BEFORE THE OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL OF,)
NANOLAB TECHNOLOGIES, INCORPORATED,) OTA NO. 22029660
APPELLANT.)
)

TRANSCRIPT OF ELECTRONIC PROCEEDINGS

State of California

Thursday, February 22, 2024

Reported by: ERNALYN M. ALONZO HEARING REPORTER

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15	taken in the State of California, commencing		
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18	Ernalyn M. Alonzo, Hearing Reporter, in and		
19	for the State of California.		
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1	Panel Lead:	ALJ JOSHUA ALDRICH
2	Panel Members:	ALJ MICHAEL GEARY
		ALJ SHERIENE RIDENOUR
4 5	For the Appellant:	ARTHUR RINSKY LAUREN RINSKY
6		THOMAS BYRD
7	For the Despendent.	STATE OF CALIFORNIA
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		<u>I N D E X</u>			
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3	<u>EXHIBITS</u>				
4					
5	(Appellant's Exhibits 1-8 will be admitted pursuant to a post-hearing order.) (Department's Exhibits A-I will be admitted pursuant to a				
6					
7	post-hearing order.)				
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9		PRESENTATION			
10		<u>PAGE</u>			
11	By Mr. Rinsky	12			
12	By Ms. Rinsky	16			
13	By Ms. Daniels	32			
15					
16	CLOSING STATEMENT				
17		PAGE			
18	By Ms. Rinsky	44			
19	By Mr. Rinsky	47			
20					
21					
22					
23					
24					
25					

California; Thursday, February 22, 2024
1:28 p.m.

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JUDGE ALDRICH: This is Judge Aldrich. We're opening the record in the Appeal of Nanolab Technologies, Incorporated before the Office of Tax Appeals, OTA Case No. 22029660. Today's date is Thursday, February 22nd, 2024, and it's approximately 1:30.

This hearing is being conducted electronically, and it is also being recorded. The hearing is being heard by a panel of three Administrative Law Judges. My name is Josh Aldrich. I'm the lead Judge for purposes of conducting the hearing. I'm joined by Judge Geary and Judge Ridenour. During the hearing, Panel members may ask questions or otherwise participate to ensure that we have all the information needed to decide this appeal. After the conclusion of the hearing, we three will deliberate and decide the issue or issues presented.

As a reminder, the Office of Tax Appeals is not a court. It is an independent appeals body. The panel does not engage in ex parte communications. Our opinion will be based off the parties' arguments, admitted evidence, and the relevant law. We have read the parties' submissions, and we're looking forward to hearing your arguments today.

Who is present for Appellant?

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MR. RINSKY: Arthur Rinsky and Lauren Rinsky and Thomas Byrd the -- he's a CPA, and he is Appellant's vice president of finance and administration.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Thank you.

For CDTFA, who is present?

MS. DANIELS: Courtney Daniels. We also have Jarrett Noble.

MR. NOBLE: Oh, sorry. Jarrett Noble. I hit the mute button when I thought it was unmute. Sorry about that.

JUDGE ALDRICH: No problem.

Sorry. Was that Mr. Parker?

MR. PARKER: Yes. Jason parker.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Thank you.

All right. So in the January 26, 2024 minutes and orders as distributed to the parties, it effectively summarized two related issues. The stated issue was whether the contracts is currently in dispute, i.e., Focused Ion Beam Circuit Edit Services, constitute qualified research and development contracts pursuant to California Code of Regulations, title 18, section 1501.1, and, if not, whether the services at issue constitute repair labor.

So I have an edit to that that I'd like to

propose. Instead, I think it should read, whether the services currently in dispute are exempt under California Code of Regulations, title 18, section 1501.1, and, if not, whether the services at issue constitute nontaxable repair labor. I think that's a bit more narrow and better captures the issue statement on appeal.

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I'll start with Appellant's representative -- yes.

MR. RINSKY: Can I make one comment? Related to the Section 1501.1 issue, something that, Judge Aldrich, you raised at the prehearing conference, and it's clearly addressed in our original appeal. And then one of the additional briefs that we filed, I think, related to that 1501.1 issue is the whole true object was a transaction issue. And I think that we want to address that because it's this confidentiality and no property fact that — that we believe should have that raised instead of —

JUDGE ALDRICH: So --

MR. RINSKY: So, that would relate in the sense to the 1501.1. But it's the two issues you mentioned, but, really, it's part of that first one. It's an inherent question. What's the true object?

JUDGE ALDRICH: Okay. And I appreciate that. With that said, I'll note that issue statements may be subject to change based off the parties' argument. So if

that's something you're going to be arguing, we may modify it for purposes of our opinion.

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With respect to the Department, do you have any issues, Ms. Daniels, with the issue statement that I modified?

MS. DANIELS: No. The Department doesn't have any problems with the modifications. Thank you.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Okay. So next I'd like to address exhibits. So the exhibits will not be admitted today. Rather, the exhibits will be admitted pursuant to a post-hearing order, but I wanted to go over them so we're all on the same page.

as Exhibits A through I. They were timely submitted during the briefing process. Excel copies of the audit work papers were submitted after the prehearing conference pursuant to OTA's or the Office of Tax Appeals request. And that request was made to facilitate the creation of a hearing binder for the parties.

However, I do want to note that the audit work papers were previously provided in briefing between July 5th, 2022, and February 6th, 2023. Those submissions, so the ones that occurred between July 5th, 2022, and February 6, 2023, are the actual items that will be offered into the evidence, not the Excel spreadsheet.

At least that's my understanding.

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With respect to Appellant's exhibits, they are identified as Exhibits 1 through 8. Prior to the prehearing conference, Appellant identified Exhibits 1 through 5. Thereafter, Appellant submitted Exhibits 6 through 8. They were timely submitted after the prehearing conference.

So during the prehearing conference, neither party had objections to admitting the other parties' respective exhibits into evidence. And the minutes and orders also provided the deadline for written objections.

Are there any objections now as to the admissibility of the exhibits? I'll start with Appellant's counsel.

Mr. Rinsky?

MS. RINSKY: Other than what was discussed already about redaction and all that? Then we wouldn't.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Yes.

MS. RINSKY: Then there wouldn't be any objections. It's just to the names and addresses.

JUDGE ALDRICH: And that will be covered in the post-hearing order.

So -- and then with respect to the, Department, do you have any objections to Appellant's proposed exhibits?

1 MS. DANIELS: No. The Department does not have 2 any objections. Thank you. 3 JUDGE ALDRICH: Great. So as I indicated previously, the parties are 4 5 free to refer to the exhibits and the exhibit numbers as 6 exhibits, but they are not currently admitted into 7 evidence. And that will be done via post-hearing order. 8 So moving on. So just so everyone has an idea of 9 how this hearing is going to proceed, Appellant will 10 present an opening presentation, including testimony for 11 approximately 30 minutes. Next, CDTFA will have an 12 opportunity to present a combined opening and closing for 30 minutes. Then the Panel will ask questions of the 13 14 parties for approximately 5 to 10 minutes. And finally, Appellant will have the opportunity for closing remarks or 15 a rebuttal. These estimates are made for calendaring 16 17 purposes. If you need more time, please ask. And if you 18 need to take a break also please let me know. 19 My understanding with respect to witness 20 testimony is that Mr. Byrd is going to be testifying. 21 Is that accurate, Mr. Rinsky? 22 MS. RINSKY: He might just be --23 MR. RINSKY: He might. MS. RINSKY: 2.4 -- available for questions.

The reason we had his declaration

MR. RINSKY:

1	submitted is to save time. So if he were going to
2	testify, those are under oath. That's what he'd be
3	testifying to. So at this point, we don't plan on having
4	him testify other than maybe to clarify if this Body has
5	questions, verification about the things in the
6	declaration. But, otherwise, the purpose of submitting
7	those was to save time.
8	JUDGE ALDRICH: I appreciate that.
9	MS. RINSKY: So if you have if sorry,
10	Judge Aldrich.
11	If you have if the Judges have questions later
12	on and we might have him answer the question if we
13	think that would be more
14	JUDGE ALDRICH: Thanks, Ms. Rinsky.
15	MS. RINSKY: Yeah. Does that make sense?
16	JUDGE ALDRICH: So at this time it would be a
17	good idea to swear Mr. Byrd in. That way if we do have
18	questions for him, we don't have to revisit swearing him
19	in or making sure that the record accurately reflects
20	that.
21	Mr. Byrd, would you mind raising your right hand.
22	
23	T. BYRD,
24	produced as a witness, and having been first duly sworn by

the Administrative Law Judge, was examined, and testified

as follows:

JUDGE ALDRICH: Thank you, sir.

Okay. We've established how the hearing is to proceed. We've addressed exhibits. We've addressed the issue statement. We've addressed witness testimony.

And so now we're ready for you, Mr. Rinsky. Are you ready to proceed with your opening?

MR. RINSKY: Yes, I am. Yes, I am.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Go ahead.

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PRESENTATION

MR. RINSKY: Good afternoon my name is Arthur Rinsky. I'm here with my partner Lauren Rinsky, and we're counsel for Appellant Nanolab. And with us also is Thomas Byrd, as I said, a CPA and Appellants VP of finance and administration.

I'd like to begin with an overview. It's the position of Appellant that, based on uncontroverted sworn evidence submitted by Appellant to this appeals body and admissions by Respondent, Appellant's FIB/CE Transactions are not subject to tax for one or more of the more following reasons: Number one, the transactions are exempt as R&D transactions under Regulation section 1501.1. Number two, in order for Respondent to

subject the transaction to tax, true object of the transaction must be the transfer or use of a taxpayer's tangible personal property. In a FIB/CE Transaction, Appellant never has any personal property to convey. And because the client item is occasionally destroyed in the transaction, true object can be the transfer by Appellant of tangible personal property in order to complete the transaction.

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And in any event, these FIB/CE Transactions can't be fabrication because they don't change the intended use or purpose of the relevant client item. In fact, they can't because it's a small piece of a larger item. And it would be reinventing the entire big wheel that that this little item is just a small part of.

As Judge Geary mentioned in the precedential case of AMB [sic] Care Collective, where taxpayer challenges a Notice of Determination or NOD. Respondent has a minimal initial burden of showing its determination is reasonable and rational, and then the burden shifts to the taxpayer to show that differing result should apply. It's Appellant's position, as discussed in more detail in this --

JUDGE RIDENOUR: Excuse me. I'm going to have to -- I can't hear you. I believe you hit the mute button. So if you can maybe go back to --

1 MR. RINSKY: Oh, I hate the computer. 2 MS. RINSKY: When did you hit the mute button? MR. RINSKY: 3 I don't know. JUDGE RIDENOUR: We're on the record. 4 5 MR. RINSKY: We're on the record. Okay. Well --6 MS. RINSKY: Really? The whole time? 7 MR. RINSKY: Yeah. My dad always used to say I 8 hate the computer, and some days I do. MS. RINSKY: Let me just watch this. 10 MR. RINSKY: Let me begin again. 11 So I'd like to begin with an overview. 12 position of Appellant that based on the uncontroverted 13 sworn evidence submitted by Appellant's to this appeals 14 body and admissions by Respondent, Appellant's FIB/CE 15 Transactions at issue are not subject to tax for one or 16 more of the following reasons: 17 Number one, these transactions are exempt as R&D 18 transactions under Regulation 1501.1. And Lauren will go 19 through that in more detail. 20 In order for Respondent to subject the 2.1 transaction to tax, true object of the transaction must be 22 the transfer or use of a taxpayer's tangible personal 23 property. In a FIB/CE Transaction, Appellant never has 2.4 any personal property to convey because of these 25 confidentiality agreements that make it clear that

whatever we do with the item, it still stays the client's. And because the item is occasionally destroyed and the transactions can still be completed, it can't be.

Tangible personal property cannot be the true object of a FIB/CE Transaction. And finally, in any event, the FIB/CE Transactions are not fabrication as they do not change the intended use or purpose of the relevant item.

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As Judge Geary stated in the precedential case of Appeal of AMB [sic] Care Collective, when a taxpayer challenges a Notice of Determination, Respondent has a minimum additional burden of showing the determination is reasonable and rational. And then the burden of proof shifts to the taxpayer to show that a different result should apply.

It's Appellant's position, as discussion in more detail in this presentation, Respondent's own admissions, the substantial sworn uncontroverted evidence previously submitted by Appellant to OTA in this case, establish that the appeal of Notice of Determination is not reasonable or rational in subjecting Appellant's FIB/CE Transactions to tax. Note also our Exhibit Number 4 where we've tried repeatedly to find out if they have anything to controvert our affidavits and all the evidence we've submitted.

I will now defer to my partner Lauren to discuss the application of Regulation section 15.01 [sic] to

1 FIB/CE Transactions. 2 MS. RINSKY: Hi. This is Lauren Rinsky speaking. 3 So I intend to refer to Appellant by Nanolab, but if that's --4 5 Oh, one moment, please. We're having a landline interference. We're moving battery? 6 7 MR. RINSKY: Yeah. MS. RINSKY: All right. I will continue. 8 Okay. 9 So Nanolab's the FIB Circuit Services 10 constitute -- it's our position that Nanolab's FIB Circuit 11 Edit Services constitute qualified research and 12 development contracts under Regulation 1501.1(a), and Regulation 1501.1(a) has -- there's two requirements. 13 14 There is first one, a discovery of information, which --15 and, which is in Regulation 1501.1(a)(1)(A), and there's 16 the delivery of that information, which is in 17 Regulation 1501.1(a)(1)(b). 18 So I'm going to address the discovery of 19 In Regulation 1501.1(a)(1)(A), that provides information. 20 that under a qualified research and development contract 21 that the services undertaken to discover information which 22 is technical in nature and the results of which are 23 intended to be useful in the development of new or 2.4 improved product process technique or invention. And in 25 here, in all of the FIB's Circuit Edit Services at issue,

Nanolab renders services on proprietary items of its clients to discover -- oh, yeah, something -- to discover information that's technological in nature, such as why the item is not performing as desired by the client and the result of which are intended to be useful in development of new or approved product, process, technique, or invention.

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More specifically, in the FIB Circuit Edit
Services, the engineers at Nanolab, they edit the
propriety item of the client so that the edits can be
inspected, examined, and tested to discover information
that's technological in nature as set forth in the
Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 7, and 8, which are the affidavits by
the engineers at Nanolab and of Thomas Byrd who is with us
today.

Moreover, the CDTFA admits in its AIS Memo, which is the audit and information section memo dated

January 24th, 2018. It admit that the value of a FIB

Circuit Edit Services is alteration of the microchip so that, quote, "Design and/or process improvements can be examined and tested," quote. Further, the CDTFA admits in its August 17th, 2018, audit report -- oh, sorry -- the AIS Memo is Exhibit, A, page 52.

And the -- continue on -- the CDTFA admits in its August 17th, 2018, audit report, which is Exhibit A,

page 43 and 44, that Nanolab performed services on the clients' proprietary devices, and that Nanolab returned the dissected services to the clients, quote, "For their own testing and analysis," quote.

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And I would like to point out that per
Regulation 1501.1(a) (7), information and testing use
includes use by either the contractor, Nanolab, or its
customers, the clients. Yeah. Thus, as evident from the
affidavits in Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8, and the
admissions by the CDTFA in the audit report and the AIS
Memo, the Fib Circuit Edit Services were undertaken for
the purpose of discovering technological information as to
client propriety items. And that information was intended
to be useful in the development of new or improved
products, process, technique, or invention by Nanolab's
clients.

With respect to delivery of information.

Regulation 1501.1(a)(1)(B) provides that the -- or it states, the contact calls for delivery of a report detailing information developed by the contractor or other tangible personal property incidental to the true object of the contract as defined by 1501. Here, in all the FIB Circuit Edit Services at issue, engineers at Nanolab convey the discovered information to Nanolab's clients by one or more of the following: An email, a phone call, or

delivery of the propriety item or pieces of the propriety item to the extent not destroyed.

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And this is set forth in the affidavits in Exhibits 1, 2, 7, and 8. And this is Regulation 1501.1 And it's not disputed by the CDTFA. And that is in -- or it is set forth in Respondent's Exhibit A, which is the Appeals Bureau decision on page 12. And then further, for the purpose of Nanolab's -- further, for the purpose of Nanolab's return to its clients of any undestroyed client proprietary item. That purpose fits squarely within Regulation 1501.1(a)(1)(B), a delivery of information requirement, and also Regulation 1501.1(a)(7), which provides the information in testing use includes use by either the contractor Nanolab or its customers, the clients.

Accordingly, the delivery of information requirement of the Regulation 1501.1(a)(1)(B) is satisfied as to the Fib Circuit Edit Services. And thus, the Fib Circuit Edit Services were rendered to pursuant to a qualified research and development contract under Regulation 1501.1(a), and the Notice of Determination is erroneous because the receipts for those FIB Circuit Edit Services are not subject to tax as provided by Regulation 1501.1(b).

And then just at the $\--$ before I defer to my

partner Arthur Rinsky, I wanted also to just point out that in addition to 1501.1(a)(7), which discusses how the information and testing use includes use by either the contractor Nanolab or its customer, the clients, I just want to point out that Section 15 -- Regulation 1501.1(a)(5), dealing with custom-made items. It states that the custom-made items does not include property the purchaser, Nanolab's clients, will use for information and testing purposes as defined in(a)(7), which is the information testing use.

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And then I also just want to point out that in Section 1501.1(a)(6), which talks about functional use, and it explains functional use is the type of use that occurs after the completion of the research and development and that custom-made items are intended for functional use, not for information and testing use. And in this case it appears that everyone seems to agree that -- that -- yeah. That it's being returned for information testing use by Nanolab, by its clients. And then also that 1501.1(a)(6) with functional use, it also there, again, specifies that the information and testing use of a prototype by the contractor Nanolab or its customer does not qualify as functional use.

And then now I will defer to my partner Art Rinsky for the balance of our presentation.

MR. RINSKY: So even if this body concludes that despite Respondent's submissions of the uncontroverted sworn evidence of the contrary that Regulation section 1501.1 should apply to the FIB/CE Transactions, nevertheless, those transactions do not and cannot have as their true object the transfer or use of tangible personal property of Nanolab. In a FIB/CE Transaction, this is because in these types of transactions, Appellant never has any property of its own to convey.

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This is the reason why we're so concerned about the NDA, the disclosure. We have no proprietary interest in anything that's done with these items or that relates to the item. And if we try to take a position, we would be out of business. Thus, we don't have any property that's ours to convey in these transactions. All we can do is return the client's property to the client, and that's it.

You can see, for example, the Exhibit 7, sections 8 and 9, the confidentiality agreement which even covers R&D results. These are very broadly gone because the people have spent a fortune on these -- on the items that they're asking us to figure out why they aren't working. The fact that Appellant has no property to convey in these transactions, distinguishes this case from both Culligan Water Conditioning and Appeal of Thomas Conglomerate, that

Judge Aldrich asked us to address.

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In both of those cases, the delivery or use of tangible property was an integral part of the transaction at issue. This no property to convey situation was also the situation and annotation 515.0680 that Judge Aldrich asked us to be prepared to address. That annotation, by the way, as well as the two cases predate Regulation In the annotation, the contractor, the taxpayer, 1501.1. had no rights in anything that was developed with respect to the client's property, and there was no specification as to how information developed was to be conveyed. are exactly the facts of FIB/CE Transaction because they can be completed without transferring any property. See, for example, Exhibit 7, section 9, and, again, that confidentiality agreement.

Today agreements, such as the NDAs that were attached to Appellant's Exhibit 7, protect the client's IP from the get go. For that reason, there's no property for a contractor, such as Appellant, to assign back at the end of the FIB/CE Transaction. In the annotation 5150680, I guess IP was more primitive in 1950. And so the owner of the proprietary item had the contractor assign back anything that it developed or whatever. But here they don't have to do it because based on the confidentiality agreement, they always own it. We don't ever own

anything.

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Second, the true object of these transactions is for Appellant to determine and fix the root cause of the client failure -- item's failure, not to make a new item but fabricate a new. Again, if you look at the confidentiality agreement that's attached to Exhibit 7, can even see the client's notation. "Root cause of the failure. Why isn't this thing working?" And they need it to work because if it doesn't work, the item of which is a part of what we're -- so Appellant accomplishes this, the FIB/CE, by using a multi-million dollar instrument that's a vacuum chamber, and they do the editing and whatever they're doing with the item in the chamber. It doesn't change the purpose or intended use of the -- of the item. That's the definition of fabrication.

Throughout this case, there's been talk by

Respondent of fabrication, but nobody ever bothers to

defines what that means. We're not fabricating anything.

We're trying to fix something that's broken and not

working. I refer you to Exhibits 1, sections 4 through 9,

2, sections 4 through 9, 3, sections 6 through 10, 7,

sections 8 and 9, and the attached NDA. Look at also

Exhibit C showing that the client understands that a

FIB/CE Transaction is, in fact, FA, failure analysis

testing. This is from the client who is not involved in

the tax case.

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Third, in a FIB/CE Transaction -- and this is something that I didn't completely understand -- because all of this work is done in a vacuum chamber, when you take the item out, it starts to oxidize and degrade, and it becomes useless. So if we take it out for testing and oxidizes and essentially degrades and it's no good, if we reseal it so the client can look at what we did and they open it up so they can see what we did, it starts to degrade and it's no good. So the oxidation issue also says that the object itself can't be the true object.

Finally, a fact that I viewed most critical here, is the fact that the client's item in a FIB/CE Transaction can be destroyed and, yet, the transaction can still be completed. Now, Respondent concedes that this destruction occurred occasionally. And, in fact, Respondent's own hearing officer found that sometimes the client requested it to be destruction -- that it be destroyed. They're so sensitive as to what this item is.

So this destruction fact, the fact you can have it destroyed and still complete the transaction distinguishes this case from both Culligan Water Conditioning where there were exchanged units and Appeal of Thomas Conglomerate where there were CDs, DVDs, and photos. In each of those cases, delivery or use of

tangible personal property was an integral part of the transactions at issue. The fact that the client wants the undestroyed item on which the services were rendered returned for informational testing and purposes is admitted by Respondent as Lauren pointed out earlier.

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That does not make the property the true object of the transaction. Rather, the true object of the transaction is one of delivery of the report detailing information, which they need if the thing has been oxidized and is no good -- as it happens when they take it out of the chamber -- or a portion of the report or the delivery of what's left of the item after we're through with it. It can't be the item.

And finally, even if this body concludes, despite the uncontroverted sworn evidence and Respondent's admissions to the contrary that somehow FIB/CE

Transactions aren't exempt from tax under Regulation section 1501.1, and that somehow even though the property gets destroyed in the process so we can still carry out the transaction and we have no rights in the property at all but, nevertheless, our property transfer to them is the true object of the transaction. It doesn't matter because these transactions are not fabrications, and they're repairs.

The definition of fabrication is in Appeal of

Praxair, which is cited in our briefs, page 25. And it's where you change the original purpose or function of the item. That's not what's going on in any case with the FIB/CE. We're trying to get something that's not working to work. That's not changing the purpose or function.

And finally in the FIB/CE process to the extent that there are items that we use in the vacuum chamber to play around with the client's item, we pay tax on those items. And, of course, they oxidize as soon as we take it out.

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So in sum, there's no rational or reasonable basis for the Respondent to subject the FIB/CE

Transactions to tax or the Notice of Determination. This is because those transactions were exempt from taxes, R&D transactions. Delivery of tangible personal property was not and could not be the true object of these transactions because the relevant client item is occasionally destroyed. And anything done to that item always remained the client's property, so we have nothing which we have title to convey.

And number three, to the extent that the transactions aren't otherwise exempt under the regulation, the R&D regulation, or the true object test, it could not be fabrication because they didn't change the intended use of the purpose of the client item. It only involved fixing an item that was not functioning as intended by the

1 And Appellant paid tax on any item used to client. 2 correct that function. 3 And thus, that concludes our initial 4 presentation. 5 Thank you, Mr. Rinsky. JUDGE ALDRICH: 6 At this time, I'm going to refer to my Panel 7 members to see if they have any questions, or they can defer until after CDTFA's presentation. 8 9 Judge Ridenour, do you have any questions? 10 JUDGE RIDENOUR: Not at this time. 11 JUDGE ALDRICH: And Judge Geary? 12 JUDGE GEARY: I might. It occurs to me that if 13 we have factual questions about the processes, we need to 14 ask Mr. Byrd those questions. And it also seems to me 15 that the Respondent has not yet offered an argument and 16 might be entitled to the benefit of additional information 17 from Mr. Byrd before it gives its argument. Do I 18 understand, Judge Aldrich, that the Respondent is going to 19 be giving just one argument? 20 JUDGE ALDRICH: That's correct, a combined 2.1 opening and closing. 22 JUDGE GEARY: Then I think I probably should ask

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my questions of Mr. Byrd now. I might have more of him

later after Respondent argues. But I think maybe a few

questions of Mr. Byrd now, if I'm allowed.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Please proceed.

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Mr. Rinsky and Ms. Rinsky, just a reminder to mute when you are not actively speaking. Thank you.

JUDGE GEARY: Good afternoon, Mr. Byrd. You submitted several declarations. I believe two or three of them if I'm not mistaken; is that right?

MR. BYRD: That's correct.

on what happens to the devices that your clients give to your company to do, whatever it is your client is going to be doing to these devices. Specifically, Mr. Rinsky indicated that the work that was done never changes the purpose of the item. But isn't one of the questions whether it changes the function of the item? And if I understand correctly, what some of the things that

Nanolabs does is that it actually alters. Let's say it's an integrated circuit. It actually, in some instances, alters the integrated circuit and returns to the client a circuit that is different than the one that was given to Nanolabs. Is that wrong or right?

MR. BYRD: That's correct.

JUDGE GEARY: It does do that on occasion. So do you know whether or not the documents that were provided to Respondent in the course of the audit are sufficiently detailed to enable Respondent to conclude whether or not

1 the device that was returned to the client was, in fact, 2 different than the device that the client first gave to 3 Nanolabs? MR. BYRD: My recollection is that pictorial 4 5 evidence was presented as an example to the auditors 6 during the process showing them how the circuit was 7 opened, how it was changed, and then resealed. 8 JUDGE GEARY: But that's not what Nanolab does in 9 every case; correct? 10 MR. BYRD: In the context of FIB Circuit Edits, 11 that is the general course of action. JUDGE GEARY: Okay. 12 13 MR. RINSKY: -- test, right? 14 JUDGE ALDRICH: Mr. Rinsky, you'll have an 15 opportunity, but I'd ask you don't interrupt Judge Geary. 16 JUDGE GEARY: I also have just one or two 17 questions about the oxidation process. And I believe 18 Mr. Rinsky indicated that when this kind of FIB/CE work is 19 done, there are times when exposure to air causes 20 oxidation and degrades and sometimes destroys the device 2.1 on which Nanolab did the work. Is that a fair statement 22 of what happens? 23 MR. BYRD: Yes, that's correct. 2.4 JUDGE GEARY: Would you also say that happens 25 occasionally? Would that be a term you would use to

1 describe how often it happens? MR. BYRD: Can I ask for some clarification? 2 3 JUDGE GEARY: Sure. MR. BYRD: So you're saying that the oxidation 4 5 occasionally happens or occasionally gets -- the object 6 occasionally gets destroyed? 7 JUDGE GEARY: I think you already said that it 8 occasionally happens. How often does it happen that the 9 object is destroyed and you, in effect, return nothing to 10 the client? 11 MR. BYRD: Full destruction is a sometimes 12 scenario. 13 JUDGE GEARY: Okay. 14 MR. BYRD: Yes. 15 JUDGE GEARY: Do you know whether the records 16 that were given to Respondent for purposes of audit 17 identify those instances in which there was full 18 destruction of the object on which Nanolab did it its 19 work? 20 MR. BYRD: We were not able to provide evidence 2.1 to the auditors in that case primarily due to 22 confidentiality agreements. We're not able to retain 23 photos and other pictorial evidence related to that. So, 2.4 no, we did not have any evidence to provide directly to

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show destruction.

JUDGE GEARY: Let me ask for some clarification 1 2 of the response you just gave. Are you saying that you 3 were not able to do it because you simply do not have such 4 records because you are prohibited by the NDAs from 5 keeping such records? 6 MR. BYRD: That is correct. 7 JUDGE GEARY: All right. I believe those are the only questions I have for Mr. Byrd at this time. 8 9 you, Judge Aldrich. 10 Thank you, Judge Geary. JUDGE ALDRICH: 11 JUDGE GEARY: Thank you, Mr. Byrd. 12 JUDGE ALDRICH: Mr. Rinsky, did you have 13 something to interject?

MR. RINSKY: My understanding -- because, again,

I'm not an engineer -- is that the oxidation occur. You

can test what we've done two ways. Either we test it, or

the client tests it. Or we both, if they don't trust our

testing. But the minute you unseal it, in other words, we

take it out of the vacuum chamber if we're doing the

testing, it's my understanding that it begins to degrade.

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If we reseal it when we take it out so it doesn't degrade instantaneously and we give it to them so they can look at it, the minute they open it up and look at it, it starts to oxidize and degrade. That's my understanding.

I mean, Thomas can clarify that or not. But bottom line

1 is you just can't open it up and look at what we did 2 without it starting to degrade. 3 JUDGE ALDRICH: Mr. Byrd, did you want to 4 respond? 5 MR. BYRD: Just to say that what Arthur Rinsky 6 stated is correct. 7 JUDGE ALDRICH: Thank you. 8 And since there was some testimony, CDTFA, did 9 you want to ask any questions of Mr. Byrd in response to 10 his statements? 11 MS. DANIELS: No. I don't believe we have any 12 questions at this time. Thank you. 13 JUDGE ALDRICH: Okay. So at this time I'd like 14 to transition to CDTFA's combined opening and closing. 15 Are you prepared to proceed? MS. DANIELS: Yes. Thank you, Judge. 16 17 18 PRESENTATION 19 MS. DANIELS: Good afternoon. 20 The matter before us originated from a Notice of 2.1 Determination, which was issued by the Department on 22 August 22nd, 2018, which included the following two audit 23 items: One, disallowed claimed nontaxable labor sales in 2.4 the amount of \$3,487,869, based on statistical samples;

and two, unreported taxable sales of \$3,149 based on the

difference between tax accrued and tax reported.

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Appellant filed a timely petition for redetermination, which was dated September 20th, 2018, disputing the liability in its entirety. By email, dated July 11th, 2019, Appellant confirmed that it was only disputing Audit Item 1 and conceded to the measure of a \$3,149 for Audit Item 2. The Department subsequently determined that some of the disallowed claimed nontaxable labor sales were not subject to tax pursuant to Regulation 1501.1.

As such, after a series of reaudits, deficiency in dispute now measures \$1,644,698. Thus, the only remaining issue in this case is whether Appellant's contracts currently dispute, i.e., the focused ion beam circuit edit services, herein collectively referred to as FIB Services, constitute qualified research and development contracts pursuant to Regulation 1501.1, and, if not, whether the services at issue constitute repair labor.

So California imposes sales tax on a retailer for its retail sales of tangible personal property in this state measured by its gross receipts, unless the sale is specifically exempt or excluded from taxation by statute. And that's Tax Code section 6051. All of a retailer's gross receipts are presumed subject to tax until the

contrary is established, and the burden of proving to the contrary is on the retailer. That's Tax Code section 6091.

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Gross receipts means the total amount of the sale price of a retailer's retail sales of tangible personal property, including the cost of labor or services, as well as any services that are part of the sale. And that's Tax Code section 6012 subdivisions (a)(2) and (b)(1). Gross receipts do not include the price received for labor or services used in installing or applying the property sold; Tax Code section 6012 subdivision (c)(3).

A sale means and includes the producing, fabricating, or processing of tangible personal property for a consideration for consumers who furnish either directly or indirectly the materials used in the producing, fabricating, or processing. And that's Tax Code section 6006 subdivision (b). Also, you can see Regulation section 1526 subdivision(a).

Fabrication includes any operation which results in the creation or production of tangible personal property, or which is a step in the process or series of operations resulting in the creation or production of tangible personal property; Tax Code section 6006 subdivision(b). Fabrication does not include the mere repair or reconditioning of tangible personal property.

And that's Regulation 1526 subdivision (b).

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Regulation 1501.1 governs a particular type of service enterprise, qualified R&D contracts. And it provides a two-part test to determine whether a particular transaction qualifies as nontaxable R&D for sales and use tax purposes. A transaction qualifies as nontaxable R&D only if one, the service is provided under agreement for the purpose of discovery information, which is technological in nature, the results of which are intended to be useful in the development of a new or improved product, process, technique, or invention; and two, the contract calls for the delivery of a report detailing information developed by the contractor or other tangible personal property incidental to the true object of the contract as defined in Regulation 1501 subdivision (a)(1).

A qualified research and development contract shall not include a contract for research for the purposes of improving a commercial product if the improvements relate to style, taste, cosmetic, or seasonal design factors. Nor does it include a contract for the design and production of custom-made item. A custom-made item is defined under subsection (a)(5) as to include one, property the purchaser wants for its intrinsic value as an item, and for which the purchaser is not interested in the data developed in the course of the manufacturer of the

custom-made item; two, property purchased for use by the purchaser or for resale; or three, tooling produced and used for the manufacturer of final production units.

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R&D contracts may include a transfer of tangible personal property. Regulation 1501.1 explains when the transfer of TPP as part of an R&D contract is nontaxable, and it draws a distinction between tangible personal property transferred as a prototype, and tangible personal property transferred as a custom-made item. And you can see Regulation 1501.1 subdivision (a) (5). However, this distinction is relevant only when the item produced by the contractor is the result of the contractor's own R&D.

Where a contractor performs R&D to produce tangible personal property, the transfer of that property may be a nontaxable transfer of a prototype or may be a taxable sale of a custom-made item. And that's 1501.1 subdivision (b)(2). Where instead the contractor produces TPP, based on R&D performed by its customer, it is simply making a sale of tangible personal property. Similarly, if a contractor fabricates a sample produced by its customer based on the customer's own R&D so that the customer can perform its own testing of its own R&D, the contractor is still simply fabricating tangible personal property for its customer, which results in making a sale of tangible personal property.

1 As such, if the property is not the result of the 2 contractor's R&D, the transfer is a sale and is taxable, 3 unless the sale is specifically exempt by statute. And that's Tax Code section 6006 subdivision (b). 4 5 right to an exemption or exclusion from tax is involved, 6 the taxpayer has the burden of proving his right to them. 7 And that's Honeywell, Inc., v. State Board of Equalization, a 1982 case available at 128 Cal.App. 3rd 8 9 See pages 744 to 745, also California Civil Code 10 section 720360. 11 Any taxpayer seeking an exemption or exclusion 12 from tax must establish that right by the evidence 13 specified by the relevant regulation. A mere allegation 14

specified by the relevant regulation. A mere allegation that the sales are not subject to tax is not sufficient. And that's Paine v. State Board of Equalization, 137 Cal.App 3rd 438 at 422, also Appeal of Talavera.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Ms. Daniels, one moment.

Mr. Rinsky and Ms. Rinsky, are you still connected?

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Okay. Did you just turn off your camera?

MS. RINSKY: Yeah. I'm sorry. We -- we can keep it on if you prefer.

JUDGE ALDRICH: No. I just want to make sure that you're able to --

MS. RINSKY: Thank you for checking.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Okay. You can go back to mute. Thank you.

Ms. Daniels, please proceed. Sorry for the interruption.

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MS. DANIELS: No problem. Thank you, Judge.

So as I was saying, a mere allegation that sales are not subject to tax is not sufficient. And that's stated in Appeal of Talavera, 2020 OTA 022P.

At the outset, we note that Appellant has not provided the Department with copies of any agreements or contracts that would help to decipher whether the services Appellant provided were exempt under Regulation 1501.1 Appellant has provided purchase orders. But, again, these invoices do not provide the reason behind the services rendered to illustrate whether the services provided were done so to discover technical information, as a service, or to produce a custom-made item.

Furthermore, Appellant failed to provide any formal reports that it issued to its clients that would thus support that the services rendered were for the purpose of discovering specific information. However, even without a written contract or report, the Department still found that Appellant's charges for failure analysis were not subject to tax because the services were provided for the purpose of discovering information, which is

technological in nature, the results of which are intended to be useful in the development of new or improved product, process, technique, or invention. And the information was conveyed to the customer in the form of the returned sample.

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The Department also found that Appellant's Decap and sample preparation services were not subject to tax because available evidence indicates that they were part of the failure analysis services. In contrast, the available evidence that the FIB Services were used to fabricate TPP provided by its clients according to their specifications and not a result of Appellant's own research and development.

So, specifically, FIB Services involve using a finely focused gallium ion beam with nano scale resolution to image, etch, and deposit materials on an integrated circuit. And that's available in our Exhibit A, page 29, which also is where Appellant states that this process is used to reroute connections within a device, as well as to create pro points for electrical testing in support of a customer's research and development process; the goal of which is to meet specified performance specifications for the subject product.

Importantly, Appellant has described its FIB

Services as making a one-time modification to a customer

sample based on the customer specifications to improve the production or design process. For example, Appellant's petition for determination, available at page 35 of Exhibit A, states, quote, "Nanolabs gets its clients suggested modification/rewire instructions," end quote. Thus, these services are based on the client's instruction and not a part of Appellant's research.

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The fact that Appellant performed these services based on its customer's request is consistent throughout its submissions and supports the Department's understanding that these were client directed fabrication and not part of a qualified research and development contract related to the failure analysis testing.

Appellant has also provided summaries of its transactions, which support the Department's understanding. An example, this would be Exhibit B, pages 43 through 56.

At the outset of every summary of the transactions provided, it states that the customer provided the sample TPP, quote, "Along with a summary of the failures they experienced in the design changes they'd like to test," end quote. And that's Exhibit B, pages 43, 48, and 53. Appellant then made these changes and subsequently returned the samples to its customer. And that's described at Exhibit B, pages 53 through 54. In some instances the sample would be sent back to Appellant

to perform further FIB Services pursuant to instructions stated on the invoice. Again, this is Exhibit B, pages 53 to 54.

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The Department's understanding that Appellant was fabricating items based on its client instructions and research is also corroborated by Appellant's second supplemental declaration of Mr. Byrd, which is Appellant's Exhibit 8. It states that the customer's property is resealed and returned to the client for secondary verification, and that resealing allows sufficient time for the client to further validate whether the property now works as intended by the client. This statement is clearly consistent with the Department's understanding that Appellant is fabricating these chips according to its client's specifications and then providing the chip back to its client for verification.

The evidence provided by Appellant constantly states that the FIB Services are rendered according to the client's instructions. If Appellant is providing services as ordered by its clients, these services are unlikely to be the result of research and development that was performed by Appellant. Accordingly, the FIB Services were not related to Appellant's research but to its client's research.

As to Appellant's arguments that the FIB Services

should be considered nontaxable repair labor, we disagree. Appellant has stated that the sample in question are generally, quote, "A wafer, chip, integrated circuit, PC board, electrical or mechanical component, or a physical material utilized by the customer as a tool for product development, engineering, or research." That's Exhibit A at page 18.

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Appellant's website states that, quote, "Circuit editing allows our product designers to reroute conductive pathways and test the modified circuits in hours rather than the weeks or months that would be required to generate new masks and process new wafers," end quote. Exhibit A, page 26.

Accordingly, when Appellant utilizes its FIB
Services to make design changes to a sample based on its
customers instructions, it has performed fabrication on
TPP furnished by the customer, which is subject to tax.
This labor as described by Appellant is not analogous to
the repair of an already functioning product. In this
matter, Appellant has the burden to show that the FIB
Services are not subject to tax pursuant to
Regulation 1501.1. And the evidence present by Appellant
does not show that it meets these requirements. The
evidence shows that Appellant provides FIB Services that
result in the creation or production of TPP. This is the

definition of fabrication. 1 2 The evidence also shows that the services 3 provided are based on its client's instructions, rather than Appellant's own R&D. Accordingly, Appellant has not 4 5 met its burden. For the foregoing reasons, no further 6 adjustments are warranted to the taxable measure provided 7 within the fifth reaudit, and we believe this appeal should be denied. 8 9 Thank you for your time. 10 JUDGE ALDRICH: Thank you. 11 Judge Ridenour did you have any questions for 12 either of the parties? 13 JUDGE RIDENOUR: I do not. Thank you. 14 JUDGE ALDRICH: Judge Geary? 15 JUDGE GEARY: No. Thank you. 16 JUDGE ALDRICH: Okay. So at this time, I'd like 17 to turn it back over to Mr. Rinsky for your opportunity to 18 provide a rebuttal or a closing statement. 19 MR. RINSKY: Give us one second. 20 JUDGE ALDRICH: Do you need a moment to gather 2.1 your thoughts? 22 MS. RINSKY: We're just having a muting issue, 23 but I was -- the way to mute or unmute is away from where 2.4 I'm sitting.

I guess -- well, I guess I -- with respect to the

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1 Req -- yeah. 2 JUDGE ALDRICH: Sorry. Just to be clear, are you 3 prepared to proceed with your closing or rebuttal or. Yes, the rebuttal. 4 MR. RINSKY: 5 The rebuttal. MS. RINSKY: 6 JUDGE ALDRICH: Okay. 7 8 CLOSING STATEMENT 9 MS. RINSKY: Yeah. Well, --10 MR. RINSKY: Leave it. 11 MS. RINSKY: -- what I initially presented still 12 stands, even with what was presented. And I'm trying to 13 think the best way to kind of -- if I want to try and 14 clarify. There seems to be some sticking point, which is 15 why at the end of my presentation I cited a couple of 16 sections in the Regulation of 1501.1, so that's (a) (7), (a) (5), and (a) (6). And (a) (5) dealt with the custom-made 17 18 items, and that specifically --19 MR. RINSKY: Testing. 20 MS. RINSKY: Well, it deals with testing. And it 2.1 says that custom-made items don't include property that 22 the purchaser would use for information in testing 23 purposes as defined in (a)(7). And I quess, I didn't --2.4 and then also, I'm trying to think the best way to explain

it. I guess nowhere in the Reg does it say it has to be

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R&D by contractor, by Nanolab. In a way that's almost a misstatement of the Reg because the whole -- because both parties are involved in the R&D process. So it's not one party is doing R&D and the other party is not.

And if you just look at the plain language of the Reg, it just simply states that there is a -- that these parties come together. There's a service provided under the contract that's undertaken for the purpose of discovering information. It doesn't say --

MR. RINSKY: That's what --

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MS. RINSKY: It doesn't say there has to be R&D by the contractor, et cetera. It just says these parties come together to gather information, and the information will be technological in nature and the results are which is intended to use in development of a new or improved product, et cetera. And the fact that it says new and improved product, that in itself it shows that this Reg seems to have come into play to address the argument that the government is trying to make now.

And there would be no reason to have this Reg if the government is making a stand because it would just wipe out the whole Reg because they're not -- because if the argument is -- that's why it's just -- yeah. And I mean also, how the Reg is very clear that about functional use, that functional use is something that occurs after

completion of R&D if the R&D is ongoing process. It's still going on. This -- these items aren't for functional use. They oxidize. They don't work. They're in pieces. Even if they were whole, they aren't meant for functional use.

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And as admitted by the government and explained in the affidavits by the engineers that do on -- that do the FIB circuit services, the whole purpose, the whole value of the service is to -- is to figure out what's going wrong -- what's going -- not working or improve the product. And it's for testing purposes as admitted by the government. And I think there was a sticking point early on that maybe when we ended up going to this whole tangent on the failure analysis service part was because there seems to be the sticking point of, well, who has to do the testing -- the information and testing.

But if you look at the Reg, it's very clear in the definition of the information and testing use in 1501.1(a)(7) where it says that it includes use -- information testing use by either the contractor or its customer. And it's also even stated again in the section on functional use in (a)(6), which says that -- that information and testing use of a prototype by the contractor, by Nanolab, or by its customer, does not qualify as functional use. So we're not dealing with a

final product that's just out there.

That makes sense.

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MR. RINSKY: Makes sense.

MS. RINSKY: Yeah. But I think I addressed most of the arguments. So I don't think there's more, unless there's any questions from the Judges. Unless --

MR. RINSKY: I have a couple of comments.

MS. RINSKY: Okay.

MR. RINSKY: Number one, I think the Respondent has been a bit disingenuous on the whole fabrication argument. I gave you a case cite that defines that -- that this -- that the OTA has come up with. And it says changing the intended purpose or use. The Respondent has not shown that that's -- that's what occurred in these transactions. We have the affidavits and declarations saying that's not what happened. We did not change the intended purpose or use. So I think the fabrication argument, there's no evidence from -- that contravenes what we've put forward that says this -- this is not fabrication using OTA's own definition.

I think number two, the whole contract issue, to me, is kind of a red herring in the sense it was dealt with through the appeals process. I would like, as a lawyer, that they would do a re -- R&D contract that would have recitals and background and all that kind of stuff,

which is what lawyers like. That's not the business, and Thomas could speak to that. The business is we get the purchase order. Then they go back and forth and they don't waste money on lawyers because they don't make any money when they involve lawyers in the process. That's just not the way the business works, the business that they're in.

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And, finally, the idea that the FIB Edit is based on instructions from the client, if the client knew how to do all this, they wouldn't pay us. These are suggestions. We try it, and I bet they don't work a lot of times. Thomas can speak to that because they go back and forth with the client trying to figure out why the item isn't working. Because if the client knew why it wasn't working, they wouldn't be paying us. So I think the whole idea that we're doing this based on their instructions is just a red herring, besides ignoring the Regulation 1501.1.

And that's the total of our rebuttal. I don't know if you --

JUDGE ALDRICH: Thank you, Mr. Rinsky.

To summarize on the contract issue, you're not saying that there was just an agreement or that there wasn't a contract. You're saying that there were contracts but perhaps not as formally robust as an

attorney might like.

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MR. RINSKY: Yes, that's exactly the case.

And -- and --

JUDGE ALDRICH: So, Mr. Byrd, to clarify, you know, the basic elements of a contract have been met between the client and the Appellant, such that there's offer, acceptance, consideration, and things like that, just they're not as robust as, you know, Mr. Rinsky would prefer. Would that be accurate?

MR. BYRD: Yes.

MS. RINSKY: Wait. Because I don't know if not -- objection to this. But the contract, whether or not there's a contract isn't at issue. I don't think that's what Arthur was trying to -- I mean, I don't think that was the point of what he was trying to convey. It was just that -- that the CDTFA is looking for something that's not going to hap -- that's not going to happen in business.

Because what happens is the client has a problem with something, or they're trying to work on something, create something. It's not working right, the way it is intended to work. And so then they send this purchase order that says, hey, we need these services. And it is understood that FIB Circuit Edit is a failure analysis service. It's in the textbooks. It's in -- it's what

they do. So when they see that, they go, okay, we are going to now provide this service. And that's kind of how it is, if that makes sense.

I just want to say we weren't trying to -- the contract issue isn't actually at issue. I don't know what you're going to ask Mr. Byrd, but -- about contracts, but our understanding is that whether or not there is a contract wasn't at issue. It's more just whether -- whether there is --

MR. RINSKY: There -- there is a contract. It's just in their business the contract is not the standard way I'd like to see it with recitals, background, all the other stuff, dispute resolution and everything else in a nice long document.

JUDGE ALDRICH: Okay.

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MR. RINSKY: They get the purchase order, and then they go back and forth trying to figure why this thing isn't working. Not trying to change it, not trying to make it different, or do anything different, just try to figure out why it isn't working.

MS. RINSKY: Or -- or -- this is Lauren speaking again. It -- it's not like there's a contract that says, we are here joined together to create. You know, it's not going to follow the Reg is what we're saying. It's not going to follow the Reg.

1 MR. RINSKY: Formally. MS. RINSKY: Yeah, formally follow the Reg. 2 3 not going to say, oh, we are hiring you to undertake a service to discover information that's technological in 4 5 nature. It's not going to say that. And I just want 6 to --7 JUDGE ALDRICH: Okay. Thank you for that 8 clarification. 9 I think we are about ready to conclude the 10 hearing. The record is not closed. We have some 11 additional housekeeping matters to address after the 12 conclusion of this hearing, which will be handled with 13 some post-hearing orders. As I mentioned, you know, if 14 either of the parties need our assistance, they can make a 15 request for a post-hearing meeting. But that request 16 needs to be in writing and with a stated purpose. 17 With that said, thank you everyone for your time 18 We're ready to end the recording, I believe. today. 19 Okay. 20 (Proceedings adjourned at 2:38) 21 2.2 23

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1 HEARING REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 2 I, Ernalyn M. Alonzo, Hearing Reporter in and for 3 the State of California, do hereby certify: 4 5 That the foregoing transcript of proceedings was 6 taken before me at the time and place set forth, that the 7 testimony and proceedings were reported stenographically 8 by me and later transcribed by computer-aided 9 transcription under my direction and supervision, that the 10 foregoing is a true record of the testimony and 11 proceedings taken at that time. 12 I further certify that I am in no way interested 13 in the outcome of said action. 14 I have hereunto subscribed my name this 15th day 15 of March, 2024. 16 17 18 19 ERNALYN M. ALONZO 20 HEARING REPORTER 21 2.2 23 2.4 25