision

from another state is not binding. You know, we never

said it was. What we said was is because Callister adopts

Meyer, that Callister is binding and therefore, so is the

rationale of the Meyer case. And that's what the verbiage

in Callister. We adopt Meyer.

And so what it means is that we adopt all the arguments. And now what is also interesting is we sit there and we can now look at the Meyers language as Respondent did, then he said, you know, paid to. We're not going to look at as a literal requirement. But then Respondent wants to turn around and rely on the terms paid to. Now, I'm not sure what the difference is between looking at the words paid and saying we're not going to do a literal test here. That's a little too convenient.

At the end of the day, what's going is that Respondent wants it both ways. Respondent on one hand

wants say, hey, if not paid to the state -- or if it's not paid to the locality and it's paid to the state, well, that doesn't mean what it says. But if it is paid to the locality and not to the state, well, that's important all of a sudden. And that's really the task is as to why it's not a meaningful requirement when it stands on its own.

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Callister didn't look at it as two distinct requirements. It says imposed by and paid to. Bartz looked at it as imposed by and paid to. And if you want to know what the word paid means, it means have I written the check. That's what all the case authority is. This is a brand-new thing that the FTB is raising, literally, out of nothing. Because what that word means is it's like, well, did you actually pay it? I don't get it if I'm credit. I don't get it if I'm filed an, you know, a refund claim that hasn't been acted on. I don't -- I mean, there's all these reasons that I don't get it because it's not paid. But what that word means is paid.

And so the idea that imposed by and paid to, when you look at the language of Callister and Meyers and even Bartz because it was overruled, they treat them together and they say, what we care about is who is the taxing authority? And, again, it's the State very clearly for the Mobility Tax. And we would say, you know, as we make clear in our arguments, the same for the UBT.

Okay. Let's talk about another argument. It says the MCTMT or the UBT, you know, the MCT is held in trust. Okay. What they're saying, again, is that it's how we use the money that determines, you know, how the tax is imposed, or who it's paid to. Well, that argument is just flat out rejected in Callister because that was the basis for the decision in Bartz with respect to the non-discretionary portion of the Maryland tax. And then they said no, we're not going to follow that rationale.

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And here's the deal. For Callister to approve the credit, the non-discretionary portion of that Maryland tax, they have to reject both arguments. They have to reject the idea that the use of the fund matters. They have to reject the idea that who it's paid to matters. They have to reject all of the arguments that would otherwise deny the credit in order to grant it. Because as Respondent indicated, we've got to meet all the requirements. I know that. But when Callister comes down and says we're giving you the credit, it means all of those argument are rejected.

And so when the FTB wants to go down that path and say, hey, this is how we're using the funds, you know, this whole agency concept. Again, raised in Bartz, reject in Callister. This is not hard. It's incredibly frustrating to sit here and watch the FTB repeatedly make

up the rules, like in their legal ruling 2018-01 where they put forth the same arguments that are rejected by the cases. They are doing it again here today. Those are not important to the outcome here. Who the check is written to. It's not important. The court say that. Our Board says that. It's precedential decision. It's what we're bound by and what we need to follow.

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So use of funds, Meyers and Callister. So the other thing that's very fascinating to me is Respondent's argument that make a point. And well, clearly, it's not a statewide tax. It's a city tax because it says in the title it's the New York City Unincorporated Business Tax. Well, I mean, it's very rare that I can sit here and say look, I got a U.S. Supreme Court case that's on my side. It says that the labels don't matter. Well, when it says labels don't matter, labels don't matter for everybody. It doesn't mean that we can decide it's important for this case but not for the other case.

Again, what the FTB want to do is they want to have their cake and eat it too by saying that who it's paid to means this for this tax, and that for that tax.

You can't do that. We got to have a rule, and that rule is articulated in the Callister case based in Meyers. And then you look at the labels. Well, labels don't matter.

So the fact that it says it's the Transit District or it's

the city tax. It doesn't matter. And the authorities are pretty -- they're just overwhelming, you know.

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So this -- the other thing, this idea, and I think I said this in response maybe to one of the questions earlier. But the idea that, you know, the power to impose. So we have power in position. We have authority. We have discretion. And, again, I think what drives this whole thing -- and, really, if you look at the language in Callister, what they talk about is who is the taxing authority. And without the state nothing happens in New York for either of these taxes, and that's the starting inquiry.

And then what we do is we say, okay. Is there, in fact, a double tax. Then we go to the net income piece again, and that's a leveling influence. We go to the use of California Nonresident Sourcing Rules. What that does is that levels out the tax again to make sure that we're talking about the same revenue or income pot for purposes of how the tax is determined, and what's paid. And once you do that, then if there's a double tax, what the statute says is our taxpayers, our residents of this state deserve a remedy for that double tax.

We're not trying to get too much. We're not trying to get too little. But if there is indeed a double tax, which there is in this case, then they deserve a

remedy for it. And it's really that simple at the end of the day. So we're all very strongly with Respondent's interpretation of either the Meyer case or the Callister case. And again, there's a reason I started with Bartz. Because all of the arguments raised in Bartz kind of, you know, have now been rejected, and there's no other authority out there on those points.

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Let's talk a little bit about the UBT, and I think it's really important because the way Respondent relied on the idea that where it's located in the tax code matters. One, we don't think it does because the State granted authority for the UBT. And once granted, once enacted in 1966, for our purposes the years under consideration, the City no longer had any discretion to the extent they may have had it earlier, and we're not even agreeing with that, Judge Gast, mindful of your question.

But at the end of the day for the years in question they couldn't change anything. They had zero discretion over the tax, and that matters. It matters a lot. At least that's the basis for Callister for it says is credible versus what is not. What matters more is that there's, in fact, a double tax because we're doing the same net income stream. We're doing a portion of it that's earned in the City, and at the end of the day

that's a clear double tax. Whether we like it or not, it's a double tax.

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And what the guidance is by looking at the Eel River the statutory construction stuff says, hey, what's the purpose of the statutes? What are we talking about here? And what we're talking about is a credit for a double tax. I understand what Respondent is saying about narrow construction, but narrow construction means consistent with the rules, consistent with the purpose of the statute. If we deny the credit for the UBT, what we're saying is yes, we know there's a double tax. But there's some technical foot fault that's going to keep that from happening, and that's just the wrong outcome.

So I think that you know -- and, again, the reference, the idea, it is -- it is in the state laws. The whole UBT is in the state laws. Mr. Newman gave that. That it's the other thing. It's like there's so many statements here that it's the reason Mr. Newman is here is to give everybody reference to the New York laws, which he's done. And so that we can focus on what we know. But when we start saying things that just aren't accurate, like, who it's paid to and where the law is found and who is the driving authority behind the tax. You know, that's the wrong way to go about resolving this sort of issue at the panel, considering policy implication.

You know, if I have to sit here one more time and hear the FTB threaten the panel with how bad this could be if the agency loses because there's so many taxpayers out there, I just -- it's not a valid legal argument. It doesn't matter. I have two clients, the Mathers. They paid this tax. They paid the tax twice on their income, and they deserve a credit so that they don't have to pay that tax twice in the same income.

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At the end of the day, that's what this case is about, not any other taxpayer in the State of California, not another tax outside of the Mobility Tax or the UBT.

It's about whether there's a double tax. And in this case, categorically there's a double tax, and they should get the relief by the additional credit.

No further comments. Thank you very much for your time today.

JUDGE GAST: Thank you. This is Judge Gast. Thank you, Mr. Brannan.

I'm going to turn it over to the panel to see if they have any final questions. Well, actually, let me ask Mr. Hall.

Since, Mr. Brannan asked some questions of Mr. Newman, did you want to ask him any follow-up questions just to be fair here?

MR. HALL: Thank you, Judge. No, we don't have

any other questions for Mr. Newman.

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JUDGE GAST: Okay. Thank you.

So I will turn it over to the panel for final questions. Judge Akopchikyan?

JUDGE AKOPCHIKYAN: I don't have any questions. Thank you everybody.

JUDGE GAST: Okay. And Judge Akin?

JUDGE AKIN: Judge Akin here. I don't have any additional questions. I just want to thank both the parties.

JUDGE GAST: And I don't have any additional questions myself.

This concludes the hearing, and I want to thank the parties for their presentations.

As I communicated to the parties prior to the hearing and during the hearing, the record in this appeal will remain open to allow the parties, if they wish, to concurrently submit any additional evidence and an additional brief related to the additional evidence to further develop the record. The parties will have by Friday, October 20th, 2023, to make their submissions and will then have 30 days to respond to the opposing party's submission. And then after that, OTA will note both the parties that the record has been closed, which will start the 100 days to issue the opinion for this matter. And I

will send out a post-hearing order with this information after this hearing, likely tomorrow or Friday. And with that, not seeing any questions on that, I will lastly state, again, thank you. And we will start again with hearings tomorrow at 9:30 a.m. Thank you everyone. (Proceedings adjourned at 4:07 p.m.)

1 HEARING REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 2 I, Ernalyn M. Alonzo, Hearing Reporter in and for 3 the State of California, do hereby certify: 4 5 That the foregoing transcript of proceedings was 6 taken before me at the time and place set forth, that the 7 testimony and proceedings were reported stenographically 8 by me and later transcribed by computer-aided 9 transcription under my direction and supervision, that the 10 foregoing is a true record of the testimony and 11 proceedings taken at that time. 12 I further certify that I am in no way interested 13 in the outcome of said action. 14 I have hereunto subscribed my name this 23rd day 15 of October, 2023. 16 17 18 19 ERNALYN M. ALONZO 20 HEARING REPORTER 21 2.2 23 2.4

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