BEFORE THE OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ΙN	THE	MATTER	OF	THE	APPEAL	OF,)			
М.	SAX	ON,)	OTA	NO.	20036049
		•		A.	PPELLAN'	Г.)			
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TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Cerritos, California

Tuesday, September 12, 2023

Reported by: ERNALYN M. ALONZO HEARING REPORTER

1	BEFORE THE OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS
2	STATE OF CALIFORNIA
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5	IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL OF,)
6	M. SAXON,) OTA NO. 20036049
7	APPELLANT.)
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14	Transcript of Proceedings, taken at
15	12900 Park Plaza Dr., Cerritos, California, 91401,
16	commencing at 2:53 p.m. and concluding
17	at 3:31 p.m. on Tuesday, September 12, 2023,
18	reported by Ernalyn M. Alonzo, Hearing Reporter,
19	in and for the State of California.
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1	APPEARANCES:	
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3	Panel Lead:	ALJ ASAF KLETTER
4	Panel Members:	ALJ RICHARD TAY
5	raner members.	ALJ EDDY LAM
6	For the Appellant:	THOMAS NITTI
7		
8	For the Respondent:	STATE OF CALIFORNIA FRANCHISE TAX BOARD
9		CAROLYN KUDUK NATHAN HALL
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1	<u>INDEX</u>
2	
3	<u>EXHIBITS</u>
4	
5	(Appellant's Exhibits 1-5 were received at page 7.)
6	(Department's Exhibits A-M were received at page 6.)
7	
8	OPENING STATEMENT
9	DACE
10	<u>PAGE</u>
11	By Mr. Nitti 7
12	By Ms. Kuduk 13
13	
14	CLOSING STATEMENT
15	<u>PAGE</u>
16	By Mr. Nitti 19, 25
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

1 Cerritos, California; Tuesday, September 12, 2023 2 2:53 p.m. 3 JUDGE KLETTER: So let's go on the record. 4 5 This is the Appeal of Saxon, OTA Case Number 6 20036049. Today is Tuesday, September 12th, 2023, and the 7 time is approximately -- is 2:53 p.m. 8 And my name is Judge Kletter. With me are 9 Administrative Law Judges Richard Tay and Eddy Lam. 10 One item I would like to address before we begin 11 is just that Judge Lam will be substituting on this panel. 12 I would like to confirm with the parties that they have no objection to Judge Lam serving on the panel for this 13 14 appeal, beginning with Appellant. 15 MR. NITTI: Tom Nitti. No objection. 16 MS. KUDUK: Carolyn Kuduk. No objection. 17 Thank you so much. JUDGE KLETTER: 18 While I am lead ALJ in conducting this hearing, 19 all three judges are coequal decision makers. Also 20 present is our stenographer, Mr. Alonzo, who is reporting 2.1 this hearing verbatim. 22 As mentioned previously, please speak one at a 23 Do not speak over each other. Please speak clearly 2.4 and loudly. And when needed, there may be an interjection 25 to stop to ask for clarification. And after the hearing,

1 there will be the final -- the official hearing transcript, which will be available on the Office of Tax 2 3 Appeals website. And the hearing transcript and video recording are part of the public record. 4 5 Now, can the parties please each identify yourself by stating your name for the record, beginning 6 7 with Appellant. MR. NITTI: Tom Nitti for Appellant. 8 9 MS. KUDUK: Carolyn Kuduk for Respondent. 10 MR. HALL: Nathan Hall on behalf of Respondent. 11 JUDGE KLETTER: Thank you. 12 And my understanding is that the issue is whether for the 2013 tax year Appellant completed any valid like 13 14 kind exchanges pursuant to Internal Revenue Code Section 15 1031. 16 Now, with respect to the evidentiary record, FTB 17 has provided Exhibits A through M. Appellant did not 18 object to the admissibility of these exhibits. Therefore, 19 these exhibits are entered into the record. 20 (Department's Exhibits A-M were received in 21 evidence by the Administrative Law Judge.) 22 JUDGE KLETTER: Appellant provided Exhibits 1 23 through 5. FTB did not object to the admissibility of

these exhibits. Therefore, these exhibits are entered

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into the record.

(Department's Exhibits 1-5 were received in

2 evidence by the Administrative Law Judge.)

JUDGE KLETTER: As a reminder for today, we have 35 minutes for Appellant's presentation, 60 minutes for FTB's presentation, and 25 minutes for Appellant's closing statements and rebuttal. Hopefully -- and there will be no time for -- there's no need for testimony. So I'm going to turn it over Appellant.

Mr. Nitti, are you ready to begin your presentation?

MR. NITTI: Yes.

JUDGE KLETTER: Please go ahead.

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PRESENTATION

MR. NITTI: Yes. This is Tom Nitti. And good afternoon to all. Behind me is my assistant Tony and the daughter-in-law of the taxpayer, Tatianna.

My client Merrily Saxon, the taxpayer involved in this matter, is 80 years old at this time, and was ten years younger in 2013 when this problem came up. Now, this is a very unique case and certainly can be determined for the taxpayer without creating a broad precedent. I think the only thing California taxpayers would want to know about this case is that if they become mentally disabled, they need not fear the Franchise Tax Board.

They can know that they will be treated fairly and with consideration for their circumstances.

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We're working with what the tax community, lawyers, accountants, and so on recognizes as an archaic rule with no useful purpose except to trip taxpayers up. This rule, the 45-day identification rule, that's a requirement to identify possible up leg properties is a hangover from the Starker case when deferred exchanges were first recognized by the courts. Regardless, it is the law, and we must deal with it.

My client has, I believe, has satisfied the

Franchise Tax Board that there should be no penalty in

this case, and the Franchise Tax Board has, in fact,

removed it. My client went to the settlement offices and

tried to settle the case. But I think the overall

understanding of the State is that, although penalties can

be settled or waived, taxes must be paid. So no relief

can be afforded regarding taxes.

The Franchise Tax Board can recognize my client's mental disability and say we're not going to hold you liable for any penalties. But nobody can point to anything that says we can relieve you of taxes. You know, I'm sorry. We just can't do it. And I imagine that would be the case in a lot of circumstances. Either you owe the taxes, or you don't. It's pretty cut and dry. Here, if

you don't meet the exchange requirements, you owe the tax.

Otherwise, they're not owed, they're just deferred. So

they're either deferred, or they're owed.

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Nevertheless, my client pleas for relief, and I believe it is possible. Now, I make the argument that this is actually three exchanges and not one exchange.

And this gives my client a non-precedential avenue to relief. If it is determined to be three exchanges, factual determination, my client did not exceed the three property identification rule. My client can only identify nine properties. Now, there is certainly evidence to support my client, if you follow a substance over form rule.

For example -- and I'll keep this brief because it's in my papers. There are three separate independent exchange agreements. There is -- there were three different parties at the other end of the exchange, three different opening dates, three closing dates, three different properties. What suddenly made it one exchange? Well, my client thought it was one exchange. I certainly understand that, but her understanding is subject to basically an objective review. And just because my client used one exchange company doesn't necessarily turn three exchanges into one.

Now, if you're inclined to look for an answer

that could give my client relief in these very unique circumstances, that's certainly one way you could go. You have -- you have -- it depends on how you look at the facts, but you definitely have a way to go there. Let me give you an analogy to what my client did here. Let's say a single woman with a child files a California 540.

Instead of checking the box head of household, she mistakenly checks single. However, she fills out the return using head of household rates. Okay. My client filled out a form incorrectly, and she filled out the rest of the tax return as if she had filled it out correctly, just like the mother who checks single and she is head of household.

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Now, of course my client's situation is a step removed from that because she is mentally incapacitated at the time. In the analogy the mother then gets a notice from the Franchise Tax Board saying she owes additional tax as a single rate and a penalty, quite similar to the present case. My client owes additional tax and a penalty. How does that play out? Well, the women in that case, the mother in that case goes into audit. And I do not doubt that the penalty would be immediately removed. It's pretty clear. She checked the wrong box. She is a mother with a child, and she is entitled to head of household.

Now, is the auditor now precluded from adjusting the tax downward to head of household rate? So when the mother says thank you for removing the penalty, but do I have to pay the single rate because I checked that box? I think not either. I think just the normal course of things, both the penalty and the tax would be adjusted. That, I believe, is inherent authority of the Franchise Tax Board, and it's the inherent authority of the OTA to deal with that. Now, my client has evidence of her intent, just like the woman in the analogy did. She said look, I filled out the tax return that had the head of household rates.

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My client's evidence is that she completed the exchange. Nobody has any question with how the exchange was completed and reported it as complete. And there's been no problem acquired of the up leg properties. They qualified, other than for this problem. You could argue my client and I will is substantial compliance, but I think more seriously her -- her mental difficulty meant that was the best she could do.

Lastly, let me talk about, just briefly, the maximus of jurisprudence. Civil Code 3529 says, acts regarding is about a -- acts being regarded as having been done, and says, "That which ought to have been done is to be regarded as done in favor of him to whom and against

him for whom performance is due." I say we ought to regard what should have been done, that form correctly filled out, under these circumstances, as done, and that my client qualified for the exchange.

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Just let me mention one other thing in anticipation of the Franchise Tax Board's presentation. The Franchise Tax Board did a lot of work on the other way of qualifying an exchange, basically, by the percentage of how much the property cost to replace it with and so on.

I just want the OTA to know for my purposes and our position, that's a none-issue for us. Our issue is we did -- you agree that we did three or nine, depending on how you see it, and qualified, or you don't. There's no need to go any numerical calculations about this exchange because we're not relying on those alternative methods because we did not qualify for any of them. We did not qualify for them anyhow.

Thank you very much.

JUDGE KLETTER: This is Judge Kletter. Thank you Mr. Nitti for your presentation.

Before I turn it over to the Franchise Tax Board,
I'd like to turn it over to my panel, beginning with
Judge Tay.

Judge Tay, did you have any questions for the parties?

1	JUDGE TAY: I have no questions for Appellant at
2	this time.
3	JUDGE KLETTER: And then I'd just like to turn it
4	over to Judge Lam.
5	Judge Lam, did you have any questions?
6	JUDGE LAM: This is Judge Lam speaking. I don't
7	have any questions for now. Thank you.
8	JUDGE KLETTER: And this is Judge Kletter. I do
9	not have any questions either.
10	Ms. Kuduk, are you ready to begin your
11	presentation?
12	MS. KUDUK: Sure. Can I ask a clarifying
13	question to opposing Counsel?
14	JUDGE KLETTER: Yeah.
15	MS. KUDUK: Okay. I just wanted to make sure.
16	So you're saying that you didn't meet the 200 percent rule
17	and the 95 percent rule? That's not at issue in this case
18	then?
19	MR. NITTI: Yes.
20	MS. KUDUK: Okay. Thank you. Give me a second
21	then. Thank you. Okay. Thank you.
22	
23	PRESENTATION
24	MS. KUDUK: Good afternoon. My name is Carolyn
25	Kuduk, and this is Nathan Hall.

The issue in this appeal is has Appellant met her burden of proof to show that the sales of the Gardner Property, the Cohasset Properties, and the Sepulveda Property in taxable year 2013 are eligible for the tax deferral treatment provided by Internal Revenue Section 1031.

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Respondent properly disallowed Appellant's one attempt in Section 1031 exchange because as opposing Counsel just said, he did not meet the 25 -- the 200 percent rule or the 95 percent rule. Further, the evidence shows that Appellant's attempted one Section 1031 exchange, not three Section 1031 exchanges. And finally, there's no law that allows Respondent to excuse Appellant from the statutory requirement that replacement property must be properly identified. Therefore, Appellant does not qualify for the nonrecognition of gain per Section 1031, and Respondent's determination must be upheld.

Okay. So the facts of this appeal show that Appellant did not properly identify replacement property in the manner required by Section 1031. Appellant sold the Gardner Properties and the Cohasset Properties in July 2013, and the Sepulveda Property in August 2013 as relinquished property in an attempted Section 1031 exchange. The fair market value of the property was \$10.3 million. But as Respondent -- or as Appellants have

stated, there is no issue about the value of the properties.

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However, Appellants have submitted one identification letter, the September 2nd identification letter, which states that Appellant would acquire only two replacement properties for one exchange ending in No. 743. The September 2nd identification letter identified five separate properties as replacement property for property relinquished in one exchange, again, with exchange number ending in 7.43 or 7-43. Appellant then acquired two properties in October and November of 2013 as replacement property, again, in one exchange he ending in the number 7-43. Appellant submitted no other identification letter but the September 2nd identification letter.

Section 1001 and 1031 relating to the taxation of gain from the sale of property. The nonrecognition provisions of Section 1031 is an exception to the general rule requiring that gain from the sale of property must be recognized. Because Section 1031 is an exception to the recognition requirement of Section 1001, a taxpayer must follow the statutory requirements of Section 1031 to gain the tax deferral treatment of Section 1031.

In this appeal, Respondent has no ability to deviate from those requirements because we conform to

Internal Revenue Code Section 1031. Specifically, 1031(a) states, "Gain from the sale of property is not eligible for nonrecognition if the replacement property is not identified by the end of the identification period or not received by 180 days."

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A taxpayer can identify up to three properties without regard to the fair market value of the properties or any number of properties as long as the fair market value of the identified properties does not exceed 200 percent of the fair market value of the relinquished property. And as stated again, this is not at issue in this case. Really, the issue in this case is, is there three separate exchanges, and does Franchise Tax Board have the ability to waive the identification requirement?

Appellant did not satisfy her burden to show that she identified replacement property for three separate exchanges as she claims. The exchange documents and only the identification letter presented, the September 2nd identification letter, indicate that Appellant attempted only one Section 1031 exchange as evidenced by the fact that only one exchange number ending in 7-43 was used. The documents never referenced any other exchange.

Appellant's September 2nd identification letter identifies replacement property for one exchange and indicates she would relinquish three properties and buy

two other properties to qualify for a Section 1031.

Appellant's actions indicate that she did one exchange.

The facts of this appeal show that she executed what she indicated she would do in the September 2nd identification letter. She relinquished three properties and then bought two properties for an alleged one exchange.

In no identification letter did Appellant indicate that she was buying a percentage of those two properties, which would be necessary if she was completing three separate exchanges. Further, Appellant did not substantiate that she identified replacement property for three exchanges in the manner required by Section 1031. Appellant did not show that she unambiguously identified replacement property for three separate 1031 exchanges. Rather, Appellant only provided the September 2nd identification letter, which identified replacement property for one exchange, again, with that No. 7-43.

Appellant provided no proof the September 2nd identification letter was revoked or any new identification letter to show she unambiguously identified replacement property for three separate Section 1031 exchanges. Appellant has not substantiated that she satisfied the strict identification requirements to identify replacement property of three separate exchanges.

Further, there's no law that allows

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Respondent to excuse Appellant from the statutory requirement that replacement property must be properly identified. FTB does not have the authority or discretion to provide relief here. Because Revenue & Taxation Code Section 18031 conforms to Section 1031, which is an exception to Section 1001, California conforms to the Treasury Regs of Section 1031. These regulations provide identification requirements.

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These identification requirements were no met.

So therefore, this transaction does not qualify for a

Section 1031 exchange. Because it does not qualify for a

Section 1031 exchange, Section 1001 must -- it -- it

governs, and the gain on the sale of the three properties

cannot be deferred, and taxes must be paid on that gain.

Since Appellant has not met the statutory requirements of Section 1031, Appellant cannot defer the gain from the three properties, and Respondent properly proposed a tax adjustment to include the gain from the sale of these three properties in Appellant's taxable income in taxable year 2013. Therefore, Respondent's determination should be upheld.

Thank you. I'm available for any questions.

JUDGE KLETTER: This is Judge Kletter. Thank you for your presentation.

Before we turn it over to Appellant's closing

statement and rebuttal, I just want to ask my panel again.

Judge Tay, do you have any questions for either of the parties?

JUDGE TAY: I have no questions at this time.

JUDGE KLETTER: And Judge Lam, do you have any questions at this time?

JUDGE LAM: I don't have any questions at this time. Thank you.

JUDGE KLETTER: And I will hold my questions until the end.

So, Mr. Nitti, would you like to make a final statement or rebuttal to anything that Ms. Kuduk said, or is there anything else that you prepared or would like to say before the case is submitted?

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CLOSING STATEMENT

MR. NITTI: Tom Nitti. Yes. Thank you.

Just because the accommodator gave these, what I call three exchanges, one number, that doesn't mean it all of a sudden becomes one exchange. There's certainly no court authority or regulatory authority or statutory authority in that regard. How they choose to number a client's exchanges internally for filing purposes, that's up to them. The facts on the ground are that we have three separate transactions that were consolidated at the

1 That doesn't mean that does now become one exchange. end. 2 And also, FTB's argument that the taxpayer hasn't 3 followed the rules, that's a very straightforward argument. I understand that. But the FTB's talking like 4 5 this is a normal taxpayer. Okay. And this is an impaired 6 taxpayer, and no consideration is being given for that 7 except for relief of the penalty. That consideration was given, but no consideration is given to the fact that this 8 9 technical error on what we agree is -- or what I see, and 10 many others, as an archaic, but binding form, puts a 11 person at -- on such a great deal of unexpected taxes. 12 Which if this were allowed to go through, the taxes would still be there. They'd be deferred and due one day. 13 So thank you very much. 14 15 JUDGE KLETTER: This is Judge Kletter. 16 you. 17 And would just like to turn it one last time to 18 my panel. 19 Judge Tay, do you have any questions for the 20 parties at this time? 21 JUDGE TAY: Can you come back to me? 22 JUDGE KLETTER: Yeah. I will come back to you. 23 Judge Lam, do you have any questions at this 2.4 time? 25 Lam. This is Judge Lam speaking. JUDGE LAM: Ι

don't have any questions. Thank you.

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JUDGE KLETTER: This is Judge Kletter. I do actually have a few questions for the parties. Mostly for Appellants, so I'll ask Appellant first.

And, Respondent, if you have any comments you can answer following.

My first question is my understanding correct that even though the identification letter references -- let me see if I can -- the identification letter, the August 15th, 2013, one says that there's a reminder letter about a first relinquished property. But I just want to confirm with Appellant and the parties that even though that Appellant agrees that only one identification letter was submitted with five properties, there was only one identification letter. You're not aware of any other identification letter or reminder letter sent by the exchange accommodator to Ms. Saxon?

MR. NITTI: Tom Nitti. I don't know what a reminder letter is, but there was only one identification letter.

JUDGE KLETTER: And my second question, just if you're aware of the exchange agreement is in the record and the Exhibit A list what properties are there, and the only property on Exhibit A is the Sepulveda Property. And my understanding from the briefing is that the two other

properties were added at a later time to Exhibit A. Do you have any other information on how that was done?

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MR. NITTI: The only information as to how that was done were the other properties were brought to the same accommodator, but they different contracts, different buyers, different due dates, different closing dates.

TUDGE KLETTER: And when those were brought to the exchange accommodator and, you know, added into that exchange agreement, was there any documentation that they were separate and independent exchange agreements? Or is there anything not in the record that when those were brought to the exchange accommodator and those properties were added to Exhibit A, the agreement, is there any other documentation not in the record or anything you're aware of that shows like that -- as to whether it was one or three agreements?

MR. NITTI: Tom Nitti. Not that I'm aware of.

JUDGE KLETTER: Okay. Thank you. And I had one more question just about the identification letter. So the identification letter identifies five properties.

And, Mr. Nitti, in your view, you know, there is an exception or a way to meet the identification requirement where you can identify up to three replacement properties per property that you're exchanging. So I'm wondering for the five properties that were identified, how would you be

able to match whether that rule is met or not?

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MR. NITTI: Well, if -- if it's one exchange, well, she identified too many properties. Okay. We're contending this can be interpreted objectively as three, giving her right to identify nine. Are you asking me is there some relationship between the three properties sold and as to which properties acquired relate to which property sold? Is that what you're asking me?

JUDGE KLETTER: That's correct. For each relinquished property --

MR. NITTI: Right.

JUDGE KLETTER: -- you're allowed. From my understanding is that you're allowed to identify up to three replacement properties.

MR. NITTI: Right.

JUDGE KLETTER: So in an instance where, let's say you're relinquishing two properties and you identify five properties, how do you determine to what properties — to what relinquished properties the identified properties relate? Let's say for the first property you identify five or, you know, but in aftermath looking at it objectively how do you know?

MR. NITTI: Okay. Sure. I don't think that's required. Okay. I haven't seen it in code or regulations at all that there has to be -- you know, we can draw

1 lines. Okay. Excuse me. Yeah, we can draw line. 2 went from this property to this one, and we went from this 3 property to half of this one and a quarter of this one. It's just not there. I don't think it was anticipated 4 5 when they wrote the statute. So I think it's okay to have 6 what my client has here, if it's objectively understood as 7 three exchanges. 8 JUDGE KLETTER: This is Judge Kletter. 9 I don't have any more questions at this time, but I 10 wanted to, if needed, FTB if you had any response to what 11 Mr. Nitti said or answered to my questions.

MS. KUDUK: I would just state that the
September 2nd identification letter said that Appellant
would be selling three properties and buying two
properties, and that's what happened in this transaction.
There was no indication that she would be selling three
properties and then buying a percentage of the two
properties, which would be needed to have three separate
exchanges.

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JUDGE KLETTER: Okay. This is Judge Kletter. Thank you.

And I just want to ask Judge Tay, do you have any questions?

 $\,$ JUDGE TAY: No. All my questions were answered. Thank you.

JUDGE KLETTER: And I just want to ask one more 1 2 time. Judge Lam, do you have any questions? 3 JUDGE LAM: No questions. Thank you. JUDGE KLETTER: Okay. So I want to thank the 4 5 parties for their presentations. 6 MR. NITTI: I'm sorry. Do I get the last word? 7 I was looking on the scheduling. JUDGE KLETTER: Oh, I'm sorry. I thought that 8 9 you had --10 MR. NITTI: Just in response to the Franchise Tax 11 Board. 12 JUDGE KLETTER: Sure. Go ahead. 13 14 RE CLOSING STATEMENT 15 MR. NITTI: My client is allowed, you know, when 16 you're going from three properties to two properties, 17 obviously, you can't go one on one. You'd have one left 18 over. So you could take one of the properties my client 19 sold and apply it to a portion of an up leg property. So 20 that way you can roll three into two. You can also 2.1 roll -- excuse. 22 You could roll two into three. You can also roll 23 two into one. You sell two properties and you take the

and half, maybe 60-40, whatever it is. But it's easily

money, and you buy the new one proportionately, maybe half

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1 done, and it doesn't have to be specified on the notice. 2 Not that I'm aware of, I've never seen a requirement for 3 that. Just to identify the parties. 4 Thank you. 5 JUDGE KLETTER: Thank you so much. This -- oh, I'm sorry. 6 7 Judge Tay, did you have any questions? JUDGE TAY: Yes. I'm sorry. I have one question 8 9 for Franchise Tax Board. 10 Is there any significance to the fact that the 11 reminder letter references one exchange number but all 12 properties -- or three properties, which is consistent 13 with the identification letter that has one exchange 14 number. Yeah, just that one exchange number but references -- I guess in the prior reminder letter, it 15 referenced three properties. 16 17 MS. KUDUK: Yes, that would indicate that this is 18 one exchange, and that's how the documents have been 19 presented throughout the exchange that it was one exchange 20 done, not three. 21 JUDGE TAY: Okay. Thank you. Sorry. I have no 22 more questions. 23 JUDGE KLETTER: I just wanted to provide 2.4 Mr. Nitty, do you have a response to what FTB said or to 25 Mr. Tay's question?

1 MR. NITTI: Only that the accommodator, whatever 2 filing system is that -- whatever her filing system is 3 that -- whatever the filing system is doesn't determine the reality or qualification of the exchange. It's the 4 5 taxpayer's actions that do that. 6 Thank you. 7 JUDGE KLETTER: Thank you so much to the parties 8 for their presentation today. 9 This concludes our hearing, and we will meet and 10 decide the case based on the documents and testimony -- or 11 based on the documents presented today. We will issue our 12 written decision no later than 100 days from today. 13 The case is submitted, and the record is now 14 closed. 15 This concludes this hearing session. Thank you 16 so much. 17 (Proceedings adjourned at 3:31 p.m.) 18 19 20 21 2.2 23 2.4 25

1 HEARING REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 2 I, Ernalyn M. Alonzo, Hearing Reporter in and for 3 the State of California, do hereby certify: 4 5 That the foregoing transcript of proceedings was 6 taken before me at the time and place set forth, that the 7 testimony and proceedings were reported stenographically 8 by me and later transcribed by computer-aided 9 transcription under my direction and supervision, that the 10 foregoing is a true record of the testimony and 11 proceedings taken at that time. 12 I further certify that I am in no way interested 13 in the outcome of said action. 14 I have hereunto subscribed my name this 2nd day 15 of October, 2023. 16 17 18 19 ERNALYN M. ALONZO 20 HEARING REPORTER 21 2.2 23 2.4

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